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Abstract 
 
In recent years, unofficial and/or illegal forms of online file sharing have been 
increasingly used by audiences worldwide to consume foreign TV programmes 
which would not previously have been available to them at the time when such 
shows were first broadcast in their original regions. This form of consumption 
shortens the time-and-space gap between foreign broadcast and local consumption, 
highlighting audiences’ desires for borderless, transnational viewing. Taking 
Taiwanese audiences as an example, this research studies the implications which 
transnational foreign television consumption via online sharing may bring. Based 
on in-depth interviews with thirty-six audience members conducted from 2010 to 
2011, I focus on two issues: 
 
1. The meaning of television for its audiences:  
This research examines how and why audiences employ online sharing to bypass 
temporal, spatial and legal constraints on consuming foreign programmes, and 
elaborates the ways in which such consumption is becoming an emerging norm of 
television experience. It sheds light on how our existing understandings have 
changed, regarding what is meant by “watching TV”, and what television’s role is 
in providing a sense of liveness, shaping audiences’ sense of social togetherness 
and their cultural identity. 
 
2. Transnational media flows and cultural power relationships: 
This research looks at the implications of this cross-border Taiwanese consumption 
of television for transnational media flows in the post-colonial East Asian contexts. 
It examines cultural power relationships between East Asian countries, as well as 
those between the East and the West. Furthermore, by elaborating how audiences’ 
sense of co-temporality with (and understanding of) other cultures develop via their 
consumption, this research analyses how such consumption shapes the direction of 
media flows and cultural power relationships of Taiwan with other countries and 
thus offers a contemporary understanding of what television means as a cultural 
form, and what features television audiences have, in the post-network era today. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction  
I. Preamble  
In the past fifteen years, along with a rapid growth of use of the Internet 
(International Telecommunication Union, 2015), media digitalisation and 
convergence (Jenkins, 2006) and the emergence of personal mobile devices, 
television forms – both in terms of distribution and consumption – are increasing in 
number and diversity. For example, in many countries, national television networks 
have just launched online viewing services in the first decade of the twenty-first 
century (e.g. BBC’s iPlayer in the UK).1 Online streaming subscription services 
that provide on-demand TV programmes and films such as Netflix and Amazon 
Instant Video have also been gaining popularity. These online services are 
accessible not only through smart TV sets, but also through computers, tablets and 
smartphones. We are more likely to watch different things, at different times, via 
diverse media technologies other than a TV set. In the context of the emergence of 
diverse forms of viewing, this research began with my question as a television 
viewer and a user of mobile devices and the Internet: what does “watching 
television” refer to today?  
 
In particular, I am interested in how practices of “watching foreign television” have 
changed. While satellite and cable systems remain important in providing 
                                                 
1 Television networks’ launching online streaming video services is not only limited to the United 
Kingdom and the United States but is also happening in other countries, including Taiwan, Japan 
and other East Asian countries. However, in contrast to the UK, the US or Japan where the 
television networks have gradually placed full episodes online, television networks in Taiwan tend 
to only make clips such as trailers, or a short part of whole shows (e.g., one or two minutes of a one 
hour drama) available on video services. Examples of television networks officially putting whole 
episodes of their shows online are still rare. 
10 
 
programmes from other territories, there are more ways through which audiences 
can access programmes across the globe. Specifically, in recent years unofficial 
and/or illegal forms of online file sharing are increasingly used by worldwide 
audiences to consume foreign TV programmes which would not previously have 
been available to them at the time when such shows were first broadcast in their 
original regions. This kind of circulation of television programmes shortens the 
time-and-space gap between foreign broadcasts and local consumption, shaping the 
notion of television in various ways relating to how it challenges various cultural, 
legal and technical limitations on audiences’ freedom – in terms of time and space, 
for instance geo-blocking – to watch television shows from other countries and 
territories. This form of consumption also highlights audiences’ desire for 
borderless, instant transnational viewing, in the context of TV broadcasting still 
based principally on national borders. 
 
For instance, roughly beginning from 2004 to 2005, more and more Taiwanese 
audiences started to download the latest Japanese and South Korean dramas or 
American TV series via peer-to-peer2 networks and then discussed them via online 
forums. In most cases, these dramas or series were on air in Japan or the United 
States just a few days before the Taiwanese online discussions came out. They had 
not yet been either legally broadcast on local channels or illegally released by 
pirate DVD publishers in Taiwan. Moreover, these foreign contents were 
commonly “fan-subtitled”3 (in Chinese) by unknown, anonymous drama/series 
                                                 
2 Peer-to-peer is one of the most popular data distribution protocols on the Internet, commonly 
abbreviated as P2P. 
3 Fan-subtitling (or fansubbing) is a term coined by amalgamating two words: “fan” and “subtitles”. 
Generally speaking, it refers to a fan-oriented activity and is usually voluntary and nonprofit. 
Lambert (2006) argues that fansubbing describes the voluntary, fan-driven action of digitally 
recording television shows, movies, their translation into another language and subsequent 
distribution in countries where the originals cannot be purchased. 
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fans, meaning that the linguistic barriers the audiences might encounter were filled 
in. Since this form of unofficial and/or illegal consumption was likely to be accused 
of copyright infringement, on public, and open-access online social networking 
sites, most people only discussed the plots of the dramas without mentioning 
exactly how they managed to access the content. Thus, for audience members who 
had not yet used online file sharing methods, it was not easy to know, from those 
online discussions, how and why some of their fellow Taiwanese were able to 
watch certain foreign dramas within such a short time-gap with a sense of 
“coevalness” (Fabian, 1983) with foreign cultures. It was common to see questions 
such as “Why can you watch the latest foreign dramas in real time? Do you all live 
in that country?” circulating on networking sites.  
 
These questions imply a fundamental assumption regarding the consumption of 
foreign TV: If people were watching in real time (or almost in real time) a certain 
foreign TV programme which was exclusively being aired for its domestic 
audiences, they had to physically be in that exact foreign country or location as a 
prerequisite. This assumption has previously made sense for at least two reasons:  
 
First, technically, the broadband speed at that period was much slower, so that the 
sharing of video files was not as prevalent as it is today. Second, and more 
importantly, legal TV networks and content providers (including online examples) 
that follow various broadcast regulations and licensing agreements have to restrict 
their content to be received exclusively within the allocated geographic territory. 
Most of the foreign shows the Taiwanese audiences talked about premiered on 
foreign countries’ national networks (e.g. ABC, NBC in the US, Fuji, Asahi of 
Japan, KBS of South Korea), rather than transnational ones. Therefore, in general, 
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these foreign shows could only be consumed in real time domestically when they 
were first on air. 4  It was still rare for the Taiwanese to consume foreign 
programmes (especially domestically produced programmes like dramas, which 
were not usually premiered internationally) almost simultaneously as the original 
domestic audiences who were based in a foreign country consumed them. As a 
result, it was unsurprising that audiences who were not aware of online sharing 
methods or platforms assumed that other people consuming the latest foreign 
shows were located in these foreign countries or regions at the moment of 
broadcast. Nevertheless, as this form of consumption is becoming more prevalent 
as time goes on, this assumption is also increasingly being challenged. More and 
more Taiwanese audiences have started to regularly consume foreign TV via 
various online sharing methods as a taken-for-granted norm, without questioning 
how and why it is possible to attain such a near-simultaneity in their viewing of 
foreign shows. This presumption indicates that the audiences’ conceptualisation of 
television experience has changed gradually.  
 
Today, fewer audiences, either those from Taiwan or elsewhere, assume that the 
consumption of the latest foreign shows can only take place in these shows’ 
original countries or regions. Rather, audiences who already know how to consume 
the latest foreign shows online are continuing to increase in number, and they tend 
to think that they can freely consume these foreign shows regardless of where they 
live, as if there were no temporal and spatial boundaries. This form of cross-border 
consumption is not only popular in Taiwan but also prevalent worldwide. Many 
programmes, especially American ones, are widely shared and consumed on the 
                                                 
4 Although more and more TV networks have started to put content (e.g. dramas, variety shows, 
animation) online as a form of on-demand service, many of them are still only available to domestic 
audiences. 
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Internet across the world. However, whilst to some existent cultural, legal and 
technical limitations that restrict audiences’ freedom to watch foreign TV are 
changing, are the boundaries really gone? How easily can audiences access the 
overseas programmes they love? How do legal broadcasters and distributors 
respond to illegal and unofficial practices? These changes in the media 
environment and audiences’ conception of television are significant because they 
raise issues such as to what extent transnational media consumption is possible, 
how television functions as a national broadcasting system, or what transnational 
cultural relationships and TV consumption between countries indicates. Of the 
various theoretical issues that relate to the consumption of foreign TV via online 
sharing, I am specifically interested in two: first, how this form of consumption 
helps us to understand the changing nature of television and television viewing; 
and second, what implications it has for transnational media and cultural flows.  
 
Three more sections are included in this chapter. The following section (II) outlines 
at greater length two implications of this study’s research questions based on 
theoretical concerns regarding television in transition, transnational media flows 
and cultural power relationships. Section III elaborates on the importance of 
examining media from a historical perspective and how this applies to this study. 
While the consumption of foreign TV via online sharing is a new form of viewing 
practice, it is by no means a brand new phenomenon completely different from 
previous viewing patterns of television. In order to properly examine how such 
online television experience sheds light on the notions of “watching television” and 
“what television is today”, Section III emphasises the necessity of placing such an 
experience within the historical development of television (both as a technology 
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and a cultural form). Section IV is a brief description of the structures of the 
remaining chapters.  
II. Research Questions 
i. Television in Transition  
The consumption of foreign TV via online sharing emerges in the so-called 
post-broadcast (Bennett, 2011; Boddy, 2011; Parks, 2004; Turner, 2011; Turner & 
Tay, 2009) or post-network era (Lotz, 2007), in which the norms and operations of 
the television industry are going through significant transitions.  
 
Spigel (2004) argues that social, economic and technological conditions – such as 
the commercialisation of public services and the innovation of digital television 
systems – all contribute to rapid changes in the concept of “watching TV”. While 
TV images become increasingly “multidimensional and fractured by different kinds 
of textual materials that coexist on the same screen”, audiences also have to learn 
how to interpret TV images from different media platforms. Given these 
circumstances, Spigel notes that if TV refers to a given technology, “we are now 
entering a new phase of television – the phase that comes after ‘TV’” (p. 2). Dovey 
and Lister (2009, p. 134) also argue that the cultural form which is recognised as 
television seems to be disappearing or transforming. As Lotz (2007) points out, 
while the TV industry, media scholars and audiences themselves know a lot about 
how audiences used to watch television, this understanding seems to provide little 
information about current and future television experiences. The above arguments 
do not mean that television has been replaced by newer technologies. Rather, they 
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indicate the importance of understanding the way in which television as well as 
television experiences have changed.5 
 
As Parks (2004) argues, the term “postbroadcasting” is employed to study “how the 
historical practices associated with over-the-air, cable and satellite television have 
been combined with computer technologies to reconfigure the meanings and 
practices of television” (p. 134). Postbroadcasting, in turn, refers to “television’s 
current transformations as part of an ongoing set of historical struggles played out 
over and around the medium”(p. 134). In this regard, studying the consumption of 
foreign TV via online sharing entails looking at the contemporary role of television. 
 
The consumption of foreign TV via online sharing as a new television experience 
that challenges the prevailing temporal, spatial and legal boundaries in TV viewing, 
raises crucial agendas concerning the changing norms of television that require 
close examination. For instance, as Bennett (2008a) points out, online catch-up 
viewing platforms launched by television networks (e.g. BBC’s iPlayer), remove 
television programmes from the linear schedule and store the programmes as 
on-demand content that allow audiences to decide what and when to watch at their 
convenience. In so doing, these platforms “remediate television’s ontology from 
flow to database” (p. 160). How audiences make sense of this remediation and how 
such sense-making practices can help understand television today is one of the 
research questions this study examines (see Chapter 5 and 6). 
 
                                                 
5 Television, as a technology and a cultural form, has been changing since its birth. For instance, in 
the mid-1980s, Drummon and Paterson’s (1986) edited book Television in Transition investigated 
how the introduction of cable and satellite television was in turn shaping the operation and 
aesthetics of television in different countries/cultures. 
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While the consumption of foreign TV via online sharing is gaining popularity 
worldwide, it is worth noting that, how such consumption emerges, on what 
cultural, technological and legal conditions it is based, or how audiences and 
industries respond to media convergence vary from location to location. While it is 
important to recognise how such consumption is becoming a global television 
experience in most developed and many developing economies, it is problematic to 
ignore heterogeneous consumption conditions in different parts of the world.  
 
As Parks and Kumar (2003) point out, global transformations of television should 
be understood “through close examination of the television industries, programmes, 
technologies, and audiences in specific cultural contexts” (p. 6). Similarly, Pertierra 
and Turner (2013) argue that when it comes to studying television, it is necessary to 
acknowledge the worldwide diversity of television’s operation and experience. 
They propose the concept of “zones of consumption” with the purpose of 
emphasising the importance of locating television within particular spatial, cultural, 
industrial, geo-linguistic contexts and scales. According to their definition, a zone 
constitutes the various contexts in which television is located (e.g. a living room, 
city, or country). A zone can be as small as a room in a domestic space, or as large 
as a transnational or regional market. They regard the use of “zones of 
consumption” as an approach that “recognises that the actual construction of the 
location within which the consumption of television occurs is itself contingent, 
conjunctural and instantiated” (p. 26).  
 
This study is based on the approach of “zones of consumption” in two senses. 
Firstly, this study examines the Taiwanese consumption of foreign TV via online 
sharing in order to illustrate how contemporary television experiences as well as 
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television’s role have changed. The configuration of industrial and cultural contexts 
in which Taiwanese online and offline consumption of television emerges is the 
subject of particular attention (see Chapter 2). Regarding Taiwan as a zone of 
consumption and examining how relevant contexts are configured helps to 
illustrate: 1) to what extent the result of this study can be generalised; and 2) in 
what sense the existing scholarship on television, especially those on changing 
practices of television, can be recast and employed in different social and cultural 
contexts. 
 
Secondly, as Petierra and Turner (2013) argue, how television is imbricated into the 
practice of everyday life and what social and cultural function it harbours has been 
studied less than issues such as the future development of production strategies or 
business models for the television industry. Employing the notion of zones of 
consumption as an approach helps to understand the uses of television as well as 
online platforms “within the structure of everyday life” (p. 27), in order to 
elaborate on how the online consumption of foreign television serves as audiences’ 
everyday practice and what functions various forms of television perform. 
 
Roughly starting with the publication of Television after TV edited by Spigel and 
Olsson (2004), more and more texts have examined the changing nature and 
practices of television in the post-network context. Other related work includes (but 
is not limited to) edited books such as Television as Digital Media (Bennett & 
Strange, 2011), Television Studies after TV (Turner & Tay, 2009), Relocating 
Television (Gripsrud, 2010b), or Newman and Levine’s (2012) Legitimating 
Television. Given that media industries in North America, Western and Northern 
Europe as well as Australia have been going through and responding to media 
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convergence relatively earlier than many other parts of the world, it is unsurprising 
that most of the relevant research is based on these countries. By comparison, 
relatively few studies have been conducted in other cultural contexts, such as East 
Asia, even though many East Asian countries and regions, including Taiwan, have 
also negotiated changes in local as well as transnational mediascapes. As a result, 
we have much less in media studies knowledge about transitions of television in the 
latter region.  
 
As mentioned earlier, forms and experiences of television, as well as the conditions 
in which they develop, are different in different locations. Research on television 
based on other countries’ social and cultural contexts is imperative if we are to 
understand television today, and this research project is shaped by this 
preoccupation. By scrutinising the consumption of foreign TV via online sharing, 
this study helps to understand what is meant by “watching TV”, what “TV” is, and 
how television as a technological and cultural form changes in the international 
contexts of the post-network era. 
 
ii. Transnational Cultural Flows 
The consumption of foreign TV via online sharing as an emerging norm of 
transnational and cross-cultural practice is associated with important theoretical 
issues concerning contemporary media and cultural flows. The online sharing and 
subtitling efforts of amateur fans/audiences accelerate the transnational distribution 
and consumption of media and cultural content. When discussing the implications 
of new media for audiences’ consumption choices, Bennett (2008a, p. 162) stresses 
the importance of scrutinising how such choices are structured and delimited by 
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legal conditions such as Digital Rights Management (DRM)6 and intellectual 
property law. The significance of this concern is manifested in the transnational 
context via which the online consumption of foreign programmes takes place. In 
most cases, these shared programmes are copyrighted materials that are not 
supposed to be consumed simultaneously by audiences overseas: copyright holders 
do not make their content available to be simulcast and consumed by foreign 
audiences. Legal business models of an instant, cross-border distribution and 
consumption of TV have not yet been widely established under current 
transnational legal and economic infrastructures.  
 
Generally speaking, the licensing of online audio-visual content, similar to that of 
other forms of content distribution, is based on geographical location (in most cases 
it is defined by national territories). The online content of a given provider will 
only be legally accessible within the licensed territory. In order to implement this 
geographical licensing, it is common for legal broadcasters and content providers to 
apply Internet Protocol (IP) restrictions on their online content to block access from 
locations whose IPs are outside their broadcast/release footprints.7 As a result, if 
audiences find a certain video on online platforms (e.g. BBC iPlayer, Hulu or a 
given licensed channel on YouTube)8 when they are outside the licensed footprints 
                                                 
6 DRM is a set of technologies used by hardware manufacturers, copyright holders and individuals 
to control the use of digital content and devices, and is commonly employed to prevent content 
piracy.  
7 Services capable of altering the actual IP address of a connected device to other addresses, such as 
virtual private networks (VPN), can be used to bypass geographically-based IP restrictions. For 
instance, if a person in the US uses a VPN which allocates a UK IP address to his connected device, 
s/he can access BBC’s iPlayer as other users in the UK do, since the device appears to be located 
within the BBC’s licensed territory.  
8 YouTube, based in the United States, is the most popular and earliest video-sharing site in the 
world. It was founded in 2005 and sold to Google in 2006. At the initial stage of its services, 
YouTube only served as a platform for the distribution and consumption of user-generated content 
(UGC). It allows individual users to set up personal channels and share their own content. While it 
remains one of the most important platforms for UGC today, many media corporations such as 
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of those platforms they are usually greeted with messages like the following 
YouTube screenshot:9 
 
Figure 1.1: YouTube screenshot indicating geographical licensing restrictions. Screenshot 
on 4 December 2014. 
 
Similar geographical licensing restrictions are often employed by online platforms 
and content providers, especially by legal ones. The importance of unofficial, 
illegal and voluntary online-sharing activities lies in the way in which these 
challenge existing legal and economic infrastructures, thereby enabling new forms 
of cross-cultural, transnational distribution and consumption of media texts. It is in 
this sense that the consumption of foreign programmes via online sharing concerns 
how media and cultural flows may develop in the contemporary media 
environment.  
 
The studies of fan-subtitling are good examples of scholarship addressing the 
                                                                                                                                       
television networks (e.g. ABC, CBS) or music labels (e.g. Universal, EMI) have developed 
partnerships with YouTube, launching their own YouTube Channels to officially provide some of 
their content via the platform. 
9 Similarly, if audiences who are outside the UK visit BBC iPlayer, the platform will show the 
following message: “BBC iPlayer TV programmes are available to play in the UK only”. 
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implications of unofficial online sharing for global cultural flows. Denison (2011) 
examines the ways in which the fansubbing and file sharing practices of Japanese 
animation shapes transnational industrial distribution. For instance, she argues that 
the multiple linguistic translations which fansubbing groups provide, help to 
globalise animation texts; in many cases, such texts are not legally released outside 
Japan. Moreover, fansubbing activities also shorten the time between the broadcast 
of Japanese animations and the foreign audiences’ consumption of these texts. This 
subsequently forces the industry to curtail the time lag between domestic and 
international distribution. As Lee (2011) points out, fansubbing practices may 
unsettle the global mediascape by presenting a new mode of global distribution 
which facilitates the grassroots globalisation of culture.  
 
Denison (2015) conducts another research on fan-subtitling and distribution of 
Japanese dorama (i.e. drama) in English-speaking regions. She finds that in the 
cases of animation, asking for donations for fansubbing is “often framed as 
crossing a line between prosumer work and bootlegging” (p. 66). By comparison, 
however, asking for donations or even seeking corporative sponsorship are 
relatively acceptable and normative practices in the fansubbing production and 
distribution of Japanese dorama. In this regard, Denison contends that these 
drama-fansubbing practices are moving closer to the capitalist system rather than to 
a “‘gift economy’ wherein fansubbers are seen to serve the needs of less 
linguistically adept community members, supporting and encouraging a wider 
fandom for Japanese media texts.” (p. 67).  
 
Online sharing is certainly not the first use of technologies that raises the issue of 
copyright infringement. The 1984 legal dispute over the use of video recorders, 
22 
 
Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios,10 established the legal framework 
that shaped judicial decisions governing more recent content-providing 
technologies such as P2P sharing, e.g. MGM v. Grokster in 2005 
(Casadesus-Masanell & Hervas-Drane, 2010; Seetoo, 2007; Vincent, 2007). As 
Lessig (2003) points out, if “piracy” means using other people’s creative property 
without obtaining the relevant permissions from them, then every industry related 
to copyrighted contents can be regarded as based on a certain kind of piracy.11  
 
As Lessig (2003) suggests, piracy often challenges existing business models 
concerning the use of a certain medium, and in turn encourages the emergence of 
newer business models or forms of media use. Pang (2009) argues that “with the 
aid of new digital technologies, piracy has become a much more adaptable and 
widespread activity that is immanent in the everyday lives of many people” (p. 
122). 
 
This study focuses on how various types of online distribution of foreign 
programmes (e.g. fansubbing networks, streaming platforms) are used by 
Taiwanese audiences to consume foreign programmes. Such consumption is often 
legally liminal (Denison, 2011; 2015, p. 60) as they are based on informal media 
systems, namely, “flows of communication, information and entertainment in 
unregulated spaces” (Lobato & Thomas, 2015, p. 1).  
                                                 
10 Sony was sued in 1976 by Universal Studios and the Walt Disney Company as they claimed the 
Sony-developed video recorder Betamax could be potentially used for copyright infringement. 
However, in 1984 the US Supreme Court ruled that the copying of complete television shows for 
the purpose of time-shifting does not constitute copyright infringement and was fair usage. 
Moreover, because Sony’s Betamax had substantial non-infringement uses, distributors of video 
recorders were not legally liable for copyright infringement.  
11 For instance, as Lessig (2003) argues, many cable TV companies refused to pay for content from 
wireless broadcasters when starting their business. In this sense, what cable TV companies did to 
the broadcasters’ content is similar to what Napster did to the music industry in the early 2000s: 
they pirated content from other industries without paying any fees to the providers. 
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Formality, as defined by Lobato (2012), is “the degree to which industries are 
regulated, measured and governed by state and corporate institutions” (p. 4). The 
informal forms of media distribution, in turn, refer to those operating beyond this 
formal sphere “or in partial articulation with it” (p. 4). More importantly, Lobato 
and Thomas (2015) point out that we should not see informality/formality as a 
binary division but as a spectrum, if we are to understand “how formal and 
informal activities interact as a medium emerges, establishes and adapts” (p. 19).  
In Chapter 2 Section IV, I will discuss various legal conditions from which the 
Taiwanese consumption of foreign TV via online sharing emerges as part of the 
informal media economy defined by Lobato and Thomas (2015). However, as a 
media researcher, it is neither my intention (nor within my competence) to judge 
the legality and morality of the consumption of foreign TV via online sharing. 
Rather, my concern is to understand the implications of this consumption for media 
and cultural flows and the role of television in audiences’ everyday lives. 
 
Focusing on the Taiwanese audiences’ online consumption of foreign TV, I am 
interested in looking at the implications of this consumption for the development of 
cultural flows, cultural identity, and cultural power relationships between countries. 
The direction of media and cultural flows has been a focus in studies of media 
globalisation; and among various forms of media flows it is the transnational 
distribution and circulation of television that has been most widely discussed 
(Parks & Kumar, 2003; Sinclair & Turner, 2004; Thussu, 2006). On the one hand, 
political economy theses tend to criticise the imbalanced cultural flows as an 
extension of Western (especially North American) imperialism. On the other hand, 
cultural studies scholars have examined how audiences interpret the foreign texts, 
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and to what extent or in what sense audiences’ resistance to imperialist ideology is 
possible. While both political economy interpretations and cultural studies’ 
accounts of media and cultural flows will be further reviewed in Chapter 3 Section 
III, here I first want to explicate the meaning of “cultural power” in this study by 
drawing on the work of Hall (1995) and Iwabuchi (2002). 
 
iii. Cultural Power in the Context of Media Globalisation 
Hall (1995) believes that globalisation should be traced back to the history of 
Western imperialism which began from the Age of Discovery in the 15th century. 
Globalisation, in his view, is “the process by which the relatively separate areas of 
the globe come to intersect in a single imaginary ‘space’; when their respective 
histories are convened in a time-zone or time frame dominated by the West” (p. 
190). He further points out that “culture and power were intimately connected” (p. 
191) from the early stages of globalisation:   
 
Cultures began to be defined […] by their relationship (usually of power) with 
other cultures. Cultures began to form one of the critical circuits through 
which power of different kinds – economic, political, religious, gendered, 
racial – circulated. […] The establishment of spheres of cultural influence, the 
hierarchical relations of dominance and subordination between colonising and 
colonised cultures, […] the shifting relations of cultural power which followed 
in the wake of the successive phases of globalisation, are difficult to 
exaggerate (Hall, 1995, pp. 190-191, italicised by the original author).12 
 
                                                 
12 Unless otherwise stated all italics are in the original quotation.  
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Iwabuchi (2002) draws on Hall’s (1995) explanation of globalisation and Nye’s 
(1990; 2004) notion of “soft power”13 to examine how Japanese popular culture 
was consumed and understood in Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore in the late 
1990s. Iwabuchi’s main concern is to “rethink the dynamics of transnational 
regional cultural power” (p. 133):  
 
Transnational cultural power does not necessarily mean the straightforward 
embodiment and recognition of one culture’s superiority over another but can 
be defined as the capacity of a culture to produce symbolic images and 
meanings which “appeal to the senses, emotions and thoughts of the self and 
others” (Lull, 1995, p. 71) (Iwabuchi, 2002, p. 133).  
The cultural power that this study refers to is based on Iwabuchi’s account of 
(transnational) cultural power. As Iwabuchi (2002) argues, “the appreciation of 
foreign media texts is never power-free” (p. 133). The (unofficial) consumption of 
foreign TV via online sharing is one of the most popular forms of consumption and 
appreciation of foreign media texts in the world. However, the implications such 
consumption has for the configuration of transitional cultural power is inadequately 
analysed in media studies. For instance, how does such consumption challenge the 
transnational production and circulation of “global entertainment media” (Mirrlees, 
2013)? Does such consumption reinforce the dominance of the American popular 
culture? How might it do this? Are countries emerging as new cultural forces 
capable of producing media texts that attract overseas audiences? These questions 
still require careful examination. It is imperative to study the implications of the 
                                                 
13 Nye (2004) defines “soft power” as “the ability to get what you want through attraction rather 
than coercion or payments. It arises from the attractiveness of a country’s culture, political ideals 
and polices” (p. x).   
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online consumption of foreign TV for transnational cultural power if we are to 
account for the ongoing globalisation of television in the post-network era.  
 
Specifically, a key concern regarding transnational cultural power is how people’s 
cultural encounters with, and consumption of, foreign cultures shape their cultural 
identities (Hall, 1995; Iwabuchi, 2002; Morley & Robins, 1995). In the past twenty 
years in East Asia, it has become common for media contents to circulate across 
national and cultural boundaries (H.-J. Cho, 2005; Chua, 2008b; Leung, 2008; Lim, 
2008). The widespread popularity of Japanese pop culture from the early 1990s 
(the so-called Japan Fever or Japanophilia) and that of Korean pop culture from the 
early 2000s (the so-called Korean Wave), are the two most influential regional 
cultural flows. Chua and Iwabuchi (2008) argue that these cultural flows provide 
“the material basis for a conceptualisation of an ‘East Asian pop culture’ sphere 
with an integrated cultural economy” (p. 2). It is from this material basis that the 
consumption of foreign TV via online sharing in Taiwan and other East Asian 
countries emerges.  
 
Many scholars discuss how increasing regional cultural flows promote mutual 
understanding between countries and inter-Asian referencing (Y. Cho, 2011; 
Iwabuchi, 2013). Some of them further suggest that such cultural flows encourage 
the emergence of an “Asian-Pacific identity” (Aoyagi, 2000) or an East Asian 
identity (Chua, 2004, 2008a, 2010; Katsumata, 2012). According to Chua (2004), 
when audiences consume foreign media cultures, they have fewer cultural 
references compared to when they consumed local ones. In order to make sense of 
foreign cultural products, audiences are required to transcend their grounded 
nationality and form an abstract identification with foreign characters/materials. 
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Chua considers that in contemporary East Asia, where inter-Asian consumption and 
referencing is common, the “foreignness” of cultures from other nations may be 
absorbed into a concept of shared East Asian-ness. As such, an East Asian identity, 
in which nationalities are suppressed, may be imaginable.  
 
However, can nationality be suppressed or, if it can, how does East Asians’ sense of 
national/cultural identity change? The significant lack of empirical data that 
underpin this kind of argument makes it difficult to understand how, or in what 
sense, audiences may attain a shared regional identity via their consumption of 
regional cultures. Furthermore, by focusing on how regional cultural flows 
promotes an East Asian identity, Chua’s argument seems to overlook how the 
longstanding presence of American culture throughout East Asia may influence this 
regional identity-building process. If we are to understand how – or if – a shared 
regional identity is imaginable, it is necessary to start by looking at how audiences 
make sense of the cultures of neighbouring countries. Studying the consumption of 
foreign TV via online sharing, an increasingly popular form of cross-cultural 
consumption, involves scrutinising how cultural flows between East Asian 
countries/regions work and how cultural identity is shaped in contemporary East 
Asia.  
 
iv. Research Questions and the Validity of Empirical Data 
Based on the above concerns, I have studied the implications of transnational 
consumption of foreign television through various online sharing methods by 
taking consumption of foreign television by Taiwan audiences via this mode as an 
example. Specifically, this dissertation focuses on two primary issues: 
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1. The contemporary meaning of television and its audiences:  
This dissertation examines how and why audiences rely on online sharing to bypass 
temporal, spatial and legal constraints on consuming foreign TV programmes, and 
elaborates the ways in which such consumption has become an emerging norm of 
television experience. In so doing, it sheds light on how our existing 
understandings have changed, regarding what is meant by “watching TV” and what 
television’s role is in providing a sense of liveness, shaping audiences’ sense of 
social togetherness, as well as organising everyday lives in the post-network 
context. 
 
2. Transnational media flows and cultural power relationships: 
This dissertation also examines the implication of cross-border online consumption 
of television for transnational media and cultural flows. Taking the consumption of 
Taiwanese audiences as an instance, it elaborates how audiences’ sense of 
co-temporality with (and understanding of) other cultures develop via their 
consumption, and how such cross-border consumption shapes their identities. In so 
doing, this dissertation illustrates the implications of the Taiwanese online 
consumption of foreign television for the direction of media flows and cultural 
power relationships of Taiwan with other countries in the post-colonial East Asian 
contexts.  
 
In terms of online sharing, I refer to all online, digital forms of data distribution 
(e.g. streams or downloads) that can be used to transnationally consume video files. 
For instance, the forms relying on P2P, such as P2P file-sharing software (e.g. 
BitTorrent) will be addressed, as P2P was the first data distribution protocol with 
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the capacity to rapidly share visual content online, making the online consumption 
of TV programmes more prevalent. In recent years, a greater number of online 
platforms that are non-P2P-based in terms of technical design have emerged as 
popular video viewing forms. Online video-sharing platforms such as YouTube or 
video streaming platforms such as Ustream are famous examples used by 
worldwide audiences to consume shows first broadcast in different parts of the 
world. The consumption of television via such online platforms is also included in 
this study.  
 
In terms of foreign programmes, this dissertation focuses mainly on the 
consumption of foreign programmes from Japan, Korea and the United States; as in 
Taiwan, programmes from these three countries are the most popular foreign 
programmes on both broadcast television and online sharing platforms (see Chapter 
2 Sections II to III for further details). Moreover, geopolitically speaking, Japan, 
Korea and the United States, along with China, also serve as the most significant 
foreign cultural forces that influence the comprehensive development of Taiwanese 
society at large (see Chapter 2 Section I). By focusing on the Taiwanese 
consumption of American, Japanese and Korean programmes, this study sheds light 
on the implications of such consumption for the cultural power relationships 
between Taiwan and Japan, Korea and the US.  
 
Compared with programmes from the three countries listed above, Chinese 
programmes are less popular among Taiwanese audiences. Therefore the 
consumption of Chinese programmes was not featured. Nevertheless, as I will 
explain in Chapter 2 Section IV, the Taiwanese consumption of foreign 
programmes relies on Chinese online sharing platforms and fansubbing activities. 
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This condition, along with the geopolitical tension between Taiwan and China over 
the sovereignty of Taiwan (see Chapter 2 Section I), highlights the significance of 
the Otherness of China in the Taiwanese online consumption of foreign 
programmes. Therefore, the role of Chinese online sharing activities, as well as the 
cultural power relationship with China, will be addressed in this study.  
 
The informal online circulation of media content has been understood in fan studies 
as part of participatory culture (Jenkins, 1992; Jenkins, Ford, & Green, 2013). A 
body of research has examined how the active and productive participants (e.g. 
individual fansubbers) have voluntarily provided access to industrial media texts 
and shaped the way those texts are circulated and consumed on a global scale (Hu, 
2009, 2014; Ito, 2012; H.-K. Lee, 2011).  
 
Rather than focusing on the production side, this study looks at the consumer. I 
focus on the Taiwanese audiences who routinely watch foreign programmes 
through informal, fan-driven online distribution, but do not or rarely contribute 
their labour (e.g. subtitling). These audiences include fans of foreign media texts, 
and more casual, ordinary viewers who view – but have not specific interests – in 
foreign content. By examining their consumption of foreign programmes, this 
study explains how informal online media distribution has been integrated into the 
everyday lives of the audiences who are at the receiving end of participatory 
culture.  
 
I want to briefly outline in the following paragraphs the development of the online 
viewing environment in Taiwan in the last 10 years and delineate how and when 
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the empirical research was conducted. This information helps to understand to what 
extent the empirical analysis of this study can be generalised. 
 
The Taiwanese online consumption of the latest foreign TV first emerged roughly 
in the middle of the first decade of the 2000s, with file-downloading the prominent 
online access to the latest foreign programmes. Various forms of video viewing 
platforms emerged around 2008 to 2009, and they have since been gaining 
popularity for two reasons. Firstly, as access to foreign programmes, they usually 
require lower technical repertoire and equipment than file-downloading. Secondly, 
the fact that users do not download but only stream the programmes on such video 
platforms indicates that while users gain the temporal access to programmes, they 
do not literally obtain the actual programme files, and this feature helps users to 
avoid directly infringing copyrights. The thriving Taiwanese pirate disc markets 
(since the late 1990s) also withered alongside the emergence of video viewing 
platforms.  
 
While Chinese online fansubbing forums and platforms began distributing 
copyrighted American, Japanese and Korean content roughly since 2004, it was not 
until the end of 2009 that the Chinese government started regulating these 
unofficial/illegal sharing activities. However, since the Chinese government has not 
whole-heartedly maintained its actions, the unofficial/illegal online distribution of 
foreign media content is occasionally jeopardised but never eradicated (see Chapter 
2 Section IV). At the time of writing in 2015, China-based unofficial/illegal 
streaming and file sharing are still prevalent and remain the most dominant ways 
through which Taiwanese audiences consume the latest foreign programmes.  
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The empirical data for this study was collected through two research methods. First, 
in-depth interviews with 36 research subjects were carried out from August 2010 to 
the end of 2011, and the data gathered though the interviews constitutes the 
primary data of the empirical analysis. Second, two forms of secondary empirical 
data were collected through online observation from 2007 to 2014: 1) public 
discussions on viewing of foreign genres on major social networking sites in 
Taiwan; and 2) worldwide development of online file sharing and viewing practices 
(with the China-based sharing activities as the main focus).  
 
Due to the lack of time and budget, I was unable to conduct other rounds of 
interviews after 2012. Two measures were employed to ensure that the empirical 
analysis remained timely and valid. First, the data collected through online 
observation (as mentioned above) is intended to keep track of the general and 
ongoing development of Taiwanese audiences’ online viewing of foreign shows. 
Second, I managed to keep in touch (online and/or offline) with one-third of the 
interviewees and captured some updated information concerning their viewing. 
Such updated information (gathered from 2012 to 2014) was incorporated into the 
empirical analysis with the interviewees’ consent. Long-term interactions with the 
interviewees helped to understand how the consumption of foreign shows via 
online sharing had become part of the interviewees’ everyday lives (see Chapter 4). 
 
Specifically, online observation and Taiwanese media discourses showed that the 
emergence of video viewing platforms, and the Chinese government’s actions on 
regulating China-based unofficial/illegal file sharing by the end of the first decade 
of the 2000s were the most recent and significant changes concerning Taiwanese 
online viewing of foreign programmes. The interviews conducted in 2010 to 2011 
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covered this critical period of time, and the interviewees recruited include 
audiences who were the early adopters of file downloading and those who began 
viewing foreign programmes online thanks to the advent of video platforms. These 
interviews provided rich empirical data for illustrating how and why the 
consumption of foreign television via online sharing has gradually become a norm 
among Taiwanese audiences. Such data also captured the way in which Taiwanese 
audiences negotiated with the change in legal infrastructures and adjusted their 
viewing accordingly. Online observation and public discourses in Taiwan also 
suggest that the consumption of foreign programmes via online sharing remains 
prevalent in Taiwan at the time of writing in 2015. In this regard, the empirical 
analysis of this study covers the historical and critical development of online 
viewing patterns in recent years and at the same time remains valid up to the 
present day. 
 
It is worth noting that, while the consumption of foreign TV via online sharing is a 
new form of viewing practice, it is by no means a brand new phenomenon 
completely different from previous viewing patterns for television. The next section 
discusses the importance of studying new media technologies with a historical 
perspective, and how this stance is applied to this study.  
 
III. Studying Media with a Historical Perspective 
i. The Myth of the “TV is Dying” Discourse 
In recent years, public debates have often proclaimed the death of television, 
arguing that television is no longer able to address a large number of audiences, or 
that audiences care less about television and spend much more time on the Internet 
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while using computers and mobile devices. Phrases such as “the Internet is 
replacing TV” (Quenqua, 2010; Richtel, 1999) or “television is dying” (Lindelof, 
2007) are often deployed in debates on the influence of the Internet on television. 
Nevertheless, this type of argument is problematic since, as Gentikow (2010) 
argues, it “confuses technological affordance with empirical use, or access with 
appropriation” (p. 141). Many researchers have rejected this 
technologically-deterministic argument, pointing out that TV ratings and/or the 
time that audiences spend on television has in fact increased in various countries 
which have multichannel and digitalised media environments (Graham, 2011; 
Gripsrud, 2010a).  
 
As Brunsdon (2008) argues, television and media industries often declare the 
novelty of new media and pursue possible profit from innovation. However, 
scholars have to diachronically inscribe television within a series of histories (e.g. 
those of nation-states, of global media industries, of development of 
genre/programmes). Studies focusing on media histories (see Briggs & Burke, 2002; 
Huhtamo & Parikka, 2011; Marvin, 1988; Sconce, 2000 for examples) demonstrate 
that newer media forms do not necessarily replace older ones. Both forms may 
exist at the same time. Moreover, in many cases, the newer forms in fact share 
similar features with – or indeed inherit characteristics from – the older ones. For 
example, as Sconce’s (2000) work demonstrates, liveness and simultaneity is not 
television’s exclusive feature. Instead, other electric media, such as radio, the form 
prior to television, or the more current exemplar, the Internet, also share this 
liveness and simultaneity. What is important is to understand how television and 
television watching correspond with media convergence. As Spigel (2004), points 
out, the more we speak of the future of television, the more we have to understand 
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television “within the ‘long view’ of its historical meaning and place in cultures” (p. 
19). The following two subsections discuss how we can study the online 
consumption of foreign television without being ahistorical.  
 
ii. Understanding Television as Digital Media  
Marvin (1988) points out that “new technologies is a historically relative term” (p. 
3). As she explains: 
 
New media, broadly understood to include the use of new communications 
technology for old or new purposes, new ways of using old technologies, […] 
are always introduced into a pattern of tension created by the coexistence of 
old and new, which is far richer than any single medium that becomes a focus 
of interest because it is novel (Marvin, 1988, p. 8). 
 
Marvin (1988) examines how the electric light and the telephone were envisioned 
and received by electricity experts and the general public when they appeared as 
new technologies in the late 19th century. Her research provides a framework for 
understanding early electric communication “in the history of continuous concern 
about how new media rearrange and imperil social relationships” (p. 235). That 
concern, she argues, is similar to debates about what contemporary new 
technologies bring to our lives.  
 
Tomlinson (2007) reminds us that, although we should avoid technological 
determinism, it is also important to recognise that technologies “possess 
independent inherent properties which define, to some extent, the possibilities and 
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meanings of their use” (p. 12). Likewise, Hutchby (2001) considers how the social 
constructivist approach (e.g. Grint & Woolgar, 1997) allows us to recognise the 
important role that human agency (both the producers and users of technology) 
plays in the social shaping of technology. Nevertheless, he suggests that the main 
problem of this approach is that it fails to explain how the materiality of technology 
may influence human uses of technology. By drawing on Gibson’s (1979) concept 
of “affordance” in the psychology of perception, Hutchby (2001) demonstrates a 
means of studying “the technological shaping of sociality” (p. 442). As he notes, 
technologies are not entirely open forms whose meanings are fully constructed by 
their users and producers. Rather, different technologies have different affordances 
that constrain the ways in which they can be possibly configured or interpreted by 
human agency. What is made of technological artefacts is “accomplished in the 
interface between human aims and the artefact’s affordances” (p. 453).  
 
As John Peters (2004) argues, “new media, as vehicles that carry our senses and 
bodies across the space-time continuum, introduce us to old modes of experience 
that we never recognised we had before and therefore seem new” (p. 195). 
Combined with Tomlinson and Hutchby’s arguments, I consider it important to 
recognise a given new media technology’s shaping of sociality, while it is also 
necessary to avoid overstating such novelty and its shaping effects. Benjamin 
Peters’ (2009) notion of “media renewability” is a good example of this stance. As 
he expands on this concept:  
 
Each medium may have a few basic ideas that take many forms in material 
technologies. While various institutions and actors clothe a medium in 
ever-changing outfits and external forms, the operative idea of a medium as an 
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environment for communicative action connects it back to other similar media 
throughout time (B. Peters, 2009, p. 22). 
 
Peters (2009) disagrees with Jenkins’ (2006) emphasis on the ease involved in the 
media converging in digital forms, since he believes that – and not just for digital 
media – “all media contain, constrain and combine fundamental ideas about what 
constitutes communication itself” (p. 22). For instance, he argues that the idea of 
“distance writing” permeates the post, telegraph, and the computer; and the idea of 
“distance seeing” is also shared by both the telescope and television. Therefore, he 
contends that media are constantly renewable, and “they tend to renew themselves 
in the gaps, silences and white space left by the media that displaced them” (p. 22). 
 
When discussing how to study changing ontologies of television in the digital, 
post-network context, Bennett (2008a) argues:  
 
Positioning the television of television studies as a technological and cultural 
form that lies at the boundaries of old and new media, window-on-the-world 
and portal, flow and database, allows us to not only historicise the seemingly 
revolutionary switch to digital technology, but also to avoid overly 
historicising this moment – as if we have come to all the issues digitalisation 
raises before (Bennett, 2008a, p. 163). 
 
Bennett (2011) further suggests the idea of studying television as digital media 
rather than as new media, because digital forms of television or other kinds of 
digital media are increasingly less new but more and more ordinary. Regarding 
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television as digital media, however, does not mean that forms such as online 
sharing or streaming of TV programmes are not considered as “television”. On the 
contrary, Bennett argues that digital forms of television dispersed across different 
screens and platforms are still television in a certain fashion. The importance is to 
recognise the rapid change of television technologies (especially in terms of its 
digitalisation) while acknowledging the continued importance of broadcast 
television. Treating television as digital media, he argues, involves “interrogat[ing] 
the everydayness and ordinariness that has structured television’s position in 
modern and postmodern society” (pp. 5-6). This stance corresponds to Pertierra and 
Turner’s (2013) emphasis on locating television in the context of everyday life. 
 
Based on these debates, I consider that the relationship between different media’s 
novelty and age should be considered simultaneously. In this study, the 
consumption of foreign TV via online sharing is not regarded as a “brand new” 
practice. Rather, I will elaborate in what sense this consumption is associated with 
older media forms and their uses in two ways. Firstly, this study discusses how 
such consumption has shaped the ontology of television (see Chapters 3, 5, 6 and 
7). Secondly, audiences’ previous television experiences were taken into account 
during the gathering and analysis of the empirical data (see Chapter 4). It is through 
the comparison of the uses of different media forms that we can better understand 
how the role of television has changed and how this is experienced by audiences in 
the age of digitalisation and convergence.  
iii. Historicising the Development of Television 
As a way to historicise digital forms of television and articulate their relationships 
to traditional broadcast television, Lotz (2009) points out the necessity of having a 
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periodisation of the industrial history of television, since changes in operational 
norms lead to changes in television’s role in society. Some work has been done in 
the UK and the US. For instance, based on the public broadcasting context of the 
UK, Ellis (2002) divides the development of broadcast television into three eras. 
The first was the era of scarcity, characterised by a few channels only broadcasting 
for part of the day. In most countries, this era lasted until the late 1970s or early 
1980s. The second was the era of availability, where more channels, commonly 
provided by cable or satellite systems, jostled for audiences’ attention. The third is 
the era of plenty, in which television programmes “will be accessible through a 
variety of technologies, the sum of which will give consumers the new 
phenomenon of ‘television on demand’ as well as ‘interactive television’” (p. 39). 
This categorisation is roughly similar to Rogers, Epstein and Reeves’s (2002) 
periodisation of US-based television history which delineates TVI (scarcity), TVII 
(availability) and TVIII (plenty), despite the fundamental difference between the 
commercial model on which the US television industry is based and the public 
model on which Britain and that of many European countries is grounded. 
 
Similarly, Lotz (2007, 2009) categorises the development of US television into 
three eras. The first period is the network era (from the 1950s to the mid-1980s), in 
which many operational and industrial norms of television were established. Such 
norms as well as the consumption experiences they delivered to audiences, have 
been considered as defining television, despite changes in its technological cultural 
form that developed over the years. The second era is the multi-channel transition 
from the mid-1980s to the mid-2000s. The third era is the post-network era, 
beginning in the middle 2000s. Lotz argues that the key feature that separates the 
post-network era from the multi-channel phase is that while most practices in the 
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network era were still preserved in multi-channel transition, changes in the norms 
and operation of the industry in the post-network era have become so pronounced 
that many new industrial practices are becoming dominant and replacing old 
network-era methods.  
The periodisation models of Ellis (2002), Lotz (2007, 2009), and Rogers et al 
(2002) share similarities with each other, and are also roughly applicable to the 
television landscape in Taiwan. However, it is problematic to employ ideas such as 
‘post-network’ without taking the specificity of the Taiwanese context into account. 
As Goldsmith underlines (2003, cited in  Keane, 2006, p. 841), “the history of 
broadcast system and broadcasting regulation is geographically and politically 
context-specific and […] shaped by the principle of national sovereignty”. Based 
on the zones of consumption approach (Pertierra & Turner, 2013), Chapter 2 
historicises the development of Taiwanese media environment, which enables me 
to make sense of how television has been experienced by Taiwanese audiences and 
how the role of television has changed in the age of online viewing.  
 
IV. Overview of the Remaining Chapters 
In the sections above, I have introduced this study’s research questions, and 
explicated how this study is based on “zones of consumption” (Pertierra & Turner, 
2013), thereby illustrating the value of studying media in a historical context. I also 
delineated the importance of studying the consumption of foreign TV via online 
sharing as an emerging norm of television experience, while avoiding technological 
determinism. As the last section of Chapter 1 here, I will introduce the remaining 
chapters of this study.  
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Chapter 2 “locates television” (Pertierra & Turner, 2013) in Taiwan by examining 
how various geopolitical conditions and historical developments established the 
material foundation on which the Taiwanese consumption of foreign TV via online 
sharing is based. Section I outlines Taiwan’s geopolitical relations with China, the 
US, Japan and Korea and their influence on the country’s contemporary 
development. Section II historicises the industrial development of Taiwanese 
television. Section III outlines how two particular regional cultural flows, Japan 
Fever and the Korean Wave, which emerged under the import-oriented structure of 
the TV industry in Taiwan, and how they were associated with the construction of 
Taiwanese identity. Section IV examines the legal conditions governing the 
distribution of foreign media in Taiwan as well as East Asia.  
 
Chapter 3 conceptualises the consumption of foreign TV via online sharing by 
discussing television’s implications for our everyday lives in different but 
interrelated ways. Thereby it sets up the theoretical frameworks required for the 
later chapters’ empirical analysis. Sections I and II review how two essential 
notions with regard to television, togetherness and liveness, have changed during 
the post-network era and examine in what sense the online consumption of 
television is associated with such changes. Sections III to VI elaborate on the 
significance of television’s globalisation. Specifically, they focus on how the 
transnational distribution and consumption of television, as a form of cultural flow, 
shapes audiences’ identification with (and understanding of) other 
cultures/countries, and why studying the Taiwanese consumption of foreign TV via 
online sharing sheds light on these issues.  
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Chapter 4 introduces the research design and methodology used for this 
dissertation’s empirical research. Section I discusses the ethical concerns of this 
study and how this has shaped the gathering of empirical data. Sections II and III 
introduce the methodology and rationales for employing various online and offline 
data generation methods. Specifically, notions of online ethnography and the way 
in which online and offline methods (e.g. observation and interview) are combined 
to recruit, interview and interact with research subjects will be addressed. Section 
IV details the ways in which the empirical research was designed and conducted, 
and Section V introduces the make-up of interviewees as research subjects, which 
helps to make sense of the empirical analysis in later chapters.  
 
Chapters 5, 6 and 7 constitute this dissertation’s empirical analysis. Chapter 5 
discusses how television’s role in social togetherness has changed in the 
post-network context, particularly based on the definition of “togetherness” 
developed in Chapter 3. It looks at how interviewees personalised as well as 
socialised their viewing of television (both online and offline) and discusses the 
implications such practices have for television’s role in social togetherness. This 
chapter also examines under what situations local live broadcasting, as an 
important condition in social togetherness, remained important to interviewees who 
were already used to time-shifting and personalising their viewing. The analysis 
demonstrates how, while the audiences’ personalisation of online viewing was 
becoming an increasingly common television experience, a sense of togetherness 
was attained, even though it might be weaker than that generated in the 
consumption of broadcast television. In addition, the domestic conditions of media 
access – particularly television and computer-based – are briefly addressed to help 
evaluate how interviewees understood these media technologies in general.  
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Chapter 6 examines how interviewees achieved a sense of coevalness (Fabian, 
1983; Wilk, 1994) in their consumption of foreign TV via online sharing as an 
everyday practice. There is some overlap between the notion of togetherness and 
that of coevalness as both concepts are associated with the way in which audiences 
believe they are connected with other individuals via their media consumption. 
Here I would like to briefly outline how I differentiate between the concepts in 
order to examine two different issues. While the sense of togetherness focuses on 
how audiences perceive their coexistence with other audience members elsewhere, 
coevalness focuses more on the overcoming of temporal distance involved in 
audiences’ encounters with foreign cultures. Moreover, few researches articulate 
how television as a time-based medium (Scannell, 2009, p. 223) shapes audiences’ 
sense of coevalness with foreign cultures through its daily output and scheduling. 
Theoretical notions concerning television’s temporality, such as flow (R. Williams, 
2003), currency (Ellis, 2002, 2007), and for-anyone-as-someone structure (Scannell, 
2000, 2014) are usually conceptualised within a given national context. However, 
when it comes to the online consumption of foreign programmes, what audiences 
look for is the flow and currency of television from foreign countries. 
 
This chapter therefore, draws on both the notion of coevalness and those regarding 
television’s temporality to examine how, by shortening the temporal gap between 
foreign broadcasts and local consumption, foreign television schedules were 
incorporated into interviewees’ everyday lives as a significant temporal reference 
point. Thereby, the audiences’ sense of coevalness with foreign countries (Japan, 
Korea and the US in particular) was enhanced. It also discusses in what sense a 
certain degree of denial of coevalness with Thailand was evident in Taiwanese 
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contexts. In so doing, this chapter engages with theoretical debates regarding 
broadcasting temporalities (e.g. liveness, currency, flow) in cross-cultural and 
transnational contexts of consumption.  
 
Chapter 7 looks at the implications of online consumption of foreign TV for 
interviewees’ perceptions of local and foreign cultures, as well as for cultural 
power relationships between Taiwan and China, Japan, Korea and the US. The first 
four sections deal with how the notion of “foreignness” was valued by interviewees, 
and how their consumption of American, Japanese and Korean cultures in turn 
shaped their understanding of Taiwanese culture and their sense of themselves as 
Taiwanese. Section V examines how the interviewees’ reliance on Chinese online 
sharing activities foregrounded their perceptions of China as a foreign Other, an 
entity that in turn potentially threatened their identity. Section VI examines how 
Korea was perceived as a new foreign presence, challenging Taiwanese society. 
Section VII illustrates how the interviewees generated a perception of regional 
cultural hierarchy in their consumption of Japanese and Korean culture, and how 
this observation was associated with the formation of regional identity.  
 
Chapter 8, the conclusion, reviews the whole study, and stresses how this 
dissertation, by examining the consumption of foreign TV via online sharing as a 
cross-cultural practice, sheds light on cultural flows, the notions of television, and 
audiences’ cultural and national identity and their perception of temporality in 
relation to foreign Others. It also discusses the study’s limitations and suggests 
avenues for future research. 
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Chapter 2: Locating Television in the Context of Taiwan 
Drawing on the approach of “zones of consumption” (Pertierra & Turner, 2013), 
this chapter outlines the general historical and geopolitical contexts that prevail in 
Taiwan, and historicises important developments in Taiwan’s media environment 
with the TV industry as the main focus. Section I outlines Taiwan’s geopolitical 
relations with China, the US, Japan and Korea. Section II historicises the 
development of the television industry in Taiwan. Section III outlines how two 
specific regional cultural flows, Japan Fever and the Korean Wave, emerged under 
the Taiwanese television industry’s import-oriented structure and how these flows 
are associated with the construction of Taiwanese identity. Section IV examines the 
legal conditions governing the distribution of foreign media in Taiwan as well as in 
East Asia, as the former are important in underpinning the Taiwanese consumption 
of foreign TV via online sharing. 
 
I. Historical and Geopolitical Backgrounds of Taiwan  
China, Japan, the United States and Korea have been the primary countries 
influencing the geopolitical status and historical development of Taiwan. This 
section characterises Taiwan’s relation with these four countries and their 
influences on the country’s development at large.  
 
First, relations between Taiwan and China (especially concerning Taiwan’s 
legitimacy as a sovereign state) have always been the most important factor 
affecting the development of modern Taiwanese society. As an important aspect of 
its geopolitical and cultural background, this is the first issue that should be 
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addressed. The Republic of China (abbreviated as ROC), commonly known as 
Taiwan, was established in 1912 in mainland China, with the Kuomintang 
(abbreviated as KMT) as the ruling party. Due to the KMT’s final defeat in the 
Chinese Civil War in 1949 at the hands of their opponents, the Communist Party of 
China (abbreviated as CPC), the KMT-led ROC was forced to retreat to Taiwan in 
order to preserve its government. In the same year, the CPC founded the People’s 
Republic of China (abbreviated as PRC), which is now normally recognised as 
China. Both the KMT and the CPC claimed their regime represented the “real” 
China and both denied the legitimacy of the opposing side. The turning point 
concerning the legitimacy came in 1971, when the United Nations (UN) recognised 
the PRC as the sole representative government of China and, consequently, the 
ROC was forced to leave the UN, ending its 26 year old control of the Chinese 
seat.  
 
The PRC has denied Taiwan’s sovereignty, regarding the latter as a part of its 
territory. This denial prevents Taiwan from becoming involved in a wide range of 
international affairs as a nation in its own right and fundamentally threatens 
Taiwan’s international and political status. For instance, during the mid-1960s and 
early 1970s, most countries cut off diplomatic relations with Taiwan, regardless of 
the substantive efforts Taiwan made to preserve them.  
 
When the KMT government retreated to Taiwan, it immediately imposed martial 
law as a necessary strategy to enforce its policy of countering the CPC and 
suppressing potential local uprisings. From 1949 until the lifting of martial law in 
1987, the authoritarian KMT regime was based on one-party rule with extensive 
police control and the widespread use of military courts. As Lihyun Lin (2005, 
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2006) points out, with the political, financial and military support of the United 
States (see below), the KMT established a repressive state with ideological 
apparatuses that tightly controlled the media (including newspapers, broadcasts, 
and other media institutions).  
 
Second, the United States, as one of the most influential countries in the world, 
plays a significant role in Taiwan’s international relations and domestic politics 
(Bernstein & Munro, 1997). It was because of US financial, diplomatic and 
military support that the KMT regime survived domestically and internationally 
during the 1950s and 1960s in the aftermath of its defeat by the CPC. Generally 
speaking, Taiwan has adopted a pro-American diplomatic position (Yeh, 1991) (this 
has had a significant influence on Taiwan’s media development, which will be 
discussed in Sections II and III). During the Cold War, Taiwan continued to 
cooperate with the US politically and diplomatically in order to maintain crucial 
US-Taiwan relations. However, the US still switched its diplomatic relations from 
Taiwan to China in 1979. This development was considered a significant Taiwanese 
diplomatic failure (alongside its expulsion from the UN in 1971). This triggered 
substantial disputes among competing political parties in Taiwan over its 
diplomatic, international and social policies, eventually leading to the country’s 
democratisation in the 1980s (Cheng, 1989; Copper, 2007, 2009).  
 
Third, in comparison to China and the United States, the influence of Japan on 
Taiwan is more related to colonial relations between the two countries. Taiwan was 
colonised by Japan for 50 years (1895-1945).1 Taiwanese attitudes toward Japan 
                                                 
1 It was not until 1945, when Japan surrendered to the Allies in World War II, that the sovereignty 
of Taiwan was restored to the ROC. 
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are complicated, due to both the positive (e.g. the development of material 
infrastructures) and negative (e.g. military and political suppression) impact that 
Japan had on Taiwan over the course of colonisation. Hostilities toward oppressive 
Japanese rule over Taiwan still exist, especially among the victims of colonisation 
(e.g. “comfort women” who were forced to become sex slaves for the Japanese 
armed forces during World War II). Nevertheless, among the older generations 
educated by the Japanese school system during colonisation, there are also positive 
attitudes regarding the advanced development Japan brought to the Taiwan and a 
certain nostalgia toward the colonisers. Such complex experiences under colonial 
rule have led to the attempts of decolonisation that lasted for more than fifty years 
up to the present day (K.-H. Chen, 2010; Y.-F. Ko, 2004). 
 
Fourth, compared with China, Japan and the United States, which have had 
significant influence on various aspects of Taiwan’s political and cultural 
development, Korea’s influence on Taiwan has been relatively less pronounced. 
Economic relations are the main ties between Taiwan and Korea. Their stages of 
modernisation and economic development were similar, thus making the two 
countries economic competitors (Copper, 2009).2 One turning point in relations 
between the two countries was Korea’s sudden ending of diplomatic ties with 
Taiwan in 1992. From the perspective of Taiwan, this made the country’s long-term 
compromises and efforts (in terms of economic development and trade profits) in 
order to maintain ties with Korea rather futile. The negative feeling towards Korea 
due to this development was most evident in how Taiwan promptly cut off the 
                                                 
2 Historically and politically speaking, Taiwan and Korea are similar in their shared experiences as 
former colonies of Japan that have adopted anti-communist political stances. Korea inherited and 
was influenced by Chinese culture and values (e.g. Confucianism), another shared cultural feature 
between the two countries. However, until the end of the 1990s neither Taiwan nor Korea exported 
their TV shows to each other on a regular basis. 
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Taiwan-Korea air-link and in its reluctance to resume the transportation 
connection.3 The growth in popularity of Korean popular culture at the beginning 
of the 2000s added more pressure on the ever-increasing demand for air traffic 
between the two countries, and eventually led to the resumption of the 
Taiwan-Korea air-link in 2004 (S.-C. Chen, 2005; Han, 2005; Kuo, 2004; You, 
2001).4   
 
II. Development of the Taiwanese Media Environment 
This section historicises and suggests a periodisation for the development of the 
Taiwanese media environment in three historical stages: 1) the introduction of 
television in the 1960s; 2) the legalisation of satellite and cable TV in the 1990s; 
and 3) the rise of the Internet, media digitalisation and convergence in the 2000s. 
 
i. Introduction of Television and the Geopolitics Behind 
The launch of TV broadcasting and the distribution of TV sets in Taiwan were 
about 10 years later than that of developed countries (e.g. the US, UK and Japan) 
which had started doing so by the end of the 1940s,5 and the local process was led 
                                                 
3 While trade relations between Taiwan and Korea gradually resumed and the exchange of cultural 
products increased in the 2000s, it was not until the end of 2004 that the air link between Taiwan 
and Korea was re-established. 
4 The number of travellers to Korea from Taiwan shot up after Korean dramas such as Winter 
Sonata were well received in Taiwan at the beginning of the 2000s (Han, 2005). While there were 
about 9,000 travellers to Korea in 1999, the number doubled to 18,000 in 2003. In 2005, the first 
year after the resumption of the air link, the number rose rapidly to over 36,000 (See the official 
statistics provided by the Tourism Bureau, M.O.T.C, Republic of China:  
http://admin.taiwan.net.tw/statistics/year.aspx?no=134.). 
5 Two factors contributed to the relatively late arrival of television. Firstly, in the 1950s the 
Taiwanese government did not have enough capital to launch its own TV broadcasting system. It 
took a long period for the government to raise sufficient capital from local enterprises and Japanese 
manufacturers. Secondly, local manufacturers and production companies lacked the technical skills 
and capital to produce television sets and programmes. These conditions also slowed down the 
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by the KMT government. Taiwan Television (TTV), launched in 1962, was the first 
terrestrial (free-to-air) television station in Taiwan. It was a Taiwan-Japan joint 
venture, with stocks being held by the KMT government (49%), Japanese 
enterprises (40%) and Taiwanese local enterprises (11%) (L. Lin, 2006, p. 79). 
During the preparatory stage of TTV’s establishment, both the US and Japan, the 
two countries with the most advanced TV-set manufacturing and broadcasting 
standards, wanted to join the business. But the sociopolitical situation in the 1960s 
was such that, as Lin (2006) argues, diplomatic relations with Japan became 
unstable as Japanese businesses established reciprocal trade with the PRC. This 
development was regarded by the government as well as Taiwanese society as 
indicating Japan’s intention to switch its diplomatic relations from Taiwan to the 
PRC. Relations with the US, by comparison, were steadier. With the expectation 
that diplomatic relations with Japan might be improved via the TTV joint venture, 
the government chose to partner with Japanese enterprises.  
 
While the KMT government cooperated with Japanese manufacturers to launch 
TTV in order to gather enough capital as well as to stabilise diplomatic relations 
with Japan, there was a controversy over the partnership with Japanese enterprises 
in terms of broadcast content. During the preparatory stage of the establishment of 
TTV, the Japanese enterprises with which the government was working originally 
included three electronic manufacturers and one commercial television station, Fuji 
TV (L. Lin, 2006, p. 79). While the electronic manufacturers provided TTV with 
TV sets and technologies as their capital, Fuji TV planned to provide two hours of 
shows per day for broadcast on TTV as cooperative conditions. At that time, TTV 
                                                                                                                                       
introduction of broadcasting and the distribution of TV sets (see Ho, 2002; Y.-F. Ko, 2009; L. Lin, 
2006 for further details). 
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was supposed to broadcast five hours of television shows daily. As TTV was not 
sufficiently prepared (in terms of equipment, labour, finance, etc.) to self-produce 
all the shows, the two hours of Japanese show could have helped to fill the empty 
airtime.  
 
However, when this plan was disclosed by local newspapers, it was strongly 
criticised by legislators and the Ministry of Education. From the nationalist 
perspective, officials were worried, that the ideological content of Japanese 
language programmes might influence Taiwanese society negatively (L. Lin, 2006). 
Due to the prevailing criticisms and concerns, the KMT government had to ask 
TTV to abandon the planned broadcast of Japanese shows and instead the 
government had to provide subsidies to TTV to produce educational shows (Ho, 
2002). The broadcasting of Japanese language shows was prohibited on terrestrial 
TV in Taiwan from the 1960s to November 1993, when the ban was abolished. 
Specifically, while Japanese cartoons were allowed to be broadcast only if dubbed 
into Mandarin or Taiwanese, other genres, such as dramas and variety shows, were 
banned, regardless of whether they were dubbed or not. Consequently, since the 
launch of television in Taiwan, the broadcasting of Japanese shows was generally 
prohibited as a part of a decolonising process. 
 
Ko (2008) argues that in cultural terms the KMT government officially banned the 
use of the Japanese language in public places, schools and the media in order to 
eradicate Japanese influences. However, in terms of material production, as the 
case of TTV clearly demonstrates, Taiwan relied heavily on Japanese technology 
and capital. As she points out, such a 
“culturally-anti-Japan-but-economically-dependent-on-Japan” (p. 132) 
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phenomenon was commonplace in many other industrial developments in post-war 
Taiwan. 
 
In comparison with Japanese content, American media material was less 
controversial in Taiwanese society, partly because the US did not colonise Taiwan 
as Japan did. Moreover, during the Cold War years, as the KMT government relied 
on US political and military power to counter the PRC, geopolitical and diplomatic 
relations with the US were friendly. At the same time, the US TV industry had been 
developing various genres, and by the 1960s overseas sales of its programmes 
exceeded domestic sales (Spigel & Curtin, 1997), the same period as Taiwanese 
television was launched. Given the advanced state of the US industry, the 
Taiwanese government and society’s pro-American position, and the anti-Japanese 
cultural atmosphere, American broadcasts became the main source of foreign 
shows on the Taiwanese networks from this period onwards. Ho (2002) states that 
in the initial years of TTV, “it could be argued that 99% of the foreign shows were 
American products” (p. 92).  
 
After TTV’s launch in 1962, another two free-to-air terrestrial televisions, Chinese 
Television Company (CTV) and Chinese Television System (CTS), were 
established in 1968 and 1971 respectively. These three terrestrial stations 
dominated the Taiwanese TV market until the end of the 1980s.6 This period can 
be regarded as exemplifying Ellis’ (2002) “era of scarcity” or Lotz’s (2007, 2009) 
“network era”. In terms of the importation of programmes, the US had long been 
the main foreign origin programme source, and this situation remained the same 
until the early 1990s. Waterman and Rogers’ (1994) empirical study based on the 
                                                 
6 The fourth terrestrial station, FTV, was launched in 1997. 
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data collected in November 1989 indicates that, among all programmes hours, 81% 
of them were domestically produced, and the remaining 19% of them were 
imported, with 17% from the US, and 2% from Japan. Ishii, Su and Watanabe 
(1999) also point out that in 1993 “when Japanese TV programmes were still 
banned on terrestrial TV, 99% of foreign TV programmes came from the US” (p. 
419). 
 
To summarise, the development of the Taiwanese TV industry demonstrates how 
the threat of China in relation to Taiwan’s political legitimacy, colonial relations 
with Japan, and Taiwan’s Cold War pro-US stance affected the development of the 
island’s TV industry in the 1960s. Politically speaking, Taiwan was anti-communist 
and part of the US-led Western bloc; culturally, it was anti-Japan but aligned with 
the US; economically, the Taiwanese industry was unable to self-produce enough 
programmes to fill its airtime without relying on foreign programmes, while the US 
counterpart had the capability to export high-quality media content. Given these 
political, cultural and economic conditions, American TV shows had taken up a 
substantial percentage of Taiwanese TV terrestrial broadcast schedules from the 
1960s onwards, which was in accordance with the global situation in which the US 
dominated the international trade in TV programmes (Hoskins & Mirus, 1988; 
Waterman & Rogers, 1994).  
 
While global concerns about media imperialism mainly focused on the dominance 
of the US (Schiller, 1969), it has been Japanese cultural products, with the 
country’s East Asian neighbours detecting a distinctive “cultural odour” (Iwabuchi, 
2002) that triggered more concerns in Taiwan (Chiou, 2002; Y.-F. Ko, 2004; T.-D. 
Lee & Ho, 2003). However, it is worth noting that, although the Japanese media 
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products (with cartoons as an exception) were officially prohibited on terrestrial 
stations until the end of 1993, they (in various forms such as comics, music, 
animations, movies, dramas) were popular and widely distributed via unauthorised 
means (e.g. videotape recording/rental, cable TV) in Taiwan and across many parts 
of Asia (Iwabuchi, 2002; Y.-F. Ko, 2008; Sakai, 2004; Shiraishi, 1997, 2000). In 
other words, Japanese media contents were never completely absent from wider 
Taiwanese society.  
 
ii. The Legalisation of Satellite and Cable TV and Import-Oriented 
Structure 
Following the lifting of martial law in 1987, direct-broadcast-satellite (DBS, i.e. 
satellite TV broadcasts) and cable TV were legalised in November 1988 and 
November 1993 respectively, underlining the fact that TV broadcasting was 
heading toward a more open, liberal environment. Since then, television in Taiwan 
has also entered the multi-channel period, or in Ellis’s terms, “the era of 
availability” (2002). Subsequently, the foreign programmes allowed to be broadcast 
significantly increased both in number and variety, including Japanese ones, which 
were prohibited to be on air on the terrestrial networks for decades.  
 
The importance of cable TV should be addressed, as the cable systems, arguably 
reaching 80% penetration (H.-T. Ko, Chang, & Chu, 2011; Li, 2004), have been 
part of the television mainstream in Taiwan since their legalisation. The 
development of cable networks can be traced back to the middle of the 1970s. 
Initially, these cable TV channels (illegally) provided foreign programmes 
including Japanese ones. Since there was a large volume of American content 
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broadcast on cable channels, the US government considered these broadcasts as a 
violation of the rights of American producers. Consequently, the US government 
put strong pressure on the Taiwanese government to legalise and regulate cable TV. 
Under US pressure, the Cable Radio and Television Act was passed, and cable TV 
was legitimised in 1993 (Iwabuchi, 2002; Li, 2004). Therefore, it can be argued 
that the US, as an economic and political powerhouse, has played a significant role 
in the development of Taiwanese TV industry in both content and industrial 
structures.  
 
Following the legalisation of cable television, more than one hundred channels 
were promptly added to the existing terrestrial networks7 as part of the legitimate 
television landscape, and the penetration of cable television soon reached 60-70% 
around 1995 to 1996, and arguably over 80% by the end of the 1990s and the 
beginning of the 2000s (Li, 2004; Y.-L. Liu, 1996). However, the increase in the 
number of channels inevitably led to intense competition for ratings and profits 
among networks and broadcasting systems. It also led to an extremely high demand 
for programmes to fill this amount of available airtime. Demand was so high that it 
was inevitable that most local networks would import foreign shows, because it 
was beyond their abilities to self-produce all the programmes required. Importing 
ready-made foreign shows in most cases was preferable as they were more 
profitable and efficient (in terms of time and budget) than domestically-produced 
shows (H.-C. Liu, 2004; Y.-L. Liu & Chen, 2004). Moreover, regarding cable TV 
                                                 
7 Under the Cable Radio and Television Act, the operators of cable TV networks have to retransmit 
all content (including programmes and advertisements) of legal over-the-air (i.e., terrestrial) TV 
channels, including the five terrestrial TV channels (TTV, CTV, CTS, FTV and the public 
broadcasting service PTS established in 1998) as the basic channels. In other words, when the 
audiences subscribe to cable TV, they can also watch terrestrial TV channels via cable without 
paying extra fees.  
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networks, under the Cable Radio and Television Act, in terms of broadcast hours 
the minimum percentage of domestically produced programmes required is 20% of 
the total airtime. This is much smaller than that of terrestrial TV networks, which 
has to reach 70%. This legal condition encourages cable networks to import a large 
number of foreign programmes to fill their schedules rather than endeavouring to 
self-produce content. 
 
Given the huge number of cable channels and high penetration of cable television, 
the television landscape in Taiwan became import-oriented soon after the 
legalisation of cable TV in the 1990s. The structure of the television industry has 
remained import-oriented up to the present day, and this structure has partly 
contributed to Japan Fever and the Korean Wave in Taiwan, two regional cultural 
flows which will be discussed in Section III. It can be argued that audiences in 
Taiwan have been living in a multichannel and relatively fragmented media 
environment and exposed to a large amount of foreign content since the beginning 
of the 1990s – well before the advent of online viewing.  
 
iii. The Rise of the Internet, Digital Switchover and After  
From the beginning of the 2000s and alongside the constant improvement of 
bandwidth provision, Internet usage in Taiwan has significantly risen. According to 
FIND, the Taiwanese research institute under the direction of the Institute for 
Information Industry,8 in 2004 to 2005 the household penetration of broadband 
climbed from 47% to 59%, and by 2008 it was over 70% (FIND, 2004, 2006, 2009). 
In 2010 and 2011, the period when the in-depth interviews of this study were 
                                                 
8 The Institute for Information Industry is a Taiwanese NGO that operates under guideline set by 
the Taiwanese Department of Industrial Technology of the Ministry of Economic Affairs. 
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conducted, this penetration was 77.1% and 80.7%, respectively (FIND, 2011a, 
2011b).9 Moreover, the household penetration of computers reached 85% from 
2009 onwards, with an average 2.3 computers per household (FIND, 2010). These 
data indicate that for most Taiwanese households, their domestic technological 
infrastructure (in terms of bandwidth and domestic access to a computer) have been 
capable of functioning as a platform via which household members can consume 
videos online since midway during the first decade of the 2000s – a crucial 
indicator of the transition of media environment to a post-network, convergence 
context. 
 
Nevertheless, while the condition required for Internet usage is well established, in 
two senses the digitalisation of Taiwanese legal television systems is less 
developed compared with the US, UK, Japan, and/or other developed countries. 
First, although terrestrial television was digitalised in 2012, the digitalisation of 
cable television has been slow; only 11% of subscribers adopted digital cable TV 
by the end of 2009, and this only reached 25% in April 2013 (Akhtar & Arinto, 
2009; H.-T. Ko et al., 2011; C.-J. Liu & Chuang, 2013). Given the high penetration 
rate of cable television, it can be argued that it is not yet common for audiences to 
experience terrestrial channels (retransmitted via cable) as well as other channels 
on cable TV in digital formats.  
 
Second, relatively few legal channels (terrestrial, cable or satellite) and content 
providers have launched online viewing services or other digital applications that 
allow audiences to access their content on computer or mobile devices. Even when 
                                                 
9 As the latest data available indicates, in 2013 broadband penetration had reached 81.6% (FIND, 
2014). 
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they have done so, they tend to provide short clips of partial content (e.g. trailers), 
rather than complete series or entire episodes of a given programme as many 
foreign viewing services do (e.g. Hulu, BBC’s iPlayer). In this regard, these 
platforms are unable to function as databases that remediate television’s flow 
(Bennett, 2008a). Moreover, as of now there are no equivalents to legal video 
streaming services providing a large amount of content such as Netflix or Amazon 
Prime Video. This absence marks a difference between Taiwan and countries such 
as the US, UK and Japan, where legal services play a crucial role in shaping 
audiences’ viewing. By comparison, illegal and unofficial platforms and 
file-sharing activities that offer plentiful and comprehensive TV content, such as 
those used by the interviewees in this study, are more influential in shaping 
audiences’ online viewing practices in Taiwan. 
 
According to a 2011 general survey concerning the personal, multi-platform 
viewing behaviours of Taiwanese audiences conducted by FIND (2011c, 2011d), 
74% of the audiences consumed audio-visual content via traditional broadcast 
television (including cable, terrestrial and satellite TV). At the same time, 29.2% of 
the audiences employed the Internet for their consumption of audio-visual content. 
Such usage was almost double that of legal IPTV and digital cable TV box (15%). 
Specifically, the Chinese video streaming platforms PPStream, and Tudou (two 
popular video platforms based in China that unofficially and illegally provided free 
content were the top two platforms audiences deployed (YouTube came in at No. 3). 
In turn, Ya-Ting Lin (2011) points out that PPStream and similar unofficial services 
rapidly became some of the most popular ways through which Taiwanese audiences 
accessed foreign content, to the extent that they began to threaten the cable 
television market. These data indicate that, although the Taiwanese media 
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environment has made the transition from the earlier stages of television to the 
post-network era, and audiences have also developed new viewing patterns, the 
role of legal television systems or content providers have still not yet been 
significant in such processes. 
 
III. Japan Fever and Korean Wave as Regional Cultural Flows  
This section outlines the context for Taiwanese development of the two regional 
cultural flows, namely Japan Fever and the Korean Wave. The focus here is on how 
the two flows developed under the import-oriented structure of the Taiwanese 
television industry, and how they are associated with the construction of Taiwanese 
identity. In so doing, the section elaborates the transnational cultural contexts from 
which the Taiwanese consumption of foreign TV via online sharing has emerged. It 
is important to note that Japan Fever and the Korean Wave refer, respectively, to 
the widespread popularity of Japanese and Korean popular culture at large, instead 
of only referring to the popularity of Japanese and Korean TV programmes. 
 
i. Media Liberalisation and Intensified Regional Cultural flows 
Given the media liberalisation underway in many Asian countries since the 1980s 
(Singh, 2000), cultural exchanges within the region have been picking up greater 
momentum. Japan Fever, evident since the 1990s, and the Korean Wave in the 
2000s have emerged as two of the most significant regional cultural flows in East 
Asia. In Taiwan, the increasingly import-oriented structural conditions of the TV 
industry, as mentioned in the last section, ensured that Taiwan was the first country 
to embrace the two regional cultural flows, thereby contributing to the rise in 
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popularity of Japanese and Korean popular culture in Taiwan. 
 
In the case of Japan Fever, Japanese media content, which was banned for almost 
30 years, has been one of the most popular choices among the available foreign 
materials since the 1990s. Specifically, STAR TV10 in the early 1990s was the first 
channel to broadcast current Japanese dramas on a continuous basis in Taiwan. In 
Japan, those dramas whose themes focus on the modern lives of young people are 
usually called “trendy dramas” (torendi dorama,トレンディドラマ). However, 
STAR TV labelled and promoted these trendy dramas as “Japanese Idol Dramas”, 
focusing on good-looking young Japanese actors and actresses. This strategy was 
successful in catching the eyes of Taiwanese audiences. The broadcast of Tokyo 
Love Story in 1992, which achieved widespread popularity, was considered the 
starting point of Japan Fever (Iwabuchi, 2002; Y.-F. Ko, 2004; M.-T. Lee, 2004b; 
Lii & Chen, 1998; Su & Chen, 2000).  
 
Watching the success of STAR TV, Taiwanese terrestrial TV stations urged the 
government to lift the ban on broadcasting Japanese shows since they also wanted 
to profit from their popularity.11.The ban was eventually abolished in 1993, and all 
three terrestrial TV stations (i.e. TTV, CTV, CTS) promptly started to broadcast 
Japanese dramas, some airing during primetime. As Lii and Chen (1998) argue, the 
broadcast of Japanese shows on free-to-air terrestrial TV made Japanese shows 
even more accessible. This proved a turning point and marked the moment when 
                                                 
10 STAR TV is the first pan-Asian satellite television broadcaster founded in Hong Kong in 1991. It 
was acquired in 1994 by the Australian-American magnate Rupert Murdoch, the founder and CEO 
of the global media conglomerate News Corporation. See Curtin (2007) and Thomas (2005) for 
further details of STAR TV’s influence on Chinese speaking regions and other parts of Asia. 
11 While satellite TV was allowed to broadcast Japanese programmes, the ban on the broadcast of 
Japanese shows on terrestrial TV networks was still in effect. It was not until November 1993 that 
this ban was officially abolished. 
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Japanese popular culture moved from a niche-oriented appeal to more general, 
mass-oriented popularity. Several cable and satellite channels featuring Japanese 
programmes were also established in the 1990s.12  
  
It is important to note that, compared to American and Korean media product 
counterparts which are more actively exported overseas, the Japanese industry is 
domestically-oriented (Iwabuchi, 1994) and relatively passive regarding its 
overseas markets. According to Iwabuchi (1994; 2002, pp. 86-97), before Japan 
Fever, given the legacy of Japanese imperialism in Asia, the Japanese media 
industry hesitated to actively enter Asian markets given potential accusations of 
cultural imperialism. Moreover, the Japanese TV industry has been supported by a 
prosperous, self-sufficient domestic market, and the profits generated from Asian 
markets are much less rewarding.13 This makes the Japanese industry reluctant to 
make great efforts to export content to Asian markets. It has been profit-seeking 
companies in Taiwan, Hong Kong or other parts of Asia that are more active in 
(both legally and illegally) importing Japanese materials (Hu, 2004, 2005; Pang, 
2006, 2009).  
 
While the viewership of Japanese dramas started to decline gradually around 2001, 
their price remained as high as before (Sakai, 2004; Shim, 2008). At the same time, 
the Korean TV industry, after ten years of imitating their Japanese and American 
counterparts, began to be capable of making dramas of similar production quality 
                                                 
12 Three of the most popular channels are Gold Sun TV (established in 1993), JET TV and 
Videoland Japan (both established in 1996). 
13 According to Iwabuchi (2002), the wholesale price for Japanese programmes in Asian markets in 
1997 was three times higher than it was in the early 1990s; but it “still constituted less than 1 
percent of the total sales figures of Japanese TV stations” (p. 88).  
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as their Japanese counterparts. Moreover, in contrast to the passive attitude of the 
Japanese media industry towards its Asian market, the Korean industry always 
aggressively exports to regional markets. As a new exporter in the region at the 
beginning of the 2000s, the Korean industry kept the export prices of dramas 
comparatively low.14 As a result, Korean dramas appeared to be a fresh substitute 
for Japanese products with similar attributes but with a much cheaper price tag for 
Taiwanese broadcasters (H. M. Kim, 2005; Nian, 2002; Sakai, 2004; Shao, 2003; 
Shim, 2008). Subsequently, starting with dramas, various forms of Korean popular 
culture gained popularity both in Taiwan and other East Asian region/countries. 
  
Taiwan is the earliest Asian country to import Korean dramas on a regular basis, 
and the Taiwanese audience’s rapid acceptance of Korean dramas indicates the 
emergence of the Korean Wave as a regional phenomenon.15 For instance, Winter 
Sonata was on air in Korea in January to March 2002, and Dae Jang Geum from 
September 2003 to March 2004. Both dramas were promptly broadcast by the 
Taiwanese network GTV16 less than two months after they had concluded in 
Korea.17 Furthermore, the Taiwanese TV industry also functions as a second-hand 
provider of Korean drama that resells Mandarin-dubbed versions to 
                                                 
14 In 2002, the price of Korean dramas was the lowest of imported programmes; the average price 
of Korean dramas per episode was around 120-150,000 New Taiwan Dollars (NTD) or even lower. 
However, at the same time the price of a Chinese drama was around 150-200,000 NTD, and 
300-400,000 NTD for a Japanese one (Nian, 2002; Sakai, 2004; Shim, 2008). One NTD was 
roughly equivalent to £0.02 stg in 2013 and 2014. 
15 They were often among the top TV drama ratings, beating most local and foreign dramas. 
16 GTV is the abbreviation of Gala Television, a cable network in Taiwan established in 1997. 
17 In Japan, Winter Sonata was first broadcast in April 2003 on NHK BS2, a pay satellite TV 
channel owned by NHK, Japan’s public service broadcaster. However, it was not until its first 
terrestrial broadcast in April 2004 on NHK that the drama gained general popularity. In the case of 
Dae Jang Geum, it was broadcast in Taiwan in May 2004. By comparison, it was not until January 
2005 and September in the same year that Hong Kong and China broadcast the drama. In Japan, it 
was first on air on NHK BS2 in October 2004, and broadcast on NHK one year later in October 
2005.   
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Mandarin-speaking countries/regions. For example, GTV’s Mandarin-dubbed 
version of Dae Jang Geum was resold to China and experienced significant 
popularity (Leung, 2008).18 It can be argued that the Taiwanese TV industry played 
a crucial role in mediating and promoting the regional flows of Korean dramas in 
the early 2000s in Chinese-speaking regions including Hong Kong and China 
(Shim, 2008). 
 
ii. Regional Geopolitics and the Shaping of Cultural Identity 
Japan went through the earliest regional experience of westernisation and 
modernisation in contemporary Asian history. By the end of the 19th century, it had 
become the most developed country and an imperial power in Asia – the only 
imperial force from the region. Today it remains one of the most developed, core 
countries in the world system (Wallerstein, 1999). Given this, Japan’s relations with 
its Asian neighbours are sensitive on a number of different levels. In Taiwan, while 
it took decades for the ban on Japanese media materials to be lifted completely, 
these materials (dramas in particular) promptly gained popularity, and eventually 
triggered the avid reception of Japanese popular culture on a wider level (i.e. Japan 
Fever). Public debates on Japan Fever focused on whether it was a sign of the 
revival of Japanese imperialism. For instance, the main public dispute over the 
legalisation of satellite TV in 1988 centred on whether it would lead to a “cultural 
                                                 
18 The business arrangement concerning Dae Jang Geum concluded between GTV and with Hunan 
Satellite TV, a local TV channel in China, demonstrates the role the Taiwanese industry plays in 
promoting the Korean Wave in the region. As Leung (2008) points out, it was not until Dae Jang 
Geum became a blockbuster in Taiwan that Hunan Satellite TV purchased exclusive broadcasting 
rights for the Mandarin-dubbed version from GTV. In China, local stations are not allowed to 
approach foreign distributors directly. Nevertheless, Hunan Satellite TV purchased the broadcast 
rights through GTV, which is not considered a “foreign” distributor under the PRC’s ideology (as 
China claims that Taiwan is part of China rather than a sovereign entity). By helping Hunan Satellite 
TV to bypass broadcasting regulations in China, “Taiwan acts as an interesting intermediary for the 
local mainland Chinese stations” (p. 64). 
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invasion” via Japanese programmes (Hsu, 1988). Such disputes were especially 
prevalent in the late 1990s to early 2000s when Japan Fever was at its peak 
(Iwabuchi, 2002).  
 
However, Ko (2004) points out that if Japan Fever indicates an imperialist cultural 
invasion, the long-standing Americanisation evident in Taiwan should have been 
criticised as another form of cultural incursion. Nevertheless, she argues that while 
Japan Fever was frequently criticised as a form of cultural imperialism in the late 
1990s to the early 2000s, the Taiwanese have been tolerant of American culture and 
more inclined to take its existence for granted. Chen (2010) also shares the same 
observation, contending that this indicates that America as an object of 
identification has been “so thoroughly integrated into our thoughts and practices 
that we have lost the ability to critically engage with the issue of U.S. imperialism 
at all” (p. 178).19  
Ko (2004) further argues that although Hong Kong, China and Korea are also 
political and cultural Others, in terms of domestic intellectual and public debates 
their cultural products seemed to be more acceptable in Taiwan than those from 
Japan in the late 1990s and early 2000s. She considers it imperative to examine 
why the Otherness of Japan was considered more threatening in Taiwan. She 
contends that in the aftermath of Japan Fever, Japan was conceptualised in two 
contradictory ways. On the one hand, there was a new and modernised Japan 
                                                 
19 Chen (2010) argues that during the cold-war period, Japan, Korea and Taiwan became US 
protectorates, and a long-lasting legacy of this period is “the installation of the 
anticommunism-pro-Americanism structure in the capitalist zone of East Asia” (p. 7). One of the 
key consequences of this legacy, Chen considers, is that the United States has not merely become a 
central component in the constitution of East Asian subjectivity. Chen argues that the United States 
has been adopted as the default point of references in many East Asian countries, and this partly 
prevented East Asian academia and critics from adequately examining the Americanism in the 
region. See also Chapter 7 Section VII. 
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demonstrating a more culturally proximate and desirable form of urban modernity 
than that of the West. On the other hand, Japan remained as a historical imperial 
force (Y.-F. Ko, 2004). The suffering during the colonial past led to decolonisation 
campaigns that have lasted for more than fifty years. However, the desire for 
modernity, with Japan as the imaginable prototype, triggered a colonial complex 
and thereby showed the futility of decolonisation efforts. As a result, a certain 
cultural anxiety arose in public debate, a concern frequently evident in anti-colonial 
and anti-cultural imperialism discourses that coexisted with the yearning for a 
“Japanese style” of modernity generated by the popularity of Japanese culture. As 
Ko stresses, the omnipresence of Japanese pop culture re-invoked the former 
colonial relations between Taiwan and Japan and raised the dispute over Taiwanese 
cultural identity.  
 
The Korean Wave has also become a significant topic in academic as well as public 
debate in line with the its rising popularity. Compared to Japan Fever, the Korean 
Wave is the first significant cultural flow in this region generated by a 
semiperipheral and non-colonising country. This non-colonial feature makes 
Korean culture “relatively free from historical, political and cultural burdens” (Park, 
2006, p. 248) and thereby seems less threatening in comparison to its Western and 
Japanese counterparts, which is commonly considered as the main reason why 
Korean popular culture can be readily accepted regionally (H.-J. Cho, 2005; Y. Kim, 
2013; Shim, 2006, 2008; Sung, 2013).  
 
Moreover, according to Wallerstein (2004), Korea is a semiperipheral country, that 
is one “with strong enterprises that export[s] products to peripheral zones, but that 
also regularly relate[s] to core zones as importers of more “advanced” products” (p. 
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30). When Cho (2005) examines how Korean discourses make sense of the Korean 
Wave, she also defines her discourse analysis as “a study of the reflexive learning 
process of people living in the semi-periphery of the world system” (p. 149). 
Japanese popular culture is often seen as a cultural interpreter moving between the 
West and East Asia, providing “a variety of ‘Asianness’ that intensely indigenises 
‘Westernness’ or ‘Americanness’” (Iwabuchi, 2002, p. 105). By comparison, while 
it is also Westernised and industrialised, Korean popular culture is often considered 
more “Asian”, retaining cultural affinities with Chinese and other Asian cultures 
(e.g. Confucian values) (H. M. Kim, 2005; Park, 2006; Sung, 2013). According to 
Ryoo (2009), this “in-between” stance of Korea, “which is neither too advanced 
nor too behind” (p. 146) in terms of economic development, political power and the 
degree of Western and Eastern hybridisation, helps Korean popular culture’s 
reception in other Asian countries.  
 
While Japan Fever triggered intense debates regarding whether Japanese culture 
threatened local identities in other East Asian countries/regions, there was 
comparatively little of this discussion in the discourse on the Korean Wave, partly 
due to Korea’s non-colonial and semi-peripheral nature. Furthermore, the Korean 
Wave emerged when the regional media market at large was more liberalised and 
open to transnational collaborations and cultural exchanges compared to the early 
1990s. As a result, it represented a regional form of urban modernity different from 
its Japanese counterpart, which in turn has encouraged debates on the emergence of 
a regional identity in East Asia (Chua, 2004, 2008a, 2010; Katsumata, 2012).  
 
However, as argued earlier, there is still a significant lack of empirical analysis to 
support the idea of the emergence of East Asian identity. This study will examine 
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how Taiwanese audiences perceive Japanese, Korean as well as Western (North 
American) cultures through their consumption of foreign shows, and how such 
consumption might shape their understanding of foreign Others as well as local 
identities. It is through the examination of the construction of local identity that we 
can understand whether – or to what extent – a shared regional identity is possible 
(see Chapter 7). Specifically, the following two conditions are taken into account in 
this study. 
 
First, nearly twenty years have passed since the rise of Japan Fever. While Japanese 
cultural products are still prevalent, anti-Japanese discourse appears to have 
declined and is milder in tone and substance. Given the changes in transnational 
cultural flows, it is not appropriate to assume that Japan is the only significant other 
that triggers cultural anxieties over the local identity of Taiwan. Rather, it is 
important to ask whether, or in what sense, Korea or other foreign others are 
significant Others that shape how identity is constituted in Taiwan. 
  
Second, while regional cultural flows have intensified, it never indicates that 
cultural exchanges between countries are equal. Instead, the directions of the 
cultural and media flows are uneven, with Japan and Korea as the main centres that 
export their media and cultural products to other regions (Chua & Iwabuchi, 2008). 
At the same time, Western (mainly American) culture remains popular in the region. 
In the case of Taiwan, on the one hand, while the export of Taiwanese media 
products goes in the main to Chinese-speaking countries and regions (e.g. China, 
Hong Kong, Chinese diasporic communities in Western countries), very few reach 
Japan or Korea. The import-oriented structure of the Taiwanese television industry 
also contributes to Taiwan’s uneven cultural exchanges with Japan and Korea. It is 
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crucial to look at how the online consumption of foreign TV complicates 
transnational cultural flows.  
 
IV. The Legal Context Shaping the Consumption of Foreign Media 
in Taiwan and East Asia 
This section addresses three main legal conditions concerning the distribution of 
foreign media in Taiwan as well as East Asia as they play an important role in 
underpinning the Taiwanese online consumption of foreign TV. The three 
conditions include: 1) the attitudes of the Taiwanese government and copyright 
holders towards piracy; 2) the role of Chinese copyright laws and regulations in 
Chinese-speaking regions; 3) the implications of pirate VCD and DVD for media 
and cultural flows in East Asia.  
 
Firstly, while the copyright regulations towards foreign media texts in Taiwan were 
not strictly enforced before the 2000s, they nevertheless became stricter after 
Taiwan’s accession to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 2002. As a WTO 
member, Taiwan was required to implement the Agreement on Trade Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), an international agreement that 
establishes intellectual property regulations, within two years (before July 2004). 
As a result of this, the Taiwanese government started to amend its copyright laws 
and investigated its pirate disc markets in an aggressive manner. However, since 
then the WTO has gradually paid less attention to Taiwan’s TRIPS implementation, 
while the Taiwanese government has again become less active in terms of 
regulating piracy.  
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In terms of online sharing, the actions of the Taiwanese government and copyright 
owners have focused largely on the cases in which the illegal/unauthorised files are 
publicly placed on Taiwanese online services/websites (whose IP addresses are 
located in Taiwan). However, the government and copyright owners do not pay 
much attention to copyrighted files that are illegally or unofficially shared on 
foreign online platforms. For instance, while the government banned some 
Taiwanese websites that publicly shared copyrighted foreign content, it has never 
taken serious action against the use of video sharing or streaming services whose IP 
addresses are located outside Taiwan.  
 
Secondly, since China’s copyright regulations are looser than those of most 
developed countries, pirating activities are rampant, making China a global centre 
for piracy (Fowler & McBride, 2005; Hu, 2009; Tosa, 2008). Specifically, the 
Chinese fansubbing groups and forums are very active in producing and 
distributing fansubbed foreign media materials to Chinese-speaking regions, 
making them the major providers of foreign media contents. Taiwanese audiences’ 
access to the latest foreign materials is deeply reliant on these China-based online 
sharing and fansubbing activities: they serve as a springboard for audiences to 
bypass Taiwanese copyright laws while consuming foreign content not legally or 
officially available otherwise. As a result, when the Chinese government makes any 
changes to its copyright regulations, Taiwanese audiences’ access to foreign 
materials will be affected.  
 
For instance, in 2009, the Chinese government declared its determination to 
implement stricter regulations in order to eliminate piracy, with online piracy of 
foreign media the key target. Most Chinese online services that provided foreign 
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shows illegally either temporally deleted them or shared them in a more low profile 
manner (e.g. limiting access to exclusive, qualified members) to avoid being 
accused of copyright infringement. However, several weeks later, when the 
Chinese government had not moved any further on this issue, the illegal contents 
gradually returned online, with more complicated and private settings required for 
access. Beginning in 2011, some P2P TV or video-streaming services also started 
to set up IP restrictions to prevent users whose IP addresses are located outside 
mainland China from using their services.20 Since then, this development has made 
foreign materials less accessible than they used to be. However, as the Chinese 
government has not whole-heartedly maintained its actions, the illegal and 
unauthorised distribution of foreign media materials is occasionally threatened but 
never eradicated (see also Chapter 7 Section V).  
 
Thirdly, in East Asia, before file sharing became the most popular means to obtain 
foreign shows not legally available, VCD21 and DVD were used for the same 
purpose. VCD is a digital CD format with poor audio-visual quality that was 
popular in most parts of Asia (including Taiwan and Hong Kong) in the late 1990s 
and the early 2000s. However, VCD did not enjoy significant success in Japan, 
North America, and other developed countries. Instead, it was its successor, DVD, 
which has a higher audio-visual capacity that was widely adopted. Davis and Yeh 
(2004, p. 237) use the term “Third World guerrilla-technology” to characterise the 
low audio-visual quality and price of VCDs. However, I believe they ignore 
                                                 
20 While a small amount of the content on these platforms was legally imported and distributed by 
the content providers, the majority was unauthorised.  
21 VCD is the first format for distributing films on standard 12 cm optical discs. Compared to DVD, 
whose capacity is between 4.7 gigabyte (GB) to 17.08 GB, VCD can only contain approx. 800 
megabytes (MB). Therefore, even the smallest DVD is still five times larger than that of VCD.  
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another key feature that makes VCD a Third World guerrilla-technology: its 
convenience in terms of copying and duplicating content.  
 
Given their digital format, VCD and DVD can be reproduced perfectly (i.e. the 
duplicated copy can be exactly the same as the original). Furthermore, the content 
can be distributed online instantly. These two features, which VCR lacks, make 
VCD and DVD much easier for users to illegally duplicate and distribute 
copyrighted content. Given these concerns, the global entertainment media have 
introduced Digital Rights Management (DRM) and applied this to copyrighted 
DVD, Blu-ray discs 22  and authorised disc players to prevent the illegal 
appropriation of copyrighted works on these formats.23 Nevertheless, despite its 
digital features, no copyright protection systems are enforced on VCD. This 
condition makes it much more convenient to illegally duplicate and distribute 
content on VCD rather than DVD formats. I argue that it is this 
copyright-disregarded aspect that is the crucial feature that has made VCD the 
“Third World guerrilla-technology”.  
 
                                                 
22 Blu-ray is a digital format designed to supersede DVD. It is capable of storing high-definition 
videos with a 25 GB capacity per layer.  
23 For example, the content-scrambling system (CSS), a kind of encryption technology, is applied to 
DVDs, drives and players. Moreover, DVD and Blu-ray region codes also allow the film industry to 
control distribution in terms of price and release dates according to region variation. A DVD disc 
with a specific region code cannot be played if the region code of the drive or player is different 
from that of the DVD disc. Sometimes the Hollywood industry and other content providers release 
their discs as region-free, allowing the discs to be played by DVD/Blu-ray players of all regions. 
There are also region-free DVD and Blu-ray devices that are able to play discs from all regions. 
Moreover, it is important to note that there are many “tactics” (Certeau, 1984) which are employed 
by worldwide audiences to transcend region code restrictions and/or CSS. For instance, it is 
common for audiences to hack their DVD/Blu-ray devices (e.g. DVD players, video game consoles) 
to make the devices region-free. As for the DVD drives on the computer, software applications 
which can play and duplicate discs while ignoring CSS and region codes are also widely used by 
audiences. Therefore, while contents are relatively better protected on copyrighted DVD/Blu-ray 
than on VCD, in practice the protection system on the former can still be bypassed by audiences. 
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Hu (2004, 2005) and Davis and Yeh (2004) point out two important reasons why 
pirated VCDs of Japanese dramas in the 1990s and early 2000s have flourished. 
First, compared to legal channels, the pirate disc companies (many of which were 
based in Taiwan or Hong Kong but produced the discs in China) provided a much 
larger number of the latest dramas for audiences to choose from. Second, they 
distributed these dramas at a much faster pace than that of the legal channels. When 
one of the most popular Japanese dramas of all time, Long Vacation, was broadcast 
in 1996 in Japan, it was promptly circulated in pirate markets. However, it was not 
until 2001 that it was legally on air in Taiwan. It was unsurprising that those 
audiences who were keen to consume the latest Japanese dramas turned to pirated 
VCDs, regardless of their low technical quality and illegality.  
 
Online sharing has significantly challenged pirate disc markets for access to foreign 
TV since it allows audiences to access a given media text much more efficiently 
and with even lower cost: a given foreign text can be promptly circulated 
worldwide within minutes or hours after it is broadcast domestically, and in many 
cases the text can be accessed for free. Subsequently, the pirate disc markets in 
Taiwan, Hong Kong and China have become much smaller in recent years.  
 
Tosa (2008) argues that “grass-rooted” technologies such as pirated DVDs or 
VCDs can be regarded as a form of “digital fast food”, which enables movies and 
dramas to be consumed rapidly and become popular worldwide. He argues that the 
reason why US culture has become globalised is not just because it is imposed on 
other countries by the US. Rather, developing countries also contribute to this: 
many media industries in developing countries exploit new technologies to pirate 
American media content and wildly distribute illegal products within and across 
73 
 
national borders. Tosa considers it important to look at the roles that piracy plays in 
economic and political relations between the First and the Third World in terms of 
globalisation.  
 
However, piracy does not exist exclusively in the Third World. In terms of online 
sharing, as many studies demonstrate it is widely used by audiences all over the 
world, including those from developed countries (e.g. Sweden, the UK and the US) 
to consume media texts (Casadesus-Masanell & Hervas-Drane, 2010; L. Edwards, 
Klein, Lee, Moss, & Philip, 2013; Larsson, Svensson, & Kaminski, 2013; Lessig, 
2003; Newman, 2012; Schwarz, 2013). As McDonald (2007, pp. 175-176) argues, 
as the core force in the global video market, Hollywood remains key to influencing 
technological and commercial changes in the digital video media industries, both 
domestically and globally. I argue that this influence is particularly evident in the 
way in which DRM is used on discs and Internet Protocol restrictions are imposed 
on streaming websites by the global media conglomerates, particularly in their 
attempt to control how the technologies are used and content is consumed 
throughout the world.  
 
Iwabuchi (2002) also argues that Japanese manufacturers (e.g. Sony) bought into 
Hollywood to “centralise product distribution” through acquiring control of both 
audio-visual hardware and software, since they regarded that cultural distribution, 
as Garnham (1990, cited in Iwabuchi, 2002, p. 37) argues, acts as “the key locus of 
power and profit”. Such influence and power in both technological and commercial 
change is controlled mainly by a small number of transnational conglomerates and 
developed countries. In this sense, the features of Third World guerrilla-technology 
and digital fast food which help audiences worldwide to promptly access 
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programmes without being constrained by restrictions set up by media industries, 
can be regarded as a “tactic” in Certeau’s (1984) terms. Online sharing, in turn, is a 
more current form of tactic that serves the same purpose. The role of online sharing 
in the audiences’ consumption of foreign TV and its implications for transnational 
cultural flows will be further examined in Chapters 6 and 7. 
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Chapter 3: Television as Technology and Cultural Form in 
the Online and Cross-border Viewing Context 
Chapter 3 conceptualises key notions regarding the consumption of foreign TV via 
online sharing, which serve as theoretical frameworks for later chapters’ empirical 
analysis. Sections I and II discuss how two essential notions with regard to television, 
togetherness and liveness, have changed in the post-network era and in what sense the 
online consumption of television is associated with such changes.  
 
As a mass medium, television has been considered important in providing individual 
audiences with shared experiences, in other words generating a mediated public 
sphere in which individuals are linked with the general public (Gripsrud, 2010a). 
However, along with the digitalisation of television and media convergence, television 
forms are growing in number and diversity, challenging fundamental assumptions 
about television such as its position as a “window on the world”, or its capacity to act 
as a vehicle to structure everyday life on a mass level (Bennett, 2011; Spigel, 1992; 
Uricchio, 2009). These online services fragment the previously mass audience of 
television into a series of personalised choices. In the post-network or 
postbroadcasting era, television viewing as a shared experience seems to be 
increasingly questioned (Lotz, 2009). Moreover, the multiplication of television forms 
also indicates that it is less likely that audiences watch the same live broadcast at the 
same time in a communal setting. This tendency challenges another important notion 
of TV, namely “the aura of live television, the uniqueness, the here-and-now-ness of 
the broadcast event” (Cubitt, 1991, p. 35).  
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As an emerging norm of television experience, the increasing prevalence of features 
on-demand and personalising viewing possibilities has ensured that the online 
consumption of television continues to shape television’s notion of social togetherness 
and liveness. Reviewing television’s notions of togetherness and liveness helps to 
understand how the role of television as a technology and a cultural form (R. Williams, 
2003) has changed, and in what sense the online consumption of foreign TV has 
implications for our understanding of television and its audiences.  
 
Sections III to VI focus on the significance of television in the context of globalisation. 
Specifically, they analyse how transnational distribution and consumption of 
television shapes audiences’ identity and co-temporality with other cultures/countries, 
and how studying the Taiwanese consumption of foreign TV via online sharing sheds 
light on these issues. Section III reviews existing studies on media and cultural flows 
to understand how media and cultural flows have developed worldwide, and what 
critical issues these flows reflect at both global and regional (East Asian) levels. 
Section IV focuses on an important issue in the discussion on media flows: how the 
relation between media (television in particular) and national and cultural identity 
develops alongside globalisation. Section V examines in what sense the practices of 
dubbing and subtitling, as important measures to bridge linguistic barriers to 
audiences’ consumption of foreign texts, are associated with the former’s perceptions 
of foreign and local cultures and cultural identities. Section VI elaborates how 
television shapes the audiences’ conception of co-temporality with foreign 
locales/countries and how such conception is associated with cultural power 
relationships between countries.  
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I. Television and the Notion of Togetherness 
This section theorises and reviews the historical relationship between television and 
the notion of togetherness. Based on Ellis (2002), I use “togetherness” in terms of 
how audiences perceive the co-presence of fellow members via their media 
consumption. The range of fellow members depends on which zones of consumption 
we look at. These can include family members, national citizens, or people who share 
the same language, etc. The media provide “the elements of a culture-in-common” 
(Scannell, 1988, p. 29) in the process of consumption, ranging from a person’s 
interaction with other people via media (e.g. phone calls or online chats) to the shared 
reception of a TV programme. In such mediated togetherness, audiences do not 
necessarily have to be co-present face-to-face, since the media’s capacity to “connect 
individuals to others geographically elsewhere” (Morley, 2000, pp. 86-87) allows 
audiences to experience “togetherness in separation with their fellow audience 
members” (Ellis, 2002, p. 32). I concentrate here on electronic media, especially 
television and its various forms that converge with the Internet.  
 
The capacity of media to provide audiences with a sense of togetherness is a key 
factor regarding why they are considered important in the construction of 
communities. The role of media (especially that of television) in the construction of a 
nation is a main focus in media studies. Going back to the launch of radio, Scannell 
(1988) outlines how the scheduling of radio and television broadcast systems 
constructed a national life available to all of those covered by the broadcast. Morley 
(2006b, pp. 216-218) points out that, in most countries, television started as a public 
medium, watched collectively in public spaces before its domestication. It was “the 
symbolic meaning of the collective nature of television” (Yoshimi, 2003, p. 459) that 
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has made television significant (see Section IV for further discussion of television’s 
role in the construction of a nation).  
 
Focusing on the domestic space as a “zone” (Pertierra & Turner, 2013), various 
studies examine how living room television has worked as a unifying force, shaping 
family life and relationships (Kubey, 1990; Spigel, 1992) and linking domestic spaces 
with public spheres (Silverstone, Hirsch, & Morley, 1994; Spigel, 1992). TV viewing, 
especially in the early years of television’s domestication, was widely considered a 
shared family activity rather than an individual practice. For instance, Spigel (1992) 
argues that in the US, the American faith in family values was threatened during 
World War II, a conflict in which many families lost members and the tensions within 
households involving traumatised returned soldiers and their wives were intense. This 
led to the 1950s social obsession with the reconstruction of family life and domestic 
ideals. In this social climate, television was expected to act in public discussions (e.g., 
women’s magazines, newspapers) as a vehicle for restoring faith in family 
togetherness.  
 
In zones of consumption larger than domestic spaces, Williams (2003) stresses that 
television has served as “a form of unified social intake, at the most general levels” (p. 
21). This feature has been examined in studies concerned with the role of media in 
constructing communal memory (Lipsitz, 1990; van Dijck, 2004; Wales, 2008), 
especially through the live broadcast of media events (Dayan & Katz, 1992) in which 
audiences experience “togetherness even when they are separate” (Zelizer, 1991, p. 
73).  
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Scannell (2000) further examines the communicative and temporal structures of 
everyday existence that media (television in particular) provide to audiences, and how 
such existence enhances a sense of social togetherness among individual audience 
members. He points out that there are three types of communicative structures 
involved in the everyday lives of human beings: 1) A “for-anyone structure” presents 
itself as useable and useful for anyone; 2) A “for-someone structure” is only 
meaningful and useful for a particular person; 3) A “for-anyone-as-someone structure” 
is an intermediary structure that links and holds the impersonal for-anyone structure 
and the personal for-someone structure in tension. Scannell argues that media provide 
individuals with for-anyone-as-someone structures that are in play in their schedules 
and outputs (e.g. programmes). In such structures, each one of us experiences what 
we see or read as if it spoken to us personally, while at the same time each of us also 
“knows that just as it speaks to me it speaks to millions of others at the same time, 
now” (p. 19). Daily media, in this sense, articulate a shared generational time, in 
which individuals are “routinely gathered into a common, shared world of concern 
that is manifestly available for each and all” (p. 22). 
 
The introduction of recording technologies (e.g. videocassette and digital video 
recorders) since the 1980s complicated television’s function in terms of social 
togetherness and as experienced in various zones of consumption, because these 
technologies allowed audiences to time-shift their viewing, which in turn led to the 
fragmentation of TV experiences. Gray (1992) examines how housewives in the 
domestic space and local communities found that while the videocassette recorder 
(VCR) provided them with the freedom to choose viewing times, shared viewing 
pleasure with others (e.g. neighbours) was also sacrificed. Cubitt (1991) argues that 
television programmes commonly use terms or phrases such as “we”, or “thank you 
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for joining us tonight” to engage with audiences in the manner of a personal address, 
and this “pretence of dialogue” is one of television’s features. However, VCR’s 
time-shifting function not only challenged the unity of the audience, but also altered 
the latter’s relation to the temporal referent of “tonight’, and the sense of “we”, “us”, 
“you”, “your”, etc. Boddy (2004) indicates that the capacity to provide the experience 
of simultaneity and liveness was traditionally considered both as part of television’s 
nature and central to its relation to the nation. However, by breaking the simultaneity 
and liveness of broadcasting, the popularity of recording technologies and other 
digital devices raise concerns regarding “the long-standing privileging of the live 
nationwide broadcast as [a] guarantor of national cohesion” (p. 104).  
 
The increased challenges new media technologies and services impose on the notion 
of television continue to be a central concern in media studies. For instance, how the 
traditional social functions of media events change (Couldry, Hepp, & Krotz, 2010), 
or how the transnational media can be used by diasporic communities to maintain 
their ties and shape their identity at local, national or transnational levels have been 
discussed (Georgiou & Silverstone, 2006; Karim, 2003). The Internet – with which 
television has converged – also complicates the relationship between media and 
audiences’ sense of togetherness. It raises issues such as how online communities 
connect fans with each other on virtual spaces in order to construct fandom (Baym, 
2000), how the use of the Internet and personal devices resulted in audiences being 
“alone together” (Turkle, 2011), or how user-generated platforms construct new forms 
of communities and television viewing (Uricchio, 2009).  
 
While the growth of online platforms and personal media devices complicates 
television’s role in social togetherness, it is inappropriate to assume that the media 
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environment and audiences just switch from one end (broadcasting-mass audiences) 
to another (narrowcasting-individualised). For instance, focusing on the UK context, 
Theodoropoulou (2003) studies the subscribers of Sky TV’s digital service in 2001. 
He points out that, although more channels were available on Sky’s digital platform, 
the most popular channels among the subscribers remained the traditional free-to-air 
channels (e.g. BBC1, Channel 4). On user-generated platforms such as YouTube, 
content from broadcast television also tends to attract many more viewers than that 
generated by users (Burgess & Green, 2009). Research conducted by the British 
communications regulator Ofcom (2013) also indicates that the increased use of 
mobile devices as a second screen (e.g. tablet, smartphone) does not necessarily 
fragment television’s role in social togetherness. Rather, the living room television is 
making a comeback in the UK: families are increasingly gathering around the main 
TV set watching live broadcasting together as they were in the 1950s. What is 
different, Ofcom argues, is that family members are also multi-tasking via other 
media devices: they chat with friends on social media, surf the Internet, or stream 
other content on smartphones and tablets when they are watching the living room TV 
with family members.   
 
More important questions to be looked at include how broadcast television as well as 
newer forms of television offer (or fail to offer) “for-anyone-as-someone” structures 
in which shared experiences and a sense of togetherness can be attained and how, in 
turn, such offerings shape television’s role in social togetherness. Studying the 
consumption of foreign TV via online sharing – one of the most popular emerging 
forms of television consumption – helps us to understand the contemporary role of 
television in the post-network era.  
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II. Television’s Notion of Liveness in the Online Setting 
After conceptualising television’s role in social togetherness for the later empirical 
analysis, this section further discusses the notion of liveness, which is considered a 
key feature of television as well as an important condition regarding whether 
togetherness can be achieved or lost through television viewing. This section first 
conceptualises the notion of liveness in relation to broadcast television, the most 
general television form. Second, it examines the relationship between live television 
and social media and ask in what sense live television and liveness remain significant 
in the post-network context.  
 
i. Television and the Notion of Liveness  
How and to what extent media technologies can generate a sense of liveness, presence 
and immediacy among the audience (Corner, 1997) has been a crucial topic in media 
studies. The ability of broadcasting to convey information over distance without time 
lapse is the basis of its claim to liveness (Auslander, 2008; Crisell, 2012). The pursuit 
of liveness in particular is facilitated by television, which is capable of transmitting 
both audio and video signals simultaneously to a mass audience in real time as events 
happen (Bourdon, 2000).  
 
In this study, the notion of liveness mainly refers to the definitions provided by Ellis 
(2002) and Crisell (2012). Crisell (2012) defines liveness with regard to broadcasting 
as follows: “Broadcast content is live in the sense that everything that radio and 
television stations transmit is received, or is capable of being received at the moment 
it is transmitted”(p. 7). Moreover, as Ellis (2002) points out, from the audiences’ 
perspective, while a single transmission is beamed out via broadcasting to dispersed 
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audiences who are watching or listening simultaneously, audiences may in turn have a 
sense that many others are consuming the same thing at the same time. According to 
Crisell (2012), this form of “co-presence in time” (while separated in space) (p. 14) as 
offered by broadcasting, is a crucial feature of television (and radio) liveness. It is 
important to note that, “co-presence in time” also serves as an important condition for 
the construction of audiences’ sense of “coevalness” (Fabian, 1983; Wilk, 1994) in 
audiences’ encounters with foreign cultures. While the notion of coevalness will be 
discussed more comprehensively in Section VI and Chapter 6, I want to address some 
other dimensions of television as related to liveness here.  
 
Spigel (1992) argues that television as a media technology was expected to be more 
capable of reproducing reality or delivering live and present entertainment into the 
home compared to other media in the 1950s. Specifically, public debates stressed that 
TV had the ability “to transport the audience to the site of events taking place 
elsewhere at the moment” (p. 138) and thus gave viewers a sense of being in the 
presence of performances. In the practice of television production, it was also 
commonly seen that when the major networks produced prime-time formats (e.g. the 
live anthology drama, the variety show) they applied the conventions of live theatrical 
entertainment. The purpose of doing so was to attract audiences by making them feel 
as if they were really at the theatre while they were, in fact, at home. Spigel calls this 
application of and appeal to theatrical, live performance the “aesthetics of ‘presence’” 
(p. 139). As Doane (1990) also points out, “time is television’s basis, and its principle 
of structuration, as well as its persistent reference” (p. 222). She argues that via its 
representation television always addresses a “present-ness” and instantaneity as its 
form of temporality.  
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Friedman’s (2002) considers that live television should be regarded as a mode of 
broadcasting, rather than a television genre. Attempting to categorise the different 
forms of liveness television generates, he distinguishes between four dominant modes 
of live texts, including (re)presentations, ceremonies, unstructured events, and 
unscripted events. Friedman rightly argues that when we see live TV as a mode of 
broadcasting, we recognise that its feature is “broadcast at the time it occurs” (p. 141). 
However, it is important to note that only factual programmes (e.g. news, sports) are 
included in the classification of his four types of live TV. Nevertheless, the crucial 
questions at stake are: if “live TV” is seen as a mode of broadcasting, can we exclude 
all forms of broadcasts of any fictional or pre-edited programmes? Is the sense of 
liveness exclusively attached to live, non-fictional, open-ended programmes?  
 
Couldry (2004) argues that in television’s early days, all programmes were live 
performances aired in real time. Television at that time could be seen as a “live” 
medium in the sense of “being broadcast as it was performed”. When the proportion 
of live performances declined, the reference point of the term “live” mainly shifted to 
the live broadcast of non-fictional events. However, Couldry argues that concept or 
sense of liveness should not be limited to the live broadcast of non-fictional genres. 
Rather, “the decisive criterion of liveness is not so much the factuality of what is 
transmitted, but the fact of live transmission itself” (p. 355). As Ellis (2002) explains: 
 
Television’s sense of liveness does not depend solely upon its programmes; it 
also lies in the very organisation of transmission. Transmission is live, even 
when the programmes are not. So recorded programmes are able to claim the 
status of liveness for themselves simply because the act of transmission attaches 
them to a particular moment (Ellis, 2002, p. 31).  
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In this sense, even if the shows are fictional (e.g. dramas), at the time they are on air 
(i.e. being live transmitted), their broadcasts can be considered as a mode of live 
broadcast. As Bourdon (2000) argues, watching television live is also “watching 
non-recorded television” (p. 550). When studying how online consumption of 
television is associated with liveness, this study not only includes the consumption of 
live, factual programmes but also that of pre-edited, fictional programmes. It 
examines in what sense watching foreign fictional genres live (or with a small delay) 
helps audiences “to become part of a specific interpretive community, and beyond of a 
national audience” (Bourdon, 2000, p. 550).    
 
ii. Live Broadcasts’ Relation to Social Media 
As discussed earlier, the multiplication of television forms and the advancement of 
recording technologies appear to challenge the importance of television’s liveness. In 
recent years, it has been common to see critics argue that social media such as 
Facebook or Twitter may significantly increase TV ratings. Critics who strongly 
believe in social media’s contribution to ratings even go so far as to argue that social 
media can save television broadcasting (K. Anderson, 2009; Boorstin, 2011; Goldman, 
2011; Norris, 2010; Pomerantz, 2013).  
 
This rhetoric is generally based on two assumptions. Firstly, critics and journalists 
(Bercovici, 2013; Boorstin, 2011; Norris, 2010; Pomerantz, 2013) often argue that the 
importance of live TV has declined given the popularity of time-shifting technologies 
and services (e.g. Tivo, iPlayer), thereby viewers no longer follow TV schedules. 
Secondly, social media can also serve as convenient online platforms that allow 
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people to discuss anything in real time with others, either acquaintances or strangers. 
Subsequently, many people start to use social media (Twitter in particular) to talk 
about (or to “tweet” about) certain programmes at the same time as they are watching 
them live. When more audiences do this, it can generate a sense of immediacy and 
togetherness, because talking about the programmes or reading relevant discussions 
on Twitter can make participants feel that they are simultaneously involved in the live 
broadcast of the programme as an “event” with others. However, if audiences want to 
enjoy this immediate togetherness (provided by Twitter), they have to stick to the live 
broadcasts since that is the only way they can ensure that there will be other people 
consuming the same thing at the same time. As Twitter’s CEO Dick Costolo (2011, as 
cited in Goldman, 2011) puts it, “Twitter provides a social framework around 
television, forcing people to watch shows as they air to get the full TV-watching 
experience […] TV shows become events, meaning people watch them as they 
happen”. It is in this sense that critics consider that social media can rescue live TV 
since it prompts people to return to live broadcasts, watching and talking about shows 
when they are on air. 
 
Nevertheless, while it may be true that social media encourages people to watch 
television in real time, the rhetoric of new social media regarding “helping” television 
live broadcasts only tells half of the story as it only focuses on how social media 
encourages the consumption of live broadcasts but ignores the corresponding 
significance of how broadcast television may boost the use of social media. According 
to Boorstin (2011), Twitter suggests that the number of tweets sent during a live 
sporting event or awards show can be fifty times larger than on an average occasion. 
Nielsen reports that in the US, 58% of TV viewers surf the Internet while watching 
TV, and the numbers of such viewers peak during live events. Moreover, although 
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nearly 40% of Americans own a digital video recorder (DVR), live TV ratings are 
holding up.  
 
The 30th Olympic Games, London 2012, provides an example of the importance of the 
liveness of live broadcasting. Given the significant growth of social media usage since 
the last games (Beijing 2008) (Farr, 2012; Ong, 2012),1 London 2012 was widely 
marked in media discourses as the first “Socialympics” (i.e. social Olympics), 
whereby audiences were connected with other viewers (and even with the athletes) by 
engaging in social media (Farr, 2012; Vidyarthi, 2012). This connectivity, which 
meant that audiences were able to communicate immediately with others in real time, 
while the games were in prograss (as well as before and after the games), enabled 
conversations between the people (e.g. viewers, athletes, game organisers) who were 
involved in the Olympic spectacle. Therefore, the International Olympic Committee 
(IOC) hailed London 2012 as the first “conversational” Games (Lopez, 2012; Pfanner, 
2012).  
 
The above analysis regarding the relation between TV ratings and the use of social 
media indicates that live broadcasts can, in fact, encourage the use of social media and 
help to maintain television’s significance in media convergence. In this regard, the 
relation between television (live broadcasts in particular) and social media may be 
mutually beneficial in terms of audience use/consumption. Moreover, as Ofcom (2013) 
points out, despite the rise in the proliferation of connected devices in the UK, “TV 
viewing in the home remains predominantly live (i.e. watched at the time of 
                                                 
1 According to Ong (2012), the opening ceremony of London 2012 inspired 9.66 million tweets, and 
those tweets generated in the first 24 hours of the games numbered more than the total number posted 
in Beijing 2008. Farr (2012) also notes that while there were 6 million users on Twitter in 2008, there 
were more than 600 million in 2012.  
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broadcast)” (p. 135), with 88% of TV owners (smart and traditional ones combined) 
using TV daily for live content. Rather than claiming that television is being saved by 
social media, it seems more appropriate to argue that, as Schneider’s (2012) title puts 
it, “live TV still matters”. The possibility that television can boost social media usage 
indicates that audiences’ inclination to watch live broadcasts is still significant. The 
importance of social media, in this sense, lies in how it functions as virtual, 
space-crossing set of platforms that encourage audiences to instantaneously talk about 
specific shows with others in real time. This study will look at how the consumption 
of foreign TV via online sharing is associated with television’s notion of liveness, and 
in what sense liveness matters in the audiences’ consumption (see Chapter 5 Section 
IV and Chapter 6 Sections I and II).  
 
After discussing how two notions concerning television’s ontology, togetherness and 
liveness, have changed in media convergence, Sections III to VI focus on 
conceptualising the role of television in globalisation. They discuss how transnational 
distribution and consumption of television shapes audiences’ identity and sense of 
coevalness with other cultures, and in what sense studying the Taiwanese online 
consumption of foreign TV sheds light on these issues. Section III reviews existing 
studies on media and cultural flows to understand how media and cultural flows have 
developed worldwide, and how critical issues the flows have raised are reflected at 
both global and regional (East Asian) levels. 
 
III. Debates on Media and Cultural Flows 
i. The Cultural Imperialism Thesis 
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The term “media flow” generally refers to the distribution and circulation of media 
products. As media flows became increasingly globalised in parallel with the 
emergence of transnational media corporations since the 1960s, many social theorists, 
especially political economists, revealed that the direction of flows was highly 
unequal: media products were predominately distributed from West to East, from 
North to South (White, 2003). Mirrlees (2013) argues that social theorists based on 
theories of capitalist world system, dependency and new colonialism, have developed 
the concept of cultural imperialism to critically examine how media corporations 
extend unequal power relations between the First World (especially the US) and the 
rest of the world. In this thesis, cultural and media products are regarded as “an 
instrument of one nation-state’s economic, geopolitical and cultural power over 
others” (p. 21).  
 
Schiller (1969, 1991) is the most representative scholar whose work focuses on 
cultural imperialism. His analysis begins with explaining how global economic 
conditions contribute to the existing international geopolitical order. He considers the 
First World to be made up of the most developed, richest, industrialised Western 
countries who have adopted capitalism as their economic system. These countries are 
the “core” constituents of the international order that controls and dominates the 
allocation of national and human resources. On the contrary, the Third World refers to 
“periphery” countries that are less developed in terms of various social aspects and 
are kept at a distance from the centres of control at a global level. Schiller believes 
that the emergence of transnational media corporations is incorporated into this world 
system. The media content produced by these corporations is imposed on the Third 
World, functioning as an informational infrastructure that ideologically supports the 
existing “core-periphery” world system, thereby contributing to Western cultural 
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domination, which Schiller considers as constituting media-cultural imperialism. 
According to Schiller, media-cultural imperialism is not independent, but a part of 
general imperialism. Media-cultural production based on the capitalist economy is not 
only ideological but also profit-serving in the wider economic and political system.  
 
Schiller (1991) further argues that, while media-cultural power forces were based on 
nation-states in the 1960s and 1970s, these forces have now been subordinated to 
transnational corporate authority: a vast number of media-cultural products circulated 
worldwide are produced by a small number of transnational media conglomerates. 
This development, from his point of view, should be understood as “transnational 
corporate cultural domination” (p. 15).  
 
ii. Audiences, Cultural Globalisation and Problems of Cultural Imperialism 
While the idea of media-cultural imperialism was prevalent in the 1970s, it has been 
criticised later, especially from the perspective of audience and cultural studies. One 
of the key problems regarding the cultural imperialism thesis is that it ignores how 
audiences and consumers of foreign cultures interpret and respond to what they 
consume. It presumes that media has a straightforward, “hypodermic” effect on 
audiences and can determine and change the latter’s thoughts. Audiences were seen as 
a “passive victim” (Takahashi, 2010, p. 23) of these imperialistic media texts. 
However, as Tomlinson (1991) points out, one cannot directly equate the presence of 
Western media texts with cultural domination. He argues that if we want to 
understand whether cultural imperialism exists or how it works, it is necessary to 
analyse the way in which these imperialistic texts are read by audiences.  
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Much research demonstrates how audiences in fact have different interpretations of 
texts instead of completely accepting the “imperialist ideology” of the texts being 
proffered. Media texts are also frequently received differently in different countries. 
For example, while the American soap Dallas was well received domestically as well 
as in Western Europe, it failed to gain popularity in Japan (Ang, 1985; Liebes & Katz, 
1986, 1990). In Taiwan, research has indicated that being a fan of “imperialistic” 
media texts (e.g. American or Japanese dramas) does not necessarily mean that they 
are uncritical audiences who accept an embedded imperialistic ideology (M.-T. Lee, 
2003; Su & Chen, 2000; Sun, 1998; Yang, 2003). Rather, these researchers 
demonstrate the ways in which Taiwanese audiences “poach” (Jenkins, 1992) the 
meaning of those foreign texts and often reconsider their own cultures and cultural 
identities via their encounters with foreign content. 
 
The second problem of cultural imperialism is its premise that First World countries 
actively impose their media and cultural products on other weaker countries, thus 
extending their cultural domination over the latter. However, the question at stake is 
whether these core countries are always active agents imposing their products upon 
the rest of the world. For instance, the Japanese television industry is, in general terms, 
was less interested in exporting its products compared to countries such as the US, the 
UK or Korea. As mentioned in Chapter 2, when Japan Fever was at its peak in the 
1990s, it was local broadcasters (e.g. those in Taiwan or Hong Kong) that were more 
active in importing Japanese media texts to attract audiences and generate profits (Hu, 
2004; Iwabuchi, 2002, see also Chapter 2 Section III).  
 
Even the US television industry, one of the most active countries in terms of cultural 
exports, does not always actively export popular programmes to other markets, 
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especially to smaller ones such as Taiwan. Even if they export their programmes, they 
do not necessarily release the broadcast rights or export the programmes when the 
importing countries ask. In the consumption of foreign shows via worldwide online 
sharing, in a large number of cases it is not the core countries that actively impose 
their media-cultural products upon the rest of the world. Rather, it is audiences from 
other countries (whether peripheral or not) that are more active and eager to access the 
content made by the core countries (see also Denison, 2015 on the English-speaking 
world's fansubbing practices of Japanese media).  
 
For instance, in 2013, the third series of HBO’s popular TV series Game of Thrones 
was widely and illegally shared online; some of its episodes generated over four 
million global downloads. The high subscription fee of local paid-channels for legal 
access to the series and the time-gap between the legal broadcast and the US premiere 
contributed to this dynamic. The deal HBO made with other foreign broadcasters in 
that year did not provide the series simulcast, but it offered a relatively short time-gap 
between the US and local broadcasts compared to the transnational distribution of 
many other programmes (it was less than 6 hours in Australia and 20 hours in the UK). 
However, it did not prevent audiences from simultaneously downloading the series. 
Given that Australia topped the piracy rates on many of the most popular file sharing 
sites, the US ambassador to Australia, Jeffrey Bleich, publicly asked Australians to 
stop pirating the series (Crooks, 2013; Dewey, 2013). Such conditions challenge the 
cultural imperialism premise. It seems problematic to argue that the core countries 
necessarily, intentionally and aggressively impose their cultures on other countries, 
thus harming both the culture and the economy of recipient nations (see also Chapter 
8 Section III concerning the global simulcast of Game of Thrones in 2015). 
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The third problem of the original cultural imperialism argument lies in its exclusive 
focus on one-way flow from the First World to the rest of the world. As transnational 
cultural flows are now more diverse, it is no longer suitable to focus solely on this 
uni-directional flow. There have been more counter-flows or contra-flows generated 
from ex-colonies to former imperialist countries (Thussu, 2006). Brazil’s domination 
of the television market in the Lusophone world, including Portugal, is the most 
significant counter-flow, and has been diagnosed as reverse cultural imperialism 
(Straubhaar, 2004, pp. 90-91). The cultural flows within regions are also increasingly 
intense. In East Asia, as mentioned earlier, Japan and Korea distribute their media and 
cultural products to the rest of the region (Chua & Iwabuchi, 2008). In the 
consumption of foreign TV via online sharing in Taiwan, Korean and Japanese 
programmes – alongside American programmes – are the most popular foreign texts 
widely shared. How emerging regional flows influence transnational media 
consumption has to be taken into account when studying the consumption of foreign 
shows via contemporary online sharing.  
 
iii. The Importance of Political Economy 
Although there are limitations to the cultural imperialism thesis, this is not to say that 
we should abandon the issues concerning political economy that it has raised. 
Tomlinson (1991) argues that nowadays, the configuration of global power and the 
interrelationship between different parts of the world are different from those that 
prevailed in the 1960s, when global power relations were viewed predominantly 
through imperialist frameworks. The new configuration of global power should be 
understood as globalisation. He argues that globalisation is different from imperialism 
in that it is a less coherent or culturally-directed process. Globalisation indicates 
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interconnection and interdependency across the globe, and its effects are “to weaken 
the cultural coherence of all individual nation-states, including the economically 
powerful ones – the ‘imperialist powers’ of a previous era” (p. 175).  
 
However, as Harindranath (2003) points out, Tomlinson overlooks how existing 
unequal relations (especially different economic conditions) between developing 
countries and the First World may influence the process and direction of transnational 
cultural flows (see also Chapter 1 Section II).  
 
Furthermore, globalisation is partially a result of neo-liberalism and the spread of 
capitalism, and it is in the West where neo-liberalism and capitalism are most 
thoroughly developed. It is problematic to assume that globalisation leads to equal 
interrelationships between different parts of the world as if the centre-periphery 
models of cultural flow have faded. Particularly, as a lot of research shows. while the 
past three decades have seen the emergence of non-US “media capitals” (Curtin, 2007) 
worldwide, the US still largely dominates the world trade in television programmes 
and films (Mirrlees, 2013; Morley, 2006a; Sparks, 2007). It is in this sense that 
Morley (2006a) stresses the importance of developing a perspective that can deal with 
the important issues raised by both audience research and political economy when 
examining transnational cultural consumption. 
 
As Christophers (2009) underlines, if we are to understand the question of power in 
international, global television, we should look at the “inability of almost all 
international producers to penetrate and profit from the US market” (p. 227). In this 
regard, it is important to examine how different parts of the world are involved with 
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global cultural flows based on the idea of power-geometry, whose concern is about 
“power in relation to the flows and the movement” (Massey, 1994, p. 149). 
 
While most East Asian countries set post-war limitations on cultural imports to protect 
their domestic media development, many of them (including Taiwan) went through 
media liberalisation and opened their markets to outside countries from the mid-1980s 
onwards. Thomas (2005) argues that most Asian countries have been compelled to 
integrate into the capitalist world economy and they have experienced the 
globalisation of their television industries. However, by no means are global media 
flows equal. On the one hand, in East Asia American culture is still popular and 
influential in various ways (e.g. economy, the shaping of local cultural identity, see 
Chua & Cho, 2012; Chun, 2012; Matsuda, 2012). On the other hand, most East Asian 
media products have difficulties entering the mainstream US market. In other words, 
the direction of global cultural flows remains substantially uneven (see also Section 
IV). This condition is taken into account in the empirical analysis of the consumption 
of foreign TV via online sharing in later chapters. 
 
An important debate on media and cultural flows is concerned with how the 
cross-cultural, transnational distribution and consumption of media texts influence the 
constitution of local identities and belongings. Mediascapes, 2  which provide 
“resources for experiments with self-making” and “new resources and disciplines for 
the construction of imagined selves and imagined worlds” (Appadurai, 1996, p. 3), 
play important roles in the transfiguration of local cultural belongings. Tomlinson 
(1999) considers it important to examine “how our very sense of cultural belonging 
                                                 
2 Appadurai (1996) refers to mediascapes as “the distribution of the electronic capabilities to produce 
and disseminate information, and the images of the world created by these media” (p. 35). 
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may be transfigured by the penetration of globalisation” (p. 10). The next section 
discusses how the relationship between media (television in particular) and national 
and/or cultural identity have developed in parallel with the advancement of 
globalisation.  
 
IV. Media and National Identity in the Global Age 
i. Television as a National Medium within Globalisation 
Since its introduction to most countries, television has operated as a national medium: 
it has been aired mainly via national broadcasting systems and viewed by these 
national broadcasters’ own citizens. It has been considered as important in shaping 
different national audiences’ sense of national belonging, identity and everyday life 
(see also Section I regarding television’s role in social togetherness). For instance, to 
use the UK as an example, Scannell (1988) examines the role national broadcasting 
systems (including radio and television) have played in mediating modernity, 
normalising the public sphere and socialising the citizen’s private life. McCarthy 
(2010) analyses how, during the inception of television in the US in the 1950s, 
different agents (e.g. corporations, intellectuals, governments) tried to use television 
as a vehicle for governing the morals, habits and mental development of Americans in 
order to create an ideal form of American citizenship.  
 
Yoshimi (2003) reviews the historical development of Japanese television and 
demonstrates how TV broadcasting has functioned as a nationwide time structure, 
linking audiences’ domestic memories with national history. In so doing he articulates 
the relationship between television and nationalism in contemporary Japan. In Taiwan, 
Lihyun Lin (2005) demonstrates the ways in which the government used television to 
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strengthen its authority at the dawn of television broadcasting in the early 1960s. Ko 
(2009) shows how the government, during the same period, inserted its idea of the 
“nation” into family life with the advent of television. While based on different 
national contexts, the above studies all demonstrate how television plays a significant 
role in constructing the nation/nationalism, thus shaping audiences’ lives on a national 
scale.   
 
The introduction of satellite television in the 1960s and 1970s made instantaneous 
global broadcasting possible, and thus marked a crucial development in the 
globalisation of television. In the 1980s, the popularisation of satellite and cable 
television and worldwide media deregulation not only encouraged global media 
expansion and distribution as Herman and McChesney (2003) argue, but also 
provided the basis for corporate consolidation in the media industry. Moreover, the 
emergence of the Internet in the mid-1990s and the subsequent development of media 
digitalisation and convergence in the 2000s enhanced the globalisation of television. 
As a result, television is no longer defined only as a broadcasting system confined to 
the borders of a given nation-state. However, this does not mean that TV as a national 
broadcasting system has come to an end. In most countries, national broadcasting, 
whether commercial or public, remains the system that attracts the largest audiences. 
Furthermore, most national broadcasting systems are still operated exclusively for 
their own national citizens under complex national, transnational and global 
broadcasting regulations.  
What is at stake, as Thussu (2004) argues, is the availability of multinational channels, 
which in turn have complicated the national discourse, with audiences being able to 
access local, national and foreign channels simultaneously as well as being able to 
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engage in different levels of mediated discourse. Therefore, he considers that the role 
of television in the construction of cultural identities is much more problematic than it 
was in the early years of television. This issue is particularly significant in the case of 
the online consumption of foreign TV, in which the audiences search for further 
deterritorialised (Tomlinson, 1999) media experiences. These audiences do not want 
their media choices to be confined to a given territory, even when there are local, 
national and foreign channels and programmes already provided by legal broadcasters. 
They actively cross temporal-spatial and national borders in order to directly access 
foreign broadcasting programmes, especially those which are supposedly produced or 
broadcast only for their own citizens to consume.  
ii. Global Media and a “Bifocal” Version of the Social World 
Archetti (1998) argues that national identity and belonging has its appeal and 
mystique in a particular territory or place, in which the nation is seen as a territory not 
shared with other foreigners. Nevertheless, global media, according to John Peters 
(1997), challenges the way different localities function “as a container of experiences” 
(p. 97). He argues that mass media offer us a ‘bifocal’ vision of the social world, in 
which media representations of totalising and global images may undercut the 
immediate knowledge and experience of our local world.3  Compared with the 
totalising, panoramic representations media provide, John Peters emphasises that our 
local knowledge and experiences are often too limited, fragmented, mired in 
immediacy, and thus “constantly discredited as a guide to living in the modern world” 
(p. 81). Similarly, when discussing the influence of globalisation on individual daily 
lives, Giddens (1991) claims that “the transformations of place, and the intrusion of 
                                                 
3 For instance, we may drive smoothly on a motorway, while only learning from the radio and 
television that there is a traffic jam miles away. 
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distance into local activities, combined with the centrality of mediated experiences, 
radically change what ‘the world’ actually is”. Therefore, he argues that “although 
everyone lives a local life, phenomenal worlds for the most part are truly global” (pp. 
187-188).  
 
As Evans (2011) argues, if viewers are able to access content from all around the 
world via illegal/unauthorised means, then the connection between television viewing 
and nationhood must be re-evaluated. By distributing the latest foreign programmes 
with the shortest time-gap, online sharing platforms increase “the capacity of 
mediated experience to involve us emotionally and morally with distant others, events 
and social-cultural contexts” (Tomlinson, 1999, p. 151), and therefore enhance 
audiences’ “bifocal” visions (J. D. Peters, 1997) of the world. It is in this sense that 
we should look at what implications online, border-crossing consumption have for 
television’s relations with national and cultural identity and belonging.  
 
iii. National and Local Identity in Globalisation 
While addressing the significance of online platforms in their capacity to introduce 
further globalised and mediated experiences to audiences, I do not assume that 
globalisation necessarily leads to the end of locality/nation-states, or a “borderless 
world” in Ohmae’s (1990) phrase. Berking (2003) argues that many theorists of 
globalisation share a belief that the “national” is increasingly losing its importance as 
the main frame for the construction of collective identities, and has been undermined 
or even replaced by deterritorialised identity formations. Typical arguments are based 
on three interlocking processes: “1) the globalisation of the national economy; 2) the 
institutionalisation of new transnational legal regimes; and 3) the globalisation of 
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media and motion, of mobile images and people in motion” (p. 250). Tomlinson (2004) 
also argues that it is commonly understood that globalisation leads to a destruction of 
national identity, while the Western media plays a key role in this process. This kind 
of argument, he continues, is based on two assumptions: First, before the era of 
globalisation, there were well-defined cultural connections between geographical 
place and cultural experience, and these connections constituted people’s cultural 
identity. Second, what globalisation brings about is a homogenisation of cultural 
experience which destroys stable localities and wipes out the differences between 
locality-defined cultures which had previously constituted our identities.  
 
There are at least three problems concerning globalisation in the above assumptions. 
First, economic transnationalisation and globalisation does not necessarily destroy 
national borders and lead to a single homogenised culture as Ohmae (1990) suggests. 
Mann (1995) states that, although international trade has greatly increased, “the 
national basis of production and trade seem undiminished” (p. 117). If we look at the 
contemporary mediascapes worldwide, such as that discussed earlier regarding the 
television industry, we can also see that national television systems remain the main 
form of television, and a large number of televisual products are still produced and 
consumed nationally. In this sense, the nation-state as a unit remains influential, even 
when the economy is increasingly globalised.   
 
Second, although it seems that cultural or national unity is often territorially bound, 
connections between geographical place and cultural experiences are anything but 
natural and well-defined. Given the differences between people with regard to social 
status and conditions (e.g. gender, income, class and age differentials) longstanding 
before globalisation, people who live in the same territory (e.g. the same town, city, 
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nation) do not necessarily share homogenous cultural experiences at a particular and 
given time. However, such cultural differences between people might not be 
enunciated when it comes to the conceptualisation of “the nation”. As Donald (1988) 
argues, “cultural heterogeneity is given a certain fixity by the articulating principle of 
‘the nation’. ‘The nation’ defines the culture’s unity by differentiating it from other 
cultures […] a fictional unity […] because the ‘us’ on the inside is itself always 
different” (p. 32).  
Third, Berking (2003) argues that the declaration of the end of the nation-sate ignores 
the fact that the “national” represents “not only identities but our dominant form of 
sociation as national-state organised societies” (p. 248). While globalising processes 
do indeed affect the form of the modern nation-state, the consequence is not so much 
the end of the nation-state, but a “reconfiguration process of the relation between state, 
territoriality, sovereignty and identity” (p. 261). Using the work of Castells (1997) as 
an example, Tomlinson (2004) states that, instead of resulting in the destruction of 
national identity, globalisation in fact may be a significant force in shaping and 
proliferating cultural and national identities and belongings.  
To summarise, while globalisation may have an impact on how local places (e.g. a 
hometown, a nation) serve as containers’ of experiences, it is problematic to assume 
that globalisation leads to the destruction of local cultural and national identities. 
Cultural (or national) identity and belonging can be seen as a matter of negotiation, 
rather than a fixed unity. It is important to consider how forms of cultural and/or 
national identity change in the process of global encounters, such as the mediated 
cultural experiences brought about by global media. Regarding the relationship 
between the online consumption of foreign TV and identity, I am interested in how an 
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audience’s understanding of local and global cultures develops via these modes of 
consumption. Specifically, how do audiences understand foreign countries when they 
can have access to an amount of the latest foreign media content larger than ever 
before? I will also examine how audiences’ senses of national cultures may in turn be 
shaped by their understanding of foreigners since, as Morley and Robins (1995) point 
out, cultural or national identities are only “constituted in and through their relations 
to one another” (p. 45).  
 
Furthermore, when it comes to the consumption and comprehension of 
cross-linguistic foreign television programmes, audiences may encounter the 
linguistic barriers: they do not speak the language of the foreign content they consume. 
Accordingly, it has been an important task for distributors and broadcasters to find 
appropriate translation practices “to transpose the language of the source programme 
into a form the target audience will readily understand” (Kilborn, 1993, p. 642). If we 
are to analyse how audiences’ understanding of foreign cultures develops along with 
their viewing of foreign programmes, it is imperative to first examine how the 
possible language barriers may be coped with through various translation practices. 
Given these considerations, the next section looks at the role dubbing and subtitling 
play in transnational, cross-linguistic media consumption. Specifically, it analyses 
how dubbing and subtitling function as “transformative practices” (Adamou & Knox, 
2011, p. 17)4 that shape audiences’ understanding and perception of foreign and local 
cultures (a crucial issue to be discussed in Chapter 7). The practices of dubbing and 
subtitling in the Taiwanese context will also be addressed.  
                                                 
4 Adamou and Knox (2011) point out that dubbing and subtitling not only “contribute to determining 
the meaning of the target text, but they problematize notions of a fixed, stable core of textual identity” 
(p. 17). It is in this sense that these two translation measures are understood by Adamou and Knox as 
“transformative practices”. (p. 17).  
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V. Dubbing, Subtitling and Their Alteration of Foreignness 
 
Dubbing and subtitling are two crucial measures to bridge language gaps and cultural 
differences which audiences may experience in their consumption of foreign media 
texts. Dubbing and subtitling, by altering the foreignness of media texts in different 
ways, may influence audiences’ understanding of these foreign texts. As Danan (1991) 
argues, dubbing is “an attempt to hide the foreign nature of a film by creating the 
illusion that actors are speaking the viewer’s language” (p. 612). It is through such 
processes that “dubbed movies become, in a way, local productions” (p. 612). On the 
other hand, subtitling is “an extreme form of source-oriented translation […] viewers 
are constantly reminded of the foreignness of a film by the presence of the original 
soundtrack” (pp. 612-613). Similarly, Chan (2011) sees dubbing as a form of cultural 
domestication, and subtitling as a form of foreignisation, or “preserving the 
foreignness” in Chua’s (2008b, 2011) terms.  
 
The respective employment of the two translation practices varies worldwide, and 
which practice is chosen in a given country is partly based on economic conditions. 
Generally speaking, as dubbing is much more expensive than subtitling, it is more 
often used in larger countries which have bigger media markets. On the other hand, 
small economies (e.g. Austria, The Netherlands) tend to adopt subtitling when 
importing foreign media (Kilborn, 1993; Wissmath, Weibel, & Groner, 2009).5 More 
importantly, the employment of either dubbing or subtitling by a given country may 
also be seen as an expression of nationalism or it can be associated with issues 
                                                 
5 For instance, in Europe, while dubbing is generally used in larger countries (e.g. Italy, Germany, 
Spain), subtitling is used in smaller countries such as Belgium, Austria and the Scandinavian countries 
(Wissmath et al., 2009).  
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concerning cultural identity (Burgelman & Pauwels, 1992; Danan, 1991; Kilborn, 
1993). For instance, in his analysis of translation practices in Western European 
countries, Danan (1991) points out that “suppressing or accepting the foreign nature 
of imported films is a key to understanding how a country perceives itself in relation 
to others” (p. 613). While subtitling corresponds to a cultural system more open to 
foreign influences, dubbing often results from dominant national systems in which 
nationalistic media rhetoric and language policy are promoted.  
 
In Taiwan, where the media industry is highly import-oriented and relatively open to 
foreign media texts (see Chapter 2), the policy regarding translation practices is 
flexible. Under the Radio and Television Act,6 while foreign-language programmes 
on free-to-air networks are required to be either subtitled or dubbed, no specific 
requirement or rules are applied regarding which translation practice should be 
chosen.7 The cable TV system is allowed to broadcast more foreign programmes with 
no regulatory stipulation regarding what translation practices are used. In practice, 
both subtitling and dubbing are commonly employed on TV (including free-to-air, 
cable and satellite networks), and the broadcasters’ decision as to which mode to 
employ depends mainly on economic reasons: broadcasters go for the practice most 
likely to attract greater audiences and/or earn more profit. Specifically, American 
programmes were typically subtitled when broadcast on free-to-air networks before 
the 1980s, as audiences (many of whom were elites and intellectuals) preferred the 
                                                 
6 Article 19 of the Radio and Television Act reads: “Locally produced programmes shall not be less 
than 70 per cent of the total radio/television programmes. Foreign-language programmes shall carry 
Chinese subtitles or broadcast with Mandarin narration. If necessary, the regulatory agency may 
instruct (sic) that the programmes be dubbed in Chinese” (official English translation). 
7 Japanese programmes and other media forms were the only foreign media texts which were strictly 
restricted regarding their importation or broadcasting before 1993 (Y.-F. Ko, 2008; Y.-T. Lin, 2011). 
However, restrictions on Japanese programmes were not listed in the Radio and Television Acts, but 
were detailed in other polices.  
105 
 
subtitled versions to the dubbed ones (Ho, 2002, p. 93). However, since the 1980s, the 
three free-to-air networks began to dub American series as a way to “popularise” 
these and to attract mass audiences. (Y.-T. Lin, 2011, pp. 52-55). Nowadays, 
American and other English programmes broadcast in Taiwan are more commonly 
subtitled, while dubbing is also employed and occasionally broadcast with 
multichannel television sound (MTS).8 
 
As part of an attempt at decolonisation, the use of the Japanese language in public 
places, schools, newspapers, and terrestrial broadcasting (including radio and 
television) was generally banned before the 1990s (Y.-F. Ko, 2008, 2009). In the rare 
cases in which certain Japanese programmes were on air, they were mostly dubbed 
into Mandarin (Cao, 1992; M.-F. Chen, 1992). After Japanese programmes were 
allowed to be legally broadcast on both satellite and terrestrial television, the 
employment of dubbing or subtitling has not so much to do with geopolitical reasons 
but more with business concerns. When Japanese trendy dramas were first imported 
in the early 1990s most were dubbed into Mandarin. However, in the mid-1990s most 
Taiwanese networks stopped dubbing the majority of Japanese programmes in 
response to the insistence of Taiwanese audiences that they wanted to consume the 
“original” Japanese versions (Iwabuchi, 2002; Sakai, 2004). Nowadays, Japanese 
programmes are usually subtitled, except for cartoons that are occasionally dubbed 
(with or without MTS, see also Chapter 2 Section II).  
 
In terms of Korean programmes, the programmes broadcast in Taiwan are mainly 
dramas (and a relatively small number of variety shows, which are either dubbed or 
                                                 
8 For instance, satellite networks such as Travel and Living Channel (TLC) and Animal Planet tend to 
localise their services by dubbing a certain amount of their programmes.  
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subtitled). Korean dramas are usually dubbed without MTS, since local networks 
consider that the dubbed versions attract more audiences (H. M. Kim, 2005; Sakai, 
2004). As a result, in cases where both dubbed and undubbed versions are broadcast, 
the dubbed version of Korean dramas is usually on primetime, whereas undubbed 
versions are placed in less popular time slots.  
 
In the empirical analysis in Chapter 7, I will further discuss how the employment of 
dubbing and subtitling in the Taiwanese industry has influenced audiences’ decision to 
opt for online sharing to consume foreign programmes, and how audiences’ online 
consumption has shaped their perception of the “foreign” and “local”.  
 
VI. Television, Co-temporality, and Cross-cultural Relationships 
This section reviews the concept of “coevalness” (Fabian, 1983) and other research 
regarding the relationship between television and temporality in cross-cultural 
contexts, in order to help examine one of the main aims of this research: the 
implications of online consumption of foreign TV for perceptions of co-temporality, 
foreign cultures and transnational cultural power relationships (see Chapters 6 and 7).  
 
i. Coevalness, Colonial Time and TV Time 
Tomlinson (2007) argues that the growing popularity of the use of media technologies, 
and the tendency for mediated experiences to be taken for granted by audiences 
indicates that media, as agents of time-space bridging, are gaining importance in our 
everyday lives. He considers it imperative to study the ways “in which technologies, 
as the perceived ‘vehicle’ of an increasing cultural acceleration, have been received 
and interpreted” (p. 11). Similarly, Wilk (1994) argues that the greatest impact of 
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media lies in “the concepts of time and distance carried by the immediacy of the 
medium” (p. 94). In this regard, it is important to understand how the use of the 
Internet in the online consumption of foreign TV bridges the temporal and spatial 
gaps between foreign broadcasts and local consumption, and how such consumption 
shapes audiences’ sense of temporal distance from foreign countries.  
 
Fabian (1983) argues that the word coevalness contains both notions of 
“synchronous/simultaneous” and “contemporary”, and he takes “synchronous to refer 
to events occurring at the same physical time; contemporary asserts co-occurrence in 
what I called typological time” (p. 31). He points out that in anthropology, especially 
Western anthropology, there is a problem called “denial of coevalness”, which refers 
to the tendency to place the people being studied at a time other than the present one 
in which the anthropologists are living. In other words, it becomes a way for 
anthropologists to put research subjects into another temporality, one normally years 
behind, thus “turning ‘the other’ far away into the ‘primitive’ long ago” (Shove, 
Trentmann, & Wilk, 2009, p. 2). 
 
Based on Fabian’s idea of time, Wilk (1994) defines two notions of time, “colonial 
time” and “TV time”, in his study of the consumption of satellite TV in Belize. 
Colonial time refers to “a system that merges time with distance and cultural 
difference” (p. 95). Wilk argues that colonial time is at the heart of colonial 
cosmology, in which time, distance and culture are almost interchangeable notions in 
terms of justifying cultural differences between the colony and the metropole. By 
objectifying the tradition of the colonial culture as something rooted in a primitive 
time and distance place, the colony is kept in a different and backward time zone. As 
such, colonial time functions as a form of cultural timekeeping and affirms the 
108 
 
superiority/advanced status of the colonial agents and the inferiority/undeveloped 
status of the colonised.  
 
Another notion of time in Wilk’s theory is TV time. He argues that before the 1980s, 
old foreign TV programmes (mainly from the United States) provided by local 
networks made the Belizeans feel that the present in Belize was years behind the 
present in the metropole (the US). However, new forms of TV time, brought by 
satellite technology in the 1980s, offered Belizean audiences a new viewing 
experience: they could watch real time television being broadcast now (p. 98) from 
the US. This change, according to Wilk, has removed the temporal distance between 
the metropole and the colony. Products and cultures outside Belize are no longer 
something from the advanced future, while, at the same time, local cultures can also 
be considered as existing in the present. Wilk believes that since the information 
time-gap between the United States and Belize is gone, Belizeans can now regard 
American culture in the same temporality as local culture. In this sense, he argues that 
TV time seems to have the power to “unfreeze clocks” (p. 100), thereby releasing the 
colony’s present from the past and placing metropoles and the colony on the same 
timeline.  
 
Nevertheless, it may be too arbitrary to argue that temporal distance is removed 
simply by the arrival of satellite TV or certain media technologies. The removal of 
temporal distance should not be understood as a decisive moment or an action that 
takes place once and works immediately. The next subsection discusses how the 
satellite as a time and space machine, might not remove but reconfirm instead the 
temporal distance between different parts of the world. 
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ii. Satellite TV and Cultural Distance in the Context of Modernity  
Green (1987, as cited in Morley, 2000, pp. 99-100) studies the consumption of 
television in the Outback, a remote area of Australia. She finds that for her 
respondents, while in the past the lack of outside communication in the Outback had 
made them feel self-centred and isolated, the introduction of satellite TV made this 
issue more complicated. On the one hand, the residents became more aware of other 
parts of Australia and thus had a stronger sense of inclusion after the introduction of 
satellite TV. On the other hand, TV commercials aggravated their sense of exclusion, 
when they found that the goods advertised were in fact unavailable in the place where 
they lived. In other words, instead of only having the effect of eliminating mental and 
geographical distance, the introduction of satellite television also heightened their 
sense of mental and geographical difference. 
 
Parks’ (2003) analysis of Our World, the first international satellite TV programme 
broadcast in 1967, further demonstrates the implications of the use of satellite 
television for the building of both temporality and spatiality. She argues that Our 
World used various forms of narrative, aesthetic and camera techniques to stress the 
concept of immediacy and global now-ness, and defines its broadcast as a global 
event that transcended temporal and spatial distance and cultural boundaries. However, 
at that time, only a few developed countries were able to receive and deliver satellite 
signals. Furthermore, Our World portrayed life in the Third World as hungry people 
struggling towards basic living conditions, while that in the West was depicted as 
people engaging in intellectual life at their leisure. In this regard, Parks points out that 
the notion of “global” is nothing more than the Western imagination of the global 
(mainly referring to the United States, West Europe and Japan at that time). 
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Non-industrialised countries were not seen as present in the same temporality as their 
industrialised counterparts when Our World was broadcast live “globally”. 
 
While Wilk shows how satellite TV can break temporal and spatial distance, what 
Green and Parks demonstrate is the opposite possibility: the historical and political 
contexts of satellite TV can work as a way to consign the geographically peripheral 
world to the past. Park (2003) states that the meaning of liveness in the 1960s was 
closely related to modernisation. Satellite TV, with its capacity to reconfigure time 
and space, became the key to reaffirming the Western hegemony over Our World 
because it “divided the world not only into First and Third, industrialised and 
developing, but also fast and slow” (p. 90). In this sense, even if satellite TV can, to 
some extent, break the temporal transmission gap, TV time does not necessarily 
escape completely from the ideology of colonial time, particularly if the First and 
Third worlds are not “co-present in time” (see also Section II regarding liveness).  
 
While Fabian (1983) argues that the notion of coevalness includes both 
“synchronous/simultaneous” and the “contemporary”, he does not clearly explain the 
relationship between the two notions, and how this constitutes coevalness. The studies 
of Wilk, Green and Parks help to clarify this relationship by demonstrating how the 
satellite’s capacity to distribute simultaneous, live information worldwide may 
influence the ways in which audiences understand the cultural and temporal distances 
between themselves and others.  
 
iii. The Acceleration of Cultural Flows, and Cultural Relationships 
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It is important to contextualise the sense of time in the setting in which the Internet is 
used as a mode of consumption. Wilk (1994) accurately points out that the greatest 
impact of TV lies in “the concepts of time and distance carried by the immediacy of 
the medium” (p. 94). As there are now more technologies capable of delivering the 
latest information from foreign cultures, the concept of TV time may be expanded to 
include that of “electronic media time”, a general category to cover the influence of 
the senses of temporality provided by different media. In particular, I argue that 
“Internet time”, as a significant type of electronic media time, shapes the sense of 
temporality in/between different regions.  
 
The consumption of foreign TV via online sharing is associated with this Internet time. 
As previously argued in Chapter 2 Section IV, the possibility of the Internet to 
promptly distribute audio-video files across various borders at a much faster speed 
than their predecessors (e.g. DVDs) is a key reason why online sharing is used 
increasingly by audiences worldwide to consume foreign programmes. Moreover, as a 
cross-cultural practice, such consumption raises two questions: what foreign media 
are audiences attracted by and why? As Iwabuchi (2002) argues, the perception and 
appreciation of foreign cultures is always associated with transnational cultural 
power – a culture’s capacity to produce symbolic meanings with which other cultures 
identify. The audiences’ sense of temporality with a given foreign other is, by default, 
reciprocal: both sides have their own sense of temporality towards their other side. 
The dynamics of cultural power relationships seem to be manifested when examining 
how two cultures, via increasing and accelerating cultural exchanges, conceptualise 
their sense of temporality with each other.  
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On the one hand, in the context of East Asia, various research regards the sense of 
coevalness as a key reason why Korean or Japanese dramas are well received in 
Taiwan and other parts of East Asia (H.-J. Cho, 2005; Iwabuchi, 2002; H. M. Kim, 
2005; M.-T. Lee, 2004b). On the other hand, studies also show that Japanese 
audiences view other East Asian cultures with nostalgia, in a sense denying 
coevalness (Iwabuchi, 2002, 2008), or “counter-coevality” in Jung’s (2011, p. 39) 
terms. In other words, intensified East Asian cultural flows do not necessarily mean 
that audiences in different countries consider that they share the same co-temporality 
with their neighbouring countries. It is true that the Internet has facilitated the 
transnational distribution of media texts and bridged the time-gap between foreign 
broadcasts and local consumption. However, when examining the consumption of 
foreign TV via online sharing, it is important to carefully look at: 1) how audiences 
conceptualise their sense of co-temporality with foreign others; 2) with which foreign 
others audiences share (or do not share) temporality; 3) what implications such 
conceptualisations have for transnational cultural power relationships.  
 
Specifically, it is important to point out that, although coevalness is commonly 
employed by studies on media flows to explain the sense of contemporaneity between 
different cultures/countries (H.-J. Cho, 2005; Y. Cho, 2011; Chua & Iwabuchi, 2008; 
Iwabuchi, 2002; Powell, 2002; Wilk, 1994), little research examines closely how the 
temporality of television output and scheduling is at work in the process of 
consumption through which a sense of temporality with foreign cultures is generated. 
As a result, the significance of television as a “time-based medium” (Scannell, 2009, 
p. 223) is not fully analysed in the cross-cultural consumption of television.  
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Scannell (2000) argues that television broadcasting is delivered as a daily schedule 
“not now and then but continuously, uninterruptedly and indefinitely” (p. 19). This 
form of dailiness, “yields the sense we all have of the ordinariness, the familiarity and 
obviousness of radio and television” (p. 19). It also helps to make time “available as a 
shared resource for the generations of living”, namely, a “shared temporality as being 
together now” (p. 19). In the consumption of foreign TV via online sharing, apart 
from watching something delivered by legal local and transnational broadcasters and 
content providers, it has become increasingly imaginable for audiences to follow 
national broadcasting schedules of foreign countries more directly. In this regard, the 
temporality of foreign broadcasting may be more significant in shaping audiences’ 
sense of temporality, and therefore should be examined closely if we are to understand 
more comprehensively how coevalness is achieved via the consumption of television. 
This is a key theme in Chapter 6’s empirical analysis.  
 
This chapter has conceptualised the consumption of foreign TV via online sharing as 
an emerging form of cross-cultural practice and has underlined its important bearing 
on changing notions of television, cultural flows and audiences’ perception of foreign 
and local cultures as well as the construction of cultural identities. As the major aim of 
the study is to understand audiences’ consumption of foreign TV via online sharing, it 
is necessary to approach audiences and to examine the way in which they construct 
their media consumption, and in what sense such online consumption of foreign 
shows is significant to them. In the next chapter, I will introduce the research design 
and the methodology applied in gathering the necessary empirical data to achieve the 
aims of this study. The design and conduct of the empirical research is framed on the 
socio-cultural conditions and theoretical discussions outlined in Chapters 1 to 3. 
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Chapter 4: Methodology and Research Design 
Four issues will be addressed in this chapter. The first section discusses the ethical 
concerns relevant to the copyright issues in this study. Second, the concepts 
involved in online ethnography, including the works of Hine (2000) and Kozinets 
(2010) in particular will be examined. The third section discusses the way in which 
online and other methods (e.g. face-to-face interviews) are used in this empirical 
research. Fourthly, I will introduce the research design, which includes participant 
observation and in-depth interviews.  
I. Ethical Concerns  
This study is an example of qualitative audience research whose data collection and 
generation focuses on the audience (Jensen, 1991, p. 139). It attempts to account 
for the cultural implications of the online consumption of foreign programmes by 
examining the way in which an audience makes sense of its consumption of foreign 
TV via online sharing. Before introducing my research design, I will briefly discuss 
a key ethical concern that influences the way in which this study was designed and 
conducted: the legality of use of online file sharing.   
  
As discussed in Chapter 1, the legality of using online file-sharing is a complicated 
issue still in dispute due to conflicts between the notion of copyright, its 
exploitation and application, and the copyright-related creative activities of 
ordinary people (Lessig, 2003). It is also partly a legal ambiguity that makes the 
consumption of online sharing increasingly prevalent as an everyday practice by 
audiences around the world. In this context, how do we approach audiences given 
these conditions? 
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It is common to find social science studies, such as analyses of deviant groups and 
behaviours, that engage with legal controversies (e.g. Adler, 1993; Adler & Adler, 
1993 on drug dealing; Bourgois, 1999 on gang communities; Whyte, 1993 on 
social activities in the Italian American slum Cornerville). The researchers who 
carried out these studies suggest that fellow scholars deploy self-consciousness and 
reflexivity in order to negotiate with (instead of ignoring) the ethical controversies 
and practical difficulties encountered in the research process.  
 
Similarly, I adopted a reflexive stance in terms of my research design and conduct 
as follows: First, given that the audiences’ perception of the legality of online 
sharing is not my research focus, and that there is still ambiguity regarding this 
issue, the most practical and reasonable way to deal with the topic is to leave the 
answer open. I did not judge whether the research subjects’ online consumption of 
foreign shows was legal or not in the first place. My research design, mode of 
conduct and analysis of the empirical data were based on this stance. After all, who 
would like to be studied if he or she finds that his or her everyday practices were 
judged illegal by an unknown researcher, while the legality with regard to such 
practices is still uncertain? Second, this is not to say that the legality of online 
sharing has been ignored here. Rather, when I recruited the potential research 
subjects, I explained to them that I was aware of possible legal controversies in 
their consumption, but I did not focus on or judge the legality of their consumption 
in the interviews. If relevant legal issues were brought up during the interview, I 
would leave my answer open and focus on understanding how they perceive the 
legality of their consumption. Such openness makes it possible to capture the 
cultural implications of such consumption without ignoring the legal concerns it 
may raise.  
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II. Online Ethnography and Its Implications for This Study 
The key data that this research needed to gather includes: how and why audiences 
employ online methods; what foreign programmes they prefer; how such 
consumption is incorporated to their everyday lives; and how it shapes their 
perception of foreign and local cultures. Face-to-face in-depth interviews were 
employed as the main research approach. This study regards qualitative interview 
as constituting data generation, a process in which researchers often cooperate with 
interviewees to co-produce the data (Mason, 1996). As Mason argues, the data 
gathered and produced are a result of the interaction between researchers and 
interviewees. The data gained from the interview and other secondary methods 
were, as Jensen (1991) argues, “interpreted with reference to context, both the 
context of the media discourses in question and the broad social context of 
historical and psychoanalytic circumstances” (p. 140).  
 
Furthermore, the consumption of foreign TV via online sharing is a social 
phenomenon that not only involves offline, physical settings (the household where 
the consumption takes place, the devices the audiences used, etc.), but is also based 
on virtual and online settings. It is a phenomenon that is manifested and can be 
captured in various online spaces. For example, we can observe that a large number 
of online forums are sharing a wide range of media content worldwide and that 
many audiences are discussing the latest programmes on social media. If we view a 
live stream video on an interactive platform, we may also be reading and 
participating in an instant discussion with other online audiences. While such 
practices demonstrate the important empirical contexts in which virtual 
consumption takes place, they are not easily captured and studied based solely on 
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traditional ethnographic methods. Given this concern, my research design and its 
conduct was based largely on blended ethnography/netography:1 “a combination of 
approaches, including data gathered in face-to-face as well as online interaction” 
(Kozinets, 2010, p. 65).  
 
As Internet-related research, my study can be counted as “research into 
communities/cultures online” as Kozinets (2010) defines it: research which does 
not focus on a certain cultural phenomenon directly related to online culture2 itself, 
but which concerns a phenomenon which exists not only online but also beyond it. 
Research based on this approach looks at a given online community or an online 
practice because it reflects and relates to a wider social phenomenon. While I 
observed and examined certain online discussions on several social networking 
sites (see Section IV), I did not look exclusively at the online phenomena as such. 
Rather, by examining the audiences’ online practices along with their offline media 
consumption, I focused more on how they made sense of such online practices in 
their everyday lives and what implications such sense-making processes have for 
                                                 
1 Kozinets (2010) argues that there are many terms attached to online ethnography, including 
webnography, cyberanthropology and so on. He defines netnography as a form of ethnographic 
research adapted to include the Internet’s influence on contemporary society. However, he does not 
clearly define how netnography is crucially different from Hine’s (2000) notion of “virtual 
ethnography”. In comparison to virtual ethnography, Kozinets focuses more on practical 
ethnographic procedures and methods of conducting online research, and he proposes the concept of 
blended ethnography/netnography. In this approach, both online and face-to-face interactions are 
important to the research. Researchers may also collect data from both online and face-to-face 
settings. In contrast, a pure netnography is more suitable for studies of “online 
communities/cultures”.  
2 Kozinets (2010) categorises Internet-related research into two types: “research into 
communities/cultures online” and “research on online communities/cultures”. The latter refers to 
research focusing on a given online culture (e.g. online dating or online gaming), and “online 
communities, online identity, online sociolinguistic patterns, cyberculture(s); relationships that 
emerge through Computer-related communication will be central, core constructs that the research 
tries to explain” (p. 64). Moreover, this type of research tends to employ netnography as the primary 
method, and Kozinet cites Correll’s (1995) work on the online lesbian community Lesbian Café and 
Baym’s (2000) research on the online soap opera newsgroup rec.art.tv.soaps as two examples of 
these studies.  
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issues such as identity construction and the development of transnational media 
flows. 
 
“Research into communities/cultures online” tends to see netnography (i.e. online 
ethnography, or virtual ethnography) as forming a secondary or supporting role 
(Kozinets, 2010). Hine (2000) argues that, traditionally, ethnography stresses being 
there, and face-to-face interaction, and therefore relies on travel, experience and 
interaction in person. However, she considers that face-to-face should not be 
regarded as inherently better than other forms of interactions. Rather, she claims 
that it is necessary to first examine how physical presence plays a role in making 
ethnographers’ work convincing3and then suggests re-conceptualising ethnographic 
authenticity in a way that incorporates mediated communications on its own 
terms.4  
 
Castells (2010) argues that, with the advent of communication technologies, 
communication practices increasingly take place not only within a given physical 
place but also at a spatial distance. He calls the spatiality of social interaction “the 
space of flows”, defining it as “the material support of simultaneous social 
practices communicated at a distance” (p. xxxi). Drawing on Castells’ theory, Hine 
(2000) points out that the space of flow is formed around connection rather than 
                                                 
3 Hine (2000, pp. 43-46) argues that ethnographies can be viewed as “textual constructions of 
reality”. Ethnographic works rely heavily on the experiences of ethnographers to construct a 
convincing story. The first-hand data is regarded as imperative in the construction of 
ethnographically valid research. It is in this sense that actions such as travelling to the field site, 
being there and interacting with people face-to-face are considered valuable in contemporary 
ethnography.  
4 Hine uses Baym’s (2000) study as an example. She argues that in Baym’s study, the latter clearly 
explains issues such as how she negotiated with the people in the online community to access 
information and how she observed and interacted with these people in the virtual setting. Since 
Baym provided valuable details to explain the significance of the virtual setting and the ways she 
coped with it and why it was appropriate to conduct the research online, she could provide 
information as valuable as other studies.  
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physical location. The ethnographic field site in turn can be considered as a field of 
flows “organised around tracing connections rather than about location in a 
singular bounded site” (p. 61). She suggests that ethnography – and virtual 
ethnography in particular – pay more attention to connectivity rather than bounded 
locations/places. Connective ethnography turns its focus from “‘being there’ to 
‘getting there’” (p. 62). It enables researchers to conduct studies based on 
connections in and around the Internet, abandoning online/offline boundaries and 
exploring how connections are assembled.  
 
By the word connectivity, Hine means the cultural processes in which social 
interactions and communication take place. Connection may refer to two friends’ 
online instant-messaging about a given television show or live discussion threads 
about a sports game on a social networking site. It can also be domestic 
environments (e.g. a living room) where the Internet is used to access a foreign 
programme. Since the connections can take place physically in a place, or virtually 
in a space, a given field site can be conceptualised as a domain that consists of 
certain connections between people. In this regard, a field site can be a physical 
place or a virtual space, or both. A given field site can expand and be linked to 
different places/spaces via the dynamic flows of cultural connection.  
 
More specifically, compared with face-to-face interviews and interactions, the most 
important benefit of virtual approaches (e.g. online interviews, online observations) 
is that they are, in a sense, closer to the “natural” (online) settings (Morley & 
Silverstone, 1991, p. 149) in which the online consumption takes place. Such 
virtual settings can also be as much field sites as physical domestic places. For 
instance, when an interview takes place face-to-face, the interviewee is usually 
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offline and not necessarily engaging with the devices (e.g. desktop) that he or she 
uses to watch the relevant programmes. By comparison, if the researcher interacts 
and interviews an interviewee online via instant messaging, such interaction may 
provide information regarding how he or she uses the Internet as a set of everyday 
practices in a more general context (even though certain visual and audio cues such 
as facial expressions are inevitably lost). Such information helps contextualise the 
interviewees’ online consumption of foreign TV. However, this may not be readily 
obtainable in a face-to-face-interview setting, a dynamic in which interviewees are 
more likely to explain, rather than “naturally” reveal their Internet use. Hence, 
online methods were applied in this study, namely with the purpose of gaining 
“access to naturalised domains and their characteristic activities” (Morley & 
Silverstone, 1991, p. 156) that face-to-face interviews might not offer. 
 
III. Applying Online and Offline Methods 
This research employed both online and offline qualitative methods, including 
online observation, online and offline recruitment of research subjects, and online 
and offline in-depth interviews with the following principles.  
 
Firstly, in terms of online observation, Baym (2000) points out that many audience 
research projects (e.g. Brown, 1994; Hobson, 1989; C. Williams, 1992) rely 
exclusively on focus groups or interviews. They did not employ any specific form 
of observation for their data collection. However, she considers that, without 
applying observation, these research projects may overlook the natural setting and 
spontaneous process in which the audience discussion occurs (p. 15). As a result, 
they cannot express clearly how fan talk is used to negotiate relationships between 
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viewers and dramas, or the relationships between viewers. I consider how social 
networking sites, as an online setting, demonstrate important information regarding 
how audiences’ discussions take place and what topics audiences care about. This 
advantage was manifested particularly when I followed live discussions in which 
audiences would gather and discuss their viewing of a certain show while the show 
was on air. Therefore, online observation was employed to gather information 
concerning the discussions of foreign programmes on several well-known, public 
Taiwanese online networking platforms and blogs (see Section IV). The purpose 
was to better understand the way audiences discussed their online viewing of 
foreign shows with others in a relatively natural online setting where the 
conversation took place.  
 
Secondly, in terms of the recruitment of the research subjects, given the legal 
sensitivity of online sharing, in most cases, those potential subjects whom I did not 
know were reluctant about be interviewed since they had difficulties in confirming 
my identity as a researcher (especially if they were contacted online). Therefore, I 
relied on my (offline) existing social networks to conduct snowball sampling and in 
order to recruit research subjects. I also attempted to recruit certain research 
subjects via online forums and platforms, ones whom I considered to be 
specifically interested in foreign programmes and heavy users of online platforms 
(e.g. administrators of forums featuring the latest foreign genres). With significant 
virtual profiles regarding their consumption of foreign TV via online sharing, such 
audiences might have been appropriate potential research subjects for this study. I 
contacted seven of these administrators or bloggers via email to ascertain their 
willingness to be my research subjects, and whether they would consent to be 
interviewed either online or in a face-to-face setting, according to their preference. 
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I explained my research purpose, my stance for the openness regarding the legality 
of their consumption, and guaranteed that all data gathered from them would be 
confidential and used exclusively for academic purposes. However, only one 
blogger agreed to be interviewed; others politely refused my request, saying either 
that they were busy or that they had their own concerns (without clearly 
mentioning what these were). Due to these difficulties, the range of online 
recruitment achieved was inevitably limited; most research subjects were drawn 
from offline snowball sampling. 
 
Thirdly, in terms of in-depth interviews, face-to-face in-depth interviews provided 
visual and audio cues to help understand the interviewees’ responses (Berg, 2009; 
Gillham, 2005; Hine, 2000; Kozinets, 2010; C. Mann & Stewart, 2000). However, 
online interviews were applied in two situations: 1) Three interviewees were 
interviewed online because they had their own concerns (e.g. lack of time, sensitive 
to accusations of copyright infringement) and were reluctant to be interviewed 
face-to-face; 2) online interviewing was applied after face-to-face interviews, when 
I needed to ask the interviewees follow-up questions and/or confirm with them 
certain pieces of information they had provided previously. 
 
The structure of the in-depth interview in this study was designed based on the 
methodological guidelines by Gillham (2005), James and Busher (2009), Mason 
(1996) and Gray (2003). It moved between semi-structured and unstructured: all 
interviews were conducted with a standard outline of questions handed to the 
research subjects, but the interviews were also interactive and open-ended.  
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I briefly explained my research and outlined key research questions at the 
beginning of the interview. After this brief introduction, I tended to let the 
interviewees develop their own narratives freely and to see how they understood 
and responded to the questions. I also responded to their spontaneous narratives 
and prompted follow-up questions if I needed to reconfirm certain information or if 
I uncovered some implications relating significantly to my research that were not 
clearly expressed. In many cases, the narratives that seemed to be trivial or 
irrelevant to the research at first glance turned out to be crucial to the explanation 
of the interviewees’ viewing patterns. 5  Specifically, in this study, many 
interviewees had already taken the online viewing of the latest foreign programmes 
for granted, so it was sometimes not easy to gather important information using a 
structured approach, because the interviewees tended to respond to the question 
simply and briefly without providing enough context. An open-ended interview 
structure was thereby applied to cope with this problem, as it provided information 
that explained how they understood the media technologies they relied on, and 
what their consumption of foreign media really meant to them. As Gray (1987, 
quoted in Morley & Silverstone, 1991, p. 155) suggests, the value of interviewing 
audiences with the open-ended approaches is that they allow “respondents to ‘tell it 
their way’ with a minimum of direction”.  
 
Fourthly and lastly, I kept in touch with the interviewees via online interaction if 
they were willing to do this. Roughly one-third of the interviewees maintained an 
online connection with me. Depending on their willingness, the degree of online 
                                                 
5 For instance, an interviewee talked about her travel plans and certain episodes regarding her 
previous student life during the interview, and such information crucially explained why she 
preferred Korean dramas to Japanese ones. Some interviewees talked about what new mobile 
phones or other media devices they were planning to buy; and such conversations were always 
helpful in analysing their understanding of media technologies as a whole. 
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interaction varied, ranging from direct instant messaging to keeping each other on 
our social networking sites (e.g. Facebook) with limited direct interaction. As 
James & Busher (2009) argue, previous research has shown that rather than 
changing their personas constantly, most individuals tend to maintain a stable and 
abiding online personality in the long term. Therefore, a long period of interaction, 
even when it takes place online, enables researchers to confirm the authenticity of 
the research subjects’ written information In this sense, in cases where the research 
subjects only wanted to be interviewed online, online interaction helped to support 
the text-based information provided by the subjects. In those cases in which 
interviews took place face-to-face, online interaction (especially if retained over the 
long-term) helped the researcher to better understand the research subjects. 
Moreover, as mentioned earlier, the consumption of foreign TV via online sharing 
takes place on the Internet: the interviewees went online to access their favourite 
programmes. Communicating with the interviewees online indicated that the 
interviewees might be in a setting closer to the situation in which their consumption 
took place, especially when compared to face-to-face interaction. Therefore, online 
interaction with research subjects provides significant information which helps to 
understand how the consumption of foreign shows via online sharing is embedded 
in audiences’ general Internet use and in everyday contexts.  
 
IV. Research Design and Conduct of the Interviews 
i. The Design of the Online Observation 
Foreign TV online public discussion platforms/forums/websites were observed 
from 2007 to 2014 as a supplementary form of data collection. The rationale for the 
observation of these forums is two-fold. First, they were public and could be visited 
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by the audiences without requiring special means of identification or complex 
procedures. Second, since these forums attracted a significant number of audiences 
who consumed the latest foreign shows via online sharing, they served as a good 
channel through which to understand the general development of this form of 
consumption.  
 
Specifically, the PTT,6 based on based on Bulletin Board System (BBS),7 is one of 
the most popular social networking sites in Taiwan. It was featured as my sample 
site for the observation of audiences’ discussions of foreign TV and which allowed 
me to search for opportunities to recruit some audience members as my research 
subjects (as explained in Section III, this recruitment turned out to be unsuccessful). 
Specifically, I focused on gathering information relating to the following questions:  
 
1. Historical changes in the discussion topics: When did the PTT and other online 
forums or social networking sites start to discuss the latest foreign TV shows, 
and when did such discussions become mainstream topics?  
2. What are the PTT forum rules regarding the discussion of “illegal” methods of 
foreign TV consumption such as pirate DVD or fan-subbing versions of files? 
                                                 
6 PTT (http://www.ptt.cc/index.html, or Telnet://ptt.cc) was established and managed by National 
Taiwan University from 1995. It has been the biggest and most influential BBS in Taiwan, with 
more than six thousands bulletin boards and sixty thousand members. 
7 Bulletin Board System (shortened as BBS) is an online social network system (developed in the 
late 1970s) providing functions such as bulletin boards, mails, chat rooms that allow users to 
communicate on the Internet. Originally, it was connected through phone lines and modems. In the 
early 1990s BBS allowed access through Telnet, a kind of online protocol. BBS lost its popularity 
since the Internet become popular throughout the world. However, the text-based BBS system is 
still extremely popular in Taiwan today. Generally, the BBSs used in Taiwan today are accessible 
via both Telnet and the Internet. In a large number of cases in Taiwan, the BBSs are founded and run 
under the regulations of education institutes such as universities so that they are not for commercial 
use.  
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3. Concerning aspects of audiences’ discussions of foreign TV, how did they 
discuss the latest dramas that they obtained only through illegal and/or 
unofficial online methods?  
 
By observing the way in which audiences discussed their viewing and acted in the 
forums, crucial information regarding how they understood and consumed foreign 
TV online was obtained. Specifically, in order to avoid being accused of infringing 
copyright, PPT does not allow users to publicly discuss and share illegal/unofficial 
access to copyrighted content. Discussions on such access (e.g. where to download 
a given programme, how to bypass the IP restrictions of a certain online platform, 
which fansubbing groups’ subtitles are more accurate) are banned by board 
administrators. Therefore, PTT users tend only to discuss the contents of foreign 
shows (e.g. why they like a given drama, whether an actor’s performance is 
convincing) without mentioning how they managed to access the shows. However, 
ironically, all public discussions about the actual content of the latest foreign shows 
unavailable via legal means (e.g. local cable television) are evidence demonstrating 
the existence of consumption through controversial online methods. 
 
While discussions on access were frequently seen before 2007, they have been 
much less evident since the beginning of the 2010s. Moreover, while the majority 
of the online discussions focused on foreign programmes broadcast on local 
television networks before 2007-2008, this has gradually switched to programmes 
available via illegal and online access. Identical patterns can be found in other 
Taiwanese social networking sites featuring foreign programmes. It seems that 
audiences take accessing this material for granted, as if it were a choice as common 
and sustainable as those provided by legal channels such as local networks. The 
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online observation followed the development of Taiwanese online discussions on 
foreign shows, and the data gathered helped to examine how the online 
consumption of foreign TV has become a norm of television experience in Taiwan 
(see Chapters 5 and 6).  
 
According to the online observation, those programmes that were popular in their 
originating countries also tended to be more frequently discussed on Taiwanese 
networking sites. Occasionally, a small number of online services that provided 
unauthorised access to the live terrestrial television of foreign countries emerged 
and became popular online. While such access was usually shorted-lived (e.g. 
lasted only in days or weeks), it often encouraged enthusiastic real-time discussions 
on networking sites when a certain highly anticipated programme was broadcast 
live in its originating country.8 This tendency was prevalent in 2007 and 2008, 
especially in cases in which some Japanese dramas that garnered high domestic ratings and 
featured popular, good-looking actors and actresses were being aired live in Japan. Special 
attention was paid to these instances. First, I observed how these dramas were discussed 
before and after the three-month span of their broadcasts. Second, I also followed closely 
the PTT discussions when these dramas were live broadcast in Japan.  
 
Specifically, the drama Operation Love (Puropōzu Daisakusen, プロポーズ大作戦) 
was one of the exemplars that generated very enthusiastic online discussions. It was 
therefore chosen as my main case study in Chapter 6 Section II concerning the 
importance of liveness in the online viewing of foreign programmes.  
 
                                                 
8 This situation was more common during 2007 and 2008. Online access to foreign live broadcasts 
(especially Japanese programmes) has become much less readily available in recent years. 
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Another example which generated a great number of discussions on social media in 
Taiwan was the broadcast of the Japanese drama Hanawa Naoki (半沢直樹) in 
Japan. While its online popularity among the Taiwanese audiences was covered 
intensely by the mainstream Taiwanese news, a serious and factual error occurred 
in such coverage. As a researcher in media studies and a long-time consumer of 
Japanese dramas, I discovered such a critical journalistic blunder right away from 
my online observation of Taiwanese social media (for details of the factual error 
and the subsequent blunder of the Taiwanese media, see Chapter 6, Section V). 
This development in the media coverage should serve as one of the most significant 
and up-to-date instances relating to one of my key research concerns: how the 
Taiwanese audiences’ sense of coevalness was achieved through informal online 
circulation of foreign programmes. The broadcast of this Japanese drama was, 
therefore, also chosen as a relevant case in point in support of such research 
concerns. 
 
ii. The Design of the Interview 
After introducing the design and conduct of the online observation, the following 
subsection discusses how the in-depth interviews was designed and conducted. 
 
1.  Outline of the in-depth interviews 
Based on my research concerns and the data collected from online observation, the 
data I aimed to gain from the in-depth interviews are listed as follows:  
(1) What general TV consumption patterns do the audiences have? 
(2) What are the viewing conditions in which the audience’s consumption takes 
place? 
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(3) How and why do the audiences use online sharing platforms/services to 
consume foreign shows? 
(4) What online sharing platforms do they use, and what are the reasons for 
choosing these platforms? 
(5) Do the audiences also deploy online sharing to consume other media materials 
(e.g. local shows, music)? 
(6) To the audiences, what are the similarities and differences between traditional 
TV watching and TV watching via online sharing? 
(7) Do they consider consumption via online sharing as in any sense significant? 
Why?  
(8) How does this kind of TV watching alter audiences’ perceptions of local and 
foreign cultures as well as their sense of time and space? 
A number of relevant studies also helped in developing the list of questions. 
Specifically, Gray’s (1992) and Moores’ (1993a) works served as guidelines when 
investigating a given new media technology’s significance “as an object of 
domestic consumption” (Moores, 1993a, p. 621). Pertierra’s (2012) study on 
practices of informal digital media circulation in Cuba helped in developing 
inquiries into audiences’ motivation and the rationales of their online consumption 
of foreign TV. The works of Ming-Tsung Lee (2004a, 2004b), Ko (2004), and 
Fujita (2009) provided insight into the empirical examination of audiences’ cultural 
identities. 
The above lists of questions were then reshaped into an outline for interviewees 
(see Appendix 1). The outline was given to every interviewee at the beginning of 
the in-depth interview as a reference guide to help them to understand what my 
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research purpose was, what information I needed from the interviews, and how the 
interviews would be carried out.  
 
2.  The definition and recruitment of the research subjects 
The above subsection discussed how the outline of the in-depth interviews was 
developed. I expand here on who I interviewed and the rationales for choosing 
them as my research subjects. Specifically, I discuss: 1). the conditions under 
which a given audience member could be defined as a potential research subject 
and; 2). how the subjects of this study were recruited and interviewed.  
 
This study regards Taiwan as a zone of consumption (Pertierra & Turner, 2013) and 
focuses on the practices of Taiwanese audiences. Specifically, the research subjects 
were defined by the following two conditions. First, the audiences had to have 
grown up in Taiwan and have accumulated their television experiences in a 
Taiwanese context before they started adopting online viewing. Second, they had 
developed a regular use of such online sharing methods to watch foreign 
programmes. “Online sharing methods” here refers to any online methods 
(downloading/sharing activities, streaming platforms, etc.) which allow audiences 
to bypass temporal, spatial and legal restrictions in order to access foreign shows, 
especially those unavailable via legal forms of access (e.g. broadcasts of local 
networks, streaming platforms). The Taiwanese audiences who met both conditions 
were broadly considered as potential research subjects. In this regard, while 
Taiwanese audiences who had grown up in foreign countries were not included as 
subjects, those who had spent their childhood and teenage years in Taiwan but 
currently lived overseas were considered as potential subjects, as their online 
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viewing was based on their previous television experiences developed in a 
Taiwanese context. 
 
Based on this delineation of research subjects, three conditions were taken into 
account in terms of subject recruitment. The first was concerned with the media the 
audiences used to consume foreign TV shows. This study aimed to understand how 
online viewing has become a normative television experience for Taiwanese 
audiences. It did not focus exclusively on those users of online sharing who mostly 
or only relied on online methods to access foreign programmes. Rather, recruitment 
included both the audiences who relied heavily on online sharing, as well as those 
who maintained older patterns of television consumption (e.g. viewing via a TV set) 
and these who used online sharing for their television consumption in a more 
casual fashion.  
 
The second condition relates to the audiences’ preferences for media content of two 
categories: the country of origin and the television genre. In terms of the foreign 
programmes’ country of origin, Chapter 2 has examined how various conditions 
made the programmes from Japan, Korea and the United States the most popular 
foreign ones in Taiwan. Moreover, the online observation also indicated that, 
compared with programmes of other foreign origins, the online access and 
discussions featuring programmes from these three countries were more commonly 
found on most social networking sites. Accordingly, the sample included audiences 
with programme preferences derived from these three foreign countries.  
 
With regard to genre, the sample consisted of audiences with different preferences 
(e.g. dramas/TV series, variety shows, animation, or sports). Specifically, the 
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sample included audiences who were fans of a certain foreign culture as well as 
those who consumed, but did not have specific interests in, foreign programmes 
and/or cultures. By taking a range of different audiences’ preferences for 
programmes into account, it was possible to make sense of the significance of the 
consumption of foreign TV via online sharing more comprehensively.  
 
The third condition had to do with the research subjects’ place of residence and 
demographic profile. Specifically, the experiences of living overseas (i.e. outside 
Taiwan) were taken into account as a crucial recruitment variable. A key concern of 
this study relates to how the audiences’ perceptions of foreign cultures may be 
shaped via their online access to foreign programmes. However, whether or not 
audiences had experiences of living abroad, as a significant form of direct contact 
with foreign cultures, plays a crucial role in influencing audiences’ perceptions and 
understanding of foreign cultures. Given such concerns, both audiences who had 
and who had not lived overseas were included in this study, for the purpose of 
examining how audiences’ boundary-crossing consumption shapes their sense of 
time and space and perception of foreign cultures along with other (local and/or 
foreign) cultural experiences. In terms of demographic considerations, I focused on 
recruiting audiences across a range of ages, educational backgrounds and 
occupations and with both genders. Based on the above three conditions, the 
following steps of snowball sampling were taken in the recruitment of my subjects: 
 
(1) As a starting point I approached audiences who I knew (my close friends, past 
colleagues, etc.) and used these contacts as the main way to recruit research 
subjects. About one-third of the subjects were recruited via this approach. My 
relationships with these contacts were formed in three ways:  
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 Education: Many of the research subjects were friends and classmates who 
attended the same high school and/or university as me.  
 Social networking sites: Some of research subjects were friends I knew via 
various online sites/forums for years, and these friendships were based on 
shared interests. While the friendships I had with them started from the 
Internet, I had met them in person over the years.  
 Workplace: A few of research subjects were my colleagues who worked for a 
governmental research project at university.  
At the time when the interviews were carried out I had known all these subjects for 
a minimum of two years (e.g. colleagues) up to a maximum of over 15 years (e.g. 
classmates from high school). 
 
There are several reasons for this choice of sampling. First of all, given that I knew 
these acquaintances and was familiar with them in terms of their personalities, 
habits, interests and so on, it was easier to capture their general media consumption 
and discover the relationship between their general consumption patterns and their 
consumption of foreign TV programmes. Second, this scrutiny also provided 
information to determine whether the samples were representative and allowed me 
to adjust the sampling procedures. Third, as media consumption was an ongoing 
process, in order to account for their consumption, it was beneficial if I understood 
whether or how their consumption and viewing conditions changed over time (e.g. 
if they started to be interested in a new programme, acquired a new media device). 
However, it requires mutual understanding and long-term interaction between a 
researcher and research subjects to gather these two forms of information. In this 
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sense, the subjects with whom I had strong interpersonal ties (e.g. friends) emerged 
as the best subjects to begin with. 
  
(2) Based on snowball sampling, I approached and interviewed audiences 
(strangers) who were introduced to me from my personal social network. About 
two-thirds of the subjects were recruited via this approach. The benefit of this 
approach was to widen the diversity of subjects in terms of age, occupation, 
education, etc., rather than limiting myself to acquaintances with whom I shared a 
similar cultural background. After each interview, I asked the interviewees if they 
could think of anyone who would be suitable to be one of my subjects, since I 
believed that they had gained more understanding of my research through their 
direct interaction with me. A few of them introduced me to their acquaintances 
(sisters, classmates, etc.), and in some cases these individuals became my 
interviewees at a later stage. Furthermore, this introduction also served as a good 
way for me to get to know these interviewees better, since their interpersonal and 
mutual networks offered a valuable opportunity to get to know them not only from 
the information they offered but also through the information provided by their 
acquaintances. 
 
(3) As mentioned previously, while I tried to recruit several subjects online who 
had actively discussed, showed interest in and practiced viewing foreign shows 
online, I only managed to interview one administrator who was once famous 
among Japanese drama audiences and whose blog specialised in sharing drama 
files.  
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In total, with the use of the above processes, 36 Taiwanese subjects were recruited 
and interviewed from August 2010 to November 2011. The recruitment was 
conducted on two occasions. First, in August and September 2010, seven subjects 
were recruited and interviewed. The data was gathered and analysed in April 2011 
as a pilot study, which focused mainly on audiences who consumed Japanese 
programmes via online sharing. Based on the this pilot study, the recruitment and 
research design were slightly adjusted to include audiences with more diverse 
consumption patterns and preferences, such as those who preferred Korean dramas 
or American series. Second, from June to November 2011, a further 29 subjects 
were recruited and interviewed. The data gathered in 2010 (for the pilot study) was 
incorporated into the whole data set for analysis.  
 
In Particular, I kept in touch (online and/or offline) with one-third of the 
interviewees and captured some updated information concerning their viewing. 
Such updated information (gathered from 2012 to 2014) was incorporated into the 
empirical analysis with the interviewees’ consent. Long-term interactions with the 
interviewees helped to make sense of how the interviewees’ online consumption of 
foreign shows was integrated in their everyday lives. 
 
V. Description of the Sample 
i. Number, Age, Gender, and Marriage Status 
Three of the 36 interviews were conducted online (Tim, Rachel and Peter), and I 
managed to meet one individual (Rachel) in person one year after the interview 
took place. The remainder of the 33 were conducted face-to-face. The length of 
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each interview lasted between 1-6 hours. Some of them were interviewed twice, 
mainly due to the interruption during the first interview.  
 
In general, in the interviews and other informal interactions (online and offline) 
Chinese (Mandarin) was used, occasionally accompanied with some English and 
Japanese terms. However, English and/or Japanese were more heavily used in the 
interactions with Peter, Evan and Ivy. The online interview with Peter, who had not 
lived in Japan, was conducted in both Chinese and Japanese, as he preferred using 
Japanese to communicate with me. However, in order to express myself more 
precisely and effectively, I mainly communicated with him in Chinese.  
 
Evan studied for his master’s degree in the UK. While we usually spoke Chinese 
face-to-face, he wrote to me exclusively in English. Consequently, I mainly 
communicated with him in English in text-based settings. Ivy studied for her 
bachelor’s degree in Japan, and our face-to-face and phone converstaions were in 
Chinese. However, in text-based settings, Ivy tended to write in Japanese, while I 
replied either in Chinese or Japanese (see also Chapter 7, Section IV concerning 
how the interviewees’ use of foreign languages is associated with their identity 
formation).   
Overall, 15 males and 21 females were interviewed and the subjects’ ages ranged 
from 16 to 57, with most of them in their mid-20s to mid-30s (see Table 4.1). In 
terms of marital status, seven subjects were married (marked with an asterisk “*”). 
While the rest of the subjects were single, two of them (Alex and Stella) planned to 
marry each other at the beginning of 2013. See Table 4.1 for further details 
(English pseudonyms were applied to all subjects). 
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Table 4.1 The age groups of the subjects 
Age 
 
Number of subjects Subjects’ names 
Under 20s 2  Fiona and Emma 
21-25 3 Vivian, Sarah and Jane 
26-30 17 Johnny, Tim, Rachel, Peter, Cheryl, Adam, 
Dan, Mandy, Sophie, Nancy, Alex, Ken, 
Gary, Evan, Jenny, Ally, and Julia 
31-35 10 Ben, Steven*, Helen*, Claire, Ryan*, Stella, 
Will, Katie, Ross and Ivy  
36-40 1 Jeff* 
41-45 2 Ann* and Nicole* 
Over 50 1 Joyce* 
 
ii. Education 
Most subjects who were over eighteen years old had a Bachelor or Master’s degree 
and their fields of study covered both social and natural sciences. More specifically, 
10 of them had studied or were studying for their degree overseas (included the UK, 
US, Australia and Japan, see Appendix 2 for further information). Those who had 
studied or lived overseas tended to be more proficient in foreign languages (e.g. 
English and/or Japanese) than those who had not. There were also a few subjects 
who were fluent in English or Japanese either because they took foreign languages 
as their major or they spent more effort learning these languages outside school. 
These two types of subjects tended to rely less on subtitle/translation than the 
others. While many subjects watched Korean programmes, none of the subjects had 
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learned Korean (see Table 4.2). Several subjects studied engineering or information 
technology and had more technical knowledge and skills than the other subjects. 
Generally speaking, they tended to start consuming programmes online earlier than 
the others.  
Table 4.2 Subjects’ education background  
Education Number of 
subjects 
Subjects 
High 
School/Junior 
College  
5 Fiona (current student) 
Ben, Ryan, Ann and Joyce (vocational 
school/junior college)  
Bachelor 14 Domestic: Peter, Cheryl, Adam, Helen, Claire, 
Emma (current student), Dan, Sarah 
(current student), Nicole, Katie, Ally, 
Jeff and Julia9 
Overseas: Ivy 
Master 14 Domestic: Johnny, Tim, Mandy, Ken, Jane, 
Ross, Gary 
Overseas: Rachel, Vivian, Sophie, Alex, Stella, 
Evan, Jenny (current student) 
PhD 3 Domestic: Nancy and Will (current student) 
Overseas: Steven (current Student) 
 
                                                 
9 Julia pursued her master degree in the UK but she decided to drop out from her study after nine 
months. She also studied in the US for a year as an exchange student during high school. 
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iii. Occupation and Family Economic Status 
Due to their differences in age and education background, the subjects varied in 
their working experiences, occupation, and salary. 10  One (Helen) became a 
housewife after she was married. Except for those who were current students, she 
was the only subject who was not working. Although the subjects differed in 
occupation, covering the fields of social science (e.g. teacher, civil servant) and 
natural science (e.g. engineer, architect), almost all of them were white collar 
workers.11 According to their occupations (and family backgrounds), most of them 
belong to the middle class. As a result, a limitation of this sample is that it did not 
have enough information to examine how class differences influenced consumption 
patterns. Specifically, those who had studied abroad were born to relatively wealthy 
families, and they were financed by their parents.12  
 
iv. Residence 
All 36 subjects lived in the urban cities, including the major cities in Taiwan (e.g. 
Taipei, Kaohsiung) and those in the foreign countries also lived in major 
metropolitan centres (e.g. New York, London). Eleven subjects had experiences of 
living abroad for one year or more (Rachel, Vivian, Steven, Helen, Sophie, Alex, 
Stella, Evan, Jenny, Ivy and Julia). Of these eleven subjects with overseas 
experiences, six of them (Rachel, Vivian, Sophie, Evan, Jenny, Julia) had lived 
overseas from one to three years, and five of them (Steven, Helen, Stella, Alex, Ivy) 
                                                 
10 As none of the subjects revealed their salary range, the salary listed in Appendix 2 was estimated 
mainly on the basis of average occupational salaries for their specific positions in Taiwan.  
11 Ben was the only one who had blue collar experiences (as a cook). However, given that he owned 
a diner, his occupation and income was closer to the white collar category. 
12 A few of other interviewees (e.g. Adam, Jane) argued that they wanted to study abroad but they 
had to give up since their families were not rich enough to support them 
140 
 
had more than five years of overseas experience when the interviews took place. 
The locations included the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia and Japan. 
While eight of them had lived in one foreign country, two of them had lived in two 
foreign countries (Jenny and Ivy), and one subject had experiences of living in 
three countries (Julia). The other subjects lived only in Taiwan.  
 
31 of the subjects lived in Taiwan when the interviews were conducted, and five 
interviewees (Vivian, Steven, Helen, Alex, Stella) lived overseas when they were 
interviewed (Vivian moved back to Taiwan three months after the interview was 
conducted). The interviewees who had lived overseas all grew up in Taiwan (most 
of them moved to other countries in their twenties); therefore they had developed 
their long-term television experiences in Taiwanese cultural contexts before they 
lived overseas. The development of their online viewing patterns is substantially 
based on domestic (Taiwanese) experiences. In this sense, their online viewing 
practices can be roughly generalised into “Taiwanese online consumption of 
foreign TV”. Given that all interviewees lived in cities, while the sample could 
reflect how overseas living experiences influenced the audience’s consumption, it 
did not have sufficient information to examine if place of residence – countryside, 
suburb or urban areas – influenced consumption.  
 
v. Media Use and Genre Preference 
The subjects’ genre preferences and media use varied. Regarding shows of foreign 
origin, those from Japan, Korea, and the US were the most popular. The sample 
included both fans of certain foreign cultures, who were keen to consume the latest 
foreign shows (e.g. Peter, Ken, Evan, Ivy), and more casual viewers (e.g. Cheryl, 
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Jenny, Nancy), who consumed foreign shows online but were not specifically 
attached to these shows or foreign cultures. The latter interviewees indicated how 
online viewing was not only fan-oriented but a more common practice for 
Taiwanese audiences. A few of them were heavy users (e.g. Ken, Julia) of online 
platforms who had abandoned broadcast television for years. The rest of them 
consumed media content via both television and the Internet, and the Internet 
tended to be a preferred choice in three cases: (a) when they wanted to watch 
something without being constrained by local broadcasting schedules; (b) when 
they could not find the content they looked for via local TV networks; (c) when 
they had limited or no access to television (see Table 4.3 and Chapter 5 Section I).  
 
vi. Access and Control over Television 
Table 4.3 outlines the subjects’ access to and control over television in their 
domestic context (married subjects are marked with an asterisk “*”). While the 
domestic space was not the main zone of consumption I focused on, some brief 
points regarding the interviewees’ use of technologies have to be addressed, since, 
as Silverstone and Haddon (1996) note, access to and control of the media is 
fundamental to an understanding of the way the media are used and understood in 
the domestic space. The extent of my interviewees’ access to television was 
influenced mainly by those they lived with and what family roles they played. 
Specifically, if the interviewees lived with parents, it was their parents who paid for 
the living room TV, arranged the family space, and subsequently had more control 
over television viewing. By the same token, the interviewees who were themselves 
parents were in charge of the TV. For most interviewees TV sets were a shared 
object. Nevertheless, while the interviewees’ access to broadcast TV varied, almost 
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all of them had their own computer connected to the Internet. Therefore, television 
viewing via their connected computer was regarded as much more personal when 
compared to that of broadcast TV. 
Table 4.3 Subjects’ access to and control over television 
Types Subjects Domestic viewing conditions 
Without 
TV access 
Tim, Vivian, 
Evan, Emma, 
Ross 
They lived by themselves without a television set. 
They had television access with limited or equal 
control when they were back with their families.   
Limited/no 
control 
Rachel, Cheryl The older family members were in control of the 
television  
Full 
control 
Ryan*, 
Nicole*, Ann* 
They were parents who set the rules controlling their 
children’s (teenagers or younger) TV access. Their 
spouses were not as interested in television, and 
gave them full control over viewing choices.  
Sarah, Ivy, 
Ken, Julia 
They were single, living either by themselves and/or 
with families, and they had their own television 
access. 
Equal 
control 
Others  They lived with families, partners or roommates 
with one or multiple TV sets. They negotiated with 
other family members regarding television choices. 
(Compiled by the author)13  
                                                 
13 See Appendix 2 for more information in relation to each subject’s socioeconomic background 
and consumption patterns. 
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VI. Concluding Remarks  
 
Two major concerns of the conduct of research are revisited in this concluding 
section. First, based on the long term online observation of social networking sites, 
several cases that involved a large number of online discussions were carefully 
chosen to be featured in the empirical analysis in the chapters that follow. These 
cases help to understand how online sharing has emerged as a norm of television 
viewing among online users who actively participate in networking activities.  
 
Secondly, regarding the 36 interviewees, they can be roughly categorised as 
middle-class and relatively tech-savvy audiences who are used to employing 
various devices and software to consume media texts. Moreover, the interviewees 
varied in their interests in foreign media. They ranged from long-term fans of 
foreign cultures to ordinary viewers who just consumed – but were not obsessed 
with – foreign content. However, it is worth noting that, if we regard the online 
consumption of foreign programmes as a digital fandom (Hills, 2013), the 
interviewees, whether or not self-defined as fans, should be understood much more 
as consumers than as producers. Most interviewees rarely or never participated in 
fansubbing production. Although they often exchanged access to foreign 
programmes with acquaintances, they were much less active in self-creating and 
sharing such access with unknown online users.  
 
While many interviewees regularly visited social networking sites such as PTT, few 
of them actively participated in online discussions. Compared to vocal, active 
participants on networking sites (e.g. fansubbers, bloggers, administers of online 
forums), not much trace of my interviewees’ viewing of foreign programmes could 
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be found on the Internet. While the approach of fan studies tends to focus more on 
the practices of the most active fans, fewer works accounted for the significance of 
the relatively less visible practices. By analysing both the online cases and the 
interview data, this study examines the implications of both highly visible and 
relatively obscure audience practices for television’s ontology, the construction of 
identity, and the configuration of transnational cultural power relationships.  
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Chapter 5: Social Togetherness via Online Viewing 
As discussed in Chapter 2, as media forms are increasing in number and diversity, 
media consumption is going through a process of fragmentation and 
personalisation, challenging our existing understanding of television viewing as a 
mass-oriented and collective experience. As Uricchio (2009) argues, “while not yet 
individualised […] we inhabit a moment where the steady erosion of the mass 
viewing public has created anxiety in political terms regarding the future of 
television as a collective mode of address” (p. 34). As an emerging form of 
consumption that enables audiences to personalise their viewing, watching foreign 
TV via online sharing has an important bearing on this transitional stage of media 
development. This chapter discusses the empirical data gathered from interviews to 
illustrate how television’s role in social togetherness at different levels (familial, 
social, global, etc.) has changed.  
 
I. Personal and Shared Screens in the Household 
While Chapter 4, Section V outlined interviewees’ access to and control over 
television, this section discusses interviewees’ domestic conditions governing such 
access making use of empirical data, as this is fundamental to understanding how 
television and computers were used by this group. Moreover, such conditions play 
an important role in how interviewees understood the functions of these 
technologies in their media consumption.  
Of my 36 interviewees, more than two-thirds of them lived with their families or 
partners.1 While the households they lived in had one or more TV sets, most of 
                                                 
1 Some of their residence conditions changed around or during the research because they moved to 
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them did not have their own television: in most cases, sets were located in shared 
spaces (e.g. the living room, a bedroom shared with family members) as communal 
objects. TV viewing, in turn, was generally negotiated by family members, and the 
interviewees watched television on TV sets with family members from time to time. 
Among the interviewees who lived with family members, Rachel and Cheryl 
enjoyed the least control over television and seldom watched TV at home, as their 
elder family members (an elder sister in Rachel’s case, parents in Cheryl’s), with 
whom they did not share media preferences, were in charge of the remote control.  
 
The remaining one-third of interviewees lived with their roommates in private 
houses or university accommodations. They either shared a TV set and negotiated 
their viewing with roommates (e.g. Alex, Stella. Nancy and Katie, Emma), or they 
had no access to TV at all (e.g. Vivian, Tim). Among the interviewees who did not 
live with their family, Ivy, who resided in a house by herself, was the only one who 
had full and unmediated access to television.  
 
As mentioned in Chapter 4, while most interviewees did not have their own TV sets 
and/or regarded a TV set as a shared object, almost all interviewees, except for the 
youngest one – Fiona, who was sixteen2 – had their own computers and access to 
the Internet. In general, they had complete control over their computers and did not 
have to share them with other family members. As a result, consuming something 
via their computers and over the Internet was considered a much more personal and 
private activity than watching anything on a TV set at home.  
                                                                                                                                       
other cities or countries for personal reasons. See Appendix 2 for more details. 
2 While Fiona did not own a computer, her parents granted her full access to the communal 
computer and the Internet at home; she also acquired more technical expertise utilising the computer 
compared to her parents. 
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Some interviewees had more than one TV sets in their households. However, they 
still preferred watching programmes on their own computers to watching TV on a 
second set. For instance, Nicole and Julia argued: 
 
Sometimes even when I have to work the next day, I still watch Korean 
dramas till 2:00 a.m. However, since I watch it in my room, rather than in the 
living room, my son has no idea about this [laughing]! He still goes to bed at 
the normal time. (Nicole, female, 45 years old)3 
 
After living alone for a few years, I was used to having my own access to TV 
shows, and I like watching TV by myself. I cannot stand someone next to me 
when I am watching something. Therefore, rather than going downstairs to 
turn on TV, I prefer staying in my room watching it on my own computer. 
(Julia, female, 28 years old) 
 
Both Nicole and Julia lived with their families. Nicole did not watch the living 
room TV very often; she especially avoided doing so at midnight, as it might 
disturb her teenage son’s everyday routine (e.g. sleep, study). She preferred 
watching Korean dramas in her bedroom, where her viewing would not influence 
her son’s routine. While she had a second TV set in her bedroom, she seldom used 
it because the Korean dramas she wanted to watch were only available on the 
Internet. In Julia’s case, while there were multiple TV sets in her household, she did 
                                                 
3 In order to reflect the natural style and register of the spoken Chinese as used by the interviewees, 
I try my best to retain, in the English translation, the linguistic and pragmatic features of their oral 
speech in the quotations. These features may include pauses, omissions, false starts, incorrect 
diction, self-corrections, and even grammatical errors. Therefore, unless otherwise specified, all the 
seeming irregularities and unidiomatic usages in English in the quotations are intended to reflect as 
closely and truthfully as possible the actual expressions of the interviewees’ speech. 
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not have her own TV in her room. After living by herself and having her own 
access to TV for years, she regarded TV watching as a personal, rather than familial 
activity. As a result, even though she moved back to live with her family during the 
period when the interview took place, she refused to watch TV in the shared family 
space, as she considered watching programmes in her room with her 
Internet-enabled computer much closer to her ideal form of television consumption. 
In both Nicole and Julia’s cases, in their media-rich households (Livingstone, 2002), 
personal computers replaced the second TV set as the main second screen. 
 
Moreover, for interviewees who had almost no control over television (e.g. Rachel 
and Cheryl) or those who did not have television (e.g. Andy, Vivian), watching 
programmes online via their own computers functioned as a solution to their 
limited access to television in the households in which they lived. Cheryl was an 
example: 
 
Well, they [parents] have their rules, but we [Cheryl and her brothers] also 
have our tactics [to bypass their parents’ control over television]. The Internet 
is so developed. Since each of us gets our own computer, as long as we plug 
our headphones in, we can very easily and freely watch whatever we want to 
watch, can’t we? (Cheryl, female, 29 years old)  
 
Cheryl and her younger brothers “had given up TV” (in her own words) due to her 
parents’ strict control over television access at home. However, she stated that with 
the Internet and their personal computers, which their parents did not have enough 
technical repertoire to take control over, “my brother and I still watch lots of stuff. 
We just do not do so via our home TV sets”. In this sense, it was Cheryl and her 
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brothers’ personal, Internet-enabled computers that helped them to access their 
favourite media content, while avoiding both parental control and possible conflicts 
over television with their parents.  
 
While, in most cases, my interviewees’ Internet-enabled computers were used for 
their individual viewing of programmes and movies, it is also important to note that 
the convergence of the Internet, computers and television made it possible to turn 
personal computers with online content into a means that enhanced family viewing 
and togetherness. Both Nancy and Ann explained how their use of online sharing 
and personal computers brought family members together: 
 
If I download some good movies, I would connect my laptop to our TV, and 
then all my family members could watch it together. In fact, in many cases, 
the reason why I download movies was for them. (Nancy, female, 27 years 
old) 
 
Last time I downloaded a Disney movie, and everyone in our family, including 
members from the extended family all liked it very much. One reason why I 
download movies is exactly because then we can all watch it together when 
we have time. On Saturdays when every family member finishes dinner, they 
definitely all come to our house. (Ann, female, 41 years old) 
 
While both Nancy and Ann, like all other interviewees, enjoyed consuming 
entertainment media by themselves via their computers, they also wanted to retain 
family TV viewing. Both of them argued that sometimes on TV there was a lack of 
content that the whole family was interested in, or was suitable for family members 
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of all ages. As a result, such a lack occasionally discouraged family viewing. Given 
this situation, both Nancy and Ann deliberately acquired media content online that 
they thought suitable for the whole family. They then connected their laptops to, 
and showed the content on, the living room TV, inviting all members to watch it 
together. In so doing, they transformed their personal devices into a family home 
cinema and maintained the main TV set as “an object that enhances family bonds” 
(Nancy’s words). In both Nancy and Ann’s cases, it was online platforms, not 
broadcast television, which provided the content that encouraged family unity. In 
this regard, Internet-enabled personal devices did not exclusively represent the 
personalisation of media use in the household. Rather, similar to the suggestion of 
Ofcom (2013) (see Chapter 3 Section I), mobile devices and online content 
functioned in two ways: while they separated the media consumption of family 
members, they also helped to encourage the traditional role of living room TV as a 
shared screen that enhanced family togetherness in other contexts.  
 
This section briefly discussed how domestic conditions shaped the way in which 
interviewees understood their viewing on TV sets and on Internet-connected 
computers. The next section focuses on how interviewees enjoyed personalising 
their viewing via online platforms, and why it was the main reason they opted for 
online viewing rather than viewing broadcast television.  
 
II. Pleasure of Personalising Viewing  
i. Making Your Own Flows 
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When defining the features of broadcast television, Raymond Williams (2003) uses 
the phrase “flow” to describe the nonstop sequence of television output, which is 
scheduled by television networks with endless successions of programmes and 
commercials. Both Ellis (1992) and Feuer (1983) refine Williams’ notion of flow 
by emphasising that broadcast television is based on the segment (e.g. programme 
segments, commercial segments). Feuer points out that it is more accurate to say 
that television is constituted by a dialectic of segmentation and flow, possessing 
“segmentation without closure” (p. 14). Ellis (1992) suggests that segments of 
television output follow on “from each other with no necessary connection between 
them” (p. 116). Most interviewees thought that the flow of broadcast television was 
filled with a great deal of unwanted interruptions (e.g. commercials) or pauses (e.g. 
a week of intervals between episodes).  
 
Therefore, broadcast television was experienced more as segmentation and 
fragmentation than as flow, over which the interviewees had little control. 
Nevertheless, online sharing platforms, similar to previous recording technologies, 
acted as “production devices” (Cubitt, 1991, p. 4) which enabled interviewees to 
control or even create their own flow with a continuity that suited their taste and 
schedule (e.g. skipping commercials, compiling moments from a programme). This 
possibility was the most frequently mentioned reason why my interviewees used 
online platforms to consume programmes. Here are two typical opinions:  
 
It is so convenient [watching her favourite shows via P2P software], and 
instantaneous. I can watch something whenever I want. I don’t need to wait, 
let’s say, from 7:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m. Sometimes they [the shows she watched] 
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would even be suddenly cancelled and replaced. How sad it is [laughs]! 
(Mandy, female, 27 years old) 
You can fast forward when you are watching shows online. My bad habit is 
that sometimes I only focus on the plot of the leading roles and fast forward 
[i.e. skip] those of the supporting roles. When my colleagues watch Korean 
dramas on TV, they just watch it obediently [i.e. passively] from the 
beginning to the end. They can’t do anything with it at all [e.g. fast 
forwarding the dramas]. But I can’t stand it. That’s why I cannot watch 
dramas on TV anymore. (Nicole, female, 45 years old)  
 
Both Mandy and Nicole were dissatisfied with the flow imposed by broadcast 
television. Mandy considered that while online platforms provided access to her 
favourite content at her own convenience, broadcast television left her no viewing 
freedom in terms of time. This contrast between online platforms and broadcast 
television was further articulated by Nicole. She disliked watching dramas on TV 
because she did not want to “obediently” (passively) follow the “sequence of 
programming, in which the programmes were carefully orchestrated by broadcast 
television” (Uricchio, 2010, p. 32) to demand her continuous viewing.  
 
For example, when airing a Korean drama comprised of 20 episodes, Taiwanese 
networks usually broadcast an episode a day every weekday. Therefore, Nicole had 
to watch the drama episode by episode, one per day, until the final day of its 
broadcast. However, she could reject this imposed programming sequence by 
actively constructing her own sequence via online platforms. She skipped the 
narratives in which she was uninterested, or browsed the finale first to see if she 
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liked the ending and was able to decide whether she would watch the whole drama. 
Since this viewing pattern was not possible via broadcast television, she refused to 
return to the passive mode of viewing. By the same token, online viewing 
platforms satisfied interviewees who preferred binge-watching weekly dramas (i.e. 
viewing sequential programme episodes at one sitting; see Brunsdon, 2010, p. 65):  
 
I want to finish watching them [dramas] in a very short time, say, within two 
or three days, doing nothing else but watching. I don’t feel like waiting [for 
the next episode every week]. (Stella, female, 33 years old) 
 
I can finish watching a certain Korean drama at one moment, just within one 
or two days. If I just don’t sleep, then I can make it! I can’t stand going to bed 
without knowing the ending [laughs]! (Mandy, female, 27 years old) 
 
Both Stella and Mandy desperately wanted to know the ending of their favourite 
dramas and preferred finishing the whole series in a more compressed period of 
time than that dictated by the broadcasting schedule. They still appreciated the 
narrative continuity and felt compelled to watch. However, they preferred acting on 
their own compulsion (e.g. watching the whole season of a drama in one day) 
instead of being “trapped” by a given timetable not shaped for them, but one 
created for attracting the largest audience. In this sense, the self-customised feature 
of online platforms became the perfect alternative. This personalised viewing 
signals a “shift from the programming-based notion of flow […] to a 
viewer-centred model” (Uricchio, 2010, p. 35). 
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ii. Impressions of Intrusion-Free 
It was common for interviewees to describe online viewing as “commercial-free” 
and they often regarded this feature as a major attraction that prompted them to 
adopt online viewing, since they considered television commercials as 
unwelcome elements that disturbed their viewing. For instance, both Joyce and 
Ann enjoyed using PPStream, a popular Chinese P2P TV online viewing 
platform, as their principal means to consume foreign dramas. When I asked why 
they preferred PPStream to local television networks, they argued: 
 
I can watch whatever I want, and the key point is with no ads! It saves so 
much time. (Joyce, female, 56 years old) 
 
The difference [between online streaming services and broadcast television] is 
that there are no ads online. It is very annoying to be interrupted by ads, and I 
won’t feel fulfilled [by such watching], because I want to finish the whole 
programme at once without pauses and interruptions. (Ann, female, 41 years 
old) 
 
In fact, the PPStream or other streaming services my interviewees used regularly 
inserted ads in two ways: via pop-up ad windows, or inserting video clips of ads 
between programme units. I briefly mentioned this condition, and asked my 
interviewees why, given this, they tended to describe online platforms as 
commercial-free. Joyce further argued: 
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Well, only two [pop-up] ads there and I can just double-click to get rid of them, 
so it’s fine. There are only 15 or 30 seconds of ads in between [programmes], 
so they will be gone very soon. It is quite satisfying. (Joyce, female, 56 years 
old) 
 
Based on Joyce’s arguments, two reasons explained why online ads were felt to be 
less intrusive than those on broadcast television: first, the length of online ads was 
shorter and, more importantly, these ads were not inserted in the middle of the 
programmes’ narratives. Pop-up ads were shown in a new window rather than in 
the same window as the platforms and could be turned off easily. The ads 
embedded in the viewing flows were inserted between programmes units, instead 
of being inserted into the programme text. As a result, commercials on the online 
platforms that my interviewees used were more likely to retain the totality of the 
narrative of a given programme. By comparison, while television commercials 
were seamlessly threaded through narratives of programmes and intervals between 
programmes (R. Williams, 2003), they cut through narratives, leaving interviewees 
who wanted to consume narratives in their totality “unfulfilled” (to use Ann’s 
expression).  
 
Moreover, and as argued earlier, compared to broadcast television, online platforms 
gave audiences greater freedom to create their own viewing flows. As a result, 
online platforms made it plausible for Joyce, Ann and many other interviewees to 
generate the impression of interruption-free, “watch-whatever-I-want” viewing 
experiences, experiences in which they were more tolerant towards, or even 
unaware of, the existence of online commercials. As Joyce and Ann pointed out, 
such personalised flows were more satisfying than linear television flows. Rather 
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than operating as commercial-free platforms, it is more accurate to describe online 
platforms as platforms capable of giving the impression of being commercial-free 
to audiences.  
 
Of all my interviewees, Ken clearly stressed that he “could not bear watching any 
programmes with all kinds of advertisements popping up and interrupting my 
watching”, and this stance was the main reason why he had “refused to watch TV 
for 10 years” (his words). By the same token, he was much less tolerant of 
advertisements on online platforms compared to other interviewees. Therefore, he 
usually downloaded programmes online instead of employing streaming, since 
downloading was the most feasible way to orchestrate a personal viewing flow 
with the least ad-interruptions, one which he might otherwise encounter on any 
networks or online platforms. 
 
Williams (2003) argues that the continuity of flow in television experiences is 
apparent in the way audiences describe their viewing: they remark that they are 
“watching television”, rather than “watching ‘something on television’” (p. 94). 
The consumption of TV via online platforms offers new insights in relation to this 
argument. Rather than saying that they are “watching television”, my interviewees 
tended to describe their consumption as watching a certain “programme” (the name 
of a programme), “a specific genre” (American TV series, Korean dramas, etc.), or 
a specific “platform” (e.g. PPstream, YouTube). Both Ken and Julia, who were 
heavy television programme viewers/lovers, claimed that they “do not watch 
television at all” at the very beginning of the interviews. However, as the 
interviews went on, it became clear that by the term “television,” they referred to 
engaging with the physical object of a television set, and the designed flow of 
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broadcast television. Both of them preferred directly downloading programmes to 
employing streaming platforms. What they tried to make clear was that their 
television consumption had more to do with specific TV programmes or genres 
than with a flow developed by television networks or even (comparatively) 
on-demand online platforms. As was the case for other interviewees who relied on 
online platforms, they tended to describe their viewing by using expressions such 
as “watching PPStream”, “watching YouTube”. In such cases, the platforms’ 
importance in making flows was made manifest.  
 
Many interviewees had bought or rented DVDs and/or used recording devices to 
cope with the time constraints and commercial insertions of broadcast television. 
However, online viewing was considered even more convenient in two ways. 
Firstly, the fact that interviewees could stay at home to access a large amount of 
content was much more efficient in terms of time and budget than opting for a disc 
rental/purchase. Secondly, and more importantly, in contrast to recording devices 
whose viewing resources were based on broadcast television, online platforms 
functioned as another viewing source with content that broadcast television did not 
offer. Therefore, online viewing became a preferable option, one that freed 
interviewees from the constraints of broadcasting. As Johnny described: “With just 
one or two clicks, here you are with the file [i.e. programme]”. 
 
As demonstrated in this section, the interviewees often contrasted online platforms 
with traditional broadcasting, regarding the former as the more liberating and 
convenient option, while the latter was seen as more constrained and demanding. In 
general, they happily detached themselves from broadcasting and moved to 
“narrowcasting” (Smith-Shomade, 2004) or “flexible microcasting” (Parks, 2004), 
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thereby engaging in tailoring their own viewing. However, while interviewees 
cherished the liberating potential of online viewing experiences (Newman, 2012, p. 
466), some interviewees also indicated that their narrowed down, personalised 
consumption might be influencing their sense of social togetherness. This leads us 
to the discussion in the next section: conflicts between personalised viewing and 
social togetherness. 
 
III. Conflicts Between Personalised Viewing and Social 
Togetherness 
To a few interviewees, it seemed that personalised viewing raised concerns about 
whether such consumption might result in their detachment from society or a lack 
of general knowledge. This tendency is demonstrated in how they described their 
complex, at times ambivalent, feelings about the on-demand feature of online 
viewing. Here are three examples:  
 
In fact, I really think that I should get a TV set and subscribe to those channels 
[the cable system providing both free-to-air and paid channels], otherwise I 
would always be considered as out of touch with the world. […] Take news 
for example, I always watch it at a later time every day compared to anybody 
else. Others watch it in the morning when they are brushing their teeth to 
know what it is going on today, while I have to wait until I get to the office or 
when I have time to check it online. (Stella, female, 33 years old) 
 
While it [watching TV via online streaming services] is convenient, I will still 
turn on the TV, watch dramas, news and other stuff […] I think that it isn’t a 
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good idea to only watch things on the Internet […] since you tend to filter the 
things you watch and choose the ones you like when you use the Internet […] 
somehow it is still necessary to know what is going on outside, more general 
information. (Katie, female, 32 years old) 
When you are on the computer, you will only choose what you want to watch 
and what you want to know, but sometimes, it is necessary to know lots of 
information you are not interested in. Although it’s convenient that you search 
for stuff yourself or watch the news you like, it means that the stuff you get to 
know is partial and limited. […] With TV you get to know more information 
that you don’t actively search for yourself, so it is better. (Ivy, female, 31 years 
old) 
 
Stella did not have access to broadcast television for years and mainly used online 
platforms to consume programmes. While she was used to living without a 
television, she expressed a sense of not being as connected to the world as people 
who had TV sets. Sometimes she arrived at her office in the morning and her 
colleagues were discussing a common topic (e.g. news or the current episode of a 
TV series) which she was not conversant with due, in her opinion, to not having 
access to broadcast television. What she missed, in terms of Ellis (2007), was the 
“social sense of currency” offered by broadcast TV as “a common point of 
reference, a means through which to belong to the same present as others” (p. 11). 
Although the Internet helped her access the news or other information, she did not 
get the same information at the same time as her acquaintances. As a result, her 
lack of access to television’s simultaneity and capacity to “aggregate dispersed 
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publics” (Uricchio, 2009, p. 33) kept her from sharing an up-to-date frame of 
reference with her peers.  
 
While many interviewees who had reduced their consumption of broadcast 
television after they started using online platforms, Katie intentionally watched 
broadcast television via her TV set. She suggested that when people (including 
herself) watch programmes online, they tended to stick to what they preferred 
while ignoring content they were not interested in. As a result, she argued, “the 
range of information you got was narrowed down”. In order to avoid this, besides 
online viewing she still watched broadcast television regularly to get a general 
picture of what was currently on air. By the same token, Ivy also stressed that while 
it was enjoyable and convenient to consume the information people were interested 
in, it was still essential to get to know a more general range of information – the 
information which people might not actively search for themselves – as delivered 
by broadcast television. It was in this sense she argued that for her “television is a 
must have”. 
 
The reasons that prompted Stella to consider buying a TV set and why Katie and 
Ivy insisted on staying “tuned” to TV were based on a similar urge to be connected 
to a more collective awareness. In these cases, it was broadcast television – not the 
Internet – that offered a stronger sense of social togetherness: interviewees tended 
to turn to broadcast television rather than online platforms to know the more 
general information which would indicate “what is going on outside” (to use 
Katie’s expressions). Such general information was, as both Katie and Ivy 
considered, necessary for them as social beings.  
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Silverstone, Hirsch and Morley (1994) identify the processes involved in the 
consumption of media technologies as appropriation, objectification, incorporation 
and conversion. They stress the importance of examining how media are consumed 
both as technologies and as content in order to grasp the role of media consumption 
in linking private and public life. As mentioned earlier, while TV sets were usually 
the shared objects in the interviewees’ households, most interviewees had their own 
Internet-connected computer and used it as a personal device. This difference partly 
explains why, although both broadcast TV and online platforms allowed access to 
“the public world outside the home” (Bakardjieva, 2005, p. 162), interviewees 
regarded the latter as more private. Furthermore, online viewing welcomed, but did 
not necessarily require interviewees’ direct interaction with others as compared to 
other online activities (e.g. instant messaging, social networking). Interviewees 
could stream programmes without interacting with anyone online. This made it 
more likely for online viewing to be experienced as personal. As a result, broadcast 
television, as Couldry (2003) argues, was regarded as the more appropriate medium 
“through which we imagine ourselves to be connected to the social world” (p. 2). 
 
To end this section, I want to briefly discuss the notions of active and passive 
viewing that were frequently brought up by interviewees (see also Section II). 
Along with the emergence of new media forms that promise audiences a greater 
degree of interactivity, selectivity and participation, industrial discourses often 
promote, as Caldwell (2004) argues, “a series of stark binaries: old media versus 
new media, passive versus interactive, push versus pull” (p. 41). Such binaries 
often describe the interactive potential of new media as more democratic in various 
ways. However, there have been academic debates examining the potential of new 
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media, examining in what sense audiences can be active or constrained, and the 
implications of such activities for democracy, public engagement, 
viewer-production relationship, etc. (Carpentier, 2011; Holmes, 2004; Jenkins, 
2006; Livingstone, 2004; Tincknell & Raghuram, 2002). Specifically, both Parks 
(2004) and Bennett (2008b) examine the binary industrial discourse of 
understanding television viewers as active and new media users as passive. They 
point out that the activity potential offered by new media still need to be 
understood within the historical context of media development, rather than viewing 
them as better than older – and more democratic – media forms.  
 
Similarly, while my interviewees often described online viewing as active and 
broadcast viewing as passive, it did not necessarily mean that the latter was a 
practice that requires no (or less) agency. As Silverstone (1994) argues, the key 
issue concerning the comparative activity and passivity of audiences “is not so 
much whether an audience is active but whether that activity is significant” (p. 
153), since television viewing or other forms of media consumption, even in their 
most habitual mode, all involve certain forms of action. Katie and Ivy actively 
chose a relatively “passive” mode of viewing (broadcast television) for the purpose 
of gaining a stronger sense of social currency, one that they might not achieve in 
their personalised online consumption. In this regard, their passive viewing did not 
seem to have less agency as compared to their tailored viewing. Rather, their 
conscious choice to keep watching broadcast television was, to some extent, an 
active way for them to imagine themselves as connected to the world as social 
beings.  
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IV. Live Broadcast in the Context of Online Viewing 
As discussed in Chapter 2, television’s liveness is a crucial condition and one 
associated with its role in social togetherness. As Couldry (2004) argues, 
television’s liveness continues to be emphasised as the former’s key selling point. 
Liveness here is understood as a form that “guarantees a potential connection to 
shared social realities as they are happening” (p. 355). The interviewee Ryan’s 
discussion of the differences between consuming live sports in the past as 
compared to the present is an example demonstrating how audiences’ sense of 
liveness and togetherness is related in a time-shifting, online age:  
 
I clearly remember the time when I was still studying in junior or senior high 
school, in the past in which the Internet did not existed. When our baseball 
team went overseas to play games, […] even when it was midnight, or one or 
two o’clock, the whole family still gathered in front of TV to watch those 
(sports) games together! But it wouldn’t be the case now since, first, sports 
games are not as popular now, and second, even if I miss live broadcasting, I 
still can watch it [the rerun] during the next timeslot. But reruns were rare in 
the past. (Ryan, male, 35 years old) 
 
On the one hand, Ryan thought that it had become easier to watch sports games 
since there were more options to do so (e.g. reruns or catch-up services provided by 
networks and online platforms). Therefore, it was not as regrettable as it used to be 
if he missed a certain live game, and he was satisfied with such options. On the 
other hand, he expressed nostalgia for enthusiastically watching live games 
together with his family members. His ambiguous feelings towards the live 
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broadcasting of sports indicates how the significance of liveness lingers in 
television consumption in an age in which time-shift options challenge the 
necessity of live broadcast’s synchronicity.  
 
Bourdon (2000) argues that recent academic debates tend to assume that live 
broadcasting or the idea of liveness is less important in an age of narrowcasting. 
However, he stresses that it is still crucial to study live broadcasting as it is linked 
to a form of socio-semiotic unity in society. As he notes, despite the trends towards 
narrowcasting, broadcast television still attracts the majority of worldwide 
audiences and the use of live broadcasting has not disappeared.  
 
The question at stake here is in what sense online viewing was associated with 
television’s experiences of simultaneity and liveness. While all interviewees were 
very used to time-shifted online viewing, they had not completely abandoned live 
broadcasts. In general, while the interviewees preferred to consume scripted or 
fictional programmes (e.g. dramas, variety shows) at their convenience, it was 
more likely for them to follow the live broadcasts when it came to non-fictional, 
non-scripted programmes (e.g. news, sports, talent competitions). At the time that 
the interviews were conducted in 2010 and 2011, the most common way to access 
live broadcast television via a computer was to use devices such as TV tuners 
(either digital or analogue) that received the broadcast signals and converted the 
computer monitor into a TV screen.4 Sarah, Vivian and Cheryl, who had very 
                                                 
4 In the United Kingdom, the main terrestrial channels, such as the BBC or ITV, have launched 
their own digital streaming platforms which simultaneously stream the same content online as their 
television broadcasts, allowing audiences to access the same live broadcasts through computers, 
tablets, smartphones and other Internet-connected devices as they do via TV sets. However, in 
contrast to the UK, in Taiwan, none of the main channels (including terrestrial, cable and satellite 
outlets) have yet to officially live-stream their broadcast content online at the time of writing (June 
2015). Although there are a few illegal platforms that re-stream the live broadcasts of some stations 
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limited access to TV sets, shared with me their memory of watching a popular live 
singing competition, the Super Star Avenue:5  
We would gather together [her friends or roommates and her], watch the Super 
Star Avenue and talked about it [the progress of competition] together. It is 
especially in the case of this programme that we did so. (Sarah, female, 21 
years old)  
 
I rarely went to watch TV at the common room, unless everyone said and 
decided that we were going to do so together, or in the situation that we felt 
we had to watch these live broadcasts. For instance, the Super Star Avenue 
finale was going out live, so we would go there and watch it. (Vivian, female, 
23 years old) 
 
Nearly 90% of the programmes I watched were downloaded. As long as I 
don’t feel an urge to watch something right away, I will wait until the whole 
shows, or at least when half of them are finished, then I start watching. 
(Yu-kei Tse: Can you name some examples of the programmes that make you 
feel the urge to watch them right away?) 
                                                                                                                                       
from time to time, their services are not sustained for a long period of time. 
5 Super Star Avenue, first aired on CTV (one of the Taiwanese free-to-air networks) at the start of 
2007, is the most popular and successful live singing competition in Taiwan in recent years. 
Different from recent singing competitions shows in the UK or US (e.g. X Factor or The Voice) 
which allow audiences to vote and decide which contestants can stay on the shows, the result of the 
competition in Super Star Avenue was still determined by the judges who were all professional 
musicians. Several contestants, especially those from the first three series, built up their popularity 
through the show and were signed by major labels in Taiwan. The show’s popularity soon reached 
its peak in the first series in mid-2007 and retained its popularity for three series until mid-2008. 
From series four onward, which started in August 2008, ratings started to decline. The show came to 
a close at the beginning of 2011 after the end of series seven, mainly due the sustained decline in 
ratings.  
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Oh yeah, Super Star Avenue, I was so addicted to it. […] I was a freshman 
living in a dorm. There were no stay-out parties at Friday nights, no kidding 
[laughs]! All the common rooms were packed with people, and every TV set 
was tuned in to Super Star Avenue. Those who couldn’t get into the common 
rooms just returned to their rooms, squeezed together in front of a computer 
screen to watch PPStream [a Chinese illegal live re-streaming platform]. We 
could even compromise on the low audio-video quality, since we were 
desperate to watch it in real time, and we needed and enjoyed the atmosphere 
of “staying tuned together in front of the screen”. It [the viewing] had to be in 
this kind of atmosphere. Until the end of the third season I always ran back 
home or to the dorm to stay tuned to TV on Friday night as long as there were 
no big deals going on. (Cheryl, female, 29 years old)  
 
When the popularity of Super Star Avenue was at its peak in Taiwan from 2007 to 
2009, Sarah, Vivian and Cheryl were all living in a dormitory on their university 
campus. In general, they usually watched programmes (mainly via their computers) 
by themselves, rather than watching programmes together with their friends and/or 
roommates. However, Super Star Avenue was a particular case for which the three 
interviewees and their friends would gather weekly to watch its live broadcast. 
While the show did not have the voting systems that granted audiences the power 
to influence the competition result as many contemporary talent programmes in 
Western countries do, the interviewees still preferred the live broadcasts to replays. 
Sarah stressed that it was more exciting to watch it together, since “we could 
discuss and witness the result directly in real time”. This coincides with “the 
atmosphere of staying tuned together in front of the screen” that Cheryl engaged in.  
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Friedman (2002) argues that, the audiences’ attraction to the televising of 
unscripted events not only involves a desire to witness history in the making, but is 
also derived from the pleasure in predicting the progression of events, and in so 
doing, their own knowledge of ongoing real events is tested and sharpened. My 
interviewees’ satisfaction with live Super Star Avenue was intensified by watching 
the show in real time together with their acquaintances and a more general public, 
and this collective viewing experience can be regarded as a form of “media event 
time” in Zelizer’s (1991) terms. The interviewees’ viewing experiences of Super 
Star Avenue indicated that live broadcasting still managed to be an influential form 
of television, one which the interviewees – who were used to detaching themselves 
from schedules – looked to for a strong social currency (Ellis, 2002, 2007), thereby 
achieving a sense of togetherness with peers. In other words, the 
“for-anyone-as-someone structure” with which television functioned in linking 
individuals and publics (Scannell, 2000) remained in play, especially relating to 
live broadcast television which exists in and as the “phenomenal now”6 that 
connected interviewees’ live consumption with the impersonal time of the human 
world. However, it is problematic to assume that the for-anyone-as-someone 
structure of television was only at work in live broadcasting or broadcast television 
per se. The next section examines how and in what sense the “narrowcasting” of 
online platforms also functioned as the for-anyone-as-someone structure, thereby 
generating various forms of social togetherness among audiences.  
                                                 
6 Based on a phenomenological approach, Scannell (2014) distinguishes between two modes of 
time. First, numbered time relates to the lifeless-eternal time-space universe (Ontology A). Second, 
phenomenal time involves life in the living world (Ontology B). While the former refers to the order 
of time that is eternal, objective and meaningless to human beings, the latter is meaningful to human 
beings as it is the temporal order of human beings’ immediate experiences. “The phenomenal now 
of immediate experience”, in turn, is “the now in the immediacy of my concern” (p. 41). See also 
the literature review on Scannell’s work in Chapter 3 Section I and the empirical analysis in Chapter 
6 Section IV. 
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V. Togetherness via Time and Space-shifting 
i. Stay Tuned with Others via Online Methods 
As argued previously, generally speaking my interviewees were used to watching 
programmes online. They not only employed online platforms to free themselves 
from broadcasting schedules, but they also had a sense that other audiences would 
also do the same. This was particularly demonstrated when I recruited them and 
explained that I was looking for viewers who regularly used various forms of 
online sharing platforms/services to consume foreign TV. Many of them said that it 
must have been very easy for me to find a large number of interviewees as they 
thought that “so many people were watching foreign programmes via online 
sharing platforms/services”. Some asked in a curious tone, “Why did you choose 
me? I am not special since I just do what others do [i.e. consuming TV online]”. 
Some of them also mentioned that they were not worried if they were caught for 
copyright infringement by illegally downloading programmes because, as Tim put 
it, “everyone is downloading them”. Moreover, both Cheryl and Adam further 
indicated that:  
 
It seems to me that nowadays most people are very used to watching TV 
programmes from somewhere besides TV, such as online. Many people no 
longer follow TV schedules. (Cheryl, female, 29 years old)  
 
There are hundreds of TV channels for me to watch. I can also download 
shows or rent a disc, there are plenty of ways to consume TV. We all have 
such choices. (Adam, male, 26 years old) 
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The way in which interviewees assumed that most viewers watched TV online or 
elsewhere in an asynchronous manner indicates that the personalisation and 
fragmentation of viewing was experienced as a communal norm. This enhanced the 
interviewees’ sense of togetherness while they personalized their viewing in two 
ways. 
 
Firstly, many interviewees visited social networking sites featuring foreign genres, 
and they found that the latest foreign shows available exclusively online were 
commonly discussed. We can take the public discussions on foreign genres on PTT, 
the most influential and popular social networking site in Taiwan (see Chapter 4 
Section IV regarding PTT), as an example. While a few years ago users typically 
discussed the foreign shows broadcast on Taiwanese networks, it is now more 
common that they focus on episodes currently on air in foreign countries. This is 
also seen on other popular Taiwanese online forums, blogs, social networking sites 
etc. featuring foreign TV, indicating that the practice of catching up with the latest 
foreign shows online is threatening traditional viewing and becoming a standard 
form of consumption. Consequently, Tim argued:    
 
I will firstly check online how PTT users talked about the latest dramas in 
order to select the ones I want to catch up with this season […] people online 
seem to think that TVBT7 does a better job in translation, right? (Tim, male, 
27 years old)  
 
                                                 
7 TVBT is one of the most popular fansubbing forums based in China and has focused on 
distributing Japanese dramas and movies since 2005.  
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Tim loved to watch Japanese dramas but had no friends with whom to discuss such 
shows. PTT served as a site where he could get to know the consumption patterns 
of other people with similar interests. When he noticed that most PTT users 
consumed the latest Japanese dramas online, he promptly adopted the same 
viewing pattern. Many interviewees considered that the number of viewers of 
online platforms seemed to be greater than those for local broadcasts. Therefore, 
they opted for online viewing when they wanted to have shared viewing 
experiences (e.g. talking about the same shows, exchanging relevant information 
about the same show) with other audiences. 
 
Anderson (2006) argues that all communities larger than primal, face-to-face ones 
in which people do not have personal contacts with all fellowmen are imagined. 
This imagining is facilitated by mass media that provides shared information for a 
scattered population to feel an affiliation with their fellowmen. Most interviewees 
did not necessarily argue that they “belong to” a certain online group or community. 
They were not users who actively engaged in networking sites, posted their own 
opinions, or who joined fansubbing groups in order to translate foreign content for 
others. In most cases, they went online to read discussions and to download or 
stream shows shared by other anonymous users. However, that is not to say they 
did not find a sense of connectedness or togetherness online. Rather, many of them 
used social networking sites as reference guides to decide what to watch and what 
platforms to use. These individual activities all had their social purpose, even if not 
as explicit as activities such as public online discussions. The way in which Tim 
adopted the same consumption pattern as other PTT users was an example of 
searching for a sense of connectedness. As Jones (1997) argues, Internet 
communities are imagined as parallel groupings of people and “they are not 
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composed of people who are necessarily connected, even by interest, but are rather 
groupings of people headed in the same direction, for a time” (p. 17). The online 
consumption of television “headed in the same direction” may refer to 
“develop[ing] a similar form of online consumption of television”.  
 
When talking about Chinese fansubbing forums, Alex stated that their files were 
“shared by all the Chinese-speaking people around the world”. This description 
indicated the ways he imagined his online consumption as part of a group who 
might not be physically watching TV together, but who were watching individually 
as part of a collective. As Jones (1997) argues, “we are struck, as we use the 
Internet, by the sense that there are others out there like us” (p. 17). This paralleled 
how the interviewees developed a sense of togetherness via their online 
consumption.  
 
The second reason why the interviewees stated that “many people watch television 
online like they did” was an interpersonal one: they found that more and more 
people around them watched TV online, or they were the people who introduced 
such online consumption practices to their acquaintances:  
 
My sister-in-law lives in the same neighbourhood, and my brother-in-law lives 
nearby. All the files they have are provided by me […] say, my brother-in-law 
mentions a certain movie that he fails to find online, and then I just say, “Okay, 
alright” and I download it. Similarly, if my sister-in-law finds the Korean 
drama that she is interested in on TV, I will download all the episodes for her. 
[Their media content] is all from me, including music content. (Ann, female, 
41 years old) 
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Nowadays, everyone goes online to directly stream something; you don’t even 
need to download it. I stopped downloading movies or programmes for others 
when I noticed that all the people around me started to use PPStream! They no 
longer need me [laughs]! (Dan, male, 27 years old) 
 
As a person interested in foreign television, familiar with computers and eager to 
maintain family bounds (see also Section I), Ann actively helped her relatives who 
were less familiar with downloading to obtain the files they wanted. Dan started to 
consume TV online (mainly by downloading) before his friends and colleagues. He 
used to be the “contributor” who actively distributed video files to people around 
him. However, the growing popularity of online streaming sites enabled people to 
watch TV online even more easily since they required lower levels of technical 
repertoire and equipment. In contrast to Ann, whose relatives still needed her to 
access media content, Dan found that more and more of his acquaintances, even 
those who had low technical repertoire, started to watch TV online without his help. 
This was the moment at which he realised how online watching was much more 
accessible than before, as well as – ironically – denying him a social role.  
 
Will ran a website sharing Japanese dramas he collected online, and he was the 
only interviewee who actively shared the downloaded content with anonymous 
online users. When being asked why he set up his drama-sharing site, he argued:  
 
I find that many people want to download or find the latest Japanese dramas 
and sometimes having problems doing so, so I set up this site. I want to 
provide and share easy access to the dramas with others online. People can 
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also share the dramas they have or discuss these dramas here [i.e. on his 
drama-sharing site]. (Will, male, 31 years old) 
 
Will set up his website with a clear social purpose: instead of watching the dramas 
individually, he engaged in sharing his viewing with anonymous, unknown users. 
Similar to Dan, Will also had high technical repertoire, and could find dramas 
online with ease. When he re-shared the dramas, he intentionally made the access 
relatively simple: users could easily download the drama by merely 
double-clicking on the listed URL links, without going through complicated steps 
and using specific software as required by many P2P sites. By attracting individual 
users to downloading files, discussing, and even sharing dramas together, his site 
became a popular hub for many Taiwanese audiences interested in Japanese 
dramas.  
 
The way in which Ann, Dan and Will helped acquaintances or unknown audiences 
to access programmes online indicated a change in the online consumption of 
television. At its inception, such consumption was commonly understood as an 
activity limited to audiences with high technical repertoires and strong interests in 
actively finding media content. However, it has gradually become a practice 
adopted by more casual audiences who enjoyed watching easily accessed content, 
without necessarily having developed technical repertoires or wanting to make 
substantial efforts obtaining the content. This change was similar to the shifting 
definition and understanding of radio listening that Boddy (2004) delineates: from 
an activity of male enthusiasts interested in machinery and assembling radio sets 
themselves, to housewives who enjoyed broadcasts during their housework via the 
complete, ready-to-be-used radio sets they purchased (see also Chapter 7 Section V 
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on Dan’s thoughts of the role Chinese online platforms played in the Taiwanese 
online viewing of television).  
 
Given that all my interviewees were audiences who actively searched for television 
programmes online by themselves, they (including female or older interviewees) 
were generally more familiar with finding online access than their acquaintances. 
While some interviewees (e.g. Will, Dan or Cheryl) had relatively higher technical 
repertoire and/or more knowledge about finding content online compared to other 
interviewees, the gender difference in this regard was not very distinct. Most 
interviewees argued that most people they knew had – to a greater or lesser extent – 
consumed TV online, indicating how such consumption became gradually 
understood as a general practice. A few years previously, a frequent question posted 
on online forums, or that interviewees asked each other was, “have you tried using 
online downloading/streaming to watch a programme?” Nowadays, the questions 
the interviewees discussed were: 
 
[…] what pieces of software are you using to download stuff, which pieces 
are better or faster in terms of sharing speed, what platforms you are relying 
on, and so on. (Ben, male, 34 years old) 
When online viewing was becoming a common practice among audiences, the 
question to ask was no longer if they did so or not, but how they did it and what the 
best ways to do so were. The growing popularity of online viewing indicates that 
even though this practice is a form of narrowcasting, it can still connect people. 
Many interviewees pointed out that the crucial reason they started watching foreign 
shows online was because they discovered that other people were doing so. For 
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example, Joyce had no idea about PPStream until her friends talked about what to 
watch in the evening; she found out that “they were busy watching PPStream every 
night” so then, she said, “I started using it as well”. Evan was very interested in 
American series and was surrounded by close friends with similar interests. Since 
he wanted to discuss the latest American programmes with them, he opted for the 
same viewing pattern (i.e. online) to ensure that they could all watch something 
within the same timeframe. Rachel also said that, besides reading online 
discussions, she also watched current dramas that her friends had introduced her to, 
which then became a shared topic of conversation.  
 
As Ellis (2007) argues, the currency of television programmes still seems to be 
important in television experience despite the growth of on-demand viewing. In 
most cases, the interviewees did not literally watch a given programme at the same 
time, or watch broadcast television live as others did. However, if they watched the 
same programme online individually within a relatively similar timeframe, it was 
likely that they could roughly catch up with the currency of that programme in 
order “to belong to the same present as others” (Ellis, 2007, p. 11). Therefore, 
many interviewees watched current foreign shows online since they felt that if they 
watched those programmes months later via local broadcasts they would have 
missed the viewing experience and the currency shared among audiences 
employing online platforms. In this sense, rather than breaking down shared 
viewing experiences, online methods were used by the interviewees in a collective 
sense, the main purpose of which was to establish identical viewing patterns with 
people who shared their interests, thereby achieving a sense of togetherness.  
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ii. Connectivity to Home 
As argued previously, illegal and/or unofficial online platforms often provide 
foreign programmes that would have been unavailable to the audiences. Such 
platforms offer audiences not only time-shifting but also “space-shifting” functions 
in their consumption. By “space-shifting” I refer to providing cross-border content 
that is difficult or impossible to find in the broadcast territory where audiences are 
located. While in most cases, space-shifting was valued by the interviewees as a 
means to access foreign shows, it was also used by some of those currently not 
resident in Taiwan to access Taiwanese content. In other words space-shifting 
served two purposes: to connect with broadcasts in foreign locations, and to link 
back to the audiences’ native land. Despite different purposes, both modes were 
used as a form of deterritorialisation (Tomlinson, 1999), that is to eliminate 
geographical, temporal and legal boundaries limiting the regions in which the 
consumption took place. The connection with foreign locations will be discussed 
more comprehensively in Chapter 6 and 7; here I will discuss the audiences’ 
experience of connecting back to their native land.       
 
Alex had lived in the US for nearly ten years, Vivian had been living in London for 
nine months when the interview took place,8 but neither of them were migrants. 
They talked about their viewing habits when living outside Taiwan: 
 
Although I was abroad, I still used YouTube or PPstream to watch Taiwanese 
shows. I mainly watched variety shows, say, Here Comes KangXi, Super 
                                                 
8 Vivian moved back to Taiwan three months later after, while Alex moved to the UK for a year, 
and then returned to the US in 2012.   
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Idols, Super Star Avenue and The University,9 and I am still simultaneous 
with Taiwan. (Alex, male, 27 years old) 
 
I don’t really change viewing habits when I am living here [in London]. I still 
watch One Piece10 and Here Comes KangXi as I did when I was in Taiwan. 
(Vivian, female, 23 years old)  
 
For Alex, being able to consume current Taiwanese shows when he was abroad 
could reduce the temporal and spatial distance between him and Taiwanese culture. 
The variety shows he mentioned were a shared topic with his Taiwanese friends 
(either in Taiwan or the US). Although most of the shows he watched were not live 
broadcasts, he still felt that he was to some extent living “in a simultaneous 
manner” with his friends. While he did not identify himself as diasporic, his 
practice was close to the ways in which diasporic communities use media to 
maintain ties with their homeland (Georgiou, 2006).11  
Moreover, online platforms were not only used to consume domestic shows but 
also non-Taiwanese shows when interviewees were abroad. Vivian had been 
watching Taiwanese and foreign programmes (e.g. Japanese animation, American 
series) online in Taiwan and she continued the same practice in London where 
these programmes were unavailable on any British broadcasting system; the 
                                                 
9 Here Comes KangXi, Super Idols, Super Star Avenue and The University are all the names of 
current and popular Taiwanese variety shows. 
10 One Piece is a Japanese animation that has been very popular in Asia in recent years.   
11 While online platforms might be used for diasporic purposes, most (or at least those that my 
interviewees relied on) cannot be counted as diaspora media or diaspora-oriented. They are not 
established and operated by a diaspora, while maintaining ties between diaspora and the homeland is 
also not their aim. For instance, the variety show clips that Alex viewed on YouTube, were frequently 
uploaded and viewed by Taiwanese viewers (in Taiwan). This might serve as a means to fill the 
absence of official online platforms of networks rather than as a diasporic medium.  
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foreign programmes she had been watching were seldom available on Taiwanese 
networks either. Online platforms helped her to carry the whole zone of 
consumption (Pertierra & Turner, 2013) that she was acquainted with her. In doing 
so, it was as if physical and spatial locations made no difference when she moved 
from one country to another. Most interviewees who had lived overseas (e.g. Jenny, 
Sophie, Helen) more or less also used online platforms as Alex and Vivian did to 
“space-shift” back home to access the zone of consumption in which they had been 
used to before they moved to foreign countries, and to watch Taiwanese 
programmes abroad. If using online methods to consume foreign TV is a practice 
conducive to connecting with foreign cultures without having to deal with time 
differences (see also Chapter 6), applying the same methods to consume shows 
from the domestic zone of consumption is a way to connect with an audience’s 
home country in real time. In either case, the time and space-shifting capacity of 
online methods helped audiences to transcend the physical, temporal and spatial 
distance to achieve a sense of togetherness at their convenience.  
 
VI. Concluding Remarks 
This chapter elaborated on the implications of foreign TV consumption via online 
sharing platforms, thereby examining television’s role in social togetherness, by 
looking at the ways in which interviewees negotiated the possibility and limits of 
both narrowcasting and broadcasting and asking how their sense of social 
togetherness was achieved or lost during the negotiating processes that this 
required. Online sharing, by definition, is never a completely isolated practice. It 
has, as Evans (2011) argues, both “a fracturing and a unifying potential in terms of 
its role in an individual’s perception of being a part of ‘an audience’” (p. 172).  
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It was common for my interviewees to cherish their freedom to personalise their 
viewing at one moment, while expressing their nostalgia for the “old days” the next, 
for times when they followed the live broadcasts as others did. This trait was also 
very commonly shown in the discussions on PTT and other social networking sites. 
Some interviewees worried they would become detached from society if they were 
not following broadcast television. Sometimes, they were conscious that their 
viewing was social, but were vague when talking about who they were ‘together’ 
with during online viewing. They mentioned friends and family, or – in many 
cases – they just said “others” or “we”, a more general public that was not clearly 
defined. Although they often referred to Taiwanese audiences in a broad sense, at 
times the sense of what this included shifted from acquaintances, national 
audiences, to an even more general idea of the transnational, global audiences who 
also adopted online viewing. It was hard to tell which forms of togetherness they 
perceived, imagined or looked for.  
 
Sometimes the interviewees were not necessarily conscious that they were looking 
for a certain sense of togetherness. For instance, they talked about how 
personalised their consumption was, while overlooking the fact that they picked a 
certain show because it was popular among their friends or on the networking site 
they visited. They frequently rushed to download shows when many users were 
sharing the file because the download speed was faster according to the technical 
specifications of P2P. That is not to say that they did not find a sense of 
togetherness. Rather, the “for-anyone-as-someone structure” with which media 
functioned in linking individuals and publics (Scannell, 2000) was still in play, but 
the social, public dimension of such viewing was sometimes overshadowed by the 
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on-demand capacity of online sharing. Consequently, in the consumption of 
television via online sharing, the sense of togetherness might be weaker than that 
generated in the consumption of broadcasts.  
 
As Lotz (2007) argues, while the customisation of viewing has become an essential 
part of television experience, in a paradoxical manner audiences also begin to 
“reestablish some of the shared cultural experience that had once been more typical 
of the medium” (p. 245). In 2013, the finale of the third series of HBO’s Game of 
Thrones was illegally shared over a million times worldwide in 24 hours, and 
became the most pirated television episode in global history (Crooks, 2013). In the 
following year (2014), the finale of the fourth season again set a new piracy record: 
it was illegally downloaded 1.5 million times in 12 hours after the US premiere; 
and the number of downloads reached 8 million by the end of 2014 (Izundu, 2014). 
Many other programmes were circulated globally in a similar way. Given how large 
the number of downloads can be, we cannot assume that audiences who personalise 
their viewing no longer appreciate shared experiences, especially in cases where 
the shows consumed (online or offline) are from mainstream networks. Such 
collective downloading/streaming practices are, as Ellis (2007) argues, “in effect 
variants of broadcasting, depending on a public currency of nowness” (p. 223). 
Even though audiences have access to more channels and platforms than before, 
this does not mean that fragmented audiences no longer constitute a mass audience. 
 
Moreover, a sense of togetherness concerns who or what publics individuals are 
together with. Gripsrud (2010a) argues that mobile and privatised people still find a 
sense of community via which broadcasting and its currency provide – shared 
topics, shared frame of reference, etc. Specifically, in the online consumption of 
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foreign programmes, the currency audiences appreciate is a transnational, foreign 
one, which is fulfilled by unofficial/illegal, space-shifting online services. When 
the currency of national broadcast television is temporally and geographically 
stretched by these transnational online practices, questions concerning television’s 
role in social togetherness that should be looked at include how, and to whom, this 
form of transnationally-stretched currency provides various forms of publicness, 
thereby shaping the construction of nation and public spheres at a transnational 
level.   
 
If broadcast television is understood as a national system territorially bounded by 
national borders, for audiences who search for foreign content unavailable on local 
networks, their practices not only challenge television’s notion of “broadcasting” 
but also that of the “national/local”. Why are they eager to transcend national 
broadcasting borders to catch up with the latest foreign content? Who or what 
communities – if any – do they imagine themselves to be with and when are they 
doing so? As Evans notes, if it becomes more feasible for audiences to access 
television shows from all over the world, as if there were no geographical and 
temporal boundaries, the relationship between television viewing and nationhood 
should be re-examined (p. 146). This chapter has demonstrated how, at a local and 
general level, the interviewees’ sense of social togetherness was achieved or 
challenged via their online viewing. Focusing on the transnational context of online 
viewing, the next chapter employs the notion of “coevalness” (Fabian, 1983; Wilk, 
1994) to ask how the consumption of foreign TV via online sharing is associated 
with a specific form of social togetherness involving audiences’ perceptions of 
temporal distance with foreign locales and cultures. 
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Chapter 6: The Sense of Coevalness in the Consumption of 
Foreign TV via Online Sharing 
This chapter examines the implications of online consumption of foreign TV for 
audiences’ sense of coevalness with foreign cultures. The concept of coevalness, as 
Fabian (1983) argues, consists of both “synchronous/simultaneous” and 
“contemporary” states. In the consumption of foreign TV via online sharing, 
technological development enables media content to be distributed and consumed 
across national borders and other spatial boundaries in a more immediate fashion. 
However, as Chapter 3 Section VI indicates, having access to the same media 
content at the same time as people located elsewhere does not necessarily mean 
that audiences will automatically consider that they are living in the same 
temporality with foreign others. The important question following from the 
improvement of synchronicity in media and cultural flows lies in whether, or in 
what sense, our sense of contemporaneity changes. Moreover, while coevalness is 
frequently employed by studies on media flows to explain the sense of 
contemporaneity between cultures and countries, little research looks closely at 
how television as a time-based medium (Scannell, 2009, p. 223), and through the 
temporality involved in its daily output and scheduling, is shaping a sense of shared 
temporality with foreign cultures.    
 
This chapter first looks at various practices of online platforms and local television 
in shortening the temporal gap between foreign broadcasts and local consumption 
in terms of “time-space compression” (Harvey, 1989) and promoting coevalness. 
Second, it also examines the way in which audiences employed different platforms 
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to access foreign television programmes in order to elaborate how temporalities of 
foreign broadcasting are implicated in interviewees’ everyday life as important 
temporal frameworks. Several important notions regarding television’s temporality 
(e.g. liveness, for-anyone-as-someone structure, currency) are employed here. 
Thereby this chapter articulates how, and in what sense, the interviewees’ sense of 
coevalness was achieved and also explores important theoretical notions on TV 
broadcasting in cross-cultural and transnational contexts.  
 
I. Live Connectivity to Foreign Locales with Re-streaming TV 
i. Conditions Regarding Transnational Live Transmission and 
Consumption of Broadcast TV 
As discussed in Chapter 3 and Chapter 5, Section IV, the liveness of television, 
most manifest in live broadcasting, is a crucial condition for television’s function in 
terms of social togetherness, contributing to “a form of enunciation evoking 
experiences of face-to-face-communications and a sense of the audience as 
simultaneously present” (Johansen, 1997, p. 192). This simultaneity is close to 
Anderson’s (2006, p. 188) idea that individuals imagine themselves as living lives 
parallel to other unknown, substantial groups of fellow members – which is key for 
the formation of imagined communities. More specifically, according to Fabian 
(1983), the notion of simultaneous and that of contemporary together constitute the 
concept of coevalness. In other words, simultaneity is a crucial condition when we 
look at whether, or in what sense, people perceive themselves and their fellowmen 
as “engaged in a common, active, occupation or sharing of time” (Johansen, 1997, 
p. 186). 
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In Chapter 5 Section V, I defined the notion of “space-shift” in terms of discussing 
the way in which online sharing helped interviewees to transcend spatial and 
temporal boundaries, virtually “shifting” themselves to other zones of consumption 
at their convenience. Here, I would like to elaborate on the practice whereby 
audiences and illegal online services strive to bypass various broadcast restrictions 
to achieve the live broadcasting of foreign networks. This will allow us to discuss: 
1) the significance of space-shifting in consuming flows of live foreign 
broadcasting; and 2) how such consumption helped the audiences to achieve a 
sense of coevalness with foreign locales and cultures. 
 
The conditions with regard to transnational live transmission and consumption of 
broadcast television should be briefly addressed here (see also Chapter 1 Section II). 
All legal television networks and providers, regardless of their differences in signal 
transmission (e.g. terrestrial, cable, satellite, online), have broadcast territories 
within which their signals are allowed to be transmitted and received legally. Such 
territories are regulated by a series of broadcast/licensing restrictions and policies 
based on geolocations.  
 
National television, by definition, generally broadcasts within its own national 
territory. While programmes made by a given national network can be traded 
internationally and globally, the flow of this given network as a whole is not 
allowed to be traded in the same way, or indeed retransmitted to other countries 
(either live or not).1 Although more national television broadcasters now release 
their programmes or even live stream their broadcasts online, access to the content 
                                                 
1 Some countries can receive the national broadcasts of their neighbouring countries via satellite or 
terrstrial antennas in real time (either legally or unofficially). However, this is not the case in Taiwan; 
for instance, Japanese and Korean national broadcasts are not accessible through satellite. 
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is still governed by IP (Internet Protocol) address restrictions. From the audiences’ 
point of view, broadcast territories determine the extent of access whereby their 
right of consumption varies according to their location. A viewer is not able to 
access the online content of a given channel or network if his or her IP address is 
not located in the same country as a given channel or network.  
 
For example, the terms of use of BBC Online Services2 clearly note that audiences 
may not access video and live television services via BBC Online Services if they 
are located outside the UK. Most national television networks apply similar terms 
of use to their broadcasts and online content. Based on these conditions, when it 
comes to the transnational consumption of television, it is difficult to access the 
entire flows of national broadcast television of a specific foreign country when 
audiences are outside this country, since they are beyond the reach of those 
networks’ broadcast territories (by comparison, it is easier for audiences to view 
foreign programme units online, either legally or illegally). 
 
From approximately 2006 onwards there have been unauthorised websites and 
streaming platforms which strive to live re-transmit the broadcasts of various kinds 
of television networks (e.g. the national networks of certain countries, paid satellite 
and cable channels). 3  Many of these live services became popular among 
audiences who wanted to consume live broadcasts of foreign networks, and 
Taiwanese audiences are no exception. On PTT, the most influential Taiwanese 
Bulletin Board System (BBS) or other social media, information about these live 
                                                 
2 See the official website of BBC for its terms of use: http://www.bbc.co.uk/terms/help.shtml. Last 
accessed 12 January 2015. 
3 KeyHole TV (http://www.v2p.jp/video/english) based in Japan or Sopcast 
(http://www.sopcast.com) based in China are some of the popular services in Taiwan.  
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streaming services promptly spread among users. However, most of these services 
did not last long. The limits of broadband width (especially in 2007 and 2008, 
when bandwidth capacity was much more limited than it is now) and providers’ 
concerns about copyright infringement were the main reasons why they could not 
be sustained.  
 
ii. Tokyolive.tv and the Space-shifting of Live Television Flow 
This subsection introduces the practice of tokyolive.tv in order to explore the 
implications of re-streaming live broadcasting from foreign networks for the 
enhancement of coevalness. Tokyolive.tv is a small-scale Taiwanese website which 
provided unauthorised, free live broadcasts of major Japanese national television 
networks (Fuji, TBS, Asashi, etc.) and which was well-known among audiences 
interested in Japanese TV. After having been in operation for a few months in 2007, 
it was eventually forced to shut down as a result of copyright concerns and a lack 
of finance. Figure 6.1 was the index page of tokyolive.tv with a statement from the 
administrators before the website was shut down. Below is my translation of the 
main part of the statement:  
 
For whatever reason you come and visit us, we believe that all of us share the 
same interest in Japanese culture. It is exactly because of this interest that our 
site is here for you. Being able to watch Japanese TV in real time might not be 
that special to many others. Moreover, nowadays many programme clips are 
already available to be downloaded online. However, to you and to us, people 
who appreciate Japanese culture, there may be a special, shared affection in 
our hearts. It is an irreplaceable affection and appreciation towards the access 
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of synchronicity and liveness. Being able to see our favourite artists in real 
time, being touched by the exquisiteness of Japanese culture, finding a 
platform to learn Japanese […] all of these aspects are what we want to offer 
and what our dreams are about. […] We are indeed facing lots of difficulties 
concerning lack of resources in these days. However, in order to insist on 
pursuing our dreams, and to let all friends with the same interests have a 
shared space, we will carry on […] we need your help, and let’s keep making 
an effort to make our shared dream come true. (tokyolive.tv, 2007)  
 
 
Figure 6.1: The index page of tokyolive.tv. Screenshot on 7 September 2007. 
 
The statement “many programme clips are already available to be downloaded 
online” indicated that tokyolive.tv clearly knew that by the time its service was 
online, many (target) audiences would have already used file sharing services to 
download their favourite shows. In what sense then did tokyolive.tv mark its 
difference, giving users an “irreplaceable affection and appreciation towards the 
access of synchronicity and liveness”?  
 
Since tokyolive.tv streamed (retransmitted) the live broadcasts of Japanese 
television in real time, the audiences did not even need to wait until programme 
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clips were uploaded hours or days later. Similar to the transnational live 
transmission of satellite television, the TV time (Wilk, 1994) tokyolive.tv delivered 
via the Internet was the transnational TV time with the narrowest temporal gap 
between their efforts and Japanese national broadcasts.  
 
Moreover, rather than only providing programme units or segments (i.e. “clips”) 
(Ellis, 2002), tokyolive.tv offered a seamless flow (R. Williams, 2003) or 
“segmentation without closure” (Feuer, 1983, p. 14) of Japanese television to 
Taiwanese audiences. As Feuer (1983) points out, television’s ability for 
instantaneous transmission and reception has become the ground for a pervasive 
ideology of liveness, and this ideology helps to overcome fragmentation within 
television’s flow. Compared to online methods or platforms which tend to function 
as databases rather than as flow (Bennett, 2008a), tokyolive.tv insisted on offering 
linear television synchronically with Japanese broadcasts, a whole package of 
television experience. This form of linear television was special in the sense that it 
was a national television flow directly “space-shifted” from another country, a flow 
not supposed to be consumed outside Japan. This was what tokyolive.tv meant by 
“irreplaceable affection and appreciation towards liveness and synchronicity”. By 
virtually space-shifting the Japanese television flow to Taiwanese audiences in real 
time, tokyolive.tv claimed its ability to offer a comprehensive and synchronised 
viewing experience that was most identical with the viewing experience of 
audiences in Japan.  
 
There are of two implications in the term “shared affection” as mentioned in the 
tokyolive.tv statement. First, given that the administrators put the website online so 
as to publicly share access to live broadcast of Japanese networks, one of their 
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main “dreams” (or more precisely, motivations), was to share their affection for 
Japanese culture with fellow Taiwanese audience members. Phrases such as “all of 
us share the same interests”, “watching in real time might not be that special to 
many others, but to you and us […] a shared affection in our heart” (my italics), 
clearly addressed a sense of togetherness regarding a specific Taiwanese audience 
with whom they shared a strong interest in Japan. Second, tokyolive.tv pursued the 
live broadcast of Japanese networks because it sought to access the most current 
Japanese information (e.g. “being able to see our favourite artists in real time”). In 
this regard, the cross-border viewing experience that tokyolive.tv offered was not 
only about a sense of togetherness with local (i.e. Taiwanese) people with similar 
interests, but also with contemporary foreign (in this case, Japanese) society and 
culture: namely, a sense of coevalenss (Fabian, 1983; Wilk, 1994). 
 
The background of the index page, as illustrated in Fig. 6.1, is a night view of the 
famous scene of Tokyo Bay featuring the Rainbow Bridge, Tokyo’s most famous 
bridge that crosses between Shibaura and Odaiba. The Odaiba area, where people 
can see the best view of Tokyo Bay and the Rainbow Bridge, has been frequently 
chosen as the exterior setting for some of the most successful Japanese trendy 
dramas (e.g., Love Generation in 1997; Yamato Nadeshiko in 2000) from the late 
1990s to early in the next decade. The Odaiba area and the Rainbow Bridge are not 
only regarded as a typical image of Tokyo and Japan, but also as a symbol of Asian 
audiences’ affection for Japanese popular culture and their desire for Japanese 
modernity (M.-T. Lee, 2003, 2004b; T.-D. Lee & Ho, 2002). In this regard, 
tokyolive.tv’s index design symbolised this same desire, and in doing so stressed its 
attempt to enhance a strong sense of coevalness. As an amateur service that did not 
charge its users any fees, tokyolive.tv was not a business that made profits by 
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infringing the copyright of Japanese networks. Rather, it “poached” (Certeau, 1984; 
Fiske, 1989) the live broadcast of Japanese networks, in order to serve as a 
fan-oriented, amateur site that sought an audience with shared interests.  
 
iii. Live Foreign Broadcasting as a Window to Foreign Countries 
There have also been Internet Protocol Television (IPTV) commercial services that 
made profits by delivering unauthorised live broadcasts of foreign TV to their 
paying subscribers.4 This section introduces two audience experiences of IPTV 
services featuring Japanese broadcast television to elaborate on the relationship 
between the consumption of live broadcast of foreign TV and the coevaleness 
achieved with foreign locales.  
 
The interviewee Ivy was very interested in Japanese culture, and this interest 
prompted her to go to Tokyo to pursue her BA degree and stayed there for five 
years during her early twenties. She had bought a TV set and enjoyed watching 
Japanese broadcasts. After moving back to Taiwan, she subscribed to a commercial 
IPTV service that offered unauthorised live broadcasts of Japanese TV for years, 
and she was the only interviewee (out of a total of 36) who had done so. She 
argued:  
 
The reason why people want to subscribe to this service is because they want 
to watch some of the hottest [Japanese] programmes live. Since I do not have 
too many financial pressures, I just keep it as a kind of access to Japan. It is 
                                                 
4  These unauthorised commercial services are in general well equipped with the necessary 
technologies (e.g. bandwidth, servers) to sustain their services compared to free amateur services. 
Moreover, they normally use a more private way to deliver their signals to users, making it more 
difficult for copyright holders (e.g. networks) to eradicate them.  
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like a window to Japan. You can use it if when you want to watch Japanese 
TV in real time. For instance, there were a lot of special programmes at New 
Year’s countdown, weren’t there? I watched them directly via it (IPTV), so it 
really tasukaru5 [i.e. helps in Japanese, 助かる]. (Ivy, female, 31 years old) 
  
Ivy explained that although it was convenient to use on-demand online services to 
choose the Japanese programmes she liked (see also Chapter 5 Section III), they 
could never replace live TV, because watching the latter, especially foreign TV, was 
important in the following sense: 
 
When you watch TV, sometimes you also have to watch the commercials, or 
follow schedules. It is not always a bad thing though. Sometimes 
commercials are not just about products, but also about a certain event, then 
you can get to know this kind of information. To be honest, you will better 
understand a country or accommodate yourself to it when you have a TV set, 
since you can know what is happening there, just by turning the TV on and 
leave it there, no matter what is being broadcast on it. Even through content 
like commercials, you will know what kinds of commodities are currently 
trendy. (Ivy, female, 31 years old) 
 
Both Ivy’s argument “you will better know a country or accommodate yourself to it 
when you have a TV set” and tokyolive.tv’s statement regarding “an irreplaceable 
affection and appreciation towards the access of simultaneity and liveness [of 
Japanese broadcasting]” indicate that the relationship between broadcast television 
                                                 
5 While Ivy spoke Mandarin in the interview, she also used certain Japanese terms. In order to 
maintain the nuance of her use of Japanese, the terms she used are kept in their original Japanese 
form rather than being translated into English.  
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and the nation was considered strong. Broadcast television, in Ivy’s understanding, 
functioned as a “window on the world” (Spigel, 1992) that helped her to be more 
connected to the public world of a given foreign country, whether she lived in that 
foreign country or not. Similar to tokyolive.tv, Ivy’s argument suggests that 
consuming a seamless flow was a more complete viewing experience than 
watching single programme units, since every piece of televised output (including 
commercials) was seen as the latest, real time information from the given broadcast 
location. In other words, foreign television flow as a whole provides the most 
comprehensive, up-to-date currency (Ellis, 2002, 2007) regarding that foreign 
country and culture. This foreign currency, with a strong relation to its nation, was 
the key to the audience achieving a sense of coevalness with a given foreign 
country and culture.  
 
The relation between live foreign broadcasts and the sense of coevalness is 
manifested in the experience of Wispa, a famous Taiwanese blogger and author 
who is interested in Japanese dramas.6 Wispa has been running various social 
networking sites (e.g. BBS board, blog, microblogging site) focusing on Japanese 
dramas since the late 1990s. In 2007, she subscribed to an unauthorised IPTV 
service and wrote an entry titled “An urge leads to the purchase of a dream! 
Watching Japanese TV in Taiwan,” and she shared her excitement on her blog 
Wispa’s Notes on TV Viewing.7 Below is a translation of part of the entry: 
 
                                                 
6 Wispa published her book featuring her viewing experience of Japanese dramas in 2005, and it is 
the most popular book on similar or identical topics. 
7 The URL of Wispa’s Notes on TV Viewing is http://wispa.pixnet.net/blog/post/10184686; last 
visited on 25 June 2015. 
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My dream of watching Japanese TV in Taiwan has come true, thanks to this 
machine! […] Watching simultaneously with Japanese audiences the live TV 
of Japan is just like a dream! The pleasure [of doing so] is completely 
different from the experience of waiting impatiently all day long and suffering 
from downloading […] I feel as if I were in Japan. Since Taiwan is an hour 
behind Japan, I even experience the time difference: I have to rush back home 
before 8:00 p.m. to watch Japanese shows broadcast at 9:00 p.m.!  
Watching Japanese broadcast television is a dream as well as an urge! Even if 
I unsubscribe half a year later, I would still feel as if it is a dream to have had 
the magical experience of synchronised viewing.8 Anyway, I really feel that 
subscribing and installing it and acting on such an urge is such a special 
Japanese drama-viewing experience! (Wispa, 2007, extracted and translated 
from ‘Wispa’s Notes on TV Viewing’) 
 
The way in which Wispa repetitively phrased the realisation of “watching Japanese 
broadcasts live in Taiwan” as a dream and “magical experience” coincides with the 
“dream” tokyolive.tv tried to achieve (i.e. restreaming Japanese broadcast TV to its 
users in real time). This phrase indicates how the consumption of the live, national 
broadcasts of another country was still considered rare and difficult in an age of 
global television (Parks & Kumar, 2003), one in which transnationally televised 
content is increasing and programme trades are more globalised.  
 
Johansen (1997, pp. 191-194) argues that national broadcast television, with its 
capacity for liveness as both “simultaneity” and “fellowship” in his terms, provides 
                                                 
8 According to the information given on Wispa’s blog, she kept her IPTV subscription at least until 
2009. 
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audiences the impression of being co-present with their countrymen. If this is the 
case, being able to watch the national broadcasts of another country indicates that 
audiences may have the impression of being co-present with the citizens of that 
given country. Since the IPTV service virtually space-shifted the consuming and 
transmitting zone of Japanese national broadcasts to Wispa’s television screen in 
Taiwan, she experienced that co-presence – “as if I were in Japan” – to the extent 
that she felt that she had lived in the Japanese time zone, which is an hour later than 
Taiwan. This experience of sharing the same time zone with Japanese audiences is 
one of the most significant examples of how the consumption of live foreign 
broadcast television helps audiences to achieve a sense of coevalness with foreign 
countries. While this section focused on the live broadcasting of Japanese TV and 
Taiwanese audiences’ coevalness with Japan, the identical pattern of consumption 
and the coevalness achieved can also be found with live broadcasting from 
countries such as Korea and the US.  
 
As Ivy was born into a family that was wealthier than average, middle-class 
Taiwanese families, she had greater economic capital than most of the other 
interviewees. She not only had the costly live IPTV subscription to virtually access 
Japan as a form of symbolic mobility, she also had the physical mobility to live in 
Tokyo, Sydney and London. To some extent, Ivy not only imagined but also 
actually experienced herself as living lives parallel to foreigners (i.e. Japanese, 
Australian, British). By comparison, despite Wispa’s long-time interest in Japanese 
popular culture, she had not lived in Japan at the time of writing the quoted blog 
entry. In this sense, live Japanese television might be more likely to function as the 
primary (if not the only) resource through which she experienced coevalness with 
Japan. While the importance of audiences’ overseas living experiences in terms of 
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physical mobility will be discussed again in Chapter 7 Sections II to IV, the next 
section discusses another audience practice associated with the live broadcasting of 
foreign networks: the real-time online discussion of the consumption of foreign 
shows via streaming services. 
 
II. Real-time Discussion Threads as a Form of Live Event 
On social networking sites (e.g. Twitter, Facebook, PTT), in recent years when a 
given popular programme is on air, it is increasingly common for audiences to 
gather online and start a live, instant thread of conversation to discuss the 
programme as it is transmitted in real time. This kind of discussion thread on PTT 
is usually called a “live thread”.  
 
On 25 March 2008, a special episode of Operation Love (Puropōzu Daisakusen, 
プロポーズ大作戦),9 the Japanese drama popular both in Japan and other East 
Asian regions at the time, was on air in Japan. Given the popularity Operation Love 
gained in 2007, the broadcast of a special episode featuring the end of the whole 
story was a long-awaited event for Taiwanese audiences on PTT, and this ignited 
enthusiastic discussions even before its Japanese premiere. On the day of its 
Japanese premiere, many enthusiastic audience members gathered at the same time 
on one of the PTT boards, Japandrama, and started live threads to discuss the 
ongoing plots with other online users/viewers. Figure 6.2 features the user AAU 
who was watching the special episode in Taiwan at around 20:00 (Taiwanese time) 
                                                 
9 The original story of Operation Love, a drama composed of 11 weekly episodes, was first 
broadcast in Japan from April to June 2007. The special episode was first aired in Japan on 25 
March 2008. It was a newly shot two-hour special episode. In Taiwan, the original 11 episodes were 
imported and first broadcast on the local channel Videoland Japan on 7-21 August 2007, and the 
special episode was on air on the same channel on 26 and 27 August 2008.  
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when the drama was being aired in Japan. The fact that AAU did not understand 
Japanese did not stop him/her from enjoying the live broadcast of the episode. He 
(or she) asked on Japandrama if other users would like to discuss the plot together. 
The entry is translated as follows: 
 
Hey, the Operation Love SP10 is on air right now in Japan! I wonder how 
many of the people here are watching. Sigh… I can neither read nor 
understand Japanese… (Well there’s no subtitle anyway…). Ahhhhhh, folks, 
how about starting a live thread? (AAU, 2008) 
 
 
Figure 6.2 The post proposing to start live threads to discuss the episode in real time. The 
arrow indicates the proposal sentence. Screenshot on 25 March 2008. 
 
A large number of users promptly responded and joined the live thread. Less than 
an hour and a half later, the number of responses on the thread was over 2,000 and 
it became the most popular entry of the day and over the following week. Many 
conversations reflected the audience’s excitement and frustration regarding their 
online connection to the live broadcast. Figure 6.3 shows a very small section of 
the threads. In the first row, the user joanayulove wrote: “the online streaming was 
                                                 
10 SP refers to the special edition of a certain drama. This term is commonly used both in the 
Japanese TV production industry and in Taiwanese audiences’ discussions.  
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disconnected…Sobbing”; and in the second row, tomwu said: “watching now…I 
don’t understand the Japanese language either, haha”. At the bottom of the figure 
‘nilcc’, who did not seem to realise that Operation Love SP was only accessible 
online at that time, asked: “which local network is broadcasting this now??” While 
many others discussed the live viewing conditions they were having, Ishigaki 
(ninth row) was the first user (in the conversation shown in Fig. 6.3) who directly 
discussed the plot: “This drama, in fact, should be called ‘runaway groom’!!!!” 
 
 
Figure 6.3 Part of the ongoing threads. Screenshot on 25 March 2008. 
 
The title of the entry that generated the live thread, was translated as “Operation 
Love SP, Live Now (spoiler alert!)”. The term “spoilers” can be understood as 
“sneak peeking”, or previewed information directly related to the plot (Baym, 2000, 
p. 87). While some people cannot wait or would not mind being “spoiled” 
regarding the story, others would – understandably – rather avoid spoilers since 
they are concerned that their later viewing enjoyment will be sacrificed. Gray 
(1992) notes that drama viewing has to be “carefully organised in order to keep up 
with not only a serial but also television-related talk” (p. 125). The influence of 
asynchronous viewing between audiences on television-related discussion is shown 
in audiences’ spoiler concerns with foreign programmes available only via 
unauthorised online methods. Since these programmes are not yet officially and 
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legally premiered in Taiwan, all detailed information about their plots are 
“spoilers” to the general Taiwanese public. In order to avoid conflicts between 
users over spoilers, as a norm on PTT, any discussion concerning foreign 
programmes is considered as a potential spoiler, and is required to be clearly 
labelled as such in the title.  
 
The live thread of Operation Love SP indicated the same practice regarding spoiler 
concerns. While many PTT users joined the discussions, the users who were 
actually watching Operation Love SP when it was simultaneously on air in Japan 
were still a minority. More users (whether participating in the discussions or not) 
consumed the episode at other times for different reasons (e.g. they were busy 
during the live broadcast, lacked the necessary IT skills, had poor Internet 
connections). Therefore, the live thread was clearly marked as spoiler to respect the 
majority of the audiences who had not watched the drama and wanted to retain 
their enjoyment both in terms of viewing and participating in the discussion. 
 
The live threads of Operation Love SP could be understood as “online liveness”, a 
form of “social co-presence on a variety of scales […] all made possible by the 
Internet as an underlying infrastructure” (Couldry, 2004, p. 356). Specifically, two 
forms of online liveness were evident. The first was associated with the real time 
connection to the live broadcast in Japan. As Ellis (1992) notes, television’s “live” 
aesthetics is maintained in the live broadcasting of factual, unfolding programmes 
as well as that of fictional programmes, “as though the TV image is a ‘live’ image, 
transmitted and received in the same moment as it is produced” (p. 132). Although 
Operation Love SP was itself fictional, its live broadcast in Japan was an actual 
event that took place in the living world. The fact that it was rare to have such live, 
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transnational access justifies this act of synchronic transmission and consumption 
as constituting a special event. Insofar as such online transmission connected PTT 
users in real time to an ongoing, unfolding “shared social reality” (Couldry, 2004, 
pp. 355-356) – i.e. the live broadcast of Operation Love SP – these users achieved 
a sense of liveness and thereby a sense of coevalness with both Japanese and 
Taiwanese fellow audiences. 
 
The second form of online liveness has to do with the live discussions that brought 
audiences together online. The live threads of Operation Love SP demonstrate the 
same conversational feature with that apparent in live tweets about the London 
2012 Olympics (as discussed in Chapter 3) and many other popular fictional and 
non-fictional programmes. Given the increasing worldwide popularity of 
television-related live tweets/discussions, the phenomenon of online live threads 
per se, while based on TV broadcasts, should be regarded as a relatively smaller but 
still significant form (compared with TV broadcasts) of live, media events.  
 
Specifically, Ytreberg (2009) examines the ways in which television networks set 
up multiple platforms to encourage audiences to discuss reality shows or even take 
part in shows’ development online (e.g. by voting). He regards this online practice 
as promoted by the networks to be a form of “extended liveness” (p. 477). 
Nevertheless, although online threads in my empirical data could also be regarded 
as a form of extended liveness, they were not the result of the networks’ deliberate 
efforts. In the online consumption of foreign TV, such as in tokyolive.tv’s case, 
liveness was not originally deployed by networks that originated the flows, as these 
networks did not intend to live broadcast their programmes to overseas audiences. 
Rather, it was the audiences who actively tried to “poach” (Certeau, 1984; Fiske, 
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1989) foreign live broadcasts in order to be connected to the latest information on 
foreign countries, via which a sense of coevalness was enhanced. 
 
III. Online Platforms’ Promotion of Foreign Schedules and Ratings 
i. Juxtaposition of Local and Foreign TV Schedules 
In the opening section of this chapter, the Taiwanese blogger Wispa’s argument 
demonstrated how, by consuming live Japanese television, the Japanese time zone 
had become a temporality within which she lived parallel with the local (Taiwanese) 
time zone. A lot of research examines how broadcast schedules play a crucial role 
in the social construction of time (Ellis, 2007; Robins, 1995). Specifically, they 
look at how broadcast systems provide a framework “both for the household’s 
involvement in the sequencing of public time, and for the sustaining of domestic 
routines through the broadcast schedules” (Silverstone et al., 1994, p. 21). 
According to Scannell (1988), throughout the years and over generations, the 
temporal rhythms of scheduling had made broadcast output a temporal reference 
that functions as “traces both of a common past and of the biography of 
individuals” (p. 19). It is in this sense that he stresses that the fundamental work of 
national broadcasting systems is “the mediation of modernity, the normalisation of 
the public sphere and the socialisation of the private sphere” (p. 28). Thereby, 
through these processes, the broadcasting system constructs a national public life 
available to all.  
 
While this research rightly explains the implications of the temporality provided by 
broadcast schedules, they are mainly based on a national context. Nevertheless, as 
Wispa’s argument indicates (see Section I), how can the temporality of television 
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function if audiences have not only their national schedule, but also other foreign 
schedules, to follow? In both this and the next section (Sections III and IV), I 
examine the way in which the scheduling of foreign broadcasts is incorporated into 
Taiwanese audiences’ everyday lives and the implications of this for coevalness 
with foreign countries. While this section focuses on the practices of online 
platforms, the next section features the interviewees’ practices. Both sections aim 
to illustrate “the ways in which media texts and technologies are implicated in the 
experience of time” (Keightley, 2013, p. 63) at a transnational level.  
 
Since approximately 2006, it has been increasingly common in Taiwan for the 
online social networking sites featuring foreign genres to juxtapose two television 
schedules. One is the local schedule showing what foreign shows will be broadcast, 
at what time, and on which Taiwanese channels. Another one is the current 
schedules of foreign television networks, listing on what day, on which channel and 
at what time the latest foreign shows will be aired in their countries of origin (see 
Figs. 6.4 and 6.5 as examples).  
 
Figure 6.4 The index page of the BBS board Reality Show on PTT. Screenshot on 19 
March 2008. 
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Figure 6.4 shows the discussion board Reality Show on PTT which features 
Western shows (mainly American ones). At the top of the figure is the current 
schedule of reality shows airing in Taiwan (e.g. the first line lists “Project Runway 
Season 4, Travel Living Channel, Tuesday at 10 pm”). The bottom lists the time the 
schedule of reality shows airing in the United States, including the current season 
of American Idol, America’s Next Top Model, Big Brother (US version), Make Me a 
Super Model, and Survivor.  
 
 
Figure 6.5 The index page of The Little Otaku’s Weekly Drama Journal.11 Screenshot on 
20 September 2012.  
 
Figure 6.5 is the index page of the fan-oriented website The Little Otaku’s Weekly 
Drama Journal with three highlights (marked by the author). The first line marked 
by an oval is information indicating those Korean dramas currently on air on 
Taiwanese local networks. The second line highlighted by a rectangle is 
information regarding Korean dramas currently on air in Korea. The last highlight 
at the bottom of the screenshot is information about current Japanese and Thai 
dramas on air in Japan and Thailand, respectively. The Little Otaku’s Weekly 
Drama Journal is a site some interviewees (e.g. Ann and Nicole) regularly visit in 
                                                 
11 The URL of The Little Otaku’s Weekly Drama Journal is: http://chi.gogoblog.tw/. Last visited on 
19 May 2015. 
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order to check for up-to-date local and foreign information regarding Korean 
dramas.  
From the audience’s perspective, the function of television schedules is to indicate 
what programmes are available, at what time and on which platforms/channels. 
Therefore, it would be almost meaningless for Taiwanese sites to share current 
foreign schedules, if these programmes were unavailable to Taiwanese audiences 
who visit these sites. These sites’ juxtaposition of local and foreign TV schedules 
indicates that it has become imaginable for Taiwanese audiences to access the 
national broadcast outputs of foreign countries, and to live in Internet-enabled 
foreign TV times (Wilk, 1994) parallel with local TV time, as if the boundaries of 
national territory within which each national broadcasting is regulated have blurred 
(if not disappeared). By the same token, a large number of Taiwanese online 
platforms (legally and illegally) provided foreign programmes to their users. Their 
programme collection is usually based on a database structure (Manovich, 2002) in 
which programmes are organised by country of origin, release date, genre, etc. 
However, it is worth noting that many of them simultaneously employ a 
calendar-based structure to orchestrate their programme units similar to broadcast 
schedules, as illustrated in Figure 6.6.  
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Figure 6.6 The weekly calendar of the latest American TV series on Sohu. Screenshot on 
20 January 2015.  
 
Figure 6.6 is the weekly calendar of the latest American TV series legally available 
on the Sohu12 streaming platform, one of the largest Chinese Internet corporations. 
While the platform also contains illegal and unlicensed content, it has started to 
make deals with major American networks and premieres a wide range of the latest, 
subtitled American TV series just one day after they air in the US. The numbers on 
the left (marked by the author) 1 and 2 represent, respectively: 1. The days of the 
week (Monday-Sunday); 2. The information of programmes updated on each day. 
This calendar, titled “Current Seasons of American TV Series to Catch Up On”, is 
designed as an index to keep users up to date with information about what and 
when the latest episode of each series would be updated on Sohu. For instance, 
Madam Secretary is a 2014-2015 series currently airing on Sundays on the 
                                                 
12 Sohu’s American TV platform is: http://tv.sohu.com/drama/us/; Sohu’s general TV platform is: 
http://tv.sohu.com/drama/; the main site Sohu: http://www.sohu.com. Last visited on 23 January 
2015. 
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American network CBS. It is listed at the top left of the calendar, indicating that it 
is updated on the platform every Monday. All American programmes on this 
calendar are updated a day after their US debuts. Many of the platforms my 
interviewees visited regularly, either Taiwanese or foreign, legal or illegal, employ 
a similar calendar structure.13 
 
Bennett (2008a) argues that online video platforms such as the BBC’s iPlayer, 
Netflix or Hulu “remediate television’s ontology from flow to database” (p. 160) by 
unbundling television programmes from the flow of the linear schedule and 
relocating them as on-demand content. Uricchio (2009) argues that video platforms 
like YouTube lack linear broadcasting flows, but offer instead “a set of equivalently 
accessible alternatives at any given moment” (p. 32). This change indicates “a shift 
from flow as default to flow as a condition that requires active selection” (p. 33). 
However, unlike iPlayer or YouTube, the online platforms that combined a database 
with a time-based calendar structure remediate television’s ontology in a different 
manner. These platforms unbundle foreign programmes from original schedules 
where the programmes are based. Nevertheless, rather than abandoning the notion 
of linear flow, these platforms imitated the practice of broadcast television and 
orchestrating foreign programmes on the platforms in a calendar layout. This is to 
guide users, not only regarding what to watch but also when to watch. In so doing, 
they in fact reformulate a flow that is similar to that of foreign broadcast television. 
The viewing experience they represent is based on the combination of two patterns 
                                                 
13  For instance, Evan relied on an English website, Sidereel (http://www.sidereel.com), that 
provided unlicensed access to American TV series with a weekly schedule to catch up on all the 
series he was into. By the same token, Ivy visited Japanese websites that collected unlicensed 
Japanese dramas, animations and variety shows and displayed them on a weekly calendar (e.g. 
YouTube Doramamatome Douga, http://youtubetvdoramadouga.blog111.fc2.com/) to find and 
watch the latest Japanese programmes. See Chapter 7 Section III for further details. Last visited on 
23 January 2015. 
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of flow: one using the database, on-demand feature, the other the linear, 
calendar-navigated device.  
 
While online platforms with both a database and calendar structure offer “a set of 
accessible alternatives at given moments” (Uricchio, 2009, p. 32), these also carry a 
currency closer to the time-based broadcast flow. By orchestrating the latest foreign 
programmes into a weekly release schedule, these online platforms reinstate the 
“watch it now insistence of broadcasting” (Ellis, 2007, p. 220), and thereby 
enhance audiences’ sense of coevalness with the foreign countries these 
programmes originated from. The importance of television programmes’ currency 
is therefore highlighted in the operation of these online platforms and the viewing 
experience they embody.  
 
ii. Tracking Foreign Ratings as a Practice 
Besides following the broadcast schedules of foreign countries, more and more 
Taiwanese networking sites have started to track keenly the ratings of foreign 
programmes in their countries of origin. Take the BBS board Japandrama as an 
instance. In Japan, the daily ratings are released the next working day. Once these 
are released, enthusiastic Japandrama audiences will update the rating charts in 
minutes (to a few hours) to keep the data up-to-date. Figure 6.7 shows a ratings 
chart of Japanese dramas for the 2012 summer season. It was posted on 
Japandrama on 24 September, when most of the summer dramas had finished. The 
numbers at the top (marked by the author) from 1 to 6 represent, respectively: 1. 
The average rating; 2. The finale’s rating; 3. The first episode’s rating; 4. The TV 
networks and the time slot these dramas were allocated; 5. The original drama title 
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(in Japanese); 6. Its Chinese translation. All the ratings listed in Figure 6.7 were 
ratings in Japan rather than in Taiwan. In fact, none of these summer dramas had 
been broadcast on Taiwanese networks at the time the chart was posted. 
 
 
Figure 6.7 The ratings chart of Japanese dramas in 2012 summer season on the BBS board, 
Japandrama on PTT. Screenshot on 2 November 2012.  
 
Similarly, Figure 6.8 demonstrates a small part of the Korean ratings chart for 
current Korean dramas in 2014-2015 winter season as created by the well-known 
amateur Taiwanese website Dorama.info.14 The numbers at the top marked from 1 
to 4 represent, respectively: 1. The days and time slot; 2. The title of Korean 
dramas (in Chinese); 3. The weekly ratings; 4. The updated average ratings. The 
chart is updated daily by the administrators; the same practice prevails for drama 
ratings in Japan, Hong Kong as well as Taiwan on Dorama.info.  
 
                                                 
14 The URL of Dorama.info is: http://dorama.info/ 
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Figure 6.8 The ratings chart for current Korean dramas, winter 2014-2015 as listed on the 
Taiwanese website dorama.info. Screenshot on 20 January 2015.  
 
The ratings of foreign dramas in their countries of origin (not the ratings in Taiwan) 
have been popular topics of discussion on networking sites featuring foreign 
programmes. Why a certain drama draws or fails to gain high ratings; or, which 
actor is capable of generating high ratings, are some of the most talked-about 
themes. Many of my interviewees regularly visited these Taiwanese sites from 
which they obtained a general idea of what current foreign programmes are on air, 
which programmes generated high ratings in foreign countries, where to access 
these programmes, etc. In the next section I will examine interviewees’ practices to 
illuminate how foreign broadcasting became “traces of the biography of 
individuals” (Scannell, 1988, p. 19) and thereby enhanced the interviewees’ sense 
of coevalness with foreign countries.  
 
IV. Living within Dual TV Times 
i. Foreign Temporal Indications as Taken-for-granted Notions 
Many interviewees showed their familiarity with foreign broadcast schedules when 
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they talked about their online viewing of foreign programmes. In many cases, they 
employed foreign temporal indications and terminologies not commonly used and 
understood in the Taiwanese cultural context. For instance, Helen was interested in 
Japanese dramas:  
 
Helen: Maybe the [drama] list of the coming season has been released now. 
And I am going to keep an eye on the dramas that are most talked-about on 
Japanese media or those whose cast interests me. Then, I can start to find 
them when they are on air [in Japan].  
(Yu-kei: Any specific ones that you want to watch this season?) 
Helen: Is it Spring Season or Summer Season you are referring to by saying 
“this season”?  
 
Helen first described how she routinely visited Chinese-language websites15 to 
gain a broad idea about Japanese dramas slated for the coming season. I followed 
up and asked what she was planning to watch “this season”, without making clear 
what season I was referring to. However, when the interview took place (the third 
week of July), it was the transition between the Spring and Summer broadcast 
seasons in Japan. Helen immediately asked me which season I exactly referred to 
since she wanted to make sure if she understood me accurately.  
 
It is important to note that, in Japan, where the four seasons are well-defined, the 
seasonal calendar is closely connected with contemporary Japanese life (Bestor, 
                                                 
15 Kenshin.hk (http://kenshin.hk) was one of the websites she used to visit. The site is operated by a 
Hong Kong blogger, Kenshin, who is known to provide extensive and up-to-date information about 
Japanese popular culture. Last visited on 23 January 2015. 
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2011; Davies & Ikeno, 2002; Linhart, 1998), and this is also articulated in 
broadcasting: the seasons are the primary category to produce, classify and 
schedule programmes (especially drama series). However, unlike Japan or other 
countries whose broadcast calendars are based on the seasons, the seasons are not 
the main notion employed in the Taiwanese broadcasting practice, where seasonal 
differences are not as distinctive.16 In terms of locally produced dramas, there are 
no regular drama seasons, and the storyline and drama settings do not necessarily 
contain materials that “suit the climate of the year” (Scannell, 1988, p. 19). In terms 
of imported dramas, broadcasters do not necessarily schedule foreign dramas 
according to the original season they were broadcast in their countries of origin. 
For instance, a winter drama featuring a love story in the snowy white Christmas 
season in Korea, Japan or the US may be on air during the Taiwanese summer 
when the temperature is 35℃. A Japanese morning drama may be shown in the 
evening. In other words, in the Taiwanese context foreign programmes may be 
scheduled “at that time” but not necessarily “for that time” (Scannell, 2014, p. 49). 
 
Given that the seasons are not key notions in the Taiwanese broadcast calendar, the 
significance of the conversation between Helen and I does not lie in which season I 
was actually referring to during the interview, but in the way she naturally 
employed the seasons as a temporal broadcast framework when responding to my 
ambiguous question. Her spontaneous response illustrated how she had attuned her 
viewing pattern to the Japanese (broadcast) seasons and adopted the Japanese sense 
of the seasons as a taken-for granted notion of broadcasting. 
                                                 
16 While Taiwanese networks produce festive programmes on national holidays (e.g. Chinese New 
Year, Mid-Autumn Festival), in general they do not specifically produce programmes based on the 
seasons. 
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Another case demonstrating how foreign broadcast calendars are implicated in 
interviewees’ viewing is evident in the way in which interviewees adopted foreign 
temporal terminologies when they talked about their viewing experiences. The 
naming system of the days of the week in Taiwan, Japan and Korea requires 
explanation. In Taiwan (and other Chinese-speaking countries/regions), Monday 
through Saturday are numbered by the numerals “one” through “six”, with the short 
form “Sun” referring to Sunday. By comparison, the day naming system in both 
Japan and Korea is ordered after the “Seven Luminaries”, consisting of the Sun 
(Sunday), the Moon (Monday) and the five planets named after the five elements in 
East Asian philosophy: Fire (Mars, Tuesday); Water (Mercury, Wednesday); Wood 
(Jupiter, Thursday); Metal (Venus, Friday); and Earth (Saturn, Saturday). Table 6.1 
compares the day naming systems between Taiwan, Japan, and Korea: 
 
Table 6.1 Comparison of names of the days of the week  
English  Taiwan 
 
Japan 
 
Korea 
Monday 一 Day One   月 Moon day 워Moon day 
Tuesday 二 Day Two   火 Fire day 화 Fire day 
Wednesday  三 Day Three  水 Water day 수Water day 
Thursday 四 Day Four 木 Wood day 목Wood day 
Friday 五 Day Five 金 Gold day 금 Gold day 
Saturday 六 Day Six 土 Earth day 토 Earth day 
Sunday 日 Day Sun  日 Sun day 일 Sun day 
(Compiled by the author) 
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Specifically, when Korean networks categorise their dramas, they name the days on 
which a certain drama is on air (e.g. Moon-Fire drama), whereas Japanese networks 
specify both the day and the time of broadcast using an abbreviation (e.g. Fire-Ten 
as dramas shown at 10 pm on Tuesday). Given that neither Japanese nor Korean 
were mandatory subjects in compulsory education in Taiwan, the Japanese and 
Korean naming system of the Seven Luminaries are not general knowledge. 
Nicole’s argument, however, indicated how familiar she was with the Korean 
naming system for the days of the week:  
 
[Korean dramas are called, for example] Water-Moon drama, or Earth-Wood 
drama.17 Their schedules are like this: they broadcast one drama on Monday 
and Tuesday, another one on Wednesday and Thursday, a variety show on 
Friday, and the hottest drama on Saturday and Sunday. (Nicole, female, 45 
years old)  
 
After mentioning phrases such as “Earth-Wood drama”, Nicole explained the 
Korean weekly drama scheduling to me, in case I was unfamiliar with the Korean 
scheduling or what Earth-Wood meant. This suggested that she was aware that 
these terminologies that she had adopted were not shared knowledge among the 
general Taiwanese public: dramas broadcast on two days a week was not a local 
broadcast convention; nor was the Seven Luminaries based on the Taiwanese day 
naming system. While Nicole did not understand Korean, she regularly checked 
Taiwanese social networking sites 18  that translated and updated Korean 
                                                 
17 Water-Moon drama and Earth-Wood drama respectively refer to the dramas shown two days a 
week, i.e. Wednesday and Monday, and Saturday and Thursday. 
18 Little Otaku’s Weekly Drama Journal (http://chi.gogoblog.tw/) mentioned in Section III is one of 
the websites she regularly visited. Last visited on 30 May 2015. 
213 
 
broadcasting information, and eventually understood how to count drama ratings in 
Korea:  
 
They don’t have as many channels as we do, so their ratings are usually 
higher [than in Taiwan]. It is very competitive in terms of ratings, so it can be 
considered very impressive if it [a given drama] gains [a rating of] 20%. The 
worst ratings would be around 6%, like the drama I mentioned. There had 
been extremely high ratings, say, 40% or 50%. (Nicole, female, 45 years old) 
 
In Taiwan, where there have been over 100 channels, many audiences have had a 
rough idea that the viewership is fragmented and TV ratings are generally low, 
regardless of whether they are able to specify the rating of a certain programme or 
not. Nicole is no exception, and she assumed that I had the same understanding 
regarding Taiwanese ratings. However, the standard by which a rating is considered 
high or low in Taiwan is very different from Korea, where viewership is dominated 
by three terrestrial networks, which is crucial information for any Taiwanese 
attempting to understand the meaning of ratings in a Korean context.19 Nicole 
expanded on her understanding of Korean ratings to ensure that I was as aware of 
Korean ratings as she was. However, while she was familiar with Korean ratings 
and regarded them as references regarding what to watch, as a viewer who seldom 
consumed Korean dramas via local networks and had no interest in Taiwanese 
dramas, she did not pay much attention to the ratings Korean or Taiwanese dramas 
achieved in Taiwan. In this sense, her drama viewing pattern was grounded, not so 
much on Taiwanese but rather on Korean broadcast television.  
                                                 
19 In recent years in Taiwan, a given local drama that scores a 4% to 5% of rating is already good 
enough to be acclaimed as a success. 
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Similar to Nicole, Claire, who was interested in Japanese culture, automatically 
employed the Japanese naming of the days of the week: 
 
Moon-Nine is always excluded from my viewing list [those shows she 
consumed online] since, first, I think that Videoland Japan [i.e. a Taiwanese 
network] will broadcast it anyway. Second, Moon-Nine is usually about 
romance, so I don’t watch it if I am not interested in the leads. (Claire, 
female, 30 years old) 
 
The term “Moon-Nine” referred to Monday 9:00 pm, and it is commonly used to 
specify Fuji TV dramas scheduled in that time-slot.20 Many dramas that drew 
significantly high ratings in Japan and other parts of East Asia were Moon-Nine 
dramas (e.g. Long Vacation in 1996, Yamato Nadeshiko in 2000). Although 
Moon-Nine is understood by Taiwanese audiences familiar with Japanese dramas, 
it is not a general phrase used in Taiwan. However, as Claire and I were friends for 
years and she was sure that I understood what Moon-Nine meant, she used the term 
spontaneously as shared knowledge (between us) without explanation. Moreover, 
the way in which Claire mentioned local broadcasting conventions and Japanese 
temporal terminologies simultaneously exemplified how both Japanese and 
Taiwanese TV temporalities had blended in her viewing patterns. Similar traits are 
seen in the following instances:  
 
                                                 
20 The combination of the day and the time in an abbreviation such as Moon-Nine is not exclusively 
used by Fuji TV. It a common form that Japanese networks usually employ to refer to a certain 
time-slot where which a certain programme is located.  
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Hawaii Five-021 is on air at 9:00 p.m. tonight. It should be Episode 13 and 14 
this week […] but I have already finished watching all 24 episodes! Files have 
been leaked from foreign countries, so many Taiwanese just go online to 
download the series. […] If I couldn’t find them, I would have followed the 
broadcast, but why would I do so and in turn limit my viewing freedom in 
terms of time, if I can find them so easily? (Ryan, male, 35 years old) 
 
If it [the Japanese animation One Piece] is out and it is possible to watch it, 
then I will definitely watch it! Can I delay my viewing? Yeah, but if I can 
catch up with the most current season, of course I will do so, why would I 
wait until TTV [a Taiwanese terrestrial network] air it? I haven’t been 
watching TTV for a long time. The time-lag between TTV and Japan is around 
three to four months. (Gary, male, 27 years old) 
 
Both Ryan and Gary knew where their favourite foreign programmes were 
allocated in both foreign and local schedules, to the extent that they knew how far 
the local broadcasts were behind their current foreign counterparts. They stressed 
that there was no reason for them to wait for the local broadcasting, if it was 
possible to keep up easily with the latest foreign broadcast. This was a shared 
opinion among most interviewees.  
 
Scannell (2014) elaborates on in what sense broadcasting creates “a spanned 
spatiality and temporality” (p. 63):  
 
                                                 
21 Hawaii Five-0 is an American police drama series that premiered on CBS in September 2010 (in 
turn a remake of the 1968 original series), and it debuted in Taiwan in June 2011. 
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In turning on the television, I enter a doubled spatiality and a doubled 
temporality: the ‘here’ of where I am (in the room) and the ‘there’ of television 
wherever it may be […] I am now (at one and the same time) in a 
here-and-there; a doubled spatiality. I am now in two times at one and the 
same time: the now of my time (in the room, watching television) and the now 
of the time of television (Scannell, 2014, p. 63).  
 
For those interviewees who had access to both local broadcasting and online 
platforms, when they went online to consume foreign programmes, they seemed to 
be given another sense of spatiality and temporality: the spatiality and temporality 
of foreign programmes created by the Internet. In this tripled spatiality and 
temporality, the temporality sustained by local television was experienced as a 
relatively “backward” temporality compared to the Internet-enabled temporality, in 
which the more current foreign content was achievable. As a result, local 
broadcasts might be less capable of enhancing the interviewees’ sense of 
coevalness with foreign locales compared to online platforms.  
 
The practices of interviewees discussed above demonstrate how both local and 
foreign temporal indications and broadcast scheduling were “implicated in the 
temporal arrangement” (Scannell, 1988, p. 28) of their daily lives. The significance 
of foreign TV times was even more manifest in other interviewee practices as 
illustrated in the following subsection.  
 
ii. Living within Foreign Temporalities 
Peter had been very interested in Japanese culture since childhood, and when he 
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told me how he was fascinated by the animation K-On!, 22 he stated:  
 
The latest one [the latest episode of K-On!] is always on Fire day, at 26:00.23 
But I get it on Wednesday after I finish my work. Oh, what should I do with 
my life after K-On! ends! (Peter, male, 29 years old)   
 
It was worth pointing out that Peter’s argument was originally written in Japanese. 
Since Peter preferred being interviewed online, all interactions with him took place 
via text-based instant messaging (IM) services (see also Chapter 7 Section IV 
regarding the implications of his use of Japanese for the shaping of cultural 
identity) 24 . The phrase he mentioned, “Fire day at 26:00”, – referring to 
“Wednesday at 2:00 a.m.” – was never a temporal indication in Taiwan. Although 
Fire day was a Japanese day-naming convention, the representation of “26:00” was 
not used in the general Japanese cultural context. Rather, it was a convention 
employed exclusively in Japanese networks’ broadcast schedules. Instead of using 
conventions widely used in Taiwan (i.e. Wednesday at 2.00 a.m.) Peter used “Fire 
day at 26:00” in a matter-of-course manner, as if it were common sense (or at least 
between him and me). As he was proficient in Japanese, he always consumed the 
un-subtitled version of K-On!, which allowed him to catch up with the latest 
episode earlier than those who relied on fan-subtitled versions that were only 
available hours after. He had been watching K-On! less than 20 hours after the 
Japanese premiere and updating the online status of his IM account with his 
                                                 
22 K-On! is the name of a Japanese animation broadcast from April 2009 to September 2010. 
23 In general, the 12-hour and 24-hour clock time conventions are more common in Japan. However, 
some of the TV schedules or the networks also use 25:00 – 30:00 to refer to 1:00a.m. – 6:00a.m. For 
example, TBS, the channel that broadcasted K-On!, uses 25:00 – 28:00 to refer to 1:00 a.m. – 
4:00a.m.  
24 The IM services we used included Windows Live Messenger and Skype. 
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thoughts on each episode as a weekly practice. This weekly viewing had become an 
important routine that he was most excited about, to the extent that he half-jokingly 
said that he “did not know what to do with his life” when K-On! eventually 
finished its run.  
 
The Japanese temporal indications he adopted, and his insistence on typing in 
Japanese and consuming exclusively un-subtitled files indicated his effort to 
“recreate” (or simulate), as much as possible, the original Japanese conditions in 
which K-On! was broadcast and consumed. It seemed that he did so to ensure that 
his sense of coevalness with Japanese culture was enhanced enhanced than if he 
had simply viewed the latest episode without simulating other Japanese conditions.   
 
I interviewed Ken on 23 September 2011, and Evan on 2 October 2011. Given that 
the most high profile American TV series usually start from late September/early 
October and end in May or June, the interviews took place at exactly the same 
moment that the latest series started to air. Ken and Evan argued respectively:   
 
Finally my life is back! I am reborn and reactivated again, as it is the time 
when all the American series are back! I am so thrilled! [I was] so bored and 
dead during the past few months. (Ken, male, 27 years old) 
 
Nothing [that I wanted to watch] was on Sunday. There are so many on 
Monday, say, Amazing Grace [while writing down Gossip Girl 
simultaneously] On Tuesday, there is Playboy Club, it’s so great! You should 
check it out […] there have been two episodes, by the way. What else is on 
Tuesday? Oh! Glee! How can I forget it? It’s my favourite! […] Oh, there is 
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the US version of X Factor just on air recently, have you heard about that? 
What is on Wednesday […thinking continuously, at times checking online 
with his smartphone, and writing down the latest American series he kept up 
in parallel with their US broadcasts]. (Evan, male, 26 years old) 
 
Both Ken and Evan were self-proclaimed fans of American TV series. While Ken 
described that he was “dead” in the previous four months, his elaboration 
symbolised vividly how his private life was synchronised and interwoven with the 
temporal arrangement of American broadcasting. Similarly, Evan was also very 
excited that the long-wait for the new season of TV series had come to an end so 
that he could start watching his favourite shows. When asked what shows he was 
currently following, he started to excitedly discuss those shows in a daily order 
from Sunday to Monday for about ten minutes. In the middle of our discussions, he 
grabbed the sheet of the interview outline I handed to him and used the back to 
write down the calendar of the series he was “chasing” (his word) as his personal 
viewing timetable (see Fig. 6.9 below). This hand-written viewing timetable 
manifested his obsession and familiarity with American series, as well as how 
much his viewing pattern was based on American broadcast schedules.  
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Figure 6.9 Evan’s hand-written timetable of the latest American TV series. Scanned on 21 
September 2012. 
 
Particularly, Ken had refused to watch Taiwanese broadcast television for years 
(see also Chapter 5 Section II) and had no interest in local programmes. While 
Evan watched Taiwanese broadcast television occasionally, he showed no 
motivation to watch American programmes on TV, not only because most series he 
watched were not available, but also because Taiwanese broadcasts were lagging 
“too far behind” their American counterparts (his words): 
 
Gossip Girl is on air [in the US] on Monday, and online links will be available 
on Tuesday morning, so [I] can watch it in the evening. There is no way we 
[he and his friends] can wait when it comes to such viewing, you know […] 
STAR World,25 Seriously? No way, I cannot stand it. It is just an alternative, 
                                                 
25 STAR World is an Asian English language cable and satellite television network owned by STAR 
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okay? It is only when my life comes to an end that I will tune into it 
[laughing]! (Evan, male, 26 years old) 
 
Even though some American series he liked aired on STAR World a week or up to 
a month later after their US broadcasts, he was still dissatisfied as online access to 
the same series was available only hours after the US premiere. Therefore, he made 
fun of STAR World as an alternative, describing it as a choice that he would have 
opted for only if/when “his life comes to an end” – a metaphor that referred to the 
situation which he would face if he had no other way to access American TV.  
 
In the cases of Ryan, Gary or Claire (discussed earlier), they were still familiar with 
both local and foreign broadcasting schedules. By comparison, for Peter, Ken and 
Evan (and, to a lesser degree, Nicole), their strong interests in foreign cultures 
seemed to prompt them to abandon the temporality of local television and instead 
stay tuned in to the temporality of foreign broadcasts. The temporality of 
Internet-enabled foreign broadcasting was implied not only in their programme 
viewing patterns but also in the routine of their everyday lives. Such experiences 
were shared by some other interviewees who had strong interests in foreign 
cultures but did not care about local television in general (e.g. Ivy, Fiona, Julia).  
 
To conclude this section, I would like to revisit Scannell’s analysis of the 
implications of temporality of broadcasting for our everyday lives. Scannell (2000) 
points out that the temporality broadcasting (i.e. its dailiness) has a 
“for-anyone-as-someone” structure: each of us experiences what we see as if it was 
                                                                                                                                       
TV and FOX International Channels. The channel broadcasts the largest number of current 
American and Britain shows in Taiwan and at the fastest pace.   
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spoken to each of us personally, while also knowing that it simultaneously “speaks 
to millions of others at the same time now” (p. 19). Based on this notion, he argues 
that broadcast television is “attuned to the existential structure of the days of our 
lives while at the same time connecting each and all of us” (Scannell, 2014, p. 49), 
and it is in this sense he contends that we can speak of broadcasting as part of our 
lives (see also Chapter 3 Section I and Chapter 5 Section IV).  
 
However, while the broadcast carries a for-anyone-as-someone structure that 
expresses “we-ness” and “articulates human social sociable life (Scannell, 2000, p. 
9), Scannell does not specify the conditions by which the structure may be shaped 
or limited in practice. For instance, when it comes to national broadcasting, which, 
by definition, addresses “a population resident within the boundaries of a given 
national territory as a mass audience of cultural citizens” (Sinclair, 2004, p. 45), its 
for-anyone-as-someone structure is not so much for anyone worldwide. Instead, it 
is more for “anyone in a given national territory”. In other words, while this 
structure indeed expresses a “public, shared and social world-in-common” 
(Scannell, 2000, p. 12), it is more accurate to suggest that it expresses a “public, 
shared and social world-in-common nationwide/in a country” (my phrases).  
 
As the above practices demonstrate (see also Section III), in the case of the online 
consumption of foreign television, audiences made efforts to access foreign 
broadcasting temporalities whose for-anyone-as-someone structures did not 
actually address them. In so doing, they were more or less connecting themselves 
to the public, shared world of those foreign countries. The “double articulation of 
life (my life and its times linked to the life and times of the world)” (Scannell, 2014, 
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p. 49) were thereby reiterated in the schedules of both local and foreign broadcasts 
over days and years.  
 
In particular, it is worth noting that Taiwanese broadcasting did not necessarily 
serve as temporal frameworks for local consumption. Rather, it was more likely 
that national broadcasting of foreign networks and online platforms offering the 
access to the latest foreign programmes and information functioned more as 
temporal references for the audiences. This tendency was specifically manifest in 
those cases where interviewees regarded the temporality of local broadcasting as 
“behind” or not “as synchronous” with the Internet-enabled temporality of foreign 
broadcasts. Moreover, it might not be the case to which foreign broadcasting was 
“attuned to the existential structure of the days of our lives”. Instead, in the online 
consumption of foreign television, it was the interviewees who actively attuned 
their temporal rhythms of daily life to foreign broadcasts; it is in this sense that the 
national broadcasting of foreign countries can be considered part of the 
interviewees’ lives. This is also how their sense of coevalness with foreign cultures 
was reiterated.  
V. Ratings in Japan as a Taiwanese Media Sensation 
This section discusses how ratings of a current Japanese drama broadcast in Japan 
became a media sensation in Taiwan and examines how this case can be linked 
with Taiwanese audiences’ sense of coevalness with Japan and the development of 
cultural flows.  
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i. Hanzawa Naoki Hype 
In July 2013 a new weekly Japanese drama, Hanzawa Naoki (半沢直樹), was 
broadcast on the Japanese network TBS. Its finale on 22 September 2013 achieved 
a 42.2% rating in eastern Japan, the highest rating of a single drama episode for 30 
years. Given this popularity, Hanzawa Naoki also attracted the attention of the 
Taiwanese news media. How its ratings continued to climb and how the storyline 
developed was covered by the Taiwanese media weekly, before and after each 
episode was broadcast in Japan, as if the drama were simultaneously on air in 
Taiwan (it was widely consumed in Taiwan before its Taiwanese legal broadcast in 
October of the same year). 
 
On Sunday, 22 September, right after the end of the finale at 10:20 p.m. Japanese 
time (9:20 p.m. Taiwanese time), a tweet (written in Japanese) on Twitter claimed 
that the ratings of the finale in Japan had reached 54.4%. This bogus information 
rapidly spread across the Internet and also featured on Taiwanese networking sites 
within hours. Almost all mainstream Taiwanese news networks considered the 
bogus rating as real and covered it as a piece of breaking news on Monday, 23 
September (see Figs. 6.10 and 6.11). On the same day, the 54.4% rating became a 
hit topic on the board Japandrama on PTT and other social networking sites 
featuring Japanese dramas. Besides those who felt surprised and excited for 
Hanzawa Naoki’s high rating, many audiences who had not watched the finale 
complained that the Taiwanese news revealed the story’s ending in the coverage 
and thus “spoiled” their viewing pleasure. 
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Despite the hype on Taiwanese media and social networking sites, some PTT users 
familiar with the release routine of TV ratings in Japan argued that the 54.4% rating 
was phony since an authentic rating would not have been officially released on a 
Sunday night. A few of those familiar with the Japanese calendar also pointed out 
that since it was a Japanese national holiday on Monday, 23 September, the rating 
would not be out until Tuesday, the next working day. Such arguments were 
rejected by other users, who believed that the 54.4% rating was accurate. The 
intense dispute over what the actual rating was finally forced the administrators of 
Japandrama to announce on 23 September, that the 54.4% rating was bogus, and 
asked users to discuss the drama peacefully and to patiently wait one more day for 
the official ratings. Roughly around the same time, an anonymous user made and 
shared a picture to mock the way in which fellow audiences and Taiwanese media 
were misled by the bogus rating. The mocking picture (see Fig. 6.12) showed the 
finale’s climatic scene, in which the lead character Hanzawa was shouting at his 
enemy Owada and commanding him to kneel down26 At the bottom of this 
mocking picture, the subtitle was altered from the original line “Kneel Down! 
Owada!” to “The rating has not been released yet!! Owada!” This parody was 
acclaimed by many PTT fellow users as ironic, funny and accurate, and was 
re-shared on other networking sites.  
                                                 
26 The same scene was frequently used by Taiwanese news networks throughout their coverage, as 
shown in Fig. 6.10 
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Figure 6.10: TV news item regarding 
Hanzawa Naoki on 23 Sept. 2013, by the 
Taiwanese network TVBS. News title: 
Hanzawa Noaki Finale Breaking Record 
54.4% Rating”. Screenshot on 23 
September 2013. 
Figure 6.11: TV news item regarding 
Hanzawa Naoki on 23 Sept. 2013, by the 
Taiwanese network ETTV. The news title: 
Hanzawa Noaki Finale Over 54%”. 
Screenshot on 23 September 2013. 
 
 
Figure 6.12: Reaction to the bogus rating on PTT on 23 Sept. 2013.The altered message 
reads: “The rating has not been released yet!! Owada!!”27 Screenshot on 23 September 
2013. 
 
The authentic, official rating of the finale of Hanazawa Naoki (42.2%) was finally 
available online in Japan at 9:00 a.m. (8:00 a.m. Taiwan time) on Tuesday, 24 
September 2013, and it was reposted on Japandrama less than one minute later. 
What the authentic rating was, how the rating climbed up during its Japanese 
                                                 
27 The man on the figure is Hanzawa (played by the actor Masato Sakai), the drama’s leading 
character. 
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premiere (in Japan), how the Taiwanese media made a mistake on covering the 
incorrect rating on 23 September, and how Taiwanese audiences were annoyed by 
having the ending spoiled by the coverage became breaking news in Taiwan on 24 
September (see Figs. 6.13 and 6.14).  
 
 
Figure 6.13: Online coverage of the official rating (in western Japan) on 24 Sept. 2013, by 
Taiwanese newsgroup Apple Entertainment. It depicts graphically the exact moment 
(Japanese time) at which the episode’s ratings climbed. The news title reads: “The 
up-shooting rating!” Screenshot on 24 September 2013. 
 
 
Figure 6.14: TV news coverage of Hanzawa Naoki on 24 Sept. 2013 on the Taiwanese 
network ETTV. The news title: “Hanzawa finale shoots up to 42.2%”.28 Photo taken on 24 
September 2013 (at the author’s household in Taiwan). 
                                                 
28 Apart from the rating, Taiwanese TV news covered the transnational sensation of Hanzawa Naoki, 
including: a) The red-bean bread (shown in the drama), which became popular both in Taiwan and 
Japan; b) The possibility of a Taiwanese remake of Hanzawa Noaki; c) The Japanese locations 
where the drama was shot that had become popular tourist attractions. 
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Two weeks after the broadcast of its finale in Japan, Hanzawa Naoki was legally on 
air on Monday, 7 October 2013 in Taiwan on Videoland Japan, the local Taiwanese 
channel featuring Japanese programmes established in 1996. Due to its high ratings 
in Taiwan (the highest rating of any Japanese drama in Taiwanese broadcast 
history), Taiwanese media covered the local (Taiwanese) ratings and other relevant 
information daily, and the news coverage hype made the drama one of the hottest 
topics throughout October 2013.  
 
ii. Hanzawa Naoki and Coevalness 
Four points regarding how the Taiwanese’ sense of coevalness is associated with 
the Hanzawa Naoki hype need to be addressed. First, the Taiwanese news networks 
incorporated the drama scenes into their coverage. However, in order to obtain the 
latest drama scenes in the shortest possible time and at the lowest cost, they did not 
seek permission to use the drama from the local and Japanese copyright holders (i.e. 
Videoland Japan and TBS). Rather, they cunningly reshot the fansubbed version of 
the drama while shadowing both the fansubbing forums’ logos and that of TBS. As 
they did not directly use the “raw” scenes that were without question identified as 
TBS’s copyrighted property, but instead reedited the drama’s “fansubbed edition”, 
they avoided directly infringing the copyright of TBS or Videoland Japan. By 
obscuring the fansubbing forums’ logo, the news networks also prevented 
themselves from being accused of encouraging piracy. Moreover, the fansubbing 
sites were by no means entitled to claim a fansubtitling “copyright”, even if their 
editions of particular dramas were used by any other parties, as their fansubtitling 
and distributing practices were legally controversial in the first place. As such, the 
illegality of fansubbing activities was exploited by Taiwanese news networks in 
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order to rapidly cover the latest Hanzawa Naoki boom in Japan as well as in 
Taiwan. Such practices are increasingly employed by Taiwanese news networks 
when they want to discuss a foreign programme not yet legally available in Taiwan. 
 
Second, and as mentioned earlier, on networking sites some Taiwanese audiences 
displayed a familiarity with Japanese temporal references, which is exemplified by 
the fact that audiences pointed out the fact that 23 September (a normal weekday in 
Taiwan) was a Japanese national holiday when discussing the disputed rating. 
Moreover, it is worth noting that the Taiwanese media hype regarding Hanzawa 
Naoki demonstrated that Taiwanese online consumption of Japanese dramas was 
not only fan-oriented but also a more general practice.  
 
Third, given that Hanzawa Naoki was neither a local Taiwanese drama, nor had it 
been on air in Taiwan, its ratings should have been of little importance in a 
Taiwanese context. However, the Taiwanese news networks covered a wide range 
of issues concerning the local reaction to Hanzawa Naoki, even before the legal 
Taiwanese premiere. The news included why Taiwanese viewers were obsessed 
with the drama, how the drama might encourage Taiwanese to travel to western 
Japan (where it was shot), how Taiwanese television producers were examining its 
success and what they learned from it, and so on. In other words, Hanzawa Naoki 
was covered intensively, not only as a foreign phenomenon, but also as a local, 
Taiwanese sensation triggered by a foreign programme. In so doing, the Taiwanese 
media created their own informational and temporal references by which a more 
general Taiwanese public might understand what Hanzawa Naoki was about. Such 
local practices made the Japanese broadcasting and ratings of Hanzawa Naoki 
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significant to Taiwanese audiences, thereby contributing to an enhanced sense of 
coevalness with Japan.   
Fourth, given the Taiwanese hype around Hanazawa Naoki, in October 2013 the 
Japanese media also covered the Taiwanese sensation around the programme (as 
well as in Hong Kong) as proof of a regional cultural phenomenon that had 
originated in Japan. This indicates that Taiwanese media and audiences are 
incorporated in a shared, regional temporality and in turn shaped a regional 
sensation alongside their Japanese counterparts.  
When mentioning the Taiwanese Hanzawa Naoki media hype, Adam argued that 
the drama was a sensation in Japan and also popular among Taiwanese audiences 
who illegally consume foreign programmes online. Both conditions made Hanzawa 
Naoki a “handy topic” for the Taiwanese news media to cover it as an example of 
hype “that resonates with their audiences” (Adam’s words). Ivy asked, “Why did 
the rating of Hanzawa Naoki in Japan matter to Taiwanese? It hasn’t been on air in 
Taiwan yet. Shouldn’t the rating be the business of the Japanese, not ours? Why do 
we care so much?”  
 
The arguments from both interviewees lead us to form a question with regard to the 
Taiwanese cultural relationship with Japan: why does a current, domestic Japanese 
media and cultural phenomenon matter so much in Taiwanese society? While 
Japanese popular culture is not as frequently featured as it was in the 1990s, the 
Taiwanese Hanzawa Naoki sensation indicates that the latest, domestic Japanese 
popular cultural phenomenon still contains a foreign currency (Ellis, 2002, 2007) 
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that appeals to Taiwan and which is employed by the Taiwanese media to resonate 
with their audiences’ sense of coevalness with Japan.   
This section uses Hanzawa Naoki as an example to examine how the Taiwanese 
media catches up with the latest Japanese popular cultural phenomenon. Similar 
practices are also increasingly employed when the media covers a given Korean 
drama – e.g. My Love from the Star that premiered in Korea at the end of 2013 – 
which was popular in Korea and among illegal sharing networks in Taiwan. In 
terms of American media content, while there are few current American TV series 
available through legal platforms, a significant number of major Hollywood movies 
are (roughly speaking) synchronically premiered in Taiwan simultaneously with 
other countries. Moreover, the major American annual film and music awards, such 
as the Golden Globes, the Grammys and the Oscars, have always been live 
broadcast (on terrestrial and/or satellite networks), whether or not the awards 
involve any Taiwanese nominations.  
 
It can be argued that, in a global sense, the international release of Hollywood 
movies plays a more significant role than Western TV series in connecting 
Taiwanese audiences to the shared temporality with the relevant Western countries 
(mainly the United States). Regionally, a given drama from East Asia continues to 
carry a strong, shared currency and substantial cultural proximity (Straubhaar, 1991, 
2003) capable of enhancing the audiences’ sense of coevalness with neighbouring 
countries. This inter-Asian referencing (Iwabuchi, 2013) feature not only applies to 
regionally-co-produced dramas, but also to locally-produced dramas which were 
regionally distributed. Nevertheless, as the Hanzawa Naoki hype indicates, this was 
more a form of cultural flow from Japan to Taiwan and Hong Kong than a 
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reciprocal cultural exchange. Compared to how common it is for the Taiwanese 
media to focus on Japanese and Korean dramas or idols (or other local phenomena 
in both countries) one does not often see the Japanese or Korean media focusing on 
a Taiwanese drama or other cultural phenomena if there are no Japanese or Korean 
elements (e.g. co-production or a franchise adopted from a Japanese or Korean 
novel/comics) in it. As Chua and Iwabuchi (2008) argue, despite the increasing 
regional cultural exchanges, cultural flows in East Asia are still imbalanced, with 
Japan and Korea as the centre that leads the flow direction. Given the scarcity of 
Taiwanese entertainment media broadcasts in Japan and Korea, it seems unlikely to 
see the emergence of a significant contra flow, at least in the near future.  
 
VI. Conditions Complicating Relations Between Access to Foreign 
Cultures and Coevalness  
i. Online Access as a Default Choice? 
This chapter introduced a range of examples regarding how interviewees and 
online platforms strived for watching and distributing the latest foreign 
programmes a short time after those programmes’ debut in their countries of origin. 
However, it is important to note that my interviewees did not always watch the 
latest foreign programmes right after they were available online. As Helen said, 
“we are just casual addicts [of foreign programmes], we can leave the files for a 
couple days”, or as Claire argued, “it doesn’t always have to be watching it right 
away”, in many cases interviewees waited for days, weeks or months until they felt 
like watching them. However, as Claire stated “it is fine as long as I can watch 
them”, this is the underlying premise in many interviewees’ arguments. The 
interviewees had the sense that there was access to the latest foreign programmes, 
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and such access had to be available as one of the default choices concerning the 
viewing platform. Nevertheless, when such unauthorised online access was gone, 
the interviewees were not happy with the situation: 
 
I was in panic and I searched so desperately for [the solution]. I forgot how 
but I eventually managed to find it [the solution] and restore access [to 
American TV series online]. (Rachel, female, 29 years old)  
 
Please give my American TV series back ASAP [laughing]! People were 
sharing solutions online to get the American TV series back [to PPStream]. 
Some friends also passed those solutions on to me, but I failed to get it right, 
so in the end I had to give up on American series for a long time. (Stella, 
female, 33 years old) 
 
If you wanna watch something you have to be quick, say, you have to watch it 
on the day [after it was uploaded], or it will be removed […] `Obviously I am 
so upset, but there’s nothing I can do. I just hurry up to find some other way 
[to consume current Korean dramas], but my sister also has time to find some 
solution, so I am not worried yet. (Nicole, female, 45 years old) 
 
Both Rachel and Stella were shocked when they found that all American series on 
PPStream disappeared at the end of 2009 (see Chapter 2 Section IV). Their 
expressions such as “give my series back” or “in a panic” indicate how they had 
become used to viewing PPStream and took it for granted as a means of default 
access to foreign programmes. Nicole also found that the online links to current 
Korean dramas did not last as long as they used to. Instead of accepting that the 
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access was gone, all three interviewees tried to develop new ways to regain 
access – a practice commonly shared among other interviewees. 
 
Certeau (1984) delineates two terms, “strategies” and “tactics”, in his analysis of 
the individuals’ practice of everyday life. He links strategies with institutions or 
structures of power (as “producers”) which have the power to set (produce) the 
rules and orders deployed in determining what should be considered as ‘proper’ in 
a certain environment or situation. On the contrary, tactics are “the act of the weak” 
(p. 37), the acts individuals (as “consumers”) apply in those environment/situations 
whose rules are defined by the institutions/power structures. His analysis is 
concerned with “battles or games between the strong and the weak, and with the 
‘actions’ which remain possible for the latter” (p. 34). In this sense, legal 
broadcasting systems and content providers can be seen as “the strong”, while 
unlicensed online viewing platforms are “the weak”. The interviewees’ use of 
online platforms includes the tactics they employed to escape from viewing 
limitations imposed on them by a range of legal systems. As Certeau argues, 
“whatever a tactic wins, it does not keep” (p. xix), thereby online methods as 
tactics that disturb legal systems in many cases did not last long or stay the same. 
In some cases, they may become “institutionalised” (i.e. legalised) and thus lose 
their tactical features that challenge the strong.29 They may also be defeated by 
power systems (e.g., eradicated by the government or legal businesses). As 
exemplified by Rachel, Stella or Nicole, rather than enduring the disappearance of 
online access, it was common for interviewees to constantly negotiate with the 
                                                 
29 See also Schwarz (2013) for his analysis on the Swedish file sharing site the Pirate Bay on this 
issue. 
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imposed limitations and develop new tactics to resume their access to the shows 
they liked watching. 
 
ii. Thai Dramas and a Denial of Coevalness  
As a counterpart to the Taiwanese sense of coevalness with the US, Korea and 
Japan as illustrated in this chapter, I will briefly discuss how Thai programmes are 
perceived in Taiwan based on the geo-economic conditions between Taiwan and 
Thailand. According to the International Monetary Fund (2013), while Thailand 
remained a developing economy, Taiwan had become an advanced one by the end 
of the twentieth century. Meanwhile, Thailand is the biggest supplier of foreign 
workers for the Taiwanese labour market (Tsay, 2002). Although Thai and other 
Southeast Asian workers are increasing in number, they have experienced 
difficulties such as being marginalised in Taiwanese society (Lan, 2003).  
 
When the interviews were conducted in 2010 and 2011, while American, Japanese 
and Korean programmes were readily available on Taiwanese channels, very few 
Thai dramas had been broadcast (the situation remains the same as of 2015). I did 
not recruit audiences specifically interested in Thai dramas, and most interviewees 
rarely mentioned them. Nicole and Joyce were the only two interviewees who 
argued that they watched a small number of Thai dramas. Both of them were online 
viewers of Korean dramas, and they noticed that their favourite online platforms 
had started to provide current Thai dramas alongside their Korean counterparts. 
What interested me was how they described their encounters with Thai dramas and 
culture: 
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I am so self-indulgent recently, spending lots of time watching Korean dramas 
online every day. I even click the links of Thai dramas and watch them 
[laughing, slightly embarrassed]. [It is because] I read some blogs featuring 
Korean dramas and which also introduced Thai dramas [...] but, to be honest, I 
don’t find any one that is really outstanding. The tone of their language is so 
weird, and in terms of their plots, they just copy pieces from here and there, 
which I cannot really stand. (Nicole, female, 45 years old) 
I started watching Thai dramas, but it was because I have already watched 
almost all of the Korean dramas. We shouldn’t make light of Thailand you 
know, they also have good traditions and morals, as do Korean or Japanese 
[cultures]. Watching their dramas, you see that they always show respect to 
others […] but I think that Korean dramas are more sophisticated. Thai 
dramas are still rarely made like that [i.e. as sophisticated]. This is to say, Thai 
actors are not as good as Korean actors in terms of acting and [in terms of 
story], good people are extremely good, and villains are extremely evil. (Joyce, 
female, 56 years old)  
 
While Nicole described how she spent her holiday, she said that she even watched 
Thai dramas (my emphasis), using a confessional tone as if she was slightly 
embarrassed to have watched so many dramas. She used Thai broadcasts to show 
how much she indulged herself in online viewing: she not only watched her 
favourite, well-made Korean ones, but also those of lower quality tha she perceived 
as being and not as worthwhile. Thai culture seemed to be perceived not only as 
exotic (e.g. the language used weird tones) but also as relatively unfashionable and 
backward in its copycatting of other foreign dramas.  
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Joyce’s comment on Thai dramas indicates vividly that while “we” (i.e. Taiwanese) 
had recognised Japanese or Korean cultures as having virtues and worthwhile 
traditions, we had not appreciated or paid due attention to Thai culture, which 
carried similar morals. However, Joyce later emphasised that Thai dramas were 
rarely as sophisticated as Korean exemplars in terms of acting or plots. Therefore, 
while she recognised that Thai dramas have their own virtues, they were still no 
more than a secondary choice: she watched these when she had finished most of the 
Korean dramas. In both Ann and Joyce’s experiences, the latest Thai dramas (and 
culture) were perceived as less advanced than other foreign dramas. The tendency 
of time-distancing evident in Thai dramas (and culture) is further demonstrated in 
the Taiwanese news media. Television news often juxtaposes old Taiwanese dramas 
with current Thai ones, sarcastically arguing how similar they are and how 
Taiwanese audiences are “brought back to the last century”,30 while at the same 
time being amused by “out-of-date Thai styles”.31  In an article in a major 
Taiwanese newspaper, United Daily News, the journalist Chen (2013) states:   
 
The characteristics of Thai dramas are: beautiful mixed-blood actors and 
actresses with extremely exaggerated plots and actions. When an actor slaps 
another person, the one who is slapped just falls dead; the good character who 
is buried by villains is rescued because the ground is chopped into pieces by 
thunder and lightning from the sky. Such exaggerated plots and shooting skills 
                                                 
30 For further details, see the news item “Thai drama hits Taiwan, 40 year old cliché is fun to 
watch” broadcast on 14 June 2013 on the cable news channel CTI (available on 
http://goo.gl/o2FPo0, last retrieved 10 March 2014). 
31 For further details, see the news broadcast titled “Cliché plots hot in Thai dramas, fifteen 
thousand amused by out-dated styles” on 14 June 2013 on the local cable news channel ETTV 
(available on http://goo.gl/bx376G, last retrieved 10 March 2014). 
238 
 
are just like the The Flower Series32 in Taiwan some 20 years ago. (H.-Z. 
Chen, 2013) 
 
As Fabian (1983) argues, “for human communication to occur, coeval has to be 
created. Communication is about creating shared time” (p. 31). As Chen’s article 
(2013) indicates, the currency of Thai cultures and dramas is not neccesarily seen 
as insignificant or not “current enough” according to the Taiwanese news media. 
While the previous lack of Thai dramas in the Taiwanese mediascape contributed to 
this tendency, it seems that Thailand’s economic stage of development is more or 
less equated with that of the country’s culture in the Taiwanese perception of 
Thailand, leading to different levels of denial of coevalness as seen in interviews 
and Taiwanese media representations. 
 
VII. Concluding Remarks 
This chapter examined a range of practices involving online platforms, local 
television and audiences, all in terms of shortening the temporal gap between the 
foreign broadcast and the local consumption, and articulated how temporalities of 
foreign broadcasting were implicated in the interviewees’ everyday life as 
important temporal frameworks. In so doing, this chapter accounted for how the 
audiences’ sense of coevalness was achieved, and also shed new light on theoretical 
notions concerning temporalities of broadcasting (e.g. liveness, 
                                                 
32 The Flower Series is made up of local Taiwanese melodramas produced by the free-to-air 
network CTV from 1988 to 2000. It is well-known for its exaggerated and clichéd styles of acting, 
storytelling and setting. Due to this, in Taiwan, The Flower Series has become a common term to 
describe something (especially dramas) that is exaggerated, platitudinous and out-dated.    
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‘for-anyone-as-someone structure’, currency, flow) in cross-cultural and 
transnational contexts of consumption.  
 
Coevalness is always about those whom we consider that we share temporality 
with. The empirical analysis indicates that, on the one hand, a strong sense of 
coevalness with Japan, Korea and the US was shown through the dissemination and 
consumption of programmes from these three countries. On the other hand, a 
certain degree of denial of coevalness was reflected towards Thailand when it 
comes to Thai dramas. As Johansen (1997) argues, it is “a denial of access to the 
kind of communicative time – analogous to the presents and presences of 
conversation – that would turned the Others into subjects and included them as 
one’s ‘fellowmen’”(p. 186). Therefore, having synchronous access to current 
foreign media and culture with people elsewhere does not necessarily lead to the 
generation of coevalness. More factors are involved in the perception and 
understanding of foreign others and foreign locales. This leads to the theme of the 
next chapter: the audiences’ perceptions of both local and foreign cultures, and the 
role of the online consumption of foreign TV in the shaping of such perceptions. 
 
The audiences’ cross-border online viewing of foreign programmes is an example 
of the “the virtual/symbolic geography, in which television flows across physical 
boundaries and connects audiences to networks of identity that transcend the 
nation-states” (Beaty & Sullivan, 2006, p. 14). Specifically, as the empirical 
analysis demonstrates, in the consumption of foreign TV via online sharing, 
schedules and temporalities of local broadcasting (including national and 
transnational broadcasters legally accessible in Taiwan) are not necessarily more 
implicated in patterns of everyday life than those of foreign broadcast television. To 
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interviewees who lived in Taiwan, foreign broadcasting schedules were often as 
important or even more significant than those of local broadcasting in terms of 
structuring their viewing as well as dictating a wider range of their daily life 
patterns. This is not to say that interviewees did not live within the Taiwanese 
temporality, or that local (Taiwanese) identity was no longer important. However, 
the above factors complicate the way in which interviewees’ everyday lives and 
identity are shaped and television’s role (both local/national and foreign ones) in 
the shaping processes. 
 
Nevertheless, it is important to note that, by no means does the cross-border 
consumption of television indicate that the relation between television and the 
nation is irrelevant, or that national boundaries are no longer important. That 
television is still closely associated with the nation can be seen in how television is 
perceived as a form of representation of a given national culture (see also Chapter 7, 
especially Sections 1, III, IV and VII). The country of origin and genre were two of 
the most important criteria for interviewees when deciding what to watch. The 
difference between the sense of coevaleness with Japan, Korea and the US, and 
with Thailand is a clear instance indicating that although interviewees appreciated a 
border-free consumption environment, it never meant that symbolic or physical 
boundaries differentiating cultures and nations were insignificant to them. The 
interviewees’ yearnings for the latest information from some specific countries (e.g., 
the US, Japan, Korea, but not Thailand as evidenced by Section VI’s analysis) 
symbolise the complicated transnational power relationships that require closer 
examination. Based on the above concerns, the next chapter examines how the 
interviewees’ sense of the “local” and the “foreign” develop via their consumption 
of foreign shows.  
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Chapter 7: The Perception of the Local and the Foreign 
This chapter examines how the interviewees’ perceptions of the local and the 
foreign developed via their online consumption of foreign programmes, and 
outlines the implications of such perceptions for transnational cultural power 
relations between Taiwan and its foreign Others. The first four sections examine 
how the notion of foreignness makes the consumption of foreign TV via online 
sharing a “process of identification and distancing, simultaneously or as a series of 
intermittent moments of one of the other” (Chua, 2008b, p. 79). Chapter 6 
demonstrated how American, Japanese and Korean cultures were interviewees’ 
most popular foreign cultures with which they searched for coevalness. Sections I 
to IV discuss how these three national cultures shaped interviewees’ identities.   
 
While this study did not focus on the consumption of Chinese programmes, online 
sharing activities based in China were crucial in making it possible for Taiwanese 
audiences to view the latest foreign TV online. Section V discusses how this 
condition foregrounded the interviewees’ perceptions of China as a foreign Other, 
threatening their Taiwanese identity. Compared to Japanese and American cultures, 
Korean popular culture is a newcomer to Taiwanese society, and during the period 
when the empirical research was conducted (from 2010 to 2011), the Korean Wave 
reached its regional and global peak. Section VI examines how, under these 
conditions, Korea was frequently perceived as a new and significant foreign 
presence, one that challenged Taiwanese society. Section VII illustrates how the 
interviewees created a perception of a regional cultural hierarchy in their 
consumption of Japanese and Korean culture, and how this perception is associated 
with the shaping of a regional identity.  
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It is necessary to note that although both Japanese and American cultures were 
important foreign lodestars that my interviewees identified with, they were not as 
frequently perceived as Others who called the contemporary identity of Taiwan into 
question as was the case for their Chinese and Korean counterparts. Firstly, the 
interviewees were accustomed to the cultural presence of the US. They did not 
always consider the American brands and icons present in their everyday lives as 
American: a similar phenomenon has been observed in other countries such as 
Brazil (Straubhaar, 2003) and Japan (Iwabuchi, 2002). Even when American-ness 
was recognised, consuming something American was not very likely to be 
considered as a challenge to the interviewees’ identity as Taiwanese. As Ivy argued: 
 
Why do I have to be told that “You really love Korea” just because I like 
Korean cuisine and Girls’ Generation, even though I don’t like the Korean 
nation at all? [...] I love American cuisine, and I used to love Britney [Spears]1 
very much, but no one would say “Oh, you love the US”. (Ivy, female, 31 
years old) 
 
Even when a number of interviewees (e.g. Evan and Jane) had been called 
Americanophile (see also Section IV) by acquaintances, such naming/labelling, 
according to them, was more playful than hostile, and is “rarely likely to happen, 
especially nowadays” (Jane’s words). Specifically, since (American) English is the 
only foreign language stipulated as a mandatory school subject in Taiwanese 
compulsory education, learning English is much more highly valued than the 
                                                 
1 Girls’ Generation is a South Korean girl group formed in 2007. From 2009 onwards, they became 
one of the most popular Korean groups in the region and around the globe. Britney Spears is an 
American singer who won international popularity soon after the release of her debut album in 
1999. 
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learning of other foreign languages. Many interviewees and their parents regarded 
consuming American popular culture as a good way to improve their English 
language proficiency, which is important to academic achievement and professional 
prospects. Interviewees such as Ann also encouraged her children to learn English 
via American movies and animation. This condition, I argue, partly explains why 
consuming American popular culture was more often regarded as a meritorious 
activity rather than challenging interviewees’ local identities.  
 
Secondly, and as argued in Chapter 2, media discussions on Japanese popular 
culture are less prominent now than they were in the 1990s and the early 2000s, 
and anti-Japanese discourses have become less explicit and milder in substance and 
tone. While some interviewees’ interest in Japanese popular culture was criticised 
by acquaintances using a nationalistic tone in the 1990s, similar comments in the 
last 10 years were rare. Instead of regarding this change as a decline in the 
influence of Japanese popular culture on Taiwan, I argue that it indicates that 
Japanese culture is more “indigenised” (Iwabuchi, 2002, p. 92) and integrated into 
the Taiwanese cultural context. This means that Japanese culture is now similar to 
American culture in Taiwan: their respective presences have become part of the 
Taiwanese context, to the extent that Taiwanese seem to be less likely to perceive 
them (either positively or negatively) as something “new” that needs to be talked 
about. Moreover, as many interviewees argued, while they disagree with and 
dislike Japanese imperialism, they also regarded it as something in the distant past. 
These factors also kept Japan from being seen as a recent challenge to the 
construction of contemporary Taiwanese national and cultural identity. Specifically, 
when examining how audiences’ identities is hybridised and shaped in global 
media flows, Straubhaar (2008) points out that “the layers of identity are articulated 
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with a variety of media […] but not in a simple sense of being primarily influenced 
by media” (p. 11), since, as he further explains: 
 
[…] markets and services are not simply or clearly defined by technology, or 
by corporate ambition, but also by culture, uses and identities and how they 
layer over time. Many of these culturally defined markets and identity reflect 
pre-global layers of culture (Straubhaar, 2008, p. 14). 
 
Likewise, the interviewees’ cultural capital influenced how they interpreted media 
content. Besides consuming media texts, other forms of consumption (e.g. travel) 
were also important in constructing the interviewees’ identification with foreign 
cultures. These conditions are taken into consideration alongside interviewees’ 
online viewing practices in order to account for their perceptions of local and 
foreign cultures and identity layering.  
 
I. Foreignness as an Attraction  
Chua (2008b) argues that foreignness is usually foregrounded by audiences as part 
of the pleasure of watching media products from other countries and regions. 
Similarly, in most cases foreignness was exactly what my interviewees looked for 
and enjoyed when they went online to download or stream a foreign programme. 
When it came to drama as a genre, most interviewees preferred foreign 
programmes to Taiwanese for three main reasons, all of which were based on how 
they “bifocally” (J. D. Peters, 1997) viewed and interpreted local as well as foreign 
cultures via media representation and their everyday life experiences.  
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Firstly, many of my interviewees believed that Taiwanese programmes were not as 
sophisticated and well-made in various aspects (e.g. settings, storylines, acting 
skills, shooting styles), by comparison with their foreign counterparts. The range of 
themes dealt with was also narrower. As a result, they found it hard to sustain 
interest in Taiwanese dramas, especially after they had watched more foreign 
broadcasts or grown older. For instance, Gary said that he was uninterested in 
Taiwanese dramas because he was “so scared by their extremely redundant and 
tedious styles”. He preferred Japanese dramas since he thought that they were 
much shorter in length while also having sharper and more subtle storylines. Stella 
watched a few Taiwanese dramas after she entered university and felt that they 
seemed to “target junior or senior high school students because they were somehow 
childish”. She then argued that she would have been obsessed with some Taiwanese 
dramas or considered them good dramas if “I were in junior or senior high school”. 
By the same token, Vivian argued that while she used to love Taiwanese dramas 
when she was in primary and junior high school, her interests shifted to Japanese 
and American examples when she was older.  
 
The second reason for interviewees’ preference for foreign dramas was based on 
how Taiwanese media products were considered copycats of foreign counterparts 
and thereby less attractive. Iwabuchi (2013) points out that in contemporary East 
Asian media culture, “the idea of the original is put into question” (p. 47) while 
inter-Asian cultural adaption and hybridisation is increasingly common. However, 
in terms of production, the idea of the original might be challenged; meanwhile 
regarding audience reception, it seemed that originality was still considered 
important by most of my interviewees:  
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Now Taiwan wants to learn how Korean music is made. Showbiz in Taiwan is 
always like this. People just all rush to learn from a certain country when that 
country becomes the fad and fashion of the time. (Claire, female, 31 years old) 
 
I think many of the themes of Taiwanese dramas can be found in Japanese 
dramas and because of these similarities I will not watch the Taiwanese 
versions. (Gary, male, 27 years old) 
 
The dramas of the three terrestrial networks were very good in the past! 
However, the quality of our dramas has declined after the great increase in the 
number of channels due to [the introduction of] cable TV. I don’t watch 
Taiwanese dramas because they just copy the ways in which Japan produces 
its idol dramas. Meteor Garden2 was just an imitation of Japanese idol dramas. 
In Japan, it seems that they broadcast an episode weekly, don’t they? Meteor 
Garden was also broadcast that way. It copied the Japanese shooting styles 
and plots as well. And then recently, [Taiwanese producers] started to imitate 
Korean dramas. I don’t really enjoy watching [Taiwanese dramas] because I 
feel that, fundamentally, they are just imitations of foreign programmes. 
Therefore, I would definitely rather watch Japanese or Korean dramas. I 
refuse to watch copycats. (Jeff, male, 36-40 years old) 
 
                                                 
2 Meteor Garden, made in 2001, was a Taiwanese idol drama based on a popular Japanese comic 
Hana Yori Dango (Boys Over Flowers). It was the first Taiwanese trendy idol drama that gained 
regional popularity in Chinese-speaking regions and Southeast Asian countries. It was also 
broadcast in Japan and Korea, but was not as successful as it was in the aforementioned countries 
and regions. The Japanese TV network TBS made its own version of Hana Yori Dango in 2005 and 
2006 (two series); subsequently, both the Korean network KBS and the Chinese network Hunan also 
produced their versions of Hana Yori Dango in 2009. Meteor Garden is considered one of the best 
examples of inter-Asian referencing that emerges in the intense regional cultural flows in East Asia 
(see Iwabuchi, 2013).  
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Claire, Gary and Jeff all pointed out that Taiwanese dramas or the entertainment 
media at large were less attractive because of their lack of originality: they always 
behaved like followers, imitating well-received media products from other 
countries, especially those from Japan and Korea. The interviewees were, at the 
same time, aware that the Japanese and the Koreans also imitated American media 
products.3 However, from the interviewees’ perspectives, Japanese and Korean 
media texts had developed their own Japanese-ness and Korean-ness and had 
managed to attract foreign audiences via the imitation of others (i.e. a “cultural 
fragrance” in terms of Iwabuchi, 2002, p.27) and therefore, to some extent, they 
could be regarded as original. Nevertheless, it was not the same for the Taiwanese 
media.  
 
Take Jeff’s comment on Meteor Garden as an example. Meteor Garden, adapted 
from a popular Japanese comic Hana Yori Dango (花より男子, Boys Over 
Flowers), is the most well-received Taiwanese drama in the region. Its regional 
popularity caused a Japanese TV network to produce its own version in 2005, while 
both Korea and China made their versions in 2009. As Iwabuchi (2013, p. 47) 
argues, it contributes significantly to the emergence of “inter-Asian cultural 
adaption” in East Asia in the early 2000s. As the earliest and the most regionally 
popular Taiwanese idol drama engaging with the contemporary urban life of the 
younger generation, Meteor Garden was relatively original compared to other 
Taiwanese dramas at that time, whose main themes rarely dealt with youth or urban 
                                                 
3 In their early years of development, Japanese dramas and music imitated and adopted the plots, 
shooting styles, etc. of their American counterparts; in the case of Korean dramas and music, it was 
their Japanese and American counterparts that they copied and learned from. These imitative 
practices were also considered a process and form of cultural hybridisation and thereby a main 
factor contributing to the regional popularity of both Japanese and Korea dramas (Iwabuchi, 2002; 
D.-H. Lee, 2004; Shim, 2006). 
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issues. However, Jeff considered that it was still a counterfeit given its obvious 
imitation of Japanese production styles (e.g. shooting skills, storylines, the weekly 
scheduling as means of broadcast).4 The imitative dimension became a crucial 
reason why, for Jeff, Taiwanese dramas were inferior to foreign examples; therefore, 
he preferred the authentic, original Japanese and Korean dramas to Taiwanese 
copycats. The foreignness of Japanese and Korean dramas was valued, not only for 
being exotic, but also for being original and creative.  
 
The third frequently cited reason why the foreignness of foreign dramas was valued 
by interviewees was associated with the idea of cultural proximity (Straubhaar, 
1991) and difference. As Jeff and Nicole argued: 
 
Since we are not very familiar with the foreign environment […] when we 
watch American dramas we would assume that their lives and how they look 
are exactly like that [how Americans were represented in dramas]. In terms of 
our own dramas, it is easier to tell if the acting is good or not based on how 
close it is with our environment. (Jeff, male, 36-40 years old)  
 
Those [dramas] from the local or [other] cultures similar to ours make you feel 
they are somehow unnatural, but you will not experience this sense of 
unnaturalness as easily when you watch Korean dramas. By the same token, 
we feel that European and American dramas are more natural when we watch 
them. The fact that they [European and American cultures] are so strange to us 
makes us feel that “they are exactly like that”. However, when you watch 
                                                 
4 Since Jeff did not specifically mention the fact that Meteor Garden was adapted from a Japanese 
comic, it remained unclear whether or not he also considered this as a factor which made Meteor 
Garden less original.  
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Taiwanese dramas you just feel that everyone in them is so affected, so fake 
and very unnatural. I feel that the way the actors/actresses talk is different 
from how I usually talk. Since I can identify such differences, Taiwanese 
dramas don’t attract me. Nevertheless, in Korean dramas they speak in Korean, 
and I cannot tell if they speak naturally. When there is a barrier you won’t 
notice if there are problems, and this is why I only watch Korean dramas. 
(Nicole, female, 45 years old)  
 
As Jeff and Nicole’s experiences indicate, in the case of Taiwanese dramas, the 
interviewees were more likely to interpret the dramas using a “reality check”. They 
inevitably and constantly compared Taiwanese dramas to their everyday 
experiences as cultural references, and judged at a denotative level (see Ang, 1985 
for her account of “emotional realism”) how natural and realistic the actual 
Taiwanese context was represented in dramas. As they often found that the 
representation (e.g. how the actors spoke) was different from their own experiences 
(how they actually talked in real life), it became difficult for them to see these local 
dramas as something realistic, or “taken from life” at a connotative level (Ang, 
1985, p. 44). As a result, Taiwanese dramas were often regarded as unnatural and/or 
affected.  
 
By comparison, Jeff and Nicole had not lived in other countries and both of them 
argued that they could not easily tell to what extent foreign conditions (e.g. how 
foreigners speak, what their daily environments were like) corresponded with 
representations of these conditions. Interestingly, this difficulty made it easier for 
them to assume and believe that the representations truthfully reflected actual 
foreign situations (even though they were aware that representation and reality 
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would not be identical). This interpretation coincides with the work of Liebes and 
Katz (1986, 1990) on cross-cultural receptions of Dallas. The authors find that 
non-Americans consider the story more real, and have little doubt that the story is 
about “America”, while Americans are less sure and somewhat sceptical about 
Dallas’s representation of North America, and were more playful in their attitudes 
towards the programme.  
 
Hoskins and Mirus (1988) introduced the concept of “cultural discount” to refer to 
the situation in which a programme rooted in one culture will have less appeal 
elsewhere “as viewers find it difficult to identify with the style, values, beliefs, 
institutions and behavioural patterns of the material in question” (p. 500). However, 
as both Jeff and Nicole demonstrated, the difficulty in the identification of foreign 
cultures in fact served as a crucial reason that made foreign dramas attractive or 
more natural and realistic than local ones. This is not to say that the interviewees 
who exhibited such interpretations uncritically believed that there was no 
difference between the representations of foreign programmes and actual foreign 
conditions. What is crucial is that the lack of cultural references regarding foreign 
reality somehow makes it more likely for them to abandon a “reality-check” (which 
might either destroy or enhance the enjoyment of viewing), thereby immersing 
themselves in the fictional foreign narratives. A sense of East Asian-ness is also 
implied in Nicole’s mentioning that European and American dramas felt even 
“more natural” and strange than Korean ones. Such feelings, associated with the 
notion of regional identity, will be discussed in Section VII.  
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II. Dubbing vs. Subtitling: Domesticating vs. Foreignising? 
The last section discussed the main reasons why the interviewees enjoyed foreign 
programmes and, in many cases, preferred foreign broadcasts to local ones. This 
section examines how the dubbing and subtitling of foreign programmes, by 
indigenising the foreignness of foreign media texts in different senses, serve as an 
important factor influencing my interviewees’ modes of consumption and their 
identification of foreign and local cultures.  
 
i. Audiences’ Preference for Subtitling to Dubbing 
Danan (1991, p. 613) argues that the ways in which a country suppresses or accepts 
the foreign nature of foreign media is a key to understanding how a country 
perceives itself in relation to others. As discussed in Chapter 3, in Taiwan, where 
the media industry is import-oriented and relatively open to the foreign nature of 
external media texts, the policy regarding translation practices is flexible. Both 
subtitling and dubbing are commonly employed, and broadcasters usually go for 
whatever method is most likely to attract more audiences and earn more profit. 
Regardless of differences in terms of age, education, location and television 
interests, when it came to the consumption of foreign programmes and movies, my 
interviewees in general preferred subtitled, undubbed versions to dubbed ones. 
Specifically, the criticism of dubbing was expressed most frequently by the 
interviewees interested in Korean dramas, which were dubbed much more often on 
Taiwanese networks compared with American and Japanese programmes:  
 
I don’t understand any one of the two languages [Japanese and Korean] so I 
always just listen to their intonations and read the Chinese subtitles, and I 
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don’t have a specific preference for either language. However, I don’t watch 
the dubbed Japanese or Korean dramas because I think that it doesn’t sound 
good to me! I can’t get used to it [dubbing]. I enjoy the original soundtrack 
with subtitles. I remember there was MTS [multichannel television sound] on 
TV in the past, wasn’t there? I never turned to it [the dubbed sound], because 
it just didn’t feel right, or to the point. In comparison, you can find the 
Chinese-subtitled versions online […] Sometimes the translation is not that 
accurate, but you can still get a general idea of what it means. Therefore it 
wouldn’t be a hassle to understand [the dramas]. (Stella, female, 33 years old) 
 
I prefer the Korean, original versions to the Taiwanese ones, which were 
translated and turned into Mandarin Chinese. In Taiwan, from 8:00 to 10:00 
p.m., it is always the Chinese versions which are on air. It is not until from 
10:00 or 11:00 p.m. onwards, during the recap, that the original versions are 
on air. I am not very much used to it. I don’t like dubbing, as the original feels 
more authentic. Take Scent of a Woman5 for instance. When its airing on 
Saturday [in Korea] is finished, I will definitely go online in the early morning 
on Sunday to watch the latest episode, and I will definitely do the same on 
Monday, after the latest Sunday episode is on air. (Ann, female, 41 years old) 
 
I prefer the original soundtrack. It feels more genuine even though I don’t 
understand it. If you watch the Taiwanese version of Korean dramas, they are 
all dubbed by Taiwanese people. However, I feel a certain kind of distance, 
and inauthenticity. Although the characters [in the Taiwanese dubbed version] 
                                                 
5 Scent of a Woman is a 2011 Korean drama on air on Saturday and Sunday from July to September 
on the free-to-air Korean network SBS. 
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speak in a language that I understand, I very much dislike it. I didn’t 
necessarily insist on listening to the Korean dialogue in the dramas, but I 
started to [do so] since [I started using] PPS [laughing]! (Joyce, female, 56 
years old) 
 
While none of the three interviewees understood Korean, they all expressed their 
strong preference for the original soundtrack of Korean dramas compared to the 
Mandarin-dubbed versions. This strong preference also served as one of the 
principal reasons why they opted to watch fan-subtitled, undubbed Korean dramas 
online, rather than on TV where Korean dramas were very frequently dubbed. As 
Stella argued that in the cases of the broadcast of American and Japanese 
programmes in which MTS was deployed, she never switched to the dubbed 
version, the three interviewees’ preference for subtitled, undubbed versions applied 
not only to Korean dramas but also to other foreign genres.  
 
The three interviewees believed that dubbed Korean dramas were culturally 
domesticated (Chan, 2011; Chua, 2011) and, to some extent, turned into Taiwanese 
media texts (particularly as expressed by Joyce). Rather than making Korean 
dramas culturally more familiar and enjoyable, however, this domestication in fact 
distanced Korean dramas from being positively perceived as authentic, regardless 
of their deployment of the same language used by the interviewees. As studies on 
translation practices point out, “the presence of the original soundtrack acts as a 
form of guarantee of authenticity” (Kilborn, 1993, p. 643), therefore subtitled 
programmes can be “more ‘real’ and more closely resemble the original 
programme because the actors are heard with their own voice” (Koolstra, Peeters, 
& Spinhof, 2002, p. 336). Both Ann and Joyce pointed out that the undubbed 
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Korean dramas felt genuine and authentic. Nevertheless, such genuineness and 
authenticity were largely lost through the use of dubbing; this was what Stella 
implied when she made this point regarding the dubbed Korean dramas, using 
expressions such as “didn’t feel right” or “not to the point”.  
 
While the interviewees did not fully elaborate what they meant by genuine or 
authentic, based on the context of the interviews I consider that their perception of 
genuineness/authenticity may refer to the following aspects. As Van Leeuwen 
(2001) argues, the term “authenticity” can refer to the “faithful reconstruction or 
representation,” and it can also apply to something “thought to be true to the 
essence of something […] the way these are worded or otherwise expressed” (pp. 
392-393). Regarding dubbed fictional programmes, I argue that there are two kinds 
of representations:  
1. Fictional narrative as a representation of the foreign culture and context in which 
the narrative is based.  
2. Dubbing as a representation of a given “raw” foreign programme, thus 
suppressing and domesticating the foreignness of the source programmes (Chan, 
2011; Chua, 2008b, 2011; Danan, 1991). Therefore dubbing reconstructs and 
represents the programme’s original foreign narrative.  
 
In terms of fictional narrative, as pointed out in the previous section, the 
interviewees’ familiarity with the local contexts and their own native languages 
made it easier for them to reflexively judge – based on their experiences – whether 
or not the narrative or the actors’ performances were natural and genuine. By the 
same token, when a foreign language was domesticated into the interviewees’ 
mother tongue (i.e. Mandarin), they tended to be more critical regarding how 
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authentic the dubbing was in representing the original soundtrack and the foreign 
culture.  
 
More specifically, dubbing’s authenticity was judged by interviewees in two ways. 
First, it had to do with how close the domestication was to the local (Taiwanese) 
context. For instance, some interviewees (e.g. Cheryl) complained that sometimes 
the phrase lines, or the voice performance of dubbing, were “not those commonly 
heard or used in our daily lives”. This made the dubbing less genuine and difficult 
to “situate in the viewer’s own environment” (Koolstra et al., 2002, p. 336), since it 
did not match the daily Taiwanese context in which Mandarin was used. Secondly, 
and more importantly, my interviewees were made up of those audiences who were 
used to watching a large number of foreign programmes before the emergence of 
online viewing. Through their active use of online platforms to access foreign 
programmes they were increasingly accustomed to foreign media texts with 
original soundtracks (e.g. Joyce’s argument). They judged dubbing’s authenticity 
by examining how close it represented the original foreign narratives and 
soundtracks. During the interview, Mandy imitated how voice actors performed 
Korean dialogue in Mandarin in a flat tone to explain how she felt that the nuances 
and tones of the Mandarin dialogue were too plain and less emotional, which was 
not in keeping with the nuances and tones of the original. Some interviewees (e.g. 
Rachel) argued that local broadcasters always employed the same voice actors in 
many different programmes, making the once distinctive stories identical to each 
other post-dubbing and thereby inauthentic compared to the original foreign 
narrative. 
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ii. Original Soundtracks and the Preservation of Raw Foreignness 
As mentioned previously, foreignness was generally appreciated by my 
interviewees as the main facet they looked for when viewing foreign programmes. 
Based on this appreciation, in many cases they preferred original soundtracks 
because they wanted to experience a “raw” foreignness, instead of a diluted, 
reconstructed version. For instance, Nicole pointed out that “I want to know 
directly what the actors’ real voices are like, and if you dub them they immediately 
sound fake”. This notion had to do with the way in which dubbing reconstructed 
the source programme. Dubbing, in Nicole’s view, prevented her from experiencing 
the original soundtrack and thus a significant degree of foreignness was lost. The 
importance of the original soundtrack as a key component for experiencing the 
foreignness was further demonstrated in Jane’s arguments. Jane, who was 
interested in American culture but had not been to the US, started watching 
American TV series since childhood via terrestrial local networks. She explained 
why she enjoyed watching American TV, especially undubbed versions: 
 
I would learn how they talk in American series. Especially, when I did my 
major in English in university, I watched even more American TV series, as it 
helped to improve my English speaking ability. Since I don’t have that much 
money to go overseas, I haven’t had the experiences of travelling to 
English-speaking countries like my classmates. Some of them even went and 
lived there when they were little. I feel like, watching American TV series, 
even though it is through small screens, helps me to know better about the US. 
Say, in the US, the Chinese takeaway food was put in that kind of [paper-made] 
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box, or American pizza seemed very thin, you know, these kinds of thoughts 
would come into my mind. (Jane, female, 25 years old) 
 
As Jane emphasised, compared with her classmates who had had the opportunity to 
make sense of American culture through travelling to or living in the US, American 
TV series was the main way through which she could experience and learn about 
American culture. The original soundtracks accompanying the scenes demonstrated 
a sense of American-ness for her that helped in imagining what actual foreign 
contexts might be like. She also improved her English-language speaking 
proficiency by listening to and learning the way American actors and actresses 
talked on screen – it was the original American soundtracks that made her language 
learning possible. As a result, it was not surprising that she preferred the original 
soundtracks, which carried a more comprehensive sense of American-ness 
compared to the dubbed versions. Jane’s experience was shared by other 
interviewees who had a strong interest in foreign cultures, especially those who had 
also learned foreign languages but had relatively limited opportunities to have 
direct encounters with those specific cultures (e.g. Ken, Adam, Claire, Emma).  
 
When Vivian studied in London, there were many Korean students at the university 
where she studied. She argued that she always liked to observe how Koreans talked 
on the phone or in person: 
 
When they finished the phone call and said goodbye, they always had a sound 
like, “um” which was very cute. The ways in which men pronounced the 
sound was different from the ways in which women did. […] Sometimes 
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when I listened to and watched how they spoke I felt “it is very much like a 
scene from a [Korean] idol drama”. (Vivian, female, 23 years old) 
 
As Vivian described, the conversations of real Koreans were “like a scene from the 
drama”, the fictional representation, manifested specifically in the original 
soundtrack, became a reference point that interviewees used to make sense of the 
real foreign contexts they experienced. Interviewees who had lived aboard and 
therefore had more encounters with foreigners (e.g. Stella, Fiona, Ivy, Sophie), or 
those who had travelled to foreign countries after they watched dramas from those 
countries (e.g. Ross, Katie, Mandy), shared impressions similar to Vivian’s.  
 
Moreover, the audiences’ judgment with regard to the authenticity of dubbing 
might not only apply to the case in which a foreign text was dubbed into Mandarin, 
but also to the case when a foreign text was dubbed into another foreign language. 
Ivy had lived in Japan for five years. When she mentioned how Friends,6 a popular 
and famous American sitcom, was dubbed in Japanese, she imitated an English line 
“Ross,7 you are so nasty” as “Rosu, hidoiwa!” (ロス、ひどいわ! her own words in 
Japanese), with a soft, feminine Japanese nuance and tone (the way in which 
Japanese females commonly talked). Then she argued: 
 
Oh my god, that’s annoying. All characters became so disgusting and 
pretentious.  
(Yu-kei: But if that were the case, perhaps it might also be the case if you 
dubbed something Japanese into English?) 
                                                 
6 Friends was broadcast on the American network NBC from 1994 to 2004.  
7 Ross is the name of one of the six main characters in Friends.  
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Yes, it could be, but it depends on what is dubbed. For instance, if you dub 
Final Fantasy,8 that should be totally okay, since the appearance of the 
characters are actually Western, and so are their names. However, in terms of 
those programmes which are very Japanese, well, I am not quite sure if 
[dubbing] works. (Ivy, female, 31 years old)  
 
Ivy elaborated an important standard in the audiences’ interpretations of dubbing’s 
authenticity, one associated with cultural proximity: as a form of representation, the 
closer the language and cultural context of dubbing were to those of the source 
media text, the more likely it would be that dubbing was considered authentic and 
natural by the audiences. Ivy felt that American sitcoms such as Friends had a 
distinct American-ness (e.g. the ways the characters spoke or the romantic 
relationships they had) that was very different from Japanese cultural contexts and 
thereby unable to be genuinely represented by Japanese dubbing. For her, the 
Japanese dubbing was unnatural because it turned Friends into a text neither 
Japanese nor American. By the same token, she was doubtful if a media text with a 
distinctive Japanese-ness could be perfectly dubbed into English. In comparison, 
Final Fantasy, a Japanese franchise featuring Western-ness in its character design 
and visual setting, was much more suitable to be dubbed into English, regardless of 
its Japanese origin.  
 
It can be argued that my interviewees tended to expect and enjoy the foreignness of 
source programmes. Therefore, they preferred subtitles to dubbing as subtitles 
                                                 
8 Final Fantasy is a famous Japanese role-playing video game series that was first released in 1987. 
It gained global popularity after several games were released in different languages. It was also 
adapted into animation, films and released in various languages. Most characters have a Western 
name and appearance (e.g. white skin, blonde hair, and other Caucasian features). 
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functioned as a “foreignising strategy that send the viewers abroad” (Venuti, 1998, 
p. 242). However, such foreignness might not necessarily be maintained if local 
broadcasters considered dubbing more profitable. As a result, the fact that original 
soundtracks were more likely to be kept and experienced via online platforms 
compared to broadcast TV made online platforms a more enjoyable choice for most 
of my interviewees, who were used to consuming foreign programmes and valued 
the foreignness of a given foreign programme. 
 
III. Maintaining Foreignness with Cultural Capital: Access to 
“Raw” Texts 
Based on Bourdieu’s (1984) concept of cultural capital, Straubhaar (2003) argues 
that such a concept plays an important role in influencing audiences’ preferences, 
whether for global, regional or national television programming. Particularly, the 
ability to speak or understand the language of a broadcast is, as Straubhhar points 
out, “an important ingredient in audiences’ selection of a programme and their 
enjoyment of it” (p. 82). His research on Brazil shows that elite and upper middle 
class Brazilians who have more cultural capital are more capable of understanding 
and enjoying programmes from other cultural-linguistic regions (especially 
non-subtitled ones) compared to other classes. By contrast, audiences with less 
cultural capital with which to comprehend foreign media texts, tend to look for 
cultural proximity in their media selection: they prefer national and regional 
television to global choices.  
 
In this study, cultural capital was not a significant factor determining my 
interviewees’ preferences for media texts, particularly in relation to cultural 
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proximity and difference.9 First, regardless of their differences in education and 
socioeconomic background, my interviewees generally enjoyed watching foreign 
programmes. In terms of dramas, they usually shared a view that foreign 
programmes (Korean, Japanese and American) were better made than Taiwanese 
variants (e.g. development of the plot, design of the setting), and thereby in many 
cases more enjoyable or worth watching. Even though the interviewees did watch 
and even like a certain number of Taiwanese dramas, they were rarely their 
favourite choices. Second, regarding country of origin of foreign dramas and 
cultures, while the interviewees’ preferences varied, no clear evidence indicated 
that those with more cultural capital tended to favour American dramas, while 
those with less cultural capital were in favour of regional (i.e. Korean and/or 
Japanese) counterparts.10  
 
Nevertheless, cultural capital seemed to play a more crucial role in shaping 
interviewees’ choice of access to foreign programmes. A few of my interviewees 
were from relatively richer families and/or families with higher cultural capital, and 
they frequently visited, or had even lived in the foreign country/countries whose 
cultures they were interested in. They acquired “nonmediated cultural capital from 
direct contact with global culture and people” (Straubhaar, 2003, p. 105), including 
language skills and knowledge of those foreign cultures. This enabled them to 
consume the raw, non-subtitled programmes via online platforms, rather than being 
limited to the subtitled versions as other audiences were.  
                                                 
9 In this study, no demographic factor stood out specifically as an individual variable that 
differentiated the interviewees’ preferences for programmes’ country of origin. 
10 Some interviewees who had acquired more cultural capital were in favour of Japanese dramas 
(e.g. Will, Ivy) or did not have a specific preference for country of origin regarding foreign dramas 
and cultures (e.g. Jenny, Julia); and some other interviewees with relatively weaker cultural capital 
(e.g. Ryan, Ben) enjoyed American TV series and movies. 
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As discussed in Chapter 6, a sense of coevalness always relates to how fast 
audiences attain access to foreign shows. Many programmes available online only 
had the non-subtitled versions, and even when both the subtitled and non-subtitled 
versions were available, the subtitled examples tended to become available later 
than the non-subtitled ones, as the former required more waiting time until the 
subtitling was completed by fansubbing groups. The interviewees with superior 
language proficiency (through their overseas living experiences and/or education) 
are more likely to access shows earlier with wider programme options than others 
with similar levels of technical literacy but less ability in terms of foreign 
languages. Therefore, these interviewees were in a “better” position when it came 
to the achievement of coevalness. Furthermore, since they did not rely on subtitles 
that somehow diluted the foreignness of the foreign content, they were more likely 
to appreciate raw, or least-altered foreignness when they consumed the foreign 
content. Sometimes they expressed a sense of accomplishment about being able to 
achieve this. Ivy is a typical instance:  
 
I am watching it [a Japanese animation] on FC211 and the version was 
without subtitles, but I am good at it [referring to her fluency in Japanese 
language], I have no problem understanding the story! […] I prefer using FC2, 
many shows are available and it was much more stable on my laptop. Youku12 
doesn’t work so well on my laptop these days. (Ivy, female, 31 years old) 
                                                 
11 FC2 (http://www.fc2.com) is a popular Japanese blogging service launched in 1999 (the host is 
based in the United States), and most of the access is from Japan. It started its video blogging 
service a few years ago, but it did not have Chinese language support in its initial years of operation. 
It was not until 2008, nine years after its launch, that Chinese and English were gradually 
introduced to its multiple services. 
12 Youku (http://www.youku.com/) is one of the largest and most popular Chinese video streaming 
sites hosted in China. It shares a large number of both legal and illegal Chinese-subtitled foreign 
programmes.  
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Motivated by her interest in Japanese popular culture since childhood, Ivy spent 
five years studying for her bachelor’s degree in Japan in her early twenties. After 
moving back to Taiwan, she had several jobs, all of which required a high-level of 
Japanese language proficiency (e.g. teaching Japanese in private institutions, 
working in the Taiwanese branches of Japanese banks). Ivy’s confidence in her 
Japanese language proficiency was manifested in her choice of using FC2, one of 
the most popular Japanese blogging and video hosts, as her primary online access 
to Japanese programmes, where a significant amount of Japanese content was 
non-subtitled. Fiona, who was also very interested in Japanese culture, set up a 
blog on FC2 for a school club which she had joined; the club was run as a 
community for students interested in Japanese popular culture. Evan, who studied 
for his master’s degree in London for a year, always watched American 
programmes via Siderell,13 an English-language website that collected streaming 
access to American TV series for its users.  
 
It is worth noting that, while FC2 and Siderell were widely used in their local 
contexts, they were much less known in other countries and linguistic regions. FC2 
focused on the domestic Japanese market in its initial years. Siderell mainly 
targeted American (and other English-speaking) users, and most access it collected 
was without Chinese subtitles (some had Spanish subtitles). Both FC2 and 
Siderell’s popularity in Taiwan were far behind the more globally-known platforms 
such as YouTube, or services aimed at Chinese-speaking populations such as 
PPStream, whose content was mostly Chinese-subtitled. Taking these conditions 
into account, I consider that Ivy, Fiona and Evan’s deliberate use of FC2 and 
                                                 
13 Sidereel (http://www.sidereel.com/) was launched in the US in 2007.  
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Sidereel indicated their strong intention to stay as close as possible to the everyday 
contexts of foreign cultures. The cultural capital the three had acquired through 
education and direct contact with foreign cultures enabled them to differentiate 
themselves from other Taiwanese audiences regarding the use of online platforms. 
Instead of choosing those Chinese-speaking platforms widely used in Taiwan, they 
tended to abandon such relatively culturally proximate media access and opted for 
platforms that local Japanese or Americans commonly employed. Thus, they 
maintained a stronger, rawer sense of foreignness, not only in terms of media 
content but also regarding the media environment (i.e. foreign platforms) in which 
the consumption took place. These practices seemed to maximise their immersion 
in, and enjoyment of, the foreign cultures they were interested in (see also Peter’s 
online viewing of K-On! in Chapter 6 Section IV).  
 
Fiona further demonstrated how her immersion in Japanese culture was enhanced 
through the simulation of a “para-Japanese media environment” (my coinage) in 
her household. Fiona’s interest in Japan was mainly due to the influence of her 
parents who had the same interests when they were young. She was their only child, 
and she grew up surrounded by various Japanese cultural and media products.14 
Encouraged by her parents, she started learning Japanese when she was 8 or 9 years 
old; by the time the interview took place, she had been learning it for seven years 
and was planning to continue her studies in Japan when she graduated from high 
school.15 When I asked what she usually watched on TV, she said that:  
                                                 
14 For example, Fiona’s father always bought pirate DVDs of Japanese dramas and watched them 
with her, by himself, or with the whole family; when it came to the purchase of electronic goods, 
SONY products were always the first choice. 
15 Fiona successfully entered one of the most prestige Japanese universities to pursue her Bachelor 
of Science degree in 2014.  
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In our home, we always have to switch to NHK16 before we switch off the TV. 
When we switch on [the TV] in the morning, it [the channel on TV] has to be 
NHK. It always has to be NHK at the time when the TV is switched on 
[laughing]. This is the rule in our home. It has to be switched to NHK when 
we switch on the TV. It has become a natural practice. If there is nothing 
interesting on NHK, then it will be switched to Videoland Japan.17 (Fiona, 
female, 16 years old) 
 
Fiona explained that her father wanted her to take her Japanese language study 
seriously. In order to encourage her to do so, he set this “NHK rule” in an attempt 
to create a media environment as close to a real Japanese context as possible (even 
though her parents did not understand Japanese). While most foreign content and 
channels on Taiwanese cable TV are localised (e.g. content editing, subtitling) in 
order to effectively address Taiwanese audiences, such cultural localisation was 
consciously abandoned by Fiona’s family in their domestic media context. After a 
few years of practice, this “NHK rule” became a ritual in her home. As a result, 
most of the time what was shown on their living room TV was Japanese content, 
which constituted the rawest version available on Taiwanese broadcast TV, since 
the content on NHK World Premium was neither dubbed nor subtitled.  
 
 
                                                 
16 NHK is the national public Japanese broadcasting system, and the channel she referred to was 
NHK World Premium, which was legally accessible on cable and satellite TV systems in Taiwan. 
There are different versions of NHK World Premium broadcast around the globe, and the content is 
tailored to target audiences in different regions. Therefore, the content seen in Taiwan is different 
from that broadcast on the British version of NHK World Premium.  
17 Videoland Japan, established in 1996, is a Taiwanese TV network that focuses exclusively on 
Japanese programmes. 
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IV. Embodying Foreignness and Identity Shaping 
The last section examined how some interviewees with more cultural capital 
strived to keep foreignness in their viewing of foreign programmes by using the 
same access foreigners frequently used, instead of that localised for Taiwanese 
audiences (e.g. Taiwanese channels, Chinese-fansubbed files). This section 
continues to elaborate other interviewees’ practices which are associated with the 
construction of their cultural identity. 
 
i. Language, Travel, and Identity 
While Fiona had not lived in Japan, she had travelled to Japan two or three times 
and stayed there for a few days to a couple of weeks every year. She elaborated on 
how her fluency in Japanese raised a question regarding her nationality for 
Japanese people: 
 
We [she and her mother] went to buy some clothes [in Japan]. I talked with 
my mom in Mandarin, and my mom asked me to help her ask some questions; 
then I started to ask the questions in Japanese. I felt that the staff member 
definitely had doubts about what our relationship was. She later asked me, 
“Are you Japanese?” She started by asking, “Are you mother and daughter?” I 
said yes. Then she asked, “Are you Japanese then?” She [said that she] 
originally thought that I must be mixed-blood and generally lived in Japan, 
and my mom came from Taiwan or somewhere else. I said, no, [my identity] is 
very simple [laughing]. Every time staff members ask [these questions] in a 
curious manner, I always have to repeat my story from the beginning. (Fiona, 
female, 16 years old) 
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As a person of Chinese origin, the media scholar Ien Ang was raised by 
Indonesian-Chinese parents in the Netherlands, spending most of her life there until 
she moved to Australia in the 1990s. She elaborates on how various notions of 
“Chineseness” are attached to and imposed on her cultural identity. She finds that, 
in her surroundings, a crucial notion regarding Chinese identity “to which the 
ethnicised ‘Chinese’ subject must adhere to acquire the stamp of ‘authenticity’” (p. 
30) is her supposed fluency in the Chinese language. The fact that she doesn’t 
speak Chinese is “a condition that has been hegemonically constructed as a lack, a 
sign of loss of authenticity” (p. 30) of her “Chinese” identity: people either 
presume that she spoke Chinese, or joked that she was “fake” Chinese as she does 
not speak Chinese.  
 
In Fiona’s case, language fluency was also crucial to how cultural identity was 
defined. The reason why Fiona was not in the first place considered Taiwanese but 
Japanese or mix-blooded, while her mother was considered Taiwanese (or some 
other foreign native), was based on the languages they spoke. According to Fiona, 
while many Japanese people identified her mother, who did not seem to understand 
Japanese, as a foreigner, they were always uncertain about her own identity. They 
often assumed that someone like her, who looked ethnically East Asian and spoke 
both Japanese and another language fluently, must be Japanese with a complicated 
cultural background (e.g. mixed-blooded or an immigrant growing up in Japan). 
Compared to diaspora or immigrants, her nationality and cultural background, as 
she argued, was rather simple: she was born to Taiwanese parents and raised in 
Taiwan and had not lived overseas. However, by acquiring Japanese language 
proficiency and demonstrating this proficiency alongside her mother tongue 
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(Mandarin), Fiona’s cultural and national identity became less clear-cut from the 
perspective of Japanese people.  
 
The relation between language and the construction of identity was also shown in 
the ways of some interviewees’ use of foreign languages as everyday practices. 
Peter, whom I interviewed via text-based instant messaging services online, 
employed Japanese temporal indicating conventions when he told me his viewing 
patterns of Japanese animation (see Chapter 6 Section IV). It is worth noting that, 
although Japanese was not our first language, he always used Japanese rather than 
Chinese (our first language) to interact with me. He was an acquaintance of my 
friends, and since he knew from my friend that I had learned Japanese, he had 
already used simple Japanese to interact with me from the very beginning. Ever 
since he was sure that my Japanese language level was “good enough to understand 
what he talked about” (his own words in Japanese), he only wrote in Japanese to 
me.18 He also mainly wrote in Japanese when he updated his status or shared 
information on social networking sites and the IM service via which we interacted. 
 
I met Evan in London in 2009 when both of us had just moved there to study. 
While we mainly spoke Mandarin with each other face-to-face in London or in 
Taiwan, our text-based, mediated interactions always took place in English: he 
never interacted with me in Chinese (even though at times I replied in Chinese) on 
all kinds of text-based messaging and networking services. His posts (either the 
notes he wrote or the information he shared on social networking sites such as 
Facebook or Instagram) were always in English. The Chinese language, as a crucial 
                                                 
18 As I considered that it was easier for me to express myself and ask questions more accurately in 
Chinese than in Japanese, I usually used Chinese rather than Japanese to interact with him. 
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condition of an expression of being “Taiwanese” rarely used in his online 
networking activities. During the interview Evan joked that he was always called, 
“the Western food boy”: a person who was uncritically obsessed with American 
(Western) material culture and he quite loved this term even if it was a bit negative 
by definition. He then argued: 
 
I always love to be a “fake” white person, you know? Yeah, [I am] saying this 
as a joke [laughs]! (Evan, male, 26 years old) 
 
As Edwards (1991) points out, language as a marker with both communicative and 
symbolic values is “the central pillar of ethnic identity” (p. 269). If Ang’s (2001) 
experience of not speaking Chinese was considered as a sign of her loss of 
authentic Chineseness, Evan’s deliberate use of English was crucial for him as an 
East Asian to disguise himself as a “fake” Westerner, or an American-born 
Taiwanese who was not “authentically” Taiwanese. Moreover, as a “fake” white 
person, Evan also picked an English last name from a fictional character, namely a 
young white New Yorker in a recent American TV series, and used it as his last 
name in most social media (e.g. Facebook) and offline memberships (e.g. a free 
membership card from a supermarket) in Taiwan as well as in the UK (he also 
picked another English last name derived from a character in the globally renowned 
British novel Harry Potter). He said that he did so mainly for fun, and in most 
cases would do so when other services did not require him to provide his authentic 
name.  
 
Compared with Evan and Fiona, Adam was born to a family with relatively less 
cultural and economic capital, and had rarely travelled overseas before he started to 
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work. Adam had been extremely interested in Japanese popular culture since 
childhood and majored in Japanese at university. After travelling to Japan for the 
first time in his mid-twenties, he was more convinced that Japan as a country and a 
culture was indeed what he wanted to identify with. Since then, he visited Japan 
one or twice yearly and always went to the same city, Osaka. One time after 
returning to Taiwan from Osaka, he wrote a post on his Facebook page in July 2013, 
and cited below is part of the content (used with his consent): 
 
I am now feeling homesick for my second homeland, Osaka. The symptoms 
include: 
1. I feel a bit annoyed when I use a large bill to pay for something, the 
[Taiwanese] staff members don't promptly and accurately count the notes for 
me when they give me back the change [as Japanese people did]. 
2. The Taiwanese airport was just so noisy. The way Taiwanese spoke was 
just so, so, so, so, so loud. 
3. [Taiwanese] people just like sounding their horn for no apparent reason 
when they drive. 
4. I feel that Taiwanese trains are just so old and shabby. 
 
I asked Adam in August 2013 to explain further to me his “homesickness for 
Japan” via instant messaging when I was in London.19 He argued:  
 
Oh, there are in fact other symptoms, say, I would accidentally use Japanese 
Yen to pay for something, and also unconsciously say “Ryoshusho ha 
                                                 
19 I also double-checked his response with him in person when I returned to Taiwan a few months 
later. His face-to-face reaction was identical to the online conversation. 
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iranaidesu” [i.e. I don't need the receipt",領収書は要らないです, written in 
Japanese in his original response]. 
(Yu-kei: I wonder why you think Osaka is your second homeland).  
The passion of Osaka people and my yearning for Japan, and the happy 
memories I had with Japanese people, and so on. These things make Osaka 
feel like a homeland to me. To some extent, the life in Japan is the life I want 
to have. I experienced and learnt lots of new things, but then I had to leave 
[Japan], and in turn I felt a sense of nostalgia for leaving Japan. For instance, 
you know Osaka people like to make jokes. I really like playing the fool, and 
these [Japanese] friends will just sarcastically point out my silly acts. [We are] 
just playing a double comedy act you know, I am the funny man and they play 
the straight man. I really enjoy this kind of interaction, and they [Japanese] get 
me. [...] Taiwanese people don't like making jokes as much. […] When I 
arrived at Kansai airport [the airport in Osaka] and rushed to take the train, I 
already felt “Oh, it is Japan, I am back”. 
(Yu-kei: You meant that you felt like going back to Japan, instead of going 
there?) 
Yes, I felt a sense of belonging […] I had wanted to do these things for a long 
time and I made it, so I had a sense of fulfilment and belonging. 
 
Unlike diaspora or immigrants who reside in places other than their countries or 
those interviewees who had lived overseas, Adam never left Taiwan, his “first 
homeland”, and each of his trips to Japan was less than ten days. However, his 
strong emotional attachment to Japanese culture is manifested in the way he used 
terms to describe his feelings about his trips such as “homesickness”, “the second 
homeland”, “back to Japan”, or “belonging”. Similar to Peter or Evan, he kept 
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using Japanese in many daily contexts (e.g. posting entries on Facebook in 
Japanese). As Frith (1996) points out, “identity is not a thing but a process” (p. 110), 
therefore Adam’s experience of “unconsciously” and “accidentally” speaking 
Japanese was a significant example showing the dynamic process in which his 
identification with Japanese culture was taking shape. If the meaning of 
“homeland” Adam referred to is similar to the homeland that Georgiou (2006) 
defines, that is “a symbolic, ideological concept […] that addresses issues of 
imagination, longing and belonging and less so a specific geographical place”(p. 
165), how was Adam’s belonging for Japan as a second homeland formed?  
 
Ming-Tsung Lee has studied how young Taiwanese audiences’ imagination and 
“tourist gaze” (Lee citing Urry, 1990) towards Japan are constructed through their 
consumption of Japanese dramas and actual visits via so-called “Japanese drama 
tours”,20 and how such practices shape their self-identifications with local and 
Japanese cultures. Similar to the informants in Lee’s study, Adam’s long-term 
consumption of Japanese media texts as “imaginary travel” (Urry, 2000)21 played a 
crucial role in developing his understanding of, and yearning for, Japanese culture. 
Through frequently engaging with Japanese media texts and majoring in the 
Japanese language, he had gone through an “anticipatory socialisation” (Wulff, 
1992) relating to life in Japan years before he actually visited the country. 
Therefore, his “nostalgia” for [visiting and leaving] Japan was not only based on 
                                                 
20 According to Lee (2004b), these drama tours are usually arranged and promoted by Taiwanese 
local travel agencies and/or Taiwanese television networks that broadcast Japanese dramas. The 
tours are tailored for Taiwanese people interested in Japanese dramas; and therefore the routes 
usually feature various scenes and locations where some of the most famous Japanese dramas are 
shot.  
21 Roughly based on the notion of imagined communities (Anderson, 2006), Urry (2000) argues 
that media generate imaginative travel, “by which distant events, personalities, and happenings are 
mundanely brought into the living room […] as a consequence we imagine ourselves sharing events, 
experiences and personalities […] with whom we constitute certain kinds of community” (p. 69). 
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the good time he had on his visits there, but was also shaped by long-term 
memories of his interest in Japanese culture.  
 
As Meyrowitz (2005) argues, media extend the boundaries of experiences and, as a 
result, those whom we perceive as significant Others or as part of the generalised 
other include not only the people we encounter face-to-face but also those from 
distant places. Moreover, by providing us with perspectives external to the locality, 
media expand our perception of “the generalised” elsewhere” (p. 23) as a mirror to 
view and judge our localities. A crucial reason why Adam regarded Osaka (and 
Japan in general) as his second homeland was because certain customs and social 
values of Japanese culture he expected and experienced were those he could 
identify with – sometimes easier than he could with Taiwanese culture, which he at 
times felt that he did not fit in with (as implied in his complaint about how 
Taiwanese people were noisy or how they constantly sounded the horn). He also 
felt that part of his personality was closer to that of Osaka people (e.g. enjoying 
making jokes) and, as a result, he thought that he shared certain social bonds and 
interpersonal interactions with them that his Taiwanese fellowmen were less likely 
to relate to. His sense of belonging in Osaka was especially evident when he 
repeatedly told me that Osaka “was the only place I want to visit if I travel 
overseas” (his words).  
 
ii. Self-identification via Understanding of Foreign Others 
Billig (1995) argues that an identity is “to be found in the embodied habits of social 
life. Such habits include those of thinking and using language” (p. 8). Day (2011) 
further underlines that language is “a tool people use to claim a cultural identity” (p. 
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51). If this is the case, what cultural identities did my interviewees want to claim, 
by consciously employing foreign languages (even avoiding using Mandarin in 
some circumstances) and by adhering to platforms foreigners commonly used (see 
Section III), alongside consuming foreign programmes as everyday practices? 
 
When Japan Fever emerged as a regional phenomenon in the 1990s, the younger 
Taiwanese generation’s strong interest in Japanese popular culture was often 
featured in Taiwanese media. Hari Kyoko,22 a famous Taiwanese writer, published 
several travel guides to Japan and books on Japanese popular culture. In her first 
book I’ve Got a Fever Called Hari, she said that she wished she were Japanese and 
she also felt as if she were Japanese in her past life. She believed that many readers 
had the same feeling. She was widely considered the most significant 
representative of young Taiwanese people who were obsessed with Japanese 
culture. The Mandarin term for such people is “Ha-ri”, meaning Japanophile.  
 
As discussed in Chapter 2 Section III, many Taiwanese critics were concerned that 
these young Japanophiles were ignorant about the history of Japanese colonisation 
and had forgotten their identity as Taiwanese. The title of one issue of the 
renowned Taiwanese news magazine The Journalist, was “Watch out! Your 
Children are becoming Japanese!” (published in April 1997) becoming the most 
substantial expression of these concerns (see also Iwabuchi, 2002, pp. 126-157). 
Arguments which were broadly based on a similar nationalistic perspective and the 
                                                 
22 Hari Kyoko, the author’s pen name, contains crucial meanings with regard to her cultural and 
national identity. “Hari” is a well-known Taiwanese term created by her that refers to the “Japan 
Fever” of a person who “fancies everything about Japan”. Kyoko is not a Taiwanese name, but a 
common Japanese name for Japanese female. As a pen name, “Hari Kyoko” was often considered 
by critics as demonstrating the Taiwanese younger generation’s embrace of Japanese identity and 
their abandonment of their Taiwanese one.  
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thesis of cultural imperialism were common in public discourse and academia in 
the 1990s and early 2000s (Y.-F. Ko, 2004). Some interviewees who were 
developing strong interests in Japanese popular culture as teenagers/children during 
this period (e.g. Ivy, Claire, Adam) were also subject to nationalistic criticisms 
expressed by their acquaintances and/or public discourses.  
 
From the perspective of cultural imperialism (see T.-D. Lee & Ho, 2003 for 
instance), the interviewees whose views were discussed in the previous subsections 
can be readily criticised as individuals who uncritically embraced everything 
foreign, to the extent that they happily abandoned their local identity in exchange 
for a foreign one. However, this kind of argument does not examine how audiences 
make sense of their local identity. It also tends to treat identity as clear-cut and 
attached to a given culturally- and nationally-defined territory, rather than as a 
process that is constantly being shaped and reshaped. As a result, it ignores the 
complexity involved in the construction of audiences’ national or cultural identities.   
 
Far from abandoning their local identities, my interviewees, including those who 
had strong interests in foreign cultures, still regarded themselves as Taiwanese. 
Their encounters with foreign cultures encouraged them to think of their cultural 
identity from a bifocal perspective (J. D. Peters, 1997). In the cases of Evan, Fiona, 
Ivy, Adam and Peter, they were confident that they were superior to many other 
Taiwanese people in terms of their knowledge of foreign cultures and languages. It 
can be argued that the concept of being a specialist in foreign culture was added 
and integrated into their identity.  
 
Nevertheless, instead of wishing that “I were a foreigner”, it seemed that my 
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interviewees were more interested in being considered as Taiwanese who were so 
familiar with foreign cultures that they might even be considered as foreigners. The 
main reason for them to act like foreigners in their everyday lives (e.g. using 
foreign languages consciously, employing foreign services unknown in Taiwan), 
was not so much to prove that they had become foreigners and so had given up 
their Taiwanese identity. Rather, it was more likely to emphasise the fact what they 
were not, which was especially evident in how Fiona described herself as “simply a 
Taiwanese” who lived in Taiwan, rather than a person with a more complicated 
transnational cultural background such as being of mixed-blood extraction or an 
immigrant. Likewise, Adam was sometimes considered Japanese by Japanese 
people (and occasionally by Taiwanese or Chinese people, as he argued) when he 
was travelling in Japan and he had a “complicated and rather bittersweet” feeling 
towards such experiences: “I had a sense of achievement as my Japanese seemed to 
be good enough to be considered as if I were Japanese, but at the same time I also 
thought, ‘Wait a minute, hey, I am misjudged! I am in fact Taiwanese [laughs]!’”  
 
It was exactly because the interviewees were not foreigners that their familiarity 
with foreign cultures and foreign language fluency was valuable to them: after all, 
nothing is special about an American speaking fluent English or a Japanese 
speaking perfect Japanese. In this sense, the interviewees’ familiarity with foreign 
cultures was more likely to be used by them to differentiate themselves from other 
Taiwanese rather than to deny themselves as Taiwanese. As Meyrowitz (2005) 
argues, instead of needing to choose between local, place-defined identities and 
more distant ones, “the media-networked glocality affords the possibility of having 
multiple, multi-layered, fluid and endlessly adjustable senses of identity” (p. 28). In 
277 
 
this sense, the interviewees’ sense of identity as Taiwanese may be shaped and 
proliferated, but not necessarily threatened. 
 
Moreover, in many cases, the interviewees expressed their interests in, and 
criticism of, foreign programmes and cultures at the same time. As Julia argued, 
through media consumption as well as actual residency, she had been learning more 
about “the good as well as the bad sides [and] the aspects you liked and agreed with 
and those you disagreed with” of a certain foreign culture. In turn she had become 
more careful and critical when making judgments about these cultures. Claire 
further argued: 
 
I wonder how closely someone’s preference or favourite is associated with his 
or her identity. […] If there were something that interests me in my own 
country, I might not have been so much into foreign stuff. But it’s not to say 
that I identify with a given [foreign] country simply because I am interested in 
something from there. For instance, since [I] have been experiencing Japan for 
a long time, you would like to get to know more about its various aspects. 
Then you realise that preference is preference, but identity is identity, they are 
different things, because if you look closer at it, you definitely find many 
things that you don’t identify with. (Claire, female, 30 years old) 
 
The “identity” Claire mentioned largely refers to national identity. She made clear 
that her preference for a given foreign culture (e.g., Japanese culture) did not 
suggest that she completely identified with Japan (as a nation state) or identified 
herself as Japanese. She further stated that her lack of interest in Taiwanese popular 
culture did not deny her identity as a Taiwanese national or her appreciation of 
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other aspects of Taiwanese culture. These thoughts were shared by most 
interviewees. It can be argued that, the interviewees’ identification as Taiwanese 
was more multilayered and hybridised (in terms of Straubhaar, 2008), but many 
layers of their identity (especially that of Taiwanese nationality) were not replaced 
by their interest in foreign cultures (see Section VI regarding the interviewees’ 
perceptions of Korean culture).  
 
V. The Role of Chinese File Sharing in Taiwanese Online 
Consumption of Foreign TV 
Sections I to IV examined the interviewees’ various forms of consumption of 
Japanese, Korean and American cultures such as travelling, language learning and 
viewing of programmes. The four sections investigated how such consumption 
shaped the interviewees’ perception of the three cultures as well as their identities 
as Taiwanese. This section, in turn, analyses the role China-based online services 
play in the Taiwanese consumption of foreign TV via online sharing. It specifically 
focuses on how such online services, along with the geopolitical relation between 
Taiwan and Chinese, influenced my interviewees’ perceptions of China, Taiwan 
(local) as well as other foreign countries. 
 
i. The Significance of Chinese Fansubbing and File Sharing  
As a part of Greater China, Taiwan and China share the same geo-cultural and 
linguistic roots, an important layer of cultural identification predating the 
nation-state and globalisation (Straubhaar, 2008). However, while 
Chinese-speaking countries and regions share the spoken language, written 
characters are divided into two types: Traditional Chinese used in Taiwan, Hong 
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Kong and Macau, and Simplified Chinese used in China, Singapore and the 
remaining Chinese-speaking regions. 23  As previously mentioned, online 
forums/services featuring Chinese fansubbing and file sharing activities are the 
central providers of foreign media content in the regions – a significant number of 
them targeted all Chinese-speaking populations, actively producing and 
distributing foreign media materials with both Simplified Chinese and Traditional 
Chinese subtitles (see Chapter 2 Section IV). 
 
The empirical data demonstrates that, to varying degrees most interviewees relied 
on Chinese online services in their consumption of foreign TV. While many of 
them (especially those who had more cultural capital or lived overseas as discussed 
in Section III) also used legal or unauthorised services hosted by other countries to 
watch foreign TV, Chinese online services in general were still the most common 
options used. In the early years of online video sharing (the mid-2000s), the 
interviewees either directly downloaded fansubbed files from forums or exchanged 
these files via personal networks. Many of them started using P2P TV and other 
types of video sites more frequently after they gained popularity around 2009 and 
2010. For them, these Chinese-based online services served as intermediates that 
increased the accessibility of foreign shows in two ways: 
 
1. Bridging the language gap with foreign (i.e. non-Chinese language) content. In 
terms of content, they added Chinese subtitles to raw files and in doing so they 
become the original producers of “first-hand fansubbed” programmes.  
                                                 
23 Traditional Chinese characters are also used in overseas Chinese immigrant communities such as 
those in the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom, since most first generation immigrants 
were from Hong Kong and Taiwan. However, Simplified Chinese characters are also used more 
often nowadays as more recent immigrants often come from mainland China.  
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2. Distribution and Circulation. These Chinese online services actively distributed a 
large number of fansubbed as well as unsubbed, copyrighted foreign programmes 
which are unavailable elsewhere.  
 
Many interviewees considered Chinese file sharing intermediates handy and 
helpful for their consumption of foreign shows, because they could, as Rachel said, 
“provide lots of things to watch at a fast [distribution] speed”. It was also easier to 
find foreign content on Chinese services since the content would last longer, 
compared to, as Emma said, sites such as YouTube, where “the copyright 
regulation was so strict that the content would be promptly removed”.  
 
Steven had been living in the United States for a few years when the interview took 
place, and he was concerned that his downloading habits might be subject to 
accusations of copyright infringement, especially as the downloaded programmes 
were American. Therefore, he argued that: 
 
In general I don’t directly download the raw American series. We can see that 
when episodes were on air, someone would record them and release them on 
P2P networks a few hours later, with English titles and the numbers of series 
and episodes listed. Authorities will use these words as keywords to track and 
identify who has downloaded the files. Similarly, [Internet] providers also 
track Internet traffic to know who downloads a lot. Well, what do I do to 
protect myself then? I don’t download the pure files. In recent years, more and 
more Chinese students came to the US, and they liked to subtitle, translate and 
upload [American programmes] to their own servers […] Those files are not 
pure files […] and the titles are in Simplified Chinese, rather than English or 
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Spanish. Therefore, they are not so easy to be tracked [by authorities when 
they are downloaded]. (Steven, male, 34 years old) 
 
The “pure” or raw files Steven mentioned refer to the files that were unsubbed and 
unaltered. Downloading raw files was perceived to be more likely to infringe 
copyright because, compared to the subbed files, raw ones were the closest 
duplicates of the original broadcast. For Steven, in comparison with raw files (in 
English) and files remade in Spanish or other Indo-European languages, 
Chinese-subbed files were a better solution to his concerns about copyright. 
(Simplified) Chinese made the Chinese-subbed files (with Chinese titles) more 
different from the original broadcasts, and thereby harder to track for the American 
authorities. Steven demonstrates how the Chinese language as a shared layer of 
cultural identification (Straubhaar, 2008) between Taiwanese and Chinese made 
Chinese fansubbing activities a perfect springboard for him to avoid infringing 
(American) copyright while accessing American TV series.  
 
In Chapter 5 Section V, I discussed how Dan had lost his social role as a personal 
file-sharing facilitator to his acquaintances due to the increasing accessibility of 
online viewing. In order to address the significance of Chinese online video 
services in shaping Taiwanese consumption of television, I will briefly revisit 
Dan’s experiences here. As a person who was proficient in computing, Dan thought 
the growing popularity of Chinese online video services (e.g. the P2P TV) 
indicated that:  
 
The way in which pirated content is accessed has become so different from 
that in the past. It is much easier to get it now. You don’t need any kind of skill. 
282 
 
In the early days if you wanted to get some file, you had to have some 
computer literacy. For instance, searching [pirated content] is a kind of skill. 
You also needed to have some skills if you wanted to merge [the subtitles and 
timelines into the file] and produce the content. That was what I did in the past. 
I got and made the files and shared them with not only my colleagues and 
friends but also others [i.e. strangers]. However, lots of sites or pieces of 
software have already done these things for you today. All you need to do is to 
install it. […] You can easily watch pirated content without having any kind of 
skill [laughs]. (Dan, male, 27 years old). 
 
When talking about Chinese fansubbers, Jane praised them for their efforts to make 
the foreign content available to a large number of audiences: 
 
These people [Chinese fansubbers] are just awesome. They help so many 
people to enjoy [the foreign content] for free, and what they do even helps 
others to learn [about different] cultures and languages. I think that they are 
really honourable! (Jane, female, 25 years old) 
 
When Jane mentioned the “people”, she mainly referred to Chinese speakers. As 
mentioned in Chapter 2, pirate VCD was the main technology East Asian audiences 
used to access the latest Japanese programmes in the 1990s and early 2000s (Davis 
& Yeh, 2004). In Chinese-speaking regions, pirate disc companies based in Hong 
Kong and Taiwan were influential in the circulation and consumption of Japanese 
(and other foreign) content at that time, since they were the production centres for 
unauthorised VCDs (Hu, 2004). However, as the above discussion demonstrates, a 
crucial change took place during the period of online sharing. China, through the 
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fansubbing activities of online forums/services, took the lead in shaping the 
circulation and consumption of (fansubbed and pirated) foreign content, thus 
becoming the production centre for such content for Chinese-speaking countries 
and regions. Jane’s argument was one of the most significant testimonies to the 
significance of such a change.  
 
In Chapter 6 I have analysed how interviewees strived to follow foreign broadcast 
schedules, and here I want to foreground the importance of Chinese online services 
in such processes. Many interviewees regularly check those specific Chinese sites 
and/or services that release their favourite foreign shows. Tim and Vivian are two 
examples:  
 
I will roughly remember [the Japanese broadcast schedules] because at the 
earliest the [fansubbed] files will be available for us to download the next day. 
So, for instance, Hotaru No Hikari seems to be on Wednesday, and Gold on 
Friday.24 I am the kind of person who downloads [fansubbed files] weekly. I 
always go to official fansubbing forums because they are the first ones to 
release files. (Tim, male, 27 years old) 
 
I watch Jin 2 and One Piece25 on Tudou.26 Jin is updated on Tuesday, I think. 
I always check it on Tuesday and find the new episode. Sometimes it [the 
                                                 
24 Hotaru No Hikari and Gold were on air in Japan 2010 on Wednesday and Thursday, respectively. 
Therefore, in terms of the Japanese broadcasting schedules of the two dramas, he was accurate 
regarding the former, but wrong in the latter (he believed that Gold was on Friday).   
25 Jin 2 is a Japanese weekly drama that was broadcast on Sunday evening from April to June 2011. 
One Piece is a Japanese animation broadcast every Sunday morning in Japan since 1999.  
26  Tudou (http://www.tudou.com) is one of the most popular Chinese video sites and was 
established in 2005. Last visited on 25 March 2015. 
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update of a new episode] will be on Monday. As for One Piece, you can watch 
it [in a Simplified Chinese version] on Sunday, and on Monday for the 
Traditional Chinese version. (Vivian, female, 23 years old) 
 
Tim did not understand Japanese, and he always waited for the regular release of 
dramas subtitled by SUBPIG, 27  a Chinese fansubbing group specialising in 
Japanese dramas. Since he wanted to access the dramas at the earliest possible time, 
he opted for “official” fansubbing forums that produced the “original fansubbed” 
files, instead of the “second-hand” online services (e.g. P2P TV) that re-uploaded 
the original fansubbed files. As soon as SUBPIG released his favourite dramas, he 
went to download them and, as a result, he gained a rough idea of Japanese 
schedules due to this regular practice. Unlike some interviewees (e.g. Peter, Adam, 
Emma, Claire) who learned Japanese and checked Japanese sites for relevant 
broadcasting information, Tim’s understanding of Japanese broadcasting schedules 
and the ways in which he followed the latest Japanese dramas was crucially 
structured by the SUBPIG operation.  
  
Rather than mentioning when Jin 2 or One Piece aired in Japan, Vivian explained 
to me in detail how and when she could access the latest episodes of both 
programmes via the Chinese streaming video site Tudou. Similar to Tim’s 
experience, her argument also indicated how Tudou determined her viewing of 
Japanese (and other foreign) shows: the updating of the Chinese video site was felt 
as more significant than the original Japanese broadcast schedules. The 
interviewees who mainly relied on Chinese online platforms to consume foreign 
                                                 
27 The website of SUBPIG is http://www.suppig.net/. Last visited on 25 March 2015. 
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programmes shared identical experiences with Tim and Vivian.  
 
In general, Chinese online services were widely used by most interviewees as 
guerrilla platforms that offered content unavailable under official capitalist 
structures. Nevertheless, besides being significant to Taiwanese consumption of 
foreign TV, Chinese online sharing forums/services as the main providers of 
foreign media content in Chinese-speaking regions, also have implications for the 
shaping of Taiwanese identity. The next subsection looks at why and how these 
Chinese services triggered interviewees’ negative feelings and anxieties towards 
China.  
 
ii. Antagonism Towards China: Making Detours as a Form of Cultural 
Resistance 
Section III has examined Fiona, Evan and Ivy’s experiences of intentionally 
choosing foreign platforms as an important way to employ foreignness in their 
everyday lives. Here I focus on the practices of other interviewees who also 
avoided or reduced using made-in-China services to access foreign content, but for 
different reasons.  
 
As an engineer, Cheryl expressed the strong criticism that there were always many 
dirty tricks (e.g. computer viruses, spam, data-theft) embedded in made-in-China 
software and this threatened her computer security. Therefore, she always tried to 
avoid made-in-China software or online services. A few interviewees (e.g. Tim, 
Peter) expressed similar reasons for their unwillingness to use Chinese software 
and/or services to watch foreign shows. If they occasionally did, they also tended to 
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reduce the usage as much as possible. Furthermore, Cheryl underlined a more 
specific reason to explain why she did not use PPStream (shortened as PPS), one of 
the most famous pieces of Chinese P2P video software: 
 
There are two reasons why I decided that I won’t use PPS. First, besides 
Taiwanese dramas, all the others (TV shows) are Simplified Chinese-subtitled. 
Second, the whole interface is full of Simplified Chinese characters as well. 
What an eyesore! (Cheryl, 29 years old) 
 
When Cheryl wanted to watch a certain show that required subtitles, she always 
tried to find the Traditional Chinese version, because “it’s my own agenda. I dislike 
Simplified Chinese characters” – thereby the anti-Simplified Chinese attitude was 
revealed again. Likewise, Adam argued that he neither understood nor liked 
Simplified Chinese characters, and stressed that he never consumed fansubbed 
files: 
 
[Chinese fansubbing forums] are never my thing, ever. The video quality [of 
fansubbed files] is so, so bad; and they [Chinese fansubbing forums] just so 
shamelessly violate copyright. On top of that, I am sick of the typical attitude 
of 426.28 They [426, i.e. “goddamn Chinese mainlander”] always thought that 
they were the boss. Some fansubbing forums even shamelessly added their 
own logos on the files, as if they were really the original one [which produced 
the programmes]. It’s so annoying. (Adam, male, 26 years old) 
                                                 
28 The three numerals ("4"-"2"-"6") in Chinese is homophonous with three other Chinese words ("
死[dead]"-"阿[vocative particle]"-"陸[mainland]"). The combination thus means "Goddamned 
Chinese (mainlander)" and is a hostile and derogatory term for Mainland Chinese. It is also 
commonly used by Taiwanese people when they refer to Chinese people in a relatively less hostile 
context. 
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Antagonism towards various aspects of China-based intermediates was evident in 
Adam and Cheryl’s arguments. Simplified Chinese characters, the dirty tricks 
embedded in the Chinese software, the low visual-quality of the files, and the 
shameless attitude toward piracy were all reasons they disliked Chinese platforms 
and services. Furthermore, the immorality and inferiority mentioned here were 
considered to be essential characteristics of the Chinese people (especially clear 
from Adam’s use of the term “426”). However, where did such antagonism come 
from? It was not so much the shortcomings of these Chinese platforms and services, 
but the political power China represented that mattered. 
 
As discussed in Chapter 2 Section I, China as a nation-state denies the sovereignty 
of Taiwan, claiming its own regime to be “the one and only” China, while 
regarding Taiwan as part of its territory. This denial prevents Taiwan as a sovereign 
nation from becoming involved in a wide range of international affairs and thus 
fundamentally threatens Taiwan’s international and political status. As the 
interviews went on, it became clear that both Cheryl and Adam insisted that Taiwan 
is not a province of China but an independent country. Nevertheless, their belief 
was not in keeping with the international political reality because most countries do 
not treat Taiwan as such given the political pressure that China exerts on the issue. 
This, in turn, triggered their antagonism toward, and resentment of, China. 
Therefore, my interviewees’ dislike of China-based intermediates was, in fact, 
mainly based on this kind of attitude. With this political concern in mind, it was 
rather uncomfortable for Cheryl and Adam to acknowledge and accept the fact that 
the Chinese file sharing service as a cultural force might affect their consumption 
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of their favourite foreign content. As a result, they wanted to make a detour to 
bypass China-based intermediations.  
 
Originally, the foreignness of a foreign show, whether American or Japanese for 
instance, did not appear to threaten the interviewees. However, with China-based 
intermediates involved, such unthreatening foreignness seemed to be compromised. 
The “pure” foreign programmes (as in Steven’s description) turned into 
“made-in-China products”, which were items they did not want to consume, or to 
admit that they had consumed.  
 
However, sometimes the interviewees found that it was almost impossible to 
completely rid themselves of China. In many cases, they needed subtitles or faster 
file sharing networks to access the files they wanted, and the China-based 
platforms were the only choice. As a result, they also expressed a certain level of 
denial of, or regret for, their reliance on China concerning their consumption. For 
instance, Adam argued that “I installed XunLei [a piece of Chinese P2P software], 
but uninstalled it right away after I got the file I needed. As I said, I don’t use it”. 
Sometimes he asked his acquaintances to help in checking or accessing Japanese 
programmes via Chinese file sharing sites since he did not want to use those sites 
himself. Such a practice showed his refusal to admit that he had indeed used and 
had to rely on the Chinese software and services. Cheryl confessed that, “I know 
that I cannot really criticise them since I benefit from them”. In other words, on the 
one hand, she knew that she still had to rely on Chinese-subtitled files. On the other 
hand, she was also a little frustrated by acknowledging her reliance on Chinese 
fansubbing activities, because she thought she might have been able to be more 
critical if she did not benefit from them.  
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iii. Making Do with Chinese Services 
Some interviewees had similar anxieties or antagonisms to those that Cheryl and 
Adam experienced regarding China as a nation-state and political superpower. 
However, despite such negative feelings, they did not try to completely avoid using 
Chinese platforms and services. For these interviewees, Chinese services were seen 
as a tactic (Certeau, 1984) in their online consumption of foreign TV. The notion of 
tactic here harbours two meanings. First, as discussed in the previous subsections, 
interviewees tactically used these Chinese platforms and services as springboards 
to access foreign content. Second, while they relied on these Chinese platforms, 
they constantly resisted or dismissed the Chinese cultural and political ideologies 
and threats they felt during their consumption as well as in other aspects of their 
everyday lives. As Mandy said:  
 
I will not avoid using [Chinese sites because] all sites that allow you to 
download things are good sites. It is the access and content that matter. 
Therefore, as long as I can understand the interface and get the shows, I don’t 
mind if it is a Chinese site or some site in Kenya or South Africa [laughing]; 
the sites that allow you to download are the good sites. After all, how is it 
possible to completely cut the relationship with China as there is so much 
made-in-China stuff available nowadays? I think that there is a clear 
distinction between everyday life and our beliefs. Well, daily life is daily life, 
and our beliefs are our beliefs. We shouldn’t mix up the two. (Mandy, female, 
27 years old) 
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Unlike most interviewees who only watched fansubbed files, Ken participated in 
Chinese fansubbing activities as a fansubber and proofreader. For him, it was an 
active and effective resistance against Chinese cultural and political power as 
demonstrated in the dominance of China in the distribution of foreign content 
among Chinese-speaking audiences:  
I mainly made the subtitles and proofread [the subtitles of others]. The reason 
why I wanted to join fansubbing groups was because many other Taiwanese 
also started to watch [foreign programmes]. With many Taiwanese starting to 
watch [those foreign programmes], Chinese fansubbers converted [Simplified 
Chinese subtitles] into Traditional Chinese subtitles and released them. 
However, they didn’t know how to really translate Simplified Chinese into 
Traditional Chinese. Foolishly, they just used Word [the word-for-word 
conversion function in Microsoft Word software] to do the conversion.29 I 
really hate the fact that many Chinese terms were mixed up with Taiwanese 
terms. I am very familiar with the differences between the two, and I felt that 
it was a kind cultural invasion when I saw such mix-ups. I was furious, again 
[laughing scornfully]! Since I knew that no Taiwanese was in that [fansubbing] 
group, they had no idea how to deal with it. On top of that, I was an early user 
of the group. Therefore, I requested to join the group, and told them that I 
could take over the Traditional Chinese role. (Ken, male, 27 years old)  
 
                                                 
29 Except for the differences in the Chinese characters, in terms of language use, many terms and 
expressions used in Taiwan and those employed in China are also different. Most conversion 
software is only capable of converting the Simplified Chinese characters into Traditional 
counterparts. It fails to automatically alter the nuances, the terms, and the expressions to those 
actually used by Taiwanese. It requires human agency (i.e. Taiwanese people) to convert such 
linguistic details if a given Simplified Chinese subtitle is to be perfectly converted to the Traditional 
Chinese version. 
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However, at times my interviewees also found it hard to tactically “make do with” 
(Certeau, 1984) these Chinese services. The most significant instance lies in how 
they were annoyed when they were unable to access their favourite content: 
 
Even Tudou is blocked now; it [a notification on Tudou] tells you that you are 
not allowed to watch it outside Mainland China. It is so irritating. (Claire, 
female, 30 years old) 
 
Now Tudou even blocks IPs from Taiwan, saying that we are not allowed to 
view the shows due to copyright issues! It is at this point that you can say that 
we are not part of you then! [I am] so upset [but laughing]! I was forced to 
give up so many American TV series, such as CSI or Criminal Minds! (Mandy, 
female, 27 years old) 
 
Chinese video platforms and services have gradually started to legalise their 
business activities from the beginning of the 2010s (roughly around the same time 
when this research was conducted). Consequently, they also began to block visitors 
whose Internet Protocols are outside Mainland China.30 In general, under such new 
terms of service, access from Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan is not granted. 
However, as Mandy’s argument points out, this clearly contradicts the political 
statement and status of China, in which Taiwan is considered part of China’s 
territory (and Hong Kong and Macau have already reverted to China). In other 
words, these three places, which are “included” in the political territory of China, 
are excluded from the digital and technological map of Chinese online platforms. 
                                                 
30 For the most recent development regarding the competition and collaboration between video sites, 
fansubbing groups and state control in China, see Hu (2014). 
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This contradiction turned out to be the main reason why interviewees like Mandy 
and Claire were irritated by the Chinese employment of IP blocking. 
 
In fact, most of the programmes and movies on the Chinese sites undergoing 
legalisation remain unauthorised or pirated. The employment of IP blocks helped 
these sites in the legalising process in two ways. Firstly, this IP blocking, as their 
statement on legitimacy, was directed at outsiders (e.g. foreign countries). Secondly, 
by keeping out outsiders, it is easier for them to “regulate” the content and access 
under the loose copyright regulations prevailing in China: they can still keep a 
large number of unauthorised and pirated programmes to attract Chinese audiences, 
without being accused of copyright infringements by copyright owners based in 
foreign countries (e.g. Hollywood studios). As a result, on the one hand for my 
interviewees the new terms of services were the tactics (tricks) employed by 
Chinese sites for their own good. On the other hand, from the Taiwanese audience’s 
perspective, it became harder for Taiwanese to access foreign content, and the 
tactics employed by Chinese sites were a strategic move against them.  
 
Unofficial and unauthorised file sharing and fansubbing activities have been 
regarded as grassroots and tactical practices that are in opposition to legal regimes 
and institutions (Pang, 2006, 2009). However, Andersson (2009, p. 64) has studied 
the Swedish filesharing site Pirate Bay, and he finds that, rather than “breaking the 
rules” as a form of tactical practice, the activities that Pirate Bay represents have 
gradually become much more influential in setting the rules of digital distribution, 
forcing the entertainment industry to respond to them. In this sense, Pirate Bay is 
more strategic and institutional than tactical in Certeau’s (1984) sense. Similarly, 
the way in which Chinese online platforms serve as production centres of 
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fansubbed foreign content, and how they legalise their business, can be seen as 
strategic and institutional manoeuvres. More importantly, due to the geopolitical 
tensions between Taiwan and China, for Taiwanese audiences it is even more likely 
to see the legalisation of Chinese platforms as a strategic force that is necessary 
(albeit difficult) to resist.  
 
VI. Korea as a Significant Foreign Other 
This section discusses the ways in which my interviewees perceived the Korean 
cultural presence in Taiwan and how it reflected their understanding of regional 
cultural power relationships. As discussed in Chapter 2 Section III, compared to 
Japan Fever that originated from a former imperial nation, the Korean Wave is the 
first significant cultural flow in this region generated by a non-colonising country, 
which is a “semi-periphery of the world system” to use Cho’s terms (2005, p. 149). 
This non-colonial aspect makes Korean culture “relatively free from historical, 
political and cultural burdens” (Park, 2006, p. 248) and thereby seem less 
threatening in comparison to its Western and Japanese counterparts, and this is 
commonly considered as the main reason why Korean popular culture can be 
readily-accepted regionally (H.-J. Cho, 2005; Y. Kim, 2013; Shim, 2006, 2008).  
 
Nevertheless, while there are no historical colonial relations between Taiwan and 
Korea, it does not necessarily indicate that the diplomatic, political and cultural 
relations between the two nations have always been friendly.31  While some 
interviewees, especially those interested in Korean programmes, had a positive 
                                                 
31 For instance, Korea cut off its diplomatic relations with Taiwan in order to establish new ties with 
China in 1992, triggering a strong antagonism towards Korea in Taiwanese society (see Chapter 2 
Section I). However, this diplomatic history was rarely mentioned in the interviews.  
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perception of Korean culture generally, it was also common for my interviewees to 
point out how and why they, their family members and/or acquaintances had 
negative impressions of Korea (as a nation and a foreign culture). These negative 
impressions were mainly based on two factors concerning cultural and economic 
relations between Taiwan and Korea. 
 
i. Sport as a Cultural Factor 
Sport is often associated with nationalism as it functions as a sphere of symbolic 
competition between nations, contests in which strong nationalistic emotions are 
easily generated (Bairner, 2001; Silk, Andrews, & Cole, 2005). For many 
interviewees the way in which Korea competed in various international sports 
competitions was one of the most crucial impressions they had of Korea as a nation. 
This impression turned out to be largely negative, mainly due to the fact that 
Taiwan has competed intensely with Korea in various sports, and Koreans were 
considered as lacking sportsmanship. As Nicole and Jeff argued:   
 
While I do watch Korean dramas, to be honest, I don’t like Koreans. Because 
the Jones Cup32 was so popular among our generation and Korea was the 
dirtiest team that cheated and played tricks, [I was] so pissed when watching 
[the games]. Therefore, I thought that they were so malevolent. (Nicole, 
female, 45 years old) 
 
Basically I wouldn’t buy their products because Koreans are so hateful. They 
                                                 
32 This refers to the William Jones Cup, an annual international basketball tournament held in 
Taiwan since 1977. It was one of the most popular international sports competitions in Taiwan in the 
1980s. 
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are very crafty in business. In sports, we all know that, don’t we? In sports 
they always play dirty tricks, and their judges also cheat, say, in those 
Taekwondo33 competitions. It isn’t just once. Various cases have happened 
here and there in recent years. Therefore I dislike the Koreans. (Jeff, male, 
36-40 years old) 
 
While Nicole and Jeff enjoyed watching Korean dramas online, both of them 
underlined that they disliked Koreans because of their lack of sportsmanship. For 
them, Koreans’ apparent lack of sportsmanship frequently put Taiwan at a 
disadvantage in competition. Similar criticism regarding Koreans was commonly 
heard from interviewees, regardless of whether they liked Korean dramas and/or 
music or not. In another instance, when asked if he watched Korean dramas, Ryan 
said “no”, with scorn. I followed his reaction, asking if there were specific reasons 
regarding his answer, and he argued: 
 
Will this be put on record [pausing, hesitant]? Is it okay if I just say anything?  
(Yu-kei: Yeah, it will be [put on record]. But it doesn’t matter. You can say 
what you want to say. 
OK, well, I am against Korea. I am against Korea. It is simple, I don’t like the 
Koreans. Maybe I should put it this way: I don’t like most of the national 
characteristics of Koreans. It’s because I am a person in love with sports. As 
long as you love sports, you will not like the Koreans; it is that simple […] I 
                                                 
33 Taekwondo, which originated in Korea, is one of the few sports in which Taiwan has been 
internationally competitive, and Korea is the strongest powerhouses against which Taiwan has been 
competing. There have been controversies regarding judging systems in Taekwondo; in Taiwan, it is 
widely considered that Taiwanese contestants are frequently treated unfairly in the games in which 
Koreans are involved (e.g. competing with Korean contestants, having Korean judges or competing 
in a Korean city).  
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would never ever watch Korean dramas [...] The Koreans are, in fact, not bad 
in terms of drama production. Although I am anti-Korea, I do admire them. 
Their national characteristics are very annoying but you have to admire them 
because they always stick together, and they make a lot of effort to promote 
themselves. (Ryan, male, 34 years old)  
 
When Ryan asked, “Will this be put on record?” it was not because he did not want 
his opinions to be recorded (he was willing to be voice-recorded throughout the 
whole interview). Rather, it was because he was unsure if his anti-Korean emotions 
were relevant to, or appropriate for, my research or not. After I said that it was okay 
to express what he thought freely, he opened up and talked about his emotions 
towards Korea and he repeatedly indicated that it was a “simple” principle that 
“sports fans would not like Koreans” because Korean national characteristics as 
demonstrated in sports were hateful. Given his scorn for and hate of Koreans’ 
behaviour in sport, he refused to watch Korean dramas, despite his recognition of 
their production quality and the fact that some Korean national characteristics (e.g. 
sticking together) were admirable. Ryan’s dislike (as well as admiration) of Korean 
national characteristics demonstrated how sports generated complex nationalist 
emotions towards Korea.34  
 
ii. Economic Competition as a Cultural Factor 
The last subsection demonstrates how the nationalistic characteristics of Koreans 
                                                 
34 It has to be noted that the negative impressions regarding Koreans sportsmanship are often 
featured in Taiwanese media, and as such are the most common impressions of Korea in Taiwan. 
Some interviewees (e.g. Mandy and Vivian) argued that, although they had no resentful feelings 
toward Koreans’ sportsmanship themselves, they were surrounded by family members or friends 
who did.  
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were perceived negatively via the interviewees’ consumption of sports games. As 
Jeff commented, Koreans are “so crafty in business”. This negative perception of 
Korean national characteristics was also frequently mentioned when interviewees 
talked about Korea’s presence in commerce.35 Crucially, Taiwan and Korea, as two 
of ‘The Four Asian Dragons’,36 went through similar development processes in 
terms of modernisation, industrialisation, and economic trajectory (see also Chapter 
2 Section I). Both countries specialise in manufacturing electronics and in 
developing information technologies; these shared trajectories have led to keen 
economic competition. Such competition, alongside the interviewees’ impressions 
of Korean national characteristics including being sly in commerce, often caused 
them to have concerns about buying Korean products. As Vivian argued, her father 
was unhappy to see her watching Korean dramas or her brother buying Korean 
smartphones because “he always thought that Koreans were the main competitors 
with the Taiwanese, in terms of both technologies and product designs” (her own 
words).  
 
Moreover, the way in which Korea has become increasingly competitive (compared 
to Taiwan) at an international level worried some interviewees. Cheryl, who 
reduced her consumption of Korean culture and manufactures, explained why she 
decided to do so: 
 
                                                 
35 For instance, Ann and Vivian both mentioned that their family members had worked with 
Koreans and realised that Koreans were aggressive and sly in business (e.g. trying to take advantage 
of the Taiwanese). 
36 The “Four Asian Dragons” label refers to Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore and Taiwan, which all 
went through rapid economy growth, modernisation and industrialisation from the 1960s to the 
1990s, and developed into advanced economies by the beginning of the 21st century.  
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On the one hand, their [Korean] economic infrastructure and advantages are 
too similar to ours. Our economy won’t be good if theirs is good, so I kind of 
boycott them. On the other hand, I think that their dumping strategy just went 
too far and, in fact, not all of their dramas are good or better than ours. 
Therefore, I seldom watch them unless there are certain themes or features 
that really attract me. (Cheryl, female, 29 years old) 
 
Cheryl elaborated why the consumption of Korean culture and manufactures might 
be worrying: she considered that the consumption of Korean culture and 
manufacturing might benefit the economy of Korea and in turn threaten the 
economy of Taiwan. Furthermore, since she felt that the Korean media’s strategies 
for exporting their not-so-well-made programmes were aggressive and 
unacceptable, she was reluctant to consume them.  
 
Similarly, while some other interviewees consumed and enjoyed Korean dramas or 
music, they tended not to consume other Korean commodities, especially 
electronics and information technologies, as the IT market is the very market in 
which Taiwanese manufacturers are in intense competition with their Korean 
counterparts. Occasionally, this kind of consumption pattern was partly due to their 
family members’ concerns about Korea:  
 
My husband always says, “We have to be against Korea, against Korea, and 
we should not buy Korean stuff.” For example, Korean smartphones, say, LG, 
Samsung, are not allowed in our home. 
(Yu-kei: How about Japanese ones then?) 
It doesn’t matter. We use Sony Ericsson [the Japanese manufacture Sony’s 
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smartphones], and our cameras are from Panasonic and Canon. His rule 
specifically applies to Korean technology. (Ann, female, 41 years old) 
 
My boyfriend said “You are so into Korea, and it doesn’t seem right, you 
know. We should support Taiwan, support our own manufactures. We should 
use HTC37 smartphones!” [laughing]. (Mandy, female, 27 years old) 
 
Ann and Mandy’s arguments indicated how economic competition in 
manufacturing between Taiwan and other countries triggered a sense of nationalism 
in Taiwan, and Korean manufacturing was the main (if not the only) industry to be 
boycotted. Similar nationalistic tones were often seen in other interviews. However, 
in many cases (as shown in Ann’s argument), Japanese products (e.g. the Sony, 
Panasonic and Canon brands), were often more acceptable than their Korean 
counterparts. As can be seen in the next section, the reasons for this tendency go 
beyond economic competition: they are associated with a regional cultural 
hierarchy as perceived by the interviewees.  
 
When Mandy talked about her boyfriend’s anti-Korean attitude, she said that he 
sometimes made fun of her interests in Korean pop culture, asking her to tell him 
“What’s superior about Korea anyway?” She explained that this kind of 
conversation was a frivolous one: they made fun of, but never seriously argued 
with each other about their opposing attitudes towards Korea. However, the 
interviewees’ thoughts with regard to whether or in what sense Korea is superior 
                                                 
37  HTC Corporation, established in 1997, is the most internationally competitive Taiwanese 
manufacturer of smartphones and tablets. 
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leads to another important issue which will be discussed more comprehensively in 
the next section.   
 
VII. Transnational Cultural Relationships and Local Identity 
i. The Perception of a Regional Cultural Hierarchy 
As two regional foreign Others to Taiwanese society, Korean and Japanese cultures 
were often compared to each other in the interviews. Some respondents (e.g. Katie, 
Nicole) preferred Korean dramas to their Japanese counterparts; a few other 
interviewees (e.g. Claire, Emma) enjoyed both Korean and Japanese cultures. Both 
types of interviewees found that many of their acquaintances showed a divergent 
attitude towards the Korean and Japanese cultures: 
 
Many people hate Koreans now, but I always want to ask them why. Is it just 
because they are arrogant and will play dirty tricks? If it is the case, haven’t 
Japanese people done the same thing? Why, then, can you accept or love Japan, 
or even become Japanophile, but cannot accept Korea? Aren’t these two 
situations the same? (Katie, female, 32 years old) 
 
My elder sister and I have a common friend, and she always says that we [my 
sister and I] are Korean, and we only watch Korean stuff recently, and I 
thought, well, if it were the case, you are Japanese then. Isn’t it the same? 
(Emma, female, 19 years old)  
 
Katie and Emma had a relatively neutral attitude towards the Otherness of both 
Korea and Japan as nation-states and popular cultures, and neither of them was 
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seen as essentially “better” than the other. However, both interviewees found that 
Japanese cultural presence often seemed to be perceived more positively than 
Korean culture in their surroundings; and they did not agree with such perception. 
They underlined their doubts regarding this circumstance in a similar tone, which 
can be roughly rephrased as “should not the two countries be judged in the same 
way?” This question seemed to be partly answered in other interviewees’ 
arguments. In many cases, the interviewees showed a relatively tolerant attitude 
towards the consumption of Japanese culture and manufacturing compared to that 
of Korean examples. Some of them explained why: 
 
My feeling towards Japanese dramas is not as antagonistic as my feeling 
towards Korean ones. Although Japan is influential in economic terms, the 
way they make money is not similar to ours. But the Korean way is. But then, 
in fact, to some extent we are not yet strong enough to challenge Japan either. 
(Cheryl, female, 29 years old) 
 
So many [Taiwanese] idiots love Korean idols. Korean idols are all clones,38 
so are their dramas. Although Johnny’s39 were pretty much as bad as theirs 
[i.e. Korean idols], at least a few of them have had some success and 
recognisable achievements. (Adam, male, 26 years old) 
                                                 
38 The term “clones” meant people who have had plastic surgery and thus looked all the same. It 
also indicated the widespread popularity or even “obsession” with plastic surgery in both the Korean 
entertainment business and wider society. There are two implications when he used “clones” to 
describe Korean dramas. First of all, it indicates that the idol actors/actresses appeared in the dramas 
have had plastic surgery and thus looked too similar to each other. Second, the dramatic plots are 
too similar and repeated constantly, so that it is difficult to tell the difference between different 
dramas. 
39 Johnny’s refers to Johnny’s Agency, the most well known talent agency in Japan which 
specialises in training and promoting young and good-looking male idol groups. The idol groups of 
Johnny’s are very popular in East Asia. 
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I am being a bit culturally discriminatory, but Korea is a totally primitive 
country that lacks a rich history. While there are many great writers in Japan, 
no one can tell me if there are any in Korea. That’s why I said, Taiwanese 
people like to consume other people’s (i.e. Koreans’) shit. It’s not worth doing 
so. There are winners of the Nobel Prize in literature in Japan. Nevertheless, 
for a country [i.e. Korea] that has a strong entertainment business but a weak 
publishing industry, how would this even be possible [for them]? […] 
Taiwanese publishing is quite influential in Chinese-speaking regions, and we 
also have many independent publishers; but Korean publishing is rather 
under-developed. However, the Taiwanese rarely resist Korean stuff. (Ken, 
male, 27 years old) 
 
The above arguments revealed several crucial issues. Firstly, all three interviewees 
considered that – compared to Korean culture – Japan’s was seen as superior in 
various aspects (e.g. having more internationally recognised achievements such as 
having novelists who had won the Nobel Prize in literature); therefore it made more 
sense to consume Japanese culture. Secondly, Ken and Cheryl’s arguments also 
indicate that Korean culture did not seem to be considered as better than Taiwanese 
(as in Cheryl’s comments that “their dramas are not good or better than ours” in the 
previous subsection). Therefore, it made less sense to be fond of something that 
was more or less similar (if not inferior) in quality. This is particularly illustrated in 
how Ken “discriminated” against Korean culture and criticised the popularity of the 
Korean Wave in Taiwan. Korean culture in his perception was inferior to Japanese 
as well as Taiwanese (e.g. Japanese and Taiwanese literature were much 
better-developed). Moreover, the way in which Cheryl argued that “we are not yet 
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strong enough to challenge Japan” seemed to indicate a perception of the cultural 
(and economic) relations between Taiwan, Korea and Japan: while Taiwan was 
competitive relative to Korea, it was not yet as competitive relative to Japan.  
 
A sense of cultural hierarchy was revealed in this subsection with which 
interviewees explained in what sense a culture was felt to be superior to another. 
The interviewees’ comparisons between Taiwanese, Japanese and Korean cultures 
were clearly subjective interpretations rather than objective facts, and not every 
interviewee had the same interpretation regarding cultural relations between the 
three countries. However, a sense of cultural hierarchy between local (national) and 
foreign cultures is associated with the construction of local cultural identity; 
therefore it is important to examine what and how structures of feeling (R. 
Williams, 1977) shaped the interviewees’ sense of this cultural hierarchy.  
 
When analysing how Japan as a significant Other has shaped Taiwanese identity, 
Ko (2004) argued in the early 2000s that, compared to Japanese culture, Korean 
culture was relatively more acceptable and less threatening in Taiwan. However, as 
discussed above, interviewees’ varied perceptions concerning Korea often seemed 
to be negative or even disdainful in the early 2010s, during which period the 
Korean Wave was at its peak. This indicates that nowadays, Korea does not 
necessarily seem to be less threatening to Taiwanese society than other foreign 
cultural presences (e.g. Japanese or American). It is more appropriate to recognise 
Korea as a sub-empire, a “lower-level empire depending on the larger structure of 
imperialism” as Chen (2000, p. 15) argues. If so, the crucial question with regard to 
the identity of Taiwan is to ask what cultural anxieties or disfavours are aroused in 
response to the Korean Wave in Taiwan. 
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While it is easier for Taiwanese to consider Japan as “better” than Korea in their 
perceptions of a cultural or economic hierarchy, a difficult question arises relating 
to where to place Taiwan in such a ranking. In other words, if Japan were 
acknowledged as leading the three, then who is next? If fewer cultural anxieties 
were caused by Japan in recent years (as compared to the 1990s) indicating that a 
cultural inferiority complex towards Japan was being triggered less frequently, 
what the Korean Wave started in Taiwan in terms of identity formation can perhaps 
be regarded as a form of cultural resistance or denial.  
 
This form of cultural resistance or denial is closely related to similarities between 
Taiwan and Korea in their developmental stages, particularly in terms of economic 
advancement and modernity. When Korea (but not Taiwan) started to appear as 
culturally and economically influential in East Asia as well as across the globe, 
similarities in the stage of development achieved between the two seemed to be 
challenged. As a result, the sense of denial (or anxiety) caused by the question of 
“Is Korea more influential than Taiwan?” or “why can Korea generate the Korean 
Wave?” is also induced. In the case of Japan Fever, “Why Japan, why not some 
other country?” (Y.-F. Ko, 2004, p. 124) as a significant Other that shapes Taiwan’s 
identity is a question having to do with the colonial relations between Taiwan and 
Japan.40 Comparatively, however, in the case of the Korean Wave, the crucial 
question seems to be “Why Korea, why not Taiwan?” 
 
ii. An East Asian Identity? 
                                                 
40 See Chapter 2 Section III regarding how Japan Fever triggered a cultural complex in Taiwan 
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As discussed in Chapter 1 Section II, a key concern in East Asia regarding 
increasing regional cultural flows, is whether or how such flows encourages mutual 
understanding and the emergence of a regional identity (Aoyagi, 2000; Chua, 2004, 
2008a, 2010; Katsumata, 2012; Park, 2004). Based on empirical data, I aim to 
respond to and rework the key idea in this debate, Chua’s (2004, 2008a) 
conceptualisation of “East Asian identity”, and argue for the following three 
charistications:  
 
First, Chua (2004) conceptualises an East Asian identity as “an ideological effect of 
the production and consumption of the [East Asian] popular culture” (p. 215). 
However, he does not specifically explain how regional identities may be 
conceived in different forms, and how multiple forms of regional identity 
constitution are associated with transnational cultural flows and power 
relationships. If audiences’ consumption of neighbouring cultures are crucial 
processes through which a sense of regional identity is generated, it is important to 
ask, which neighbouring cultures do audiences consume and identify with?  
 
For a common regional identity to emerge, there should not be significant gaps 
between each East Asian country/region in terms of their “cultural power […] to 
produce symbolic meanings which appeal to the sense, emotions, thoughts of the 
self and others” (Iwabuchi, 2002, p. 133). However, such power is highly 
imbalanced between each East Asian country/region (see Chapter 2 Section III and 
Chapter 3 Section VI). Particularly, while Japanese and Korean popular cultures are 
popular throughout East Asia, other East Asian cultures still have difficulties 
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entering the Japanese and Korean markets.41  Such cultural power disparities 
indicate that not every East Asian culture can serve, on an equal basis, as a 
significant Other with which its neighbours identify. For instance, while Japanese 
and Korean cultures are important in shaping identity in Taiwan, Taiwanese culture 
is less likely to have the same or similar influence in Japan and Korea. Given these 
conditions, even if we ignore cultural heterogeneity within a nation and regard 
people in each East Asian country/region as having a roughly united national 
identity, it is still hard to imagine that different East Asian countries/regions will 
share one East Asian identity.  
 
It is appropriate, therefore, to conceptualise regional identity as plural; that is: East 
Asian identities or senses of East Asian identity.42  Based on the notion of 
“structures of feeling” (R. Williams, 1977), Cho (2011) conceptualises the idea of 
“East Asian sensibilities” as “emerging structures of feeling within the cultural 
geography of the region that encompass meanings and values as they are actively 
lived and felt” (p. 393). Following Cho’s idea, each East Asian identity can be 
regarded as an identity consisting of different sets and combinations of East Asian 
sensibilities. In contemporary Taiwan, it is Japan, Korea and China that function as 
the most significant regional Others in terms of any conceptualisation of regional 
identity (Singapore, which is included in Chua’s conceptualisation of East Asia, 
was nearly never mentioned in the interviews). The interviewees’ perceptions of the 
                                                 
41 Cultural production and collaboration between Taiwan, Hong Kong and China is increasing, yet 
these productions are mainly circulated among Chinese-speaking locations and populations. 
42 See also Chen (2010) on his account of the anxieties over the meaning of “Asia” in different 
Asian countries. 
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regional cultural hierarchy, as part of their identity construction (for instance), can 
be seen as a Taiwanese perspective on an East Asian sensibility.43  
 
Second, in Chua’s (2004) conceptualisation of East Asian identity, he assumes that 
the “insertion and projection of an idea of ‘Asian-ness’, with nationalities 
suppressed” (p. 217) is evident in the production, circulation and consumption of 
regional cultural products. For instance, he argues that trendy dramas from multiple 
East Asian countries/regions all emphasise identical urban lifestyles and promote a 
similar standard of beautiful youth. As a result, “urban middle-class Asians are 
given interchangeable bodies on screen […], only the trained eyes of aficionados 
who can recognise the actors and actresses are able to distinguish one country’s 
product from that of another” (p. 217). These East Asian dramas, he considers, 
“foster identification among those who are willing to interpellate themselves into 
the screen, by temporally and permanently suppressing their national/ethnic 
identities” (pp. 216-217). 
 
However, even though nationalities are “suppressed” and less clear-cut in the 
production of regional cultural products, it does not necessarily mean that 
nationalities were perceived by the interviewees to be suppressed and 
indistinguishable. As examined in previous sections, the interviewees generally 
preferred to experience a raw, “less-diluted” foreignness in their viewing of foreign 
programmes. This preference, in effect, encouraged them to discern cultures based 
on nationality. The way Chinese online sharing activities and the regional cultural 
                                                 
43 Although issues such as how Japanese and Korean senses of regional identities are generated are 
beyond the scope of this study, they are imperative issues to be examined in the future if we are to 
investigate the implications of regional cultural flows for generation of regional identities.  
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hierarchy were perceived indicate how national boundaries were recognised 
distinctly as important dimensions by the interviewees in terms of their 
consumption. It is true that the interviewees formed abstract identifications with 
overseas cultural products. Nevertheless, rather than “transcend his or her grounded 
nationality” as Chua (2004, p. 200) suggests, the interviewees always carried with 
them their identity/nationality, and made sense of foreign cultures using a “bifocal” 
vision (J. D. Peters, 1997). It was also through such a bifocal perspective in their 
consumption of foreign programmes that the interviewees’ identification as 
Taiwanese nationals was reconfirmed.  
 
My interviewees’ interests in popular cultures from the main neighbours (e.g. Japan, 
Korea, Hong Kong and China) varied. However, in general they (including those 
who did not consume these neighbouring cultures) did not have much difficulty in 
distinguishing a Korean drama from a Japanese one. When the interviewees 
delineated their perceptions of East Asian neighbours, they tended to talk more 
about differences than similarities between Taiwanese culture and neighbouring 
exemplars. As Iwabuchi (2002) points out, the interconnected “familiar difference 
and bizarre sameness are simultaneously articulated” (p. 15) in global cultural 
encounters. The interviewees reflexively perceived the “familiar differences” 
between Taiwan and neighbouring countries, while at the same time they 
comprehended geographical, ethnic and cultural proximity with these East Asian 
neighbours. This brings us the third issue which Chua (2004, 2008a) does not 
specifically address in his account of regional identity: the role of American culture 
in the shaping of East Asian identity.  
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The interviewees clearly specified each country/culture more frequently rather than 
using pan-regional terms such as “Asian” or “East Asian”. They neither used such 
terms when they specified the differences between several East Asian 
countries/cultures, nor did they use them when they generalised about the 
similarities between Taiwan and its East Asian others, or the similarities between 
two East Asian neighbours (e.g. Japan and Korea). It was mainly when the 
interviewees talked about American or other Western cultures that they used 
“Asian” or, in fewer cases, “East Asian”, to make generalised statements about 
multiple Asian countries.  
 
This is not to say that the interviewees did not have a sense of East Asian identity. 
Rather, it is to suggest that the term “East Asian” is more commonly used in 
academia and public discourses than in more mundane, everyday contexts. While 
the term “foreign” was usually employed to refer to something not Taiwanese, 
interviewees at times also used the phrase to refer exclusively to Western (mainly 
American) cultures, as if their Japanese and Korean counterparts were not foreign. 
This is a common slip of the tongue often found in general Taiwanese contexts. For 
instance, Nicole once said that her husband did not watch Korean and other (East) 
Asian dramas because “he feels unnatural whenever he sees Asian people acting. 
However, he likes foreign series, since he finds the performances of European and 
American actors are natural and authentic”. As such, the meaning of “foreign” and 
“European and American” became interchangeable. In these circumstances, 
Western cultures (especially American culture) were roughly conceptualised by my 
interviewees as entities – and opposite to Taiwanese and other East Asian cultures 
(see also Nicole’s comments in Section I and Ivy’s thoughts on dubbing in Section 
II). Thus, the interviewees’ encounters with American or other Western cultures in 
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effect encouraged them to conceive a certain sense of “sameness” (Iwabuchi, 2002) 
and “cultural proximity” (Straubhaar, 1991) with East Asian neighbours. It was in 
this regard that a sense of East Asian identity emerged.  
 
VIII. Concluding Remarks 
This chapter examined interviewees’ perceptions of foreign cultures and how these 
perceptions shaped their conceptions of Taiwanese culture and their identity as 
Taiwanese. As the empirical data demonstrated, the foreignness of source 
programmes was highly valued and expected by the interviewees in their viewing 
of foreign programmes. With the expectation of experiencing foreignness, the 
interviewees often preferred unofficial online platforms and sharing activities to 
local broadcast television because they were more likely to experience a range of 
foreignness that was lost or diluted in the domestication of local broadcast 
television (e.g. dubbing). As examined in Chapter 6, this was based on the same 
expectation that many interviewees who followed foreign broadcasting schedules 
to enhance their sense of coevalness with foreign countries exhibited. In such cases, 
the foreignness represented by both the content and the broadcast mode employed 
was maintained. The interviewees with a high proficiency in foreign languages and 
thus relying less on language domestication also turned out to be at an advantage 
regarding experiencing “rawer” foreignness in their consumption.  
 
As Morley and Robins (1995) argue that cultural or national identities are 
“constituted in and through their relations to one another” (p. 45), the interviewees’ 
consumption of Japanese, Korean and American programmes not only enhanced 
their identifications with these foreign others, but also in turn shaped their identities. 
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Through their identifications with foreign cultures, the interviewees’ senses of 
identity were proliferated, diversified, layered and hybridised. Such processes seem 
to be more likely to help interviewees to identify what kind of Taiwanese they were 
going to become, rather than directly threatening their (cultural and/or national) 
identity as Taiwanese.  
 
It is important, nevertheless, to note that local (Taiwanese) programmes and 
television networks seemed to gradually lose their importance in shaping the 
interviewees’ senses of identity – many interviewees were less likely to consume 
Taiwanese programmes and/or consume programmes in general via Taiwanese 
networks. The interviewees expected that their access to foreign media texts to be 
increasingly “deterritorialised” (Tomlinson, 1999). In many cases, such 
expectations were more likely to be fulfilled through online platforms than via local 
networks’ importing overseas programmes. Moreover, even if the access to foreign 
cultures is more deterritorialised, it does not necessarily mean that those foreign 
Others with which Taiwanese audiences identify, or search for coevalness with, will 
significantly increase. Both Chapters 6 and Chapter 7 have demonstrated that the 
foreign Others that acquired the cultural power to produce symbolic meanings 
appealing to Taiwan were largely limited to Japan, Korea and the US. The 
interviewees’ cross-border viewing, in this regard, was at the same time an 
experience of “reterritorialisation”, whereby the interviewees’ identifications 
seemed to be increasingly connected to Japanese, Korean and American cultural 
contexts.  
 
In terms of China, on the one hand, online sharing services based there bridged the 
language gap with foreign content, and distributed a significant number of both 
312 
 
fansubbed and unsubbed copyrighted foreign programmes unavailable elsewhere. 
Interviewees, alongside their Taiwanese (and other Chinese-speaking) fellowmen, 
more or less relied on these China-based services to consume foreign programmes. 
In other words, China-based services played an important role in “reterritorialising” 
interviewees’ viewing of programmes from Japanese, Korean and the US as well as 
their identification with these three cultures.  
On the other hand, as a country, China’s denial of Taiwan’s legitimacy and its 
increasing influence on the economy and culture of Taiwan makes China both an 
urgent and long-term threat. These cultural and geopolitical conditions turned out 
to foreground the Otherness of China (represented by China-based online platforms 
and services) in the interviewees’ online consumption of foreign TV. Some 
interviewees tried to reduce their reliance on Chinese platforms; some other 
interviewees regarded these Chinese platforms as part of their tactics (Certeau, 
1984) to access foreign programs, while arguing that they resisted the cultural and 
political ideologies and threats of China they felt in their everyday lives. These 
practices indicate how China was perceived as a foreign Other that threatened 
Taiwanese society on a range of cultural and political issues. 
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Chapter 8: Conclusion 
I. Review and Summary 
This study examined the implications of the consumption of foreign TV via online 
sharing for television’s role in everyday life and the configuration of transnational 
cultural power relationships. My overall concern was to understand how this 
emerging form of television experience “re-cast the organization of the spatial and 
temporal scenes of social life” (Barnett, 2004, p. 59). As Moores (1993b) argues, if 
media can “‘transport’ viewers and listeners to previously distant or unknown sites, 
meditating between private and public domains, we need to specify the kind of 
‘journeys’ that are made” (p. 366). Questions such as “who chooses to go where, 
with whom and why […] what different sorts of identification are on offer” (p. 366) 
are the crucial dimensions in such mediated, symbolic journeys. Viewing the 
Taiwanese audiences’ various forms of online consumption of foreign programmes 
from the perspective of these journeys, this study looked specifically at how such 
consumption was concerned with the following three issues:  
 
1. Television’s role in social togetherness in the post-work, narrowcasting context.  
2. The way foreign broadcasting has functioned as an important temporal 
framework in Taiwanese audiences’ daily lives. 
3. The audiences’ identifications with themselves and foreign cultures and how 
such identifications are associated with the cultural power relationships 
between Taiwan, Japan, Korea and the US. 
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The remainder of this first section summarises the key findings in relation to the 
above three issues. The second section in turn discusses how the consumption of 
foreign TV via online sharing, as a practice crossing temporal, spatial, and cultural 
boundaries, are structured by the specific conditions of the “power-geometry” of 
time-space compression (Massey, 1994). The last section discusses the limitation of 
this study and suggests directions for future research. By paying attention to “the 
media’s temporal and spatial organisation” (Moores, 1995, p. 329) in any account 
of the online consumption of foreign TV, this study has articulated the various roles 
television, both as a technological and cultural form, plays in media convergence 
and given an increasingly globalised context.  
 
i. Television’s Role in Social Togetherness in the Narrowcasting Context 
Chapter 5 examined how television’s role in constructing social togetherness has 
changed in the post-network context, by analysing the way in which interviewees 
personalised as well as socialised their online and offline television viewing. 
Interview findings demonstrate that most respondents preferred online platforms to 
broadcast television as they believed online platforms gave them much greater 
freedom to orchestrate their viewing. Nevertheless, it does not indicate that 
interviewees who enjoyed customised viewing no longer searched for a sense of 
togetherness with others in their consumption of television.   
 
Some interviewees noticed that their personalised, time-shifted online viewing 
might prevent them from experiencing “a public currency of newness” (Ellis, 2002, 
2007) as carried by broadcast television, and consequently they might become 
detached from society. Therefore, they tuned into broadcast television at times, 
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especially for live broadcasts of certain media events (e.g. a Taiwanese singing 
competition) on local networks, in order to gain a more rounded awareness of the 
social environment in which they lived. Moreover, by using online platforms, 
interviewees also achieved a sense of togetherness in two ways. First, the 
interviewees managed to connect to other people (acquaintances as well as 
strangers) with the same interests in foreign programmes by establishing identical 
online viewing patterns with these people. Second, some interviewees who had 
lived overseas found that consuming current, domestic programmes online helped 
them to reassociate with their home country and cultures when they were abroad. 
These are the practices through which the interviewees considered themselves to be 
connected to the general public.  
 
When personalised online viewing increasingly became a collective, shared 
television experience between interviewees and their fellow audiences, a sense of 
togetherness was also more likely to be achieved. The ‘for-anyone-as-someone 
structure’ with which media functioned in linking individuals and publics (Scannell, 
2000) was still in play in the online consumption of television. However, it is worth 
noting that the social, public dimension of online viewing was sometimes 
overshadowed by the on-demand features of online platforms and the interviewees’ 
understanding of a computer as a personal device. Consequently, interviewees 
might tend to regard their online viewing as personal, while overlooking the fact 
that their viewing was encouraged by a given social purpose (e.g. watching a 
certain programme because it generated discussions on the social media they 
visited). In this regard, the sense of togetherness attained in the online consumption 
of television might be at times weaker than that generated in the consumption of 
broadcasts.  
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ii. Television’s Changing Ontology and Its Relation to Coevalness   
Chapter 6 looked at the implications of online consumption of foreign TV for the 
audiences’ sense of coevalness (Fabian, 1983; Wilk, 1994) with foreign cultures. 
Coevalness is frequently employed by studies on transnational media and cultural 
flows to explain how people gauge their temporal distance with other cultures and 
countries. Nevertheless, little research articulates how television as a time-based 
medium (Scannell, 2009, p. 223) shapes audiences’ sense of temporality with 
foreign cultures/countries through its daily output and scheduling. Theoretical 
notions concerning television’s temporality, such as flow (R. Williams, 2003), 
currency (Ellis, 2002, 2007), and for-anyone-as-someone structure (Scannell, 2000, 
2014) are usually conceptualised within a given national context. However, when it 
comes to the online consumption of foreign programmes, what audiences look for 
is the flow and currency of broadcast television from foreign countries.  
 
This study, therefore, analysed the ways in which online platforms, local television 
and audiences endeavoured to shorten the temporal gap between the foreign 
broadcast (mainly from the US, Japan, and Korea) and local consumption, and 
articulated how temporalities of foreign broadcasting were implicated in the 
interviewees’ everyday lives as important temporal frameworks. It also employed 
theoretical notions regarding temporality of broadcasting in cross-cultural, 
transnational contexts of media consumption.  
 
The empirical analysis finds that various forms of online viewing platforms and 
services stored a large amount of content for audiences to choose from. They did 
indeed remediate television’s ontology from flow to on-demand database as 
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Bennett (2008a) argues. However, it is important to point out that many of these 
platforms also employed calendar-based structures in their operation. For instance, 
they often adopted a calendar template as an index guiding their users to find what 
and when to watch and/or download – a function very similar to traditional linear 
television schedules. Such practices, I argue, to a certain extent have recreated 
television’s ontology as both flow and a time-based medium.   
 
Specifically, unofficial and illegal online platforms/services closely followed the 
schedules of foreign broadcasts, and accordingly released the latest foreign 
programmes. As such, they formulated a form of television viewing that allowed 
audiences to experience the television flow and temporality of foreign broadcast 
television. Consuming the current foreign contents through online 
platforms/services in turn encouraged the interviewees to have a sense of living 
simultaneously in both local and foreign television temporalities. It is through this 
process that interviewees’ coevalness with foreign countries was achieved. The fact 
that such online platforms/services were increasingly employed by interviewees as 
their primary means of access to the most current output and schedules of foreign 
broadcasts challenges the role of local broadcasts (including those national and 
transnational broadcasters legally accessible in Taiwan) in shaping interviewees’ 
everyday lives. For many interviewees living in Taiwan and interested in foreign 
cultures, foreign broadcasts – as temporal frameworks – were as important as, or 
even more significant than, local broadcasts in structuring their viewing as well as 
their daily life patterns. 
 
On the one hand, a strong sense of coevalness with Japan, Korea and the US was 
demonstrated among the interviewees by the dissemination and consumption of 
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programmes from these three countries. On the other hand, a certain denial of 
coevalness regarding Thailand was reflected from the interviewees when it came to 
the distribution and consumption of Thai dramas. Coevalness is always concerned 
with those who we consider that we share temporality with. More specifically, as 
Fabian (1983) and Johansen (1997) suggest, it is a notion whereby we include and 
exclude foreign Others as “fellowmen”. The Taiwanese perception of temporality 
with Japan, Korea, the US and Thailand indicated that, having synchronous access 
to the latest foreign media and cultures did not guarantee that these foreign cultures 
would be the same societies that Taiwanese would identify with. Such inclusion 
and exclusion of foreign Others is associated with transnational cultural power 
relationships between different countries and cultures.  
Furthermore, as Chinese programmes were not as popular as programmes from 
Japan, Korea and the US, this study did not feature the way in which audiences 
consumed Chinese programmes. As a result, it was unable to account for whether 
or how Taiwanese audiences had a sense of coevalness with China through their 
consumption of Chinese programmes. However, as Chinese programmes appear to 
be gradually gaining popularity in recent years in Taiwan, future research should 
also examine their Taiwanese consumption. This may help in any analysis of how 
such consumption, along with the conflict between Taiwan and China regarding 
Taiwan’s sovereignty, might be influencing the way Taiwanese perceive their 
temporal distance with China.  
 
iii. Cultural Flows and the Formation of Identity  
Chapter 7 continued to investigate interviewees’ perceptions of foreign cultures 
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(mainly those of Japan, Korea, the US), and how such perceptions in turn shaped 
their conception and perception of Taiwanese culture and their identity as 
Taiwanese. The foreignness of source programmes was highly valued by the 
interviewees, and they often preferred unofficial online platforms to local broadcast 
television because the former meant that they were able to experience a range of 
foreignness which was lost or diluted in the domestication of local television (e.g. 
dubbing). In such cases, the foreignness represented by both the content and the 
mode of broadcasting was maintained. Those interviewees with a high proficiency 
in foreign languages and thus relying on less language help turned out to be at an 
advantage regarding experiencing “rawer” foreignness in their consumption.  
 
As demonstrated in the empirical data, those foreign Others that displayed cultural 
power that was able to produce symbolic meanings with which Taiwanese 
audiences identified were mostly limited to Japan, Korea and the US. The 
interviewees’ cross-border viewing was a simultaneous experience of 
“reterritorisation”, in which their identifications seemed to be increasingly 
connected to Japanese, Korean and American cultural contexts.  
 
In the 1990s when Japanese popular culture promptly gained popularity, media 
scholars such as Lee and Ho (2002, 2003), alongside the public discourses, were 
concerned to examine if young Taiwanese “Japanophiles” uncritically embraced 
everything from Japan to the extent that they would happily abandon their local 
identity in exchange for a Japanese one. This kind of inverstigation regarded 
audiences as passive victims whose cultural/national identity as Taiwanese was 
jeopardised by their consumption of Japanese popular culture. However, this view 
overlooked the fact that cultural and/or national identity is never a fixed essence in 
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the first place. As Hall (1989) argues, cultural identity is “a matter of ‘becoming’ as 
well as of ‘being’. […] Far from being eternally fixed in some essentialised past, 
[cultural identities] are subject to the continuous ‘play’ of history, cultural and 
power” (p. 70). Through the consumption of Japanese, Korean and American 
programmes, the interviewees made sense of their own cultures and foreign 
counterparts using bifocal, or even multiple viewpoints. The interviewees’ 
identities were proliferated, layered and hybridised. Such processes appeared to be 
more likely to help interviewees to identify “what kind of Taiwanese they were 
going to become” as I phrased it in Chapter 7, rather than directly threatening their 
(cultural and/or national) identity as Taiwanese.   
 
Drawing on the interview findings, this study also revised the idea of “East Asian 
identity” as conceptualised by Chua (2004, 2008a). Specifically, Chua’s 
conceptualisation focuses on how regional cultural encounters make East Asian 
identity imaginable, yet ignores the importance of American culture (and other 
Western cultures) in the construction of regional identity. However, a regional 
identity is formulated, not only through the encounters with regional neighbours, 
but also through encounters with the cultures of other regions. The interviewees 
had a rough sense of East Asian or Asian identity, but they rarely employed terms 
such as “East Asian” when they accounted for the similarities and differences 
between Taiwan and its neighbours. They were also more likely to detect and talk 
about the differences instead of similarities between Taiwanese culture and its East 
Asian counterparts. Even if increasing regional cultural exchanges and 
co-productions promote an idea of East Asian-ness with nationalities being 
suppressed as Chua suggests, it does not necessarily mean that audiences might 
overlook the differences between different East Asian locales. 
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When Chen (2010, p. 177) discusses the extent of the unconscious identification 
with the US in Taiwan, he points out that the word “foreign” is often used 
interchangeably with “America” (the United States). In a similar vein, terms such 
as “foreign”, “America”, “Europe-America” and “the West” were at times used 
interchangeably by my interviewees. In such cases, multiple Western cultures were 
roughly simplified as one single concept, “Western culture” or 
“European-American (US) Culture”, in contrast to Taiwanese and other (East) 
Asian cultures. When the West was seen as an entity, the similarities between 
Taiwan and its East Asian neighbours were at the same time implicated. It was in 
this way the interviewees’ sense of East Asian identity was articulated.  
 
As mentioned previously, the empirical data of this study was collected from 2007 
to 2014. During this period of time, the cultural presences of Japan and the US 
were both already deeply integrated as part of Taiwanese society to the extent that 
Taiwanese people seemed to be less likely to perceive their presence (either 
positively or negatively) as something “new” that needed to be talked about. By 
comparison, the cultural presence of Korea and China – as well as the cultural 
anxieties towards the cultural and national identities they triggered – were more 
commonly regarded as new and recent. It was more common to detect my 
interviewees’ attempts to make sense of what Korean and Chinese presences meant 
to them. The ways in which the interviewees discussed their dislike of Korean 
national characteristics, alongside their liking of Korean dramas or their love or 
hatred of Chinese fansubbing activities, can be regarded as examples of such 
attempts.  
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In the case of Korea, while Taiwanese seemed to be relatively used to the idea of 
seeing Japan and the US as the cultural loci for the project of modernity, Korea 
emerged as another more recent locus of modernity. The popularity of Korean 
popular culture was at its global peak during the time the empirical research was 
conducted. Moreover, Taiwan’s economy has heavily relied on its technology 
sector from the 1980s onward, when it first became a key exporter in the global 
high-tech market. However, Korean conglomerates (e.g. Samsung) have been 
expanding their global market share in this very market since the beginning of the 
21st century. These developments indicate Korea’s increasing cultural and 
economic power in the world system; and the similarities in the stage of 
development (in terms of economy, modernisation and industrialisation) achieved 
between Taiwan and Korea seemed to be challenged. Compared with the long-term 
American and Japanese influence on Taiwan (either positively or negatively), 
Korea’s growing cultural and economic competiveness seemed to be a more recent 
threat that had to be dealt with.  
 
In terms of China, its denial of Taiwan’s legitimacy, alongside its significantly 
growing influence on the Taiwanese as well as global economy and politics, makes 
China an increasingly urgent threat to be faced. Moreover, most Chinese-speaking 
regions, including Taiwan, heavily rely on Chinese online sharing activities which 
subtitle and distribute the foreign media texts unavailable elsewhere. These 
conditions inevitably foregrounded the cultural presence of China in the 
interviewees’ online viewing of foreign programmes. Some interviewees disliked 
China-based online platforms and sharing activities, or felt uncomfortable 
admitting their reliance on them. The main reason was because these online 
platforms and activities somehow reminded them of China’s denial of the 
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legitimacy of Taiwan and underlined the former’s increasing influence on 
Taiwanese society. Consequently, these interviewees also revealed their antagonism 
toward China as a foreign Other threatening their identities.  
 
II. Television in a Global and Digital Context: Border and Power 
Geometry 
i. The Implications of “Cross-border” 
The consumption of foreign TV via online sharing always involves the idea of 
“crossing borders”. Borders here refer to the conditions that may limit the extent a 
given media text is distributed and consumed across the globe. They include (but 
are not limited to): national borders; language barriers, time-gap between foreign 
broadcast and local consumption, international licensing agreements regarding 
media distribution, etc. This study has illustrated how Taiwanese audiences 
employed a range of practices (“tactics” in terms of Certeau, 1984) to transcend 
various borders to consume and make sense of foreign media texts and the 
implications of such practices for the notions of television, the formation of cultural 
identity and transnational cultural flows. How and to what extent an audience can 
cross borders in the online viewing of foreign TV is a concern shared by audiences 
around the world; yet what boundaries are encountered and how they are dealt with 
may vary. Given these concerns, it is imperative to keep examining the online 
consumption of foreign TV in different parts of the world if we are to account for 
the changing notions of television and transnational cultural power relationships in 
the global and post-network context. Therefore, I want to briefly illustrate how 
online viewing of television is imagined and how it is in play in other cultural 
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settings (e.g. English-speaking regions) before returning to the specific issues 
concerning online TV viewing in a Taiwanese (and East Asian) context.  
 
Emerging Internet-enabled TV viewing platforms and services often share a similar 
rhetoric in their marketing strategy: addressing their capacity to offer 
audiences/users with great viewing freedom in terms of time and space. They label 
themselves as on-demand, “pull” services/platforms in contrast to traditional 
broadcast television, a “push” medium that does not grant viewers much freedom. 
For instance, the satellite television provider Sky TV in the UK launched its online 
service in 2006. With its DVR and software, Sky TV now allows audiences to 
watch both live television and on-demand TV content on a wide range of devices 
(e.g. TV sets, smartphones, tablets, computers); and it brands its service as 
“whenever you want, wherever you are”. The US-based on-demand television 
platform Hulu (owned by NBC, ABC and FOX) launched its service in 2009 with 
the slogan “anywhere, anytime”. Likewise, the video streaming subscription 
service Netflix (launched in the US in 2007) proclaims its service as “watch TV 
shows & movies anytime, anywhere”.1 This kind of “anywhere, anytime” rhetoric 
is shared by other online TV viewing services across the world. In its dawn in the 
1990s, the Internet was often imagined as a primary driver of globalisation (Schulte, 
2013), through which “all were supposedly connected to all, without boundaries of 
time and space” (Wellman, 2011, p. 18). In the 2010s, online viewing services’ 
rhetoric still chimes with this sentiment.  
 
                                                 
1 Netflix launched its service in 2012 in the UK. The phrase it uses to promote its service is “watch 
TV programmes & films, anytime, anywhere”, which is nearly identical to its US counterpart.  
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Nevertheless, as the analysis of our empirical data shows, this “anytime, anywhere” 
rhetoric can be easily challenged when we examine it in the context of a 
transnational zone of consumption. Online viewing services as well as Internet 
Service Providers (ISPs) are still principally based on national borders. Under these 
conditions, audiences’ access to a given viewing platform is confined within the 
national territory where the service is based. In other words, by no mean can 
audiences literally consume the content on these viewing services “wherever they 
are”, unless they employ Virtual Private Network (VPN) or Doman Name System 
(DNS) to virtually alter their IP address and thereby space-shift (my coinage in 
Chapter 5) themselves to other national territories (see also Chp. 1, Sec. II). 
 
Schulte (2013) argues that the 2000s was “characterised by remapping physical and 
often national boundaries onto the internet” (p. 155). This development, she 
considers, “challenged late 1990s globalisation rhetoric, in which scholars expected 
that the nation would fade away and citizens would become netizens” (p. 155). 
Through the geo-blocking execution of online platforms, national boundaries are 
experienced and rearticulated in audiences’ various online practices (e.g. online 
viewing, shopping, social networking). As Morley (2000) points out, while the 
Internet has been “lauded for its capacity to transcend geography, [it] turns out to 
have a very real geography which replicates and reinforces existing patterns of 
social, economic and cultural division” (p. 187). This contradiction between how 
the Internet is expected to be and how it actually functions is articulated when 
audiences look for “anytime, anywhere” viewing yet encounter geo-blocking.  
 
At the time of writing this study (2015), Netflix provides its service in over 20 
countries. The entry-level pricing is roughly the same in the US, the UK and 
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Australia (roughly £5-6 stg). However, the available content varies significantly. 
While over 8,000 titles are available in the US, only 3,000 and 1,500 titles are 
available in the UK and Australia respectively. Roughly 4,000 titles are available in 
Canada, where some major American channels are accessible via legal TV systems 
in many parts of the country. This condition encourages audiences in the UK, 
Australia and Canada, many of whom share the same language (i.e. English) with 
Americans, to use VPN or DNS to access US Netflix rather than consuming their 
localised versions. Moreover, the market research conducted by GlobalWebIndex 
indicates that more than 30 million Netflix users are based in countries where the 
service is unavailable without the employment of VPN or DNS. Among these users, 
more than 20 million are in China, where most of the population are not native 
speakers of English (Coletta, 2015; Hern, 2015).  
 
Meanwhile, on the one hand, Netflix has started to use measures to block VPN and 
DNS access. On the other hand, it also plans to overcome various legal and cultural 
restrictions to make its content the same around the world in the near future 
(Hooton, 2015; Roberts, 2015). It remains to be seen to what extent the Netflix 
service can be standardised across the globe, and how copyright holders, ISPs, 
national governments and audiences negotiate with each other in order to secure 
their own interests. Along with the growing worldwide popularity of online TV 
viewing, the conflict between audiences and services (whether legal or illegal) over 
geo-blocking is increasingly common. As Roberts (2015) argues, audiences’ VPN 
practices are testament to an “issue confronting media owners: the territory-based 
approach to selling movie and TV rights is harder than ever to maintain in digital 
world […] the role of borders is less obvious when it comes to the Internet”. What 
is at stake concerns who has more power over whom, who will shape the landscape 
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of online TV viewing, and how audiences can “make do” (Certeau, 1984) in this 
new context. Massey’s (1994) notion of “power-geometry” helps us to approach 
these issues more theoretically and I will explore this further in the next subsection. 
 
ii. Power Geometry of Online TV Viewing  
The empirical findings of this study regarding cultural flows and power 
relationships can shed light on Massey’s (1994) contention that the 
power-geometry of time-space compression concerns “power in relation to the 
flows and the movement” (p. 149). Massey argues that control over mobility is 
uneven. While there are social groups that are in charge of time-space compression 
(and thus are able to turn it to their advantage), there are also groups on its 
receiving end. Based on Massey’s notion, Morley (2000) underlines that if we 
regard “(voluntary) access to both physical mobility (transport) and information 
(via communication systems) as forms of cultural capital, then the question is that 
of the social distribution of access to these goods” (p. 196). He argues that access is 
structured by a whole range of social factors (e.g. class, gender, ethnicity), and 
unevenness of access can be seen not only between the First World and the Third 
World, but also within the First World. The ultimate issue, he notes, is “who has 
control – both over their connectivity, and over their capacity to withdraw and 
disconnect” (p. 199).  
 
In the case of Netflix, from the perspective of audiences, we can see how they 
might have different control over access (or connectivity) to the US service. For 
instance, in the US access to Netflix is often structured by factors such as economic 
capital and class. For audiences in the UK and Australia, whether they acquire 
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technical repertoire to bypass geo-blocking may be another important factor that 
influences their access to different versions of Netflix. In countries such as Taiwan 
and China, access to any version of Netflix may turn out to be heavily structured by 
audiences’ English language proficiency (cf. the relationship between my 
interviewees’ language proficiency, their cultural capital, and the role of this 
linguistic advantage in terms of their consumption of foreign TV via online 
sharing). On the side of the industry, the example of Netflix shows that the 
Hollywood industry (including major television networks, film studios, and other 
content providers) continues to play an important role in shaping the development 
of global mediascapes. How industries in other countries and regions are going to 
respond to this shaping in the globalising post-network era is a key issue that 
requires further attention. Furthermore, questions regarding transnational cultural 
power relationships – the key focus of this study – such as why audiences 
worldwide want to consume TV shows and films (made mainly by Hollywood) on 
Netflix, or how such consumption shapes audiences’ identities, remain issues that 
need to be investigated.  
 
In order to examine further the importance of power-geometry of the online 
consumption of foreign television and this study’s analysis of this phenomenon, I 
want to briefly reiterate this study’s findings. In her account of how Japanese 
animations are pirated and circulated in China, Pang (2009) argues that “the 
cultural hierarchy of production and reception in which Japan is centre is not 
challenged but is further promoted by these illegal practices” (p. 127). In a similar 
vein, in the Taiwanese consumption of foreign TV via unofficial and illegal online 
sharing, the cultural hierarchy of production and reception in which Korea, Japan 
and the US act as centres of production were also reinforced. Moreover, in terms of 
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distribution, in the 1990s and at the beginning of the 2000s, pirate disc companies 
based in Hong Kong and Taiwan served as the primary access to the latest Japanese 
(and other foreign) content in Chinese-speaking regions. However, in the age of 
online sharing, it is the China-based unofficial/illegal online platforms and services 
that have played a much more significant role in mediating transnational media and 
cultural flows and in forming implied cultural hierarchies of production and 
reception. Meanwhile, at this moment there are no Taiwan-based businesses (either 
legal or illegal) capable of competing (or indeed willing to do so) with China-based 
services over online foreign media distribution. 
 
These findings indicate Taiwan’s lack of influence regarding the development of 
transnational cultural flows in two respects. First, the Taiwanese media industry 
faced difficulties in exporting its contents to Korea, Japan and the US. Second, 
Taiwan-based businesses have lost their influence on (legally or illegally) 
mediating content distribution in Chinese-speaking regions. Consequently, it seems 
that Taiwan is increasingly located in a “peripheral” position in the 
power-geometry of the online transnational distribution and consumption of media 
content. 
 
Such conditions also influence the way in which Taiwanese audiences’ identities 
are constructed. As Massey and Jess (1995) argue, “the identities of both places and 
cultures […] have to be made. And they may be made in different, even conflicting, 
ways. And in all this, power will be central: […] the power […] to construct the 
dominant imaginative geography” (p. 232). Different countries will have different 
perceptions and definitions of East Asia based on their encounters and relationships 
with their regional neighbours.  
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It is true that increasingly intense regional cultural exchanges have promoted 
interconnectivities and cross-border dialogues (see Iwabuchi’s (2013) “inter-Asian 
referencing”) between East Asian cultures/countries. However, if regional cultural 
circulation and consumption is the key factor for the emergence of East Asian 
identities as Chua (2004) suggests, we have to consider who has the power to 
influence regional cultural flows and shape the imaginative geography of the region. 
On the one hand, with the success of Japan Fever and the Korean Wave, the two 
countries have delivered their own respective modernities that Taiwan and other 
East Asian and neighbouring countries have – at least to some extent – identified 
with. On the other hand, in the case of Taiwan, while the island’s media industry 
has entered Chinese-speaking regions and some South Asian countries (e.g. 
Indonesia), making its cultural products points of identification in these territories, 
it is not yet capable of doing so in locations such as Japan and Korea. It remains to 
be seen if other East Asian cultures are capable of having more influence on 
regional cultural flows and the formation of regional identities.  
 
III. Limitations of This Study and Suggestions for Future Studies 
This section outlines the limitations of this study and provides suggestions for 
future research. First, as described previously, the empirical data of this study was 
collected through two ways: 1) the observation of online discussions concerning 
online consumption of foreign TV was conducted from 2007-2014; and 2) in-depth 
interviews were carried out from August 2010 to the end of 2011. Due to time and 
budget constraints, I was unable to conduct additional interview rounds after 2012. 
However, I managed to keep in touch with one-third of the interviewees and gather 
some updated information concerning their viewing, and incorporated such 
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information into the empirical analysis. I also maintained a close and constant 
observation of public discussions concerning online viewing and the ongoing 
international growth of online sharing services and activities. These measures 
helped to ensure that the findings of this study remained timely and valid.  
 
Nevertheless, as discussed in the previous section, with the increasing worldwide 
popularity of online viewing of foreign shows, the legal, cultural and technological 
conditions governing such viewing changed accordingly. On the one hand, 
unofficial and illegal forms of online viewing continue to increase in number and 
diversity. On the other hand, legal businesses are gradually beginning to actively 
respond to worldwide audiences’ demand for transnational cross-border viewing. 
Except for Netflix, many television networks worldwide, including both public and 
commercial ones, are developing new forms of delivery in an attempt to extend 
their global reach and to fight against piracy.  
 
For instance, in January 2014, the third season of BBC’s Sherlock was legally 
released in China on the Chinese online streaming platform Youku a few hours 
after its debut in the UK. This was the show’s earliest overseas release – two weeks 
and three weeks ahead of its Taiwanese and US releases, respectively. This also 
marked the BBC’s first move to cooperate with a given Chinese online platform in 
terms of content distribution. While Youku enforced geo-blocking to Sherlock, 
many Taiwanese audiences also employed VPN to access the show along with 
audiences in China before the show was on air in Taiwan. In a similar vein, the 
Chinese online video platform iQIYI made a deal with the Korean network SBS to 
simulcast its hit drama My Love from the Star in February 2014. This marked the 
first overseas simulcast of a given Korean drama. In this case, no geo-blocking 
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measure was applied to iQIYI’s My Love from the Star, and thereby many 
audiences in Taiwan could access the show with ease. Both Sherlock and My Love 
from the Star gained further popularity after they were on air on Taiwanese 
channels weeks later.  
 
In April 2015, HBO simulcast the fifth season of its drama Game of Thrones in 
over 170 countries (including Taiwan), and it claimed to create a “global television 
event” each week of the show’s 10 episode run (Steinberg, 2015). The finale aired 
in June became the most-pirated episode worldwide, and attracted 1.5 million 
downloads in 8 hours, many of which were from the US, the UK and Canada 
(Russon, 2015). In Taiwan, many scenes that were considered inappropriate to be 
on air (e.g. violence, nudity) were cut. In China it was CCTV, the state-owned 
television broadcaster, who purchased the broadcast rights. While the illegal online 
access to the fansubbed version of the show can still be found, the fact that CCTV 
owned the rights inevitably made Game of Thrones relatively less accessible than 
many other shows (including other American shows and Japan and Korea 
counterparts).  
 
All instances mentioned above suggest the complexity of the shaping of 
cross-border viewing, with a large number of local and global sectors with their 
own economic, cultural and geopolitical concerns involved. For Taiwanese 
audiences who want to consume the unedited, subtitled foreign shows within the 
shortest time gap, they continue to negotiate with these complicated conditions. 
Further interviews that I might conduct with both existing respondents and new 
participants would scrutinise how such ongoing transnational developments are 
influencing Taiwanese audiences’ consumption of foreign TV, thereby shaping 
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notions of “watching television” as well as transnational cultural power 
relationships. 
 
There are also other issues that call for further investigation. As mentioned 
previously, in Taiwan (and other Chinese-speaking regions), the audience’s online 
access to foreign media texts relies deeply on fan-subbing and online sharing 
activities based in China. Nevertheless, the Chinese government has gradually 
tightened its copyright enforcement, especially over the last three years. Moreover, 
more and more Chinese platforms and services are legalising their services and, as 
a result, they are employing more complicated geo-blocking systems against IP 
addresses outside mainland China. How these changes, alongside China’s denial of 
Taiwan’s sovereignty, will affect audiences’ access to foreign cultures and their 
construction of identity remain one of the first and most urgent issues that requires 
further examination in the near future.  
 
Second, this study discussed how language proficiency, technical repertoire, and 
the experience of living overseas shaped the audiences’ consumption of foreign 
shows via online sharing. However, as most interviewees belonged to the middle 
class and lived in urban areas, this study did not have enough information to 
account for how class differences influenced Taiwanese audiences’ online 
consumption of foreign programmes. It is suggested that follow-up studies examine 
audiences’ online consumption of programmes, based on factors such as class, 
gender, age, etc. in order to understand more comprehensively the implications of 
such consumption for changing notions of television, transnational cultural flows, 
and other social aspects.   
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Third, while the online viewing of foreign shows has become an emerging norm of 
transnational and global television experience, we should keep looking at how 
consumption patterns are developing in different places and/or countries. Park and 
Kumar (2003) conceptualise “global television [as] part of the very social fabric 
that gives shape to us as individual subjects and imagined communities” (p. 3). 
Meyrowitz (2005) argues that “we now live in “glocalities”. Each glocality is 
unique in many ways, and yet each is also influenced by global trends and global 
consciousness” (p. 23). Online viewing of foreign programmes, as a type of 
cross-border, transnational cultural consumption, certainly shapes audiences’ 
experiences of glocalities. In this regard, the relevant and important questions to 
ask concern who we have connections with, in what glocalities are these based, and 
how we are influenced by such connections.  
 
Fourth, with regard to the configuration of power-geometry in online consumption 
of foreign TV, it is certainly not a ready-made, fixed product but an ongoing 
process associated with a range of local, transnational and global sectors. 
Specifically, the key concerns have to do with who acquires the economic and 
cultural power required to offer symbolic meanings and to whom the flows may be 
appealing. In the context of Taiwan, Japanese, Korean and American cultures are 
the most popular foreign cultures, and this study offered a general and current 
account of the Taiwanese consumption of, and identification with, these three 
cultures. It also suggested that the cultural hierarchy of production and reception in 
which Japan, Korea and the US as the centres of production was not challenged but 
reinforced. 
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Chen (2010) points out that US culture’s power “comes from its ability to insert 
itself into a geocolonial space as the imaginary figure of modernity, and as such, 
the natural object of identification from which the local people are to learn” (p. 
177). Based on the empirical findings of this study, the cultural power of the US as 
the imaginary figure of modernity does not seem to be changing soon in Taiwan. 
Mirrlees (2013) also argues that although currently there are a large number of 
“media capitals” (Curtin, 2003) across the world, the most influential examples are 
still located in the US. This is evident in HBO’s simulcast of Game of Thrones. As 
a live telecast of a particular fictional TV series, it is by far the most globalised 
exemplar. To what extent media capitals based in other countries can globalise the 
simulcasting of their media content, or how other cultures negotiate with the 
cultural power of the US in the age of online viewing, are critical issues to be 
looked at.  
 
Fifth, besides Japan, Korea and the US, are there still other cultures that may and 
become significant in the identifying process of Taiwanese audiences? While the 
latter opt for online platforms to consume American, Japanese or Korean shows, 
will foreign audiences from these countries do the same? While a significant 
number of Taiwanese audiences consider that they are living in the same 
temporality as Japanese, Koreans and Americans, what do these foreign audiences 
think of the temporal distance between the Taiwanese and themselves? Will 
Taiwanese culture constitute a significant foreign Other to these three countries, or 
to other places? These issues are beyond the scope of this study. However, it is 
imperative to examine them in the near future if we are to understand in greater 
depth the implications of cross-border online viewing for the configuration of 
transnational cultural flows and power relationships. 
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Finally, while this study focuses on TV viewing online, it is important to note that, 
other forms of media consumption also involve different cross-border conditions 
and are shaped by complicated configurations of power-geometry. For instance, 
geo-blocking has been widely used, not only by video viewing platforms, but also 
by a large number of Internet-based services (e.g. application stores for mobile 
devices, e-journals databases). Consequently – similar to the cases of online 
viewing – various means of space-shifting (e.g. VPNs) are also employed by users 
and audiences who intend to freely access geo-blocked services regardless of where 
they are. It is therefore important to investigate how different forms of cross-border 
consumption emerge, how they may be structured, and by what kinds of power 
geography, as such investigations help us to understand the way the media function 
in the deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation of our everyday life. 
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Appendix 1: Outline of the Interviews   
 
1. The media devices/equipment deployed and their use contexts 
 What kinds of audio-visual media devices/equipment (e.g. PCs, TVs, DVD 
players) do you have, in the place in which you live?    
 Do you use these media devices/equipment with others? If so, please 
describe how they are being used.  
2. TV viewing patterns 
 What kinds of TV shows do you watch on a regular basis? 
 Can you briefly introduce your viewing histories of foreign TV shows (e.g. 
Japanese drama, American series, Japanese animations, Korean dramas) 
 Please list one or two of your favorite foreign shows, and explain why you 
like them. 
 Based on your viewing history, please briefly compare with and talk about 
the similarities and differences between shows from different countries. For 
example, what do you think about the differences and similarities between 
Taiwanese, Japanese, and Korean dramas, and American TV series?  
3. Consumption patterns of other media forms 
 Apart from watching TV, what kinds of media materials (e.g. music, books, 
comic, movies, etc.) do you consume on a regular basis?   
 How do you consume these materials (e.g. buying CDs/movie tickets, DVD 
rentals, downloading)? 
4. Ways used to consume foreign TV shows  
 Based on your knowledge, please introduce the ways/platforms allowing 
you to watch the foreign shows you like. Of the ways that you know, which 
is (are) the one (ones) you usually apply? 
 How are you aware of these ways of consuming? 
 How long have you applied these ways to consume foreign (and local) TV 
shows? 
 Please describe how you use these ways to watch foreign shows, taking one 
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or two of your favorite shows as examples. 
 
5. The differences and similarities between traditional TV watching and 
alternative TV watching 
 Will you use the same or different ways when you watch different kinds of 
genres? If yes, then how and why will you do so under different 
circumstances? 
 What are the main reasons for you to use P2P or other alternative ways to 
watch shows (e.g. foreign dramas)? 
 Do you think there is some influence on your life when you apply online 
methods to consume foreign shows (e.g. the change of media consumption 
patterns, a change in your understanding of a foreign county, etc.)? If yes, 
what are the most significant influences that TV watching via online 
sharing have on you?  
 
 
 Appendix 2: Interviewees’ backgrounds1	 	
Table: Interviewees’ backgrounds 
Category
Name 
Age Gen
der 
Marital 
Status 
Education Occupation Salary2 Residence  Notes 
1.Johnny 27 M Single MBA Project manager at a major 
car company   
Above 
average 
Taipei 
Lives with 
parents 
His family owns a 
company and is 
wealthy (according 
to his friends). 
2. Tim 27 M Single MBA 
BS in Engineering 
Engineer  Above 
average 
Tauyuan (North 
Taiwan) 
Lives by 
himself 
High technical 
skills 
3.Rachel 29-30 F Single MA in Marketing 
Management in the 
UK 
BA in Information 
Communication 
Website Designer/manager 
in a clinic 
Around/ 
above average
Taipei 
Lives with her 
sister 
She lived in the 
UK for around a 
year. 
                                                 
1  The interviewees are listed according to the chronological order in which their interviews took place.   
2  The average personal monthly salary in Taiwan in 2011 is NTD 45,462 (around £ 900 stg). See the official website of National Statistics, R.O.C 
http://www.stat.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=30679&ctNode=527 
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 Category
Name 
Age Gen
der 
Marital 
Status 
Education Occupation Salary2 Residence  Notes 
4. Peter 30 M Single BA Administrator/Manager in 
business 
Around/Abov
e average 
Taipei. 
Lives with 
parents 
His family is 
wealthy.  
He travels overseas 
a lot.  
5. Cheryl 29 W Single BS in Engineering Engineer in a private 
company 
Around 
average 
Taipei 
Lives with 
parents 
High technical 
skills 
6. Ben 34 M Single Vocational School Cook and owner of a diner. 
Used to be work in video 
retailing 
Unknown  Taipei 
Lives with 
parents 
His family ran a 
business in VCR 
retailing.  
7. Adam 26 M Single BA in Japanese Staff in a business hotel Around/ 
below average
Shinchu (North 
Taiwan) 
Lives with his 
mother 
His parents 
divorced when he 
was young. 
8. Vivian 23 F Single MA in Media in the 
UK 
BA in English 
Student  Civil servant  Around 
average 
Taichung 
Kaohsiung 
(Central and 
South Taiwan) 
Lives by herself 
in hall 
She lived in 
London for a year. 
Her family owns a 
factory in 
manufactory.  
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 Category
Name 
Age Gen
der 
Marital 
Status 
Education Occupation Salary2 Residence  Notes 
9.Steven 34 M Married PhD Candidate in 
Information 
Communication/Te
chnology in the US.
MA in Information 
Sociology 
BA in Psychology 
Graduate Student  (Student) Indianapolis, 
US 
 
He has been living 
in the US for 5 
years. 
High technical 
skills 
10. Helen 35 F Married. BA in Chinese 
Literature 
Housewife. 
Used to be a book editor 
before marriage  
No Indianapolis, 
US 
 
She has been living 
in the US for 5 
years. 
Married to Steven 
11. Claire 30 F Single BA in Information 
Management  
Unoccupied  Manager 
 
Around 
average 
Taipei 
Lives with 
parents 
Her father is an 
engineer and his 
mother is a tailor. 
12. Emma 19 F Single BS student in 
Forestry and 
Natural Resource 
BA student Student Yilan (North 
Taiwan) 
Lives by herself 
in hall /with 
parents 
Claire’s sister 
She lives in a 
university hall 
during semesters. 
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 Category
Name 
Age Gen
der 
Marital 
Status 
Education Occupation Salary2 Residence  Notes 
13. Ryan 34 M Married Vocational School Customer service in a major 
consumer electronic 
company 
Around/ 
above average
Taipei. 
Lives with his 
family (wife 
and two 
children) 
His family is 
wealthy and gave 
him financial 
support to buy his 
house. 
14. Dan 27 M Single BS in Engineering 
 
Engineer in a major 
consumer electronic 
company 
Around 
average 
Taipei. 
Lives with his 
father 
His mother passed 
away years ago. 
15 Mandy 27 F Single MA student in East 
Asian Studies 
Student Student Taipei. 
Lives with her 
boyfriend 
She is the youngest 
child in her family, 
with brothers and 
sisters who are 10 
years older. 
16. Sarah 21 F Single BA student in 
Communication 
Student Student Taipei. 
Lives by herself 
in hall/ with 
parents 
She lives in a 
university hall 
during semesters. 
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 Category
Name 
Age Gen
der 
Marital 
Status 
Education Occupation Salary2 Residence  Notes 
17. Sophie 26 F Single MA in Media, 
Communication 
and Tourism in 
Japan 
BA in Japanese 
Research assistant at a 
University  Civil servant 
Above 
average 
Taipei 
Lives with 
parents 
 
She lived in Japan 
for 2 years. 
18. Nicole 45 F Married BA in Education Teacher in elementary school Above 
average 
Taipei. 
Lives with her 
husband and 
son 
She has a son who 
is a teenager, about 
14 years old.  
Her husband is a 
Physics teacher in a 
cram school. 
19. Nancy 27 F Single PhD student in 
Psychology  
MBA  
PhD student Student Chiayi (South 
Taiwan). 
Lives by herself
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 Category
Name 
Age Gen
der 
Marital 
Status 
Education Occupation Salary2 Residence  Notes 
20. Alex 27 M Single  MBA 
BA in Management
Manager in the UK. 
Program Manager at a major 
company in the US 
Above 
average 
Oxford, UK 
Indianapolis, 
US 
Taipei 
Lives in a 
shared 
house/lives in 
hall 
He will get married 
in January 2013 
with Stella (Subject 
27). His father is a 
university 
professor. 
He has US 
citizenship. 
He lived in the US 
for more than 10 
years. 
21. Ann 41 F Married Vocational School Freelance 
architect/housewife  
Unstable 
(freelance) 
Keelung (North 
Taiwan) 
Lives with her 
husband and 
two children 
Her husband is also 
in the architecture 
business. 
22, Ken 27 M Single MA student in 
Journalism  
Student Student Taipei. 
Lives with 
parents 
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 Category
Name 
Age Gen
der 
Marital 
Status 
Education Occupation Salary2 Residence  Notes 
23. Gary 27 M Single MS in Mathematics
BS in Mathematics 
Teacher in High school Above 
average 
Taipei. 
Lives with his 
mother 
Joyce’s son. 
His father worked 
in the biggest 
Taiwanese telecom 
company, now 
retired. 
24 Joyce 56 F Married Vocational School Senior manager Above 
Average 
Taipei 
Lives with her 
son 
Gary’s mother 
25 Evan 26 M Single MA in Media in the 
UK 
BA in Television  
TV News Editor Around/ 
below average
Taipei. 
Lives with his 
aunt 
He lived in London 
for around a year. 
26. Jane 25 F Single MA in Television 
BA in English 
Freelancer/writer Unknown/ 
unstable 
(freelance) 
Shinchu (north 
Taiwan). 
Lives with her 
family 
She claimed that 
her family is not 
wealthy. 
27. Stella 33 F Single MA in 
Management 
Office employee Above 
average 
New Jersey, US.
Lives in a 
shared house 
She has been living 
in the US for 6 
years 
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 Category
Name 
Age Gen
der 
Marital 
Status 
Education Occupation Salary2 Residence  Notes 
28. Will 31 M Single PhD student in 
Physics  
Graduate Student Student Taipei. 
Lives with 
parents 
He is taking a 
temporary break 
from his studies. 
29. Katie 32 F Single BA in English Office employee in a law 
firm 
Around 
average 
Taipei. 
Lives with her 
sister 
 
30 Jenny 28 F Single MA student in 
Media in the US 
BA in Japanese 
Graduate Student 
Office employee in a 
foundation  
Student New York 
Taipei 
Lives with 
parents 
She has been living 
in the US since 
Aug. 2012. 
She lived in Japan 
for a year. 
31.Ally 29 F Single BA in English English teacher in a cram 
school for children 
Around/ 
below average
Changhua 
(Central 
Taiwan). 
Lives with 
parents 
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 Category
Name 
Age Gen
der 
Marital 
Status 
Education Occupation Salary2 Residence  Notes 
32. Fiona 16 F Single Student in High 
School 
Student Student Taipei. 
Lives with 
parents 
She is an only 
child. 
Her parents are 
very interested in 
Japanese culture. 
She often travels to 
Japan.  
33 Jeff 35-40 M Married BA in Education Teacher in elementary school Above 
average 
Taipei 
Lives with his 
wife 
He is very 
interested in 
consumer 
electronic products. 
34, Ross 33 M Single MA student in 
Sociology 
(unfinished) 
Teacher in elementary school 
Research assistant  
Around 
average 
Taipei. 
Lives by 
himself 
He took a 
temporary break 
from his study.  
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Name 
Age Gen
der 
Marital 
Status 
Education Occupation Salary2 Residence  Notes 
35 Ivy 31 F Single BA in Management 
in Japan 
Office employee in a branch 
of a major Japanese bank in 
Taiwan 
Around/ 
below average
Taipei. 
Lives by herself 
(her parents live 
nearby) 
 
 
She lived in 
Australia for 1 
year, Japan for 5 
years and she is 
moving to London, 
UK in Jan. 2013.  
Her family is 
wealthy and her 
father has his own 
business. 
36 Julia 28 F Single MA student in 
Asian studies in the 
UK (unfinished) 
BA in Journalism 
Marketing/PR manger in an 
art/entertainment agency 
Around/ 
below average
Taipei. 
Lives with 
parents 
She lived in the US 
for a year as an 
exchange student 
during her high 
school years. 
She lived in Japan 
and the UK for a 
year each 
respectively.  
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